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THE SLAVE SOUTH IN THE FAR WEST: 
CALIFORNIA, THE PACIFIC, AND PROSLAVERY VISIONS OF EMPIRE 
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This dissertation rests on a relatively simple premise: America’s road to disunion 
ran west, and unless we account for the transcontinental and trans-Pacific ambitions of 
slaveholders, our understanding of the nation’s bloodiest conflict will remain incomplete. 
Whereas a number of important works have explored southern imperialism within the 
Atlantic Basin, surprisingly little has been written on the far western dimension of 
proslavery expansion.  My work traces two interrelated initiatives – the southern 
campaign for a transcontinental railroad and the extension of a proslavery political order 
across the Far Southwest – in order to situate the struggle over slavery in a continental 
framework.  Beginning in the 1840s and continuing to the eve of the Civil War, southern 
expansionists pushed tirelessly for a railway that would run from slave country all the 
way to California. What one railroad booster called “the great slavery road” promised to 
draw the Far West and the slaveholding South into a political and commercial embrace, 
while simultaneously providing the plantation economy with direct access to the Pacific 
trade. The failure of American expansionists to construct a transcontinental railroad 
during the antebellum era has discouraged close scholarly scrutiny of this political 
movement. Yet through their efforts, southern railroaders triggered some of the fiercest 
	 xii 
sectional struggles of the era, and carried the contest over slavery far beyond the Atlantic 
world. The second part of this dissertation reconstructs local political contests in Utah, 
New Mexico, Arizona and California to highlight the long reach of proslavery interests. 
Never a majority in the region, southern-born leaders wielded an outsized influence 
within western legislatures, courtrooms, and newspaper offices to effectively transform 
the Southwest into a political appendage of the slave South. With the fracturing of the 
Union in 1861, the project of southern expansion moved to the battlefields of a 
continental civil war, with several initially successful Confederate invasions of New 
Mexico. Even as the rebellion collapsed across the South, Confederate leaders continued 
to look west, authorizing yet another invasion of the region as late as the spring of 1865.  
The proslavery dream of a western empire almost outlived slavery itself.     
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	 1 
Introduction 
WEST OF SLAVERY 
 
Over two-thousand miles from the rebellion’s heartland in South Carolina, a 
group of white settlers in Mesilla, New Mexico hosted a secession convention of their 
own. This was March 1861, at which point only six other slave states had followed South 
Carolina out of the Union.  Despite the abundant risks, and the rather limited support that 
the rebellion had mustered thus far, the New Mexican delegates unanimously agreed: 
they too would break from the Union and form the Confederate territory of Arizona.1  In 
the one-sided debate leading up to this resolution, the fire-eating General W. Claude 
Jones celebrated the common bonds that united South and West.  “Our destiny is linked 
with the South,” he argued. “Her memory of the past, her principles, her interests, her 
present glory, her hopes of the future, are ours.”  The decision was a stark one for Jones 
and his fellow delegates in Mesilla.   “Northward, insult, wrong and oppression are 
frowning upon us,” he thunderedlth.  “Southward a brilliant and glorious pathway of 
hope, leads to the star of empire.”2  South Carolina’s hotspur, William Lowdes Yancy, 
could have hardly said it better himself. 
																																																						
1 Up until this point, Arizona did not exist as a separate territory – despite the best efforts of many of its 
residents. And unlike the state of Arizona, which sits directly to the west of New Mexico, the Confederate 
territory of Arizona occupied the southern portion of New Mexico. For histories of the region and the 
territorial purchase that brought it within U.S. borders, see; Paul Neff Garber, The Gadsden Treaty 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1923); William S Kiser, Turmoil on the Rio Grande: History of 
the Mesilla Valley, 1846-1865 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2011); and Howard R. Lamar, The Far 
Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966, revised 
edition, 2000), 361-376.  
2 Speech of General W. Claude Jones at the secessionist convention at Mesilla, March 16, 1861, in Mesilla 
Times, March 30, 1861. The issue also includes a report on a gathering of leading local citizens at Tucson 
on March 25, who likewise passed secessionist resolutions. My thanks to Sarah Allison, special collections 
librarian at New Mexico State University, for making available to me this scarce issue. For a biographical 
sketch of Jones and his longstanding campaign to separate the southern half of New Mexico as the territory 
	 2 
Why would settlers in a region with only a handful of slaves and thousands of 
miles from the plantations of the Deep South hitch their fortunes to a slaveholder’s 
fledgling rebellion?  The answer to that question requires a long view both of antebellum 
western history and of the geopolitics of slavery.  Arizona was not an anomaly in the 
West.  Rather its secessionist convention was an extreme manifestation of a proslavery 
ethos that had spread across the entire region prior to the Civil War.3  A fully-fledged 
slave system took root in neither California, Arizona, nor New Mexico, yet they all 
harbored influential partisans like W. Claude Jones, who gave western politics a strong 
southern flavor.  In turn, when expansionists in the South looked to the Trans-Mississippi 
West, they saw a field of imperial opportunity, a region that may or may not develop an 
economic dependency on chattel slavery, but would at least defend the political ideology 
upon which it rested.  Their ambition was to create a sphere of influence across the entire 
southern corridor of the continent – from the plantation districts of the Deep South, 
across Texas and New Mexico, and into California – and thereby bolster proslavery 
power at the national level.  When Jones spoke of the “vast interests” of the South, he had 
in mind these westward-facing slaveholders.  This dissertation explores their projects, 
from grand visions of empire, to the local initiatives which made that empire real. 
The analysis begins in the realm of imagination, with slaveholders’ bold designs 
for a Pacific railroad.  No western project generated greater interest in the South than this 
																																																						
of Arizona, see L. Boyd Finch, “William Claude Jones: The Charming Rogue Who Named Arizona,” 
Journal of Arizona History 31 (Winter 1990), 405–424.  
3 There is no firm scholarly consensus on what constitutes the “West,” not least because America’s western 
boundary shifted over time. This dissertation is concerned with the territories of the antebellum Desert 
West – Utah and New Mexico (including Arizona) – as well as the state of California. When the term “Far 
Southwest” is deployed in this study, it is meant to signify this region.       
	 3 
campaign for transcontinental communication.  At its helm were some of the great 
slaveholding luminaries of the antebellum period – including John C. Calhoun, Jefferson 
Davis, J.D.B. De Bow, James Gadsden, William McKendree Gwin, and Matthew 
Fontaine Maury.  Their aim was to construct a railroad that would run through slave 
country all the way to the shores of California.  What one railway booster called “the 
great slavery road” promised to draw the Far West and the plantation South into a 
political and commercial embrace, thus giving slaveholders a transcontinental landscape 
upon which to project their imperial fantasies.4  But more than just the American West 
was at stake.  This iron thoroughfare would also provide the plantation economy with a 
direct outlet to the Pacific trade, potentially rerouting Asia’s commerce through the slave 
South, and vice versa.  As a typical piece of railroad boosterism predicted, this highway 
would connect “the cotton planting and sugar growing States of the South” with “the 
West coast of this continent, with the Sandwich Islands, with the East Indies, with China, 
with Japan, with six hundred millions of people.”5  Slave-grown staples would thus 
circulate through a truly global market of commerce, a southern empire of trade that 
would link the emporia of Liverpool in one direction to the ports of Canton in the other. 
The grandiosity of these ambitions was matched only by the fervor with which 
southerners pursued the project.  From 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War, proslavery 
partisans schemed, lobbied, and petitioned for a Pacific railroad, bringing sectional 
																																																						
4 In a speech near Marshall, Texas, Thomas Jefferson Green, a Texas slaveholder-cum-California politician, 
trumpeted the southern transcontinental railroad: “This road is emphatically the Southern – yea, what the 
abolitionist truly calls the ‘great slavery road.’” The speech is excerpted in the Texas State Gazette, July 
29, 1854. 
5 Circular to the Citizens of the United States by the Memphis Convention Corresponding Committee; 
together with “Steam Navigation to China,” Matthew Fontaine Maury to T. Butler King, January 10, 1848 
(Memphis, no publisher: 1849), Library Company of Philadelphia, 3, 5.  
	 4 
tensions to a near breaking-point on several occasions.  Northern politicians and 
businessmen did not sit by idly as southerners campaigned for a railway through slave 
country, however.  Instead, they mounted an equally vigorous effort on behalf of 
alternative routes across free soil.6  The result was the longest-lived controversy of the 
period, one that predated, outlasted and triggered many others, including the Gadsden 
Purchase and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  As both sides recognized, the project would 
transform both national geopolitics and global trade. Whichever section won the railroad 
would command not only the political allegiances of the West, but also the commerce of 
the oceans beyond.  
 This railroad campaign ultimately amounted to what we might consider a 
monumental non-event.7   For all the political capital expended on its behalf and all the 
factional conflicts it generated, a Pacific railway was never constructed during the 
antebellum period.  Although sectional partisans lobbied up until the eve of the Civil 
War, with each passing year compromise over a transcontinental route became 
increasingly elusive.  Yet the so-called “great slavery road” was no mere pipe dream.  
The clarity of hindsight should not obscure the contingency of this historical moment.  
Slaveholders exercised a disproportionate influence at both the executive and 
																																																						
6 It should be noted here that there was no uniformity of opinion amongst the railroaders in either the North 
or the South. While an influential body of southerners, for instance, advocated for a line running from 
Memphis to San Diego, they were challenged by others in the slave states who preferred alternative termini 
for the would-be road, such as New Orleans. There were similar regional disputes amongst northern 
railroad promoters. For more on these internal divisions see Chapter 2; also David Michael Dunning, “The 
Southern Perception of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1845-1853” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, 1995); and for what William Freehling calls the “many Souths” see, Freehling, The 
Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (Oxford University Press, 1990) and The Road to 
Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
7 This formulation is a repurposing of Robert E. May’s characterization of the slaveholding bid for Cuba, 
what he calls “one of the major non-events of the antebellum period;” May, The Southern Dream of a 
Caribbean Empire (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1973, 2002), 186. 
	 5 
congressional levels, and they used that influence to advance their bold project for 
transcontinental communication.  On several occasions, they nearly secured legislation to 
commence construction to the Pacific, and in the process they articulated some of the 
most sweeping imperial visions of the era.  This study, then, takes seriously these foiled 
ambitions and failed dreams of empire, as the blueprints for an America that very nearly 
could have been.    
It also assesses their ancillary projects, which in and of themselves transformed 
the nation’s geopolitical alignments.  Southern expansionists scored one of their great 
victories in 1853, when, at the insistence of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, the U.S. 
government dispatched the proslavery ultra, James Gadsden to Mexico.  His mission was 
to negotiate a purchase of Mexican territory over which a far southern transcontinental 
railroad could cross.  The resulting treaty, finalized in 1854, gained for the U.S. – and for 
slaveholders in particular – some 30,000 square miles of prime railroad real estate in the 
Mesilla Valley, in exchange for $10 million.8  Shortly thereafter, the federal government 
began an extensive series of surveys under the direction of Davis to determine the most 
favorable route for a Pacific railroad.  In his official report, Davis dismissed the northern 
options as unsuitable and formally endorsed a far southern route along the Gila River and 
through the newly acquired Mesilla Valley.9  Then, in 1857 a proslavery postmaster 
																																																						
8 For Gadsden’s dealings with Mexico, see William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United 
States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, 12 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 1932-1939) 9:134-69, 600-96. For Gadsden’s official instructions, which highlighted “the sole 
object… in desiring a change in the treaty line on this frontier – an eligible route for a rail-road,” see 
William L. Marcy to Gadsden, July 15, 1853, in David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International 
Acts of the United States of America, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-
1948), 6: 342-347.  
9 Jefferson Davis, Report of the Secretary of War on the Several Pacific Railroad Expeditions (Washington: 
A O.P. Nicholson, 1855). 
	 6 
general used Davis’s report to override northern congressional opposition and authorize 
the construction of the nation’s first overland mail road across this far southern route.10  
Along this highway, southern migrants carried westward their goods, their families, and 
most significantly their political loyalties. 
 Slaveholders never built their transcontinental railway, but in developing these 
ancillary projects, they helped achieve one of the road’s primary aims: to extend the 
southern political orbit across the Far West.  The next section of this study picks up here, 
thus shifting the analytical frame from South to West, and from grand imperial visions to 
the local political struggles which gave shape to that empire.  It was the free state of 
California, paradoxically, that became the lynchpin in the project for a continental South.  
With little regard for the state’s free-soil constitution, southern-born politicians quickly 
seized the reins of power in California, and over the next decade, steered its political 
course along a distinctly proslavery path.  They did so through a well-oiled political 
machine that marginalized the antislavery opposition and packed the state’s federal posts 
with proslavery loyalists.  Through the statehouse and the courtrooms, they opened legal 
loopholes for California’s small, but not insignificant slaveholding population, and 
imperiled the liberties of African Americans in the West.  They also consistently 
controlled the state’s congressional delegation – two Senate and two House seats – thus 
lending the South a valuable western ally in the national debate over slavery.  And on an 
almost annual basis, they attempted to split the state in half to make way, many 
																																																						
10 For the official justification for what the Chicago Tribune called “one of the greatest swindles ever 
perpetrated upon the country by the slave holders,” see Report of the Postmaster General, Congressional 
Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, appendix, 27-28. The Tribune is quoted in David Lavender, The American 
Heritage History of the Great West (New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1965). 
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presumed, for a slaveholding territory in southern California.  Never a majority within the 
state, southern-born leaders wielded an outsize influence to give to California a political 
complexion that more closely resembled Virginia than Vermont. 
 Likewise, in New Mexico, Arizona, and to a certain extent Utah, proslavery 
politicians punched well above their numerical weight.  In symbolic legislative acts, both 
Utah and New Mexico passed slave codes in 1852 and 1859, respectively.  Although 
territory housed more than a few dozen black slaves, the two codes nevertheless sent a 
powerful message to the rest of the nation: the political vision – if not the economic order 
– of the slave South would hold sway in the Far Southwest.  As Alexander M. Jackson, 
author of the latter slave code, exulted in a letter to Jefferson Davis, “This legislation 
perfected the title of the South to New Mexico.”11  Meanwhile in the southern portion of 
that territory, what residents referred to as Arizona, a territorial movement emerged that 
drew strength from slaveholders at the national level.  Populated primarily by Texas 
migrants and composed largely of Gadsden Purchase lands, the would-be territory of 
Arizona promised to southerners yet another ally in the slave extension controversy.  
Arizona never won its independent territorial status during the antebellum years, but 
when the secession movement rippled west, its residents were among the first to declare 
allegiance to the nascent Confederacy.  
 The project of southern expansion, carried out for well over a decade in 
Washington and across the West, now moved to the battlefields of a continental civil war.  
																																																						
11 Alexander Jackson to Jefferson Davis, February 17, 1861 in John P. Wilson, ed., When the Texans Came: 
Missing Records from the Civil War in the Southwest, 1861-1862 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 2001), 18. 
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And thus, what had been a purely political project could be pursued henceforward 
through the apparatus of a militarized state, as dreams of western empire merged into 
Confederate grand strategy.  It was precisely because of their earlier geopolitical victories 
across the Far Southwest that slaveholders were willing to wager so much during their 
rebellion.  Indeed, the first Confederate invasion of the war targeted New Mexico, where 
some of the staunchest western rebels were clustered.  Although rebel forces eventually 
failed in their primary objective – to blaze a pathway to the Pacific – they succeeded for a 
time in driving federal troops from much of the Southwest and in securing the 
Confederate territory of Arizona.  To be sure, the war was ultimately won and lost in the 
major military theaters of the East.  But the willingness of the Confederate high 
command to divert scarce men and materiel to New Mexico’s deserts speaks to the 
enduring hold of the Far West on the southern imperial imagination.  As the rebellion 
collapsed across the South, Confederate leaders continued to look west, authorizing yet 
another invasion of the region even as late as the spring of 1865.  The proslavery dream 
of a Pacific empire almost outlived slavery itself.     
*** 
 What can a dream that ultimately failed teach us about the nature of slavery, of 
the South, and of American empire?  This study does not conform to the standard 
narrative of slaveholding imperialism.  From Robert May to Walter Johnson, and a 
number of historians in between, scholars have pointed to the Caribbean as the theater of 
slavery’s restless empire.  The “All Mexico” movement to absorb an entire nation, 
William Walker’s invasions of Nicaragua, John A. Quitman’s numerous efforts to 
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conquer Cuba – these have come to epitomize the southern lust for expansion. 12  While 
not always focused explicitly on empire per se, recent scholarship has nuanced this 
portrait of the internationalist South, highlighting the less overtly violent side to the 
overseas dealings of slaveholders.  Michael O’Brien’s authoritative analysis on the 
intellectual world of the Old South, Brian Schoen’s study of the transatlantic career of 
southern cotton, and Matthew Karp’s work on the “foreign policy of slavery,” among 
others, have challenged the persistent caricature of the atavistic slaveholder.13  Instead 
their work foregrounds a slaveholding class that stood, in many ways, among the 
																																																						
12 Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of 
Florida, 1973, 2002). Despite his bold claims, Walter Johnson does not substantially alter the geography of 
slaveholding imperialism in River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 2013). For more on American filibustering throughout the Spanish speaking world, 
see Tom Chaffin, Fatal Glory: Narciso Lopez and the First Clandestine U.S. War against Cuba 
(Charlottesville, 1996); Robert May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995); May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); May, Slavery, Race, and Conquest in the Tropics: 
Lincoln, Douglas, and the Future of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For 
more on the simultaneous growth of southern slavery and American empire, see John Craig Hammond, 
“Slavery, Sovereignty, and Empires: North American Borderlands and the American Civil War, 1660-
1860,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4 (June 2014), pp. 264-298. 
13 Eugene D. Genovese famously explained the “pre-modern” and “feudal” tendencies of slaveholders in 
The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New York, 
1965). For more recent historians of the American South, Genovese has become something of a straw man. 
His scholarship is a good deal more nuanced and sophisticated than subsequent historians have recognized, 
however, and his arguments about the anti-capitalist nature of slavery still hold some water (as I argue in 
Chapter 2). James Oakes is perhaps most guilty of caricaturing Genovese’s earlier work; see Oakes, The 
Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York: Norton, 1982).   
For path-breaking works on the international reach of the Old South and its modernizing impulses, 
see Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal 
Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); 
Matthew J. Karp, “‘This Vast Southern Empire:’ The South and the Foreign Policy of Slavery, 1833-1861” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2011). See also, Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of 
Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill, 2000); Matthew Pratt Guterl, 
American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University, 2008); Laura Jarnagin, A Confluence of Transatlantic Networks: Elites, Capitalism, and 
Confederate Migration to Brazil (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama, 2008); Gerald Horne, The Deepest 
South: The United States, Brazil, and the African Slave Trade (New York: New York University Press, 
2007). For a treatment of the commercial savvy and forward thinking tendencies of slaveholders within a 
domestic context, see Aaron W. Marrs, Railroads in the Old South: Pursing Progress in a Slave Society 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
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vanguard of American modernizers.  Commercially-minded, transnationally-connected, 
and forward-thinking, antebellum southerners dictated a political vision for the nation 
that was firmly in step with global developments.  As the price of plantation staples 
soared across Atlantic markets and as unfree agricultural labor flourished throughout 
Europe’s empires, American southerners could claim, with some confidence, that history 
was on their side.14  The modernizing slaveholder was no contradiction in terms.     
Pioneering though they are, these works implicitly confine slaveholders’ horizons 
to the Atlantic Basin, when, in fact, southern visions of empire were truly global in 
scope.15  This study follows the slaveholding gaze westward to argue that, while planters 
operated primarily in an Atlantic world, they dreamed of a Pacific one.  Indeed, they took 
active, often bold steps in an attempt to extend their reach all the way to the ports of 
China.  As many at the time argued, trade with Asia was to be the cornerstone upon 
which a southern commercial empire would rest. “The Eastern World!” bellowed Judah 
Benjamin at a New Orleans convention in 1852. “Its commerce has been the bone of 
many a bloody contest.  Its commerce makes empires of the countries to which it flows, 
																																																						
14 Matthew Karp makes this point with particular clarity in “The World the Slaveholders Craved: 
Proslavery Internationalism in the 1850s,” in Andrew Shankman, ed., The World of the Revolutionary 
American Republic: Land, Labor, and the Conflict for a Continent (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
Numerous observers in the antebellum South touted the global ascendency of unfree labor and the triumph 
of slave-grown products. For one of the most robust arguments of this kind, see George Fitzhugh, 
Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters (Richmond, A. Morris, 1857); and James Henry Hammond’s 
famous “King Cotton” speech in Cong. Globe, 35th congress, 1st session (March 4, 1858), 959-962. 
15 The absence of the Pacific in Civil War-era historiography emerged as a theme in a panel with Brian 
Schoen and others at the Society for Civil War Historians in Chattanooga, TN this June. Their roundtable 
discussion, “The Transnational Perspective of the Civil War: Revolution, Nationalism, Separatism,” 
celebrated recent scholarship on Latin America and Europe, which has greatly enlarged the geographic 
scope of the American political crisis over slavery, while noting that the transnational turn in Civil War 
studies has yet to incorporate the Pacific world. Of all the aforementioned works, Karp’s is the only one to 
consider the Pacific dimension to proslavery foreign policy, primarily through an examination of southern 
efforts to shape the role of the Pacific squadron. 
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and when they are deprived of it they are empty bags, useless, valueless.”16  In this 
pursuit of transcontinental communication and trans-Pacific trade, southerners proved 
perfectly willing to hazard a precarious sectional balance.  For many slaveholders, this 
was an empire worth fighting for.  And for historians by extension, this is a political 
project worthy of closer scrutiny.    
Taking seriously this geopolitical vision requires a new, more capacious way of 
thinking about proslavery imperialism.  Such an empire depended not only on efforts to 
capture more territory for slavery, as historians have shown, but also on a less dramatic 
brand of political and commercial expansion.  A slaveholder’s empire, its champions 
recognized, could even cross free soil.  To be sure, slaveholders rarely overlooked an 
opportunity to enlarge the terrain open to plantation agriculture.  But they also sought 
political allies to enhance their national influence and commercial outlets to broaden their 
economic prospects. These latter objectives – driven more by coercion than conquest – 
reflected a distinctly imperial logic nonetheless.  In the decade before the Civil War, the 
proslavery push westward relied on territorial purchase from Mexico, the pacification of 
the Southwest’s powerful Indian tribes, and diplomatic pressure to open ports throughout 
the Pacific world.17  In many ways, the most successful slaveholding imperialists did not 
																																																						
16 Benjamin’s speech was printed in New Orleans Picayune (no date), and reprinted in the Arkansas Whig, 
22 January, 1852. 
17 This study interprets the project of southern commercial and political expansion as a fundamentally 
imperial venture. For works on American empire-building along the Mexican border, see Samuel Truett, 
Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008); Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011). Efforts to displace and pacify Native peoples in these southwestern 
borderlands required substantial military, economic, and diplomatic coercion. For studies on the enduring 
power of Indians in this region, see Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-
Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); and Peka Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Similarly, the American commercial presence in the Pacific 
world was predicated on coercion. This early history is traced in David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific 
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face southeast toward the Caribbean; they looked west toward the Pacific.  Whereas 
southern filibusters failed in their attempts to seize Cuba and held Nicaragua for just a 
few short and bloody years, slaveholders could claim more lasting victories in the West.  
There, territorial purchases and infrastructural projects buttressed a transcontinental 
sphere of proslavery influence and bolstered southern power at the national level.  For too 
long, a historiographic focus on episodes in the Atlantic Basin has distracted scholarly 
attention from these more enduring projects along the Pacific.18  Is it not telling that the 
Confederacy quickly abandoned its bid for Cuba, but launched several invasions to open 
a pathway to California’s ports? 
A Pacific orientation enlarges our perspective not only on slaveholding 
imperialism, but on the history of American empire more generally.  We now know, of 
course, that America’s empire did not sprout overnight with the U.S. victory over Spain 
in 1898, as an earlier generation of historians argued.19  Walter LaFeber and William 
Appleman Williams, among others, have backdated this “new” overseas empire to the 
																																																						
Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). For the violent 
history of American involvement in what were then known as the Sandwich Islands, see Gary Okihiro, 
Island Worlds: A History of Hawaii and the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
Perhaps America’s most baldly imperialistic effort in Asian markets was the forced opening of Japan’s 
ports in 1853; see George Feifer, Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American 
Imperialism in 1853 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2006). 
18 A western focus should not, however, lead us to dismiss these Atlantic interventions as errands into the 
wilderness or as geopolitically inconsequential.  The so-called southern dream of a Caribbean empire 
provided a perennial sticking point for sectional politics and no doubt hastened the nation’s spiral toward 
disunion.  Furthermore, plenty of western expansionists also nurtured Caribbean dreams of empire; see for 
instance, James Gadsden to Jefferson Davis, July 19, 1854, in Lynda Lasswell Crist, ed. The Papers of 
Jefferson Davis, Vol. 5, 1853-1855 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 5:78-79. 
19 A chapter in Samuel Flagg Bemis’s standard account of American foreign policy is titled “The Great 
Aberration of 1898;” Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1950), 
463. For a survey of scholarship on American imperialism, see Edward P. Crapol, “Coming to Terms with 
Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 
16 (1992), pp. 573-597. 
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Gilded Age and even to the Civil War.  American enterprise, Williams in particular 
argues, was the tail that wagged the dog, directing the state’s gaze across the Atlantic and 
Pacific in search of new commercial outlets, years before the conquest of Cuba and the 
Philippines.20  Yet the rich body of work on this subject often still divides the history of 
American empire into two distinct periods – one continental and antebellum, the other 
extraterritorial and postbellum.21  This distinction is misleading.  As the western 
expansionists of the antebellum era understood all too well, continental conquest and 
trans-Pacific empire fit hand-in-glove.  Indeed, they were part of the same project.  
California, therefore, was not to be the cul-de-sac of empire, but rather the beachhead for 
further conquests.  This is precisely what slaveholders had in mind when they looked 
westward.    
As the study moves from slaveholding visions of empire in the Pacific to local 
political struggles in the Far West, it contends with yet another body of scholarship: the 
political history of the sectional crisis and the Civil War era.  The recent Civil War 
																																																						
20 The seminal works to prompt this historiographic turn are Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1963, 1998); William 
Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of 
Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random House, 1969). In his most enduring 
work, Williams makes similar arguments, while extending his chronology forward in time; Williams, The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1959, 2009); see also his brief and 
provocative, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Past 
Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).    
21 Most surveys of American empire have adopted this misleading periodization, including, one of the 
better brief histories on the subject; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion 
(New York: Vintage, 2008). Several scholars have noted this temporal divide in the historiography of 
American empire. See for instance, Matthew J. Karp, “Slavery and American Sea Power: The Navalist 
Impulse in the Antebellum South,” Journal of Southern History 77 (May 2011), 289; and Paul A. Kramer, 
The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 10-11. For a rare and (often overlooked) challenge to this periodization, see 
Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion (Claremont, CA: 
Regina Books, 1983, reprint edition, first published 1955). The Graebner thesis received a reboot in Bruce 
Cumings’s sprawling account of the American push to the Pacific; Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: 
Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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sesquicentennial prompted a proliferation of highly original works, some of which 
pushed westward the geographic boundaries that have long circumscribed the scholarly 
scope of the conflict.  From Glorieta Pass to the San Juan Islands, we now know a great 
deal about military engagements and secessionist scares across the American West.22  Yet 
we understand far less about the deep-rooted imperial aims which set them in motion.23  
																																																						
22 It is somewhat surprising that historians have been so slow to extend the terrain of Civil War studies into 
the American West. After all, the effort unites two of the most popular and deeply researched fields in 
American historiography: the struggle over slavery and the nation’s continental conquests. Two new edited 
collections have dramatically increased the scholarly coverage of the subject; see Adam Arenson and 
Andrew R. Graybill, eds. Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States (University of California, 
2015); Virginia Scharff, ed., Empire and Liberty: The Civil War and the West (University of California 
Press, 2015); and the accompanying exhibit, “Empire and Liberty,” at the Autry Museum of the American 
West. For a geographically expansive reinterpretation of the Civil War era, see Steven Hahn, “Slave 
Emancipation, Indian Peoples and the Projects of a New American Nation-State,” The Journal of the Civil 
War Era 3 (Sept. 2013). For recent works from the perspective of St. Louis, Colorado, and California, 
respectively, see Adam Arensen, The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the Cultural Civil War 
(2011); Susan Schulten, “The Civil War and the Origins of the Colorado Territory,” Western Historical 
Quarterly 44 (spring 2013), pp. 21-46; and Glenna Matthews, The Golden State in the Civil War: Thomas 
Starr King, the Republican Party, and the Birth of Modern California (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). These works join several older monographs, primarily concerned with military operations in 
far western theaters. See, for instance Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1960); Roy C. Colton, The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984); Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., 
The Civil War in the American West (New York: Vintage, 1991); Donald S. Frazier, Blood and Treasure: 
Confederate Empire in the Southwest (College State: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); L. Boyd Finch, 
Confederate Pathway to the Pacific: Major Sherod Hunter and Arizona Territory, C.S.A. (Tucson: Arizona 
Historical Society, 1996); and Andrew E. Masich, , The Civil War in Arizona: The Story of the California 
Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). William F. Deverell has argued 
that this focus on the relatively minor military engagements in the region have distracted from the deeper 
meaning of the Civil War in the West. “Western historians look for the Civil War in the West in the wrong 
places,” Deverell wrote, “A skirmish here or there, a real battle in northern New Mexico, and that is 
supposedly the whole story;” Deverell, “Redemptive California? Re-thinking the Post-Civil War”, 
Rethinking History 11:1 (March 2007), 64. 
In an attempt to assess some of this recent historiography and suggest further avenues for research, 
several scholars (myself included) assembled a roundtable panel at the recent Society for Civil War 
Historians Conference, titled, “Go West, Young Historians! Expanding the Boundaries of Civil War 
Studies.” Several forthcoming works will, no doubt, further enrich our understanding of the Civil War-era 
West, including Megan Kate Nelson’s hefty Path of the Dead Man: How the West was Won – and Lost – 
during the American Civil War; Deverell’s To Bind Up the Nation’s Wounds: The American West in the 
Aftermath of the Civil War; and a special issue on the Civil War in the West from the Journal of the Civil 
War Era, guest-edited by Ari Kelman and with articles from Peka Hamalainen, Stacey Smith, Megan Kate 
Nelson, and myself.  
23 There have been a few exceptions, however. Megan Kate Nelson provides brief, but useful background 
on proslavery expansion in the Southwest in “Death in the Distance: Confederate Manifest Destiny and the 
Campaign for New Mexico, 1861-1862,” Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States, Arenson 
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Although historians frequently cite the westward expansion of slavery as the driving issue 
that led to the Civil War, only rarely do they look beyond Bleeding Kansas. The sectional 
crisis in the Far West remains lodged in a scholarly blind spot – a curious oversight given 
that historians have spilled more ink on the Civil War-era than any other period in 
American history.  The leading narratives of the sectional crisis suggest that California’s 
free soil constitution of 1849 effectively banished proslavery intrigue to the east of the 
Sierra Nevada or even the Rocky Mountains.  Similarly, other parts of the Far Southwest 
– including New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah – rarely figure in the political accounts of 
this period.24 
Although the Far West remains conspicuously absent from the dominant narrative 
of the sectional crisis, some regionally focused studies have illustrated how slavery 
spread beyond the confines of the plantation South.  Stacey Smith, for instance, has 
																																																						
and Graybill, eds.; as does Frazier in Blood and Treasure, Chapter 1. Oddly, however, Frazier focuses on 
an earlier period while glossing over proslavery imperialism during the formative final decade before the 
conflict. Such an oversight is reflective of the broader trend, in which the Compromise of 1850 marks the 
breaking point in proslavery western expansion.  
24 In important and prize-winning works on the Civil War-era, the Far West makes only a fleeting 
appearance, quickly receding from view upon the resolution of Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill. See, for 
instance, James M. McPherson’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine, 
1989); William Freehling’s magisterial two-volumes on the coming of the Civil War, The Road to 
Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (Oxford University Press, 1990) and The Road to Disunion: 
Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (Oxford University Press, 2008); and David M. Potter’s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1976). It should be noted, however, that Potter briefly covers the Pacific railroad 
debates as a prologue to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The absence of the Far West after 1850 is perhaps more 
surprising – given his title – in Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of 
Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997); see 
also Robert E. Bonner, Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). A number of historians have even gone so far as to argue 
that southerners’ expansionist aims on the Far West lay dormant throughout the 1850s; see William Earl 
Weeks, Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from Revolution to the Civil War (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861: A Study in 
Political Thought (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1930, 1990). Similarly, landmark surveys 
of western American history have given short shrift to the Civil War; see, for example, Richard White, 
“It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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argued persuasively that California’s ostensibly free soil gave rise to a number of unfree 
labor practices, from black chattel slavery, to Indian bound servitude, to Chinese sex 
trafficking.25  With a focus on Utah and New Mexico’s slave codes, several local 
historians have also tracked the development of proslavery policies in individual western 
territories during the 1850s.26  Often lacking a national framework, however, these studies 
generally lose sight of the broader issues that made the West’s antebellum politics so 
fractious in the first place.  Absent from most of these accounts are southern slaveholders 
themselves, who, through their actions at the federal level, turned the Far West into a 
sectional battleground.  In contrast, this study moves beyond the local and the regional to 
examine a political struggle that was, in fact, continental.  Facing west from slave country 
and east from gold country, we can recognize the political culture of California, New 
Mexico, and Arizona for what it truly was: the direct product of a southern imperial 
project.27  This was, in the words of one anxious Unionist on the eve of the Civil War, “a 
																																																						
25 Although largely overlooked by the major surveys of the period, California historians have, for decades, 
studied the influence of proslavery ideology and unfree labor within the state. The most sophisticated and 
important account is Stacey Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor, 
Emancipation and Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). My work is 
particularly indebted to Smith’s insights, her advice, and her generous sharing of sources. See also Rudolph 
M. Lapp, Blacks in Gold Rush California (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). The work that most 
successfully incorporates California’s political battles with national developments is Leonard Richard’s 
analytically-thin but content-rich, The California Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: 
Vintage, 2007).  
26 The work on proslavery politics in the Southwestern territories – some of it very good – is confined 
mostly to regional journals. See, for example, Mark J. Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula 
Blush? New Mexico Territory’s Unique Slave Code, 1859-1861,” New Mexico Historical Review 87: 2 
(spring 2012), pp. 209-242; Newell G. Bringhurst, “The Mormons and Slavery – A Closer Look,” Pacific 
Historical Review 50 (August 1981). The fullest account of these political struggles in New Mexico 
remains Loomis Morton Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861 (Philadelphia: 
Porcupine Press, 1976, reprint of 1944 edition). And for a rare work that incorporates the political history 
of the entire region, see Howard Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966, revised edition, 2000). As a survey with a broad 
geographic and temporal scope, however, Lamar’s history deals only briefly with the slavery question. 
27 This formulation is, of course, a riff on Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native 
History of Early America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). Like Richter’s work, this 
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grand scheme of intercommunication and territorial expansion more vast and complicated 
than was ever dreamed of by Napoleon Bonaparte in his palmiest days of pride and 
power.”28   
In contemporary scholarship, the trans-Mississippi remains, in many ways, a land 
apart.29  And yet, during the antebellum period, the line separating the slave South from 
the Far West was faint enough to be, at times, indistinguishable.  This study analyzes 
those regional interconnections to fix our attention on a proslavery agenda that bridged 
the southern corridor of the continent.  West of slavery, the American political landscape 
did not give way to free soil.  Instead, the plantation South faded into what we might 
consider the Desert South, a western borderland where African bondage existed only in 
isolated pockets, and yet the political ideology of slavery maintained a predominant 
																																																						
study illustrates how a geographic reorientation of traditional narratives can yield new and surprising 
histories. Unlike his book, however, this dissertation primarily follows the agents of empire, rather than 
those who resisted its incursions.  
28 William Need to Simon Cameron, September 27, 1861, Official Records of the War of the Rebellion 
(OR), Series I, Vol. L, Part I, 635-641. 
29 Arthur Quinn made this point explicitly with regard to California, arguing that the state is traditionally 
seen “as the great exception within American history, only incidentally involved in the history of the 
broader nation;” Arthur Quinn, The Rivals: William Gwin, David Broderick, and the Birth of California 
(New York: Crown, 1994), v. Patricia Nelson Limberick has argued that “Most American historians, 
including all the writers of college-level American history textbooks, have postponed their reckoning with 
the Western half of the nation;” All Over the Map: Rethinking American Regions (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 96. See also, observations by Elliot West in The Contested Plains: 
Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (University Press of Kansas, 1998)), 11. In more recent 
years, historians have done much to bring the West into the national narrative, though there still remains 
much work to be done. The historians most successful at bridging South-West divide have focused, for 
obvious reasons, on the Texas borderlands and often in the context of American imperial history. See 
Andrew J. Torget, Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 
1800-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Sarah Rodriguez, “‘Children of the 
Great Mexican Family’: Anglo-American Immigration to Texas and the Making of the American Empire, 
1820-1861,” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2015); Randolph B. Campbell, An Empire for 
Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1991). Although her focus is on a later period, the geographically wide-ranging work of Hope McGrath has 
perhaps been most successful in tracing the linkages between the nineteenth-century South and West; see 
McGrath, “An Army of Working-Men: Military Labor and the Construction of American Empire, 1865-
1915” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2016).  
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position.  To look for the Old South in these unexpected places – far beyond the fifteen 
states that have historically defined the region – we gain a new perspective on American 
empire and the Civil War era.  Through infrastructural development and political 
scheming rather than outright conquest, slaveholders sought to extend their domain to the 
very shores of the Pacific, and in the process, ignited some of the fiercest political 
contests of the period.  Yet in their campaign to bind south and west, they ultimately 
fractured the nation, and their dream of Pacific empire crumbled along with their 
rebellion. 
*** 
Across six chapters, this dissertation explores both southern projects for Pacific 
empire and the political struggles that those projects sparked throughout the Far West.  
Chapter 1 follows the slaveholding gaze across the Pacific in the years prior to 1850 to 
illustrate how southerners pursued a far vaster empire of commerce than historians have 
yet recognized.  While individual Yankee traders plied Pacific waters, it was slaveholding 
politicians, by and large, who brought the American state within striking distance of 
Asia’s markets and, in the process, added a global dimension to the deepening sectional 
crisis.  In the decade that followed, as Chapter 2 illustrates, slaveholders intensified the 
race for transcontinental and trans-Pacific influence through a tireless railroad campaign.  
Rather than state-right purists or agrarian isolations, the slaveholders who pushed for a 
transcontinental railroad were shrewd expansionists and worldly businessmen who 
exploited all the resources within reach – technology, capital, and federal power – to 
extend the South’s geostrategic reach.  They ultimately failed in their railroad ambitions, 
	 19 
but through their corollary projects, slaveholders largely dictated federal policy within the 
Far West.    
The Compromise of 1850 may have rendered California free soil, but it did not 
blunt the western aspirations of slaveholders, contrary to what the standard narrative 
would have us believe.  Rather, as Chapter 3 argues, California’s admission to the Union 
as a free state paradoxically inaugurated a decade of proslavery control over that region.  
But California was just a piece – albeit a crucial one – to the puzzle of proslavery 
political dominion in the Far West.  In Chapter 4, the analysis moves to the neighboring 
territories of Utah and New Mexico (including Arizona) to examine how the politics of 
slavery infiltrated a region generally ignored by historians of the antebellum era.  As part 
of the first study to connect proslavery politics across the entire Southwest, these chapters 
pose a question that, only at first blush, appears self-evident: where did the slave South 
end and the Far West begin?  Generally studied in isolation, these two regions possess 
histories more deeply intertwined than the current scholarship allows. As Chapters 3 and 
4 argue, the South and West often made natural bedfellows, and together the leaders of 
these regions sought a new geopolitical alignment that would link the American slave 
system to both the Atlantic and Pacific worlds. 
Without this perspective on the political economy of the antebellum West, we 
cannot understand Confederate grand strategy during the war that followed.  Chapter 5 
argues that rebel war aims constituted the military continuation of this decades-old 
imperial project.  It also explores pro-Confederate agitation within the Far West, which 
transformed the region into what we might consider a vast border zone by 1861.  The 
conclusion of the conflict witnessed the collapse of both the plantation system and the 
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proslavery dream of Pacific empire, but, surprisingly, not the end of the South’s political 
influence within the Far West.  Chapter 6 examines the afterlife of pro-southern politics 
in California.  It argues that the racial reordering of the Reconstruction era drew some of 
its stiffest opposition from well beyond the former Confederacy.  California’s Democratic 
Party led a revolt against Reconstruction by linking the white supremacist anxieties of the 
state’s electorate to the ongoing political struggles of the South’s former rebels.  Like the 
dissertation as a whole, this final chapter applies a national framework to a political 
history that has often been described in narrowly regional terms.  In short, this study 
brings to light what contemporaries recognized but historians have largely failed to see: 
the struggle over slavery and its legacies played out on a truly continental stage.  
	 21 
Chapter 1 
THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A PACIFIC EMPIRE, 1607-1850 
 
When the first Jamestown colonists landed on the coast of Virginia in 1607, they 
were already dreaming of distant shores.  Although for years the colony struggled to feed 
itself as it clung to a narrow spit of land on the Atlantic seaboard, the Pacific exerted a 
powerful pull on the Virginian imagination.  Starving or not, the colonists would not 
ignore two main objectives as outlined by the Virginia Company: to find valuable 
materials for export, ideally gold, and to discover a route to the South Sea.  The latter, of 
course, had been the fantasy of Columbus as he sailed west from the Spanish port of 
Palos in 1492.  Now, with a beachhead on the North American mainland, the Jamestown 
colonists hoped to finally open a gateway to the lucrative China trade.  While their few 
early explorations yielded little – except for an appreciation of the continent’s vastness – 
subsequent generations would not be deterred.1  In 1668, as the colony achieved firmer 
footing, Governor Berkeley began preparations for a two-hundred-man expedition “to 
find out the East India sea,” as he wrote to Lord Arlington.  Unfortunately for Berkeley, 
heavy rains and a lack of royal patronage would scuttle this and a subsequent expedition.2  
But though the disappointments mounted, the dream never died.  If anything, the search 
																																																						
1 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, The Jamestown Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
150-158.  
2 Clarence Walworth Alvord and Lee Bidgood, The First Explorations of the Trans-Allegheny Region by 
the Virginians, 1650-1674 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1912), 60-62. For an original study of eighteenth-
century European imperialism and the Pacific slope see Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest 
for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). Mapp argues that the 
Seven Years War “arose, proceeded, and expired” (p. 3) in response to imperial ambitions on what is now 
the American Far West. European powers had only a hazy sense of this region’s geography, Mapp shows, 
yet they avidly sought to unlock its potential. His study is particularly useful in broadening the geographic 
terrain of early North American studies, which remains overwhelming Atlantic-centric.     
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for a Pacific outlet only became more urgent over the coming century and a half.  And 
Virginians – more specifically, slaveholding Virginians – continued to lead the way. 
 Scholars have characterized the early Eastern Pacific Ocean as something of a 
Yankee lake.  To be sure, it was primarily New England traders who plied the waters off 
the coast of California in the early nineteenth century, transforming the tallow and hide 
trade into a lucrative American enterprise.  Yet historians have been all too quick to write 
slaveholders out of this story.3  David Igler’s original and important account of the early 
Pacific world, for instance, uses South Carolina senator George McDuffie as a stand-in 
for slaveholding apathy towards Asian trade.4  But if some southerners cleaved to strict 
constructionism and agrarian parochialism to dismiss the search for Pacific commerce, 
they were largely out of step with the leading thinkers of their region.  For the first half of 
the nineteenth century, southern statesmen articulated and pursued a geopolitical agenda 
that set the United States on the path toward continental and Pacific empire.  America 
built that empire in three great lunges – the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas, 
and the seizure of New Mexico and California – and each of these was orchestrated by a 
slaveholding president. 
																																																						
3 Charles Sellers, for instance, credits “northeastern commercial men” with the nation’s drive toward Asian 
commerce and California’s ports; Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Sellers does, however, make note of John Tyler’s efforts to 
secure California from Mexico. 
4 David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 126. For an earlier account of Yankee influence in the Pacific world, see Samuel 
Eliot Morrison, “Boston Traders in the Hawaiian Islands, 1789-1823,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society 54 (October 1920), pp. 9-47. For one of the most complete studies of American trade in 
the Pacific during this period, see David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Involvement: American Economic 
Expansion across the Pacific, 1784-1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001). Tellingly, 
Pletcher deals very little with American slaveholders.  
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 By tracing this southern push toward the Pacific, we enlarge the perspective on 
both slaveholding imperialism and American empire, more generally.  Scholars have 
explored the ways in which antebellum southerners looked well beyond the confines of 
their plantations.  Indeed, slaveholders involved themselves intimately, these historians 
show, in the diplomatic, commercial, and military affairs of the Atlantic world.5  But the 
southern imperial imagination could never be confined to a single ocean basin.  While 
slaveholders lived in an Atlantic world, they dreamed of a Pacific one, and they took 
active steps to extend their influence well beyond the hemisphere.  From the explorers of 
the colonial era, to the policymakers of the early republic, to the thinkers and politicians 
of the antebellum period, southerners assumed a leading role in the American march to 
the Pacific.  By the 1840s, in particular, somewhat abstract hopes for trans-Pacific 
influence took more concrete form with the campaign for a transcontinental railroad 
																																																						
5 Southerners’ involvement in the Atlantic world took many forms. For bloody slaveholding incursions in 
the Caribbean, see Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire (Gainesville, Fla.: 
University Press of Florida, 1973, 2002); Robert E. May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); and Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and 
Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard, 2013). For slavery’s long commercial reach, see 
Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil 
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and Laura Jarnagin, A Confluence of Transatlantic 
Networks: Elites, Capitalism, and Confederate Migration to Brazil (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama, 
2008). For the flourishing of southern cultural and intellectual life in the Atlantic orbit, see Michael 
O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2010); and Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern 
Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 2008). For political 
accounts of the South’s Atlantic influence, see Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An 
Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery, completed and edited by Ward M. 
McAffee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Matthew J. Karp, “This Vast Southern Empire: 
The South and the Foreign Policy of Slavery, 1833-1861,” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 
2011). It should be noted again that Karp’s analysis is an exception, in that his early chapters assess the 
slaveholding interest in the Pacific slope as well. For more observations on the absence of the Pacific in 
American historiography generally, see Bruce Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy 
and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), introduction. 
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through slave country.  And in the process, southern expansionists transformed the 
Pacific coast into a sectional battleground. 
As with the scholarship on southern expansionism, the historiography of 
American antebellum empire is in need of a broader optic.  To be sure, historians no 
longer write of empire-building as a strictly European practice, as an older generation 
once did.  The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, once dismissed as an 
exception, now typifies an imperial nation-state that was at least decades in the making.6  
And yet, contemporary scholars still employ an often misleading distinction between 
“formal” and “informal” empires – the former describing the imperial quest for territorial 
aggrandizement, while the latter applies generally to commercial penetration and 
diplomatic coercion.7  These categories serve to divide the history of American empire 
into temporal halves.  The first phase features continental conquest during the antebellum 
																																																						
6 For this older American scholarship, see, for instance, Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the 
United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1850). American historians are not the only ones to downplay their 
nation’s deliberate imperialist policies. The English historian Sir John Robert Seeley famously wrote in 
1883, “We seem, as it were, to have conquered and people half the world in a fit of absence of mind;” 
Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1883, 2010), 8.  
7 In fact, the New Left historians most singularly responsible for overturning the previous exceptionalist 
model are guilty of an exceptionalism of a different sort. They conclusively challenged earlier scholarship 
that portrayed 1898 as an anomalous imperial moment in an otherwise unproblematic past, by instead 
highlighting the deep-seated motivations for these overseas conquests. For them, the restless nature of 
America’s economy and the relentless quest for more markets set the nation on this imperial path since at 
least the Civil War. But through their emphasis on commercial imperialism, they implicitly argued that 
America’s empire was distinct from European models. They suggested that, unlike the European powers, 
the U.S. avoided territorial entanglements whenever possible.  This narrative, however, overlooks the 
centuries-long conquest of the North American continent. Even during the postbellum period of which 
these New Left historians wrote, the United States was still engaged in a series of wars to wrest the last bits 
of land from the continent’s Native people. For the most important of these works see, Walter LaFeber, The 
New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 
1963, 1998); William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the 
Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random House, 1969). 
For the role of the U.S.-China trade in this so-called informal empire, see Thomas J. McCormick, China 
Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). Again, 
there has been far less written on the American ethos of commercial expansionism during the antebellum 
period. 
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period, followed by a campaign of commercial extension during the post-Civil War era.8  
As slaveholding expansionists recognized, however, these two modes of empire – formal 
and informal, territorial and commercial – were mutually constitutive.  By conquering the 
continent, the United States not only enlarged its territorial holdings; it also gained more 
direct access to a Pacific world of commerce.  In fact, for slaveholding presidents like 
James K. Polk, the driving motivation behind territorial conquest was the access that it 
provided to maritime outlets.  Antebellum imperialists never intended to stop short at the 
shores of California.9 
 
Slaveholders and the Continental Approach to a Pacific Empire   
Long before regional identities hardened into sectional rivalries, southern-born 
leaders articulated a vision of continental destiny and trans-Pacific influence.  Thomas 
Jefferson deserves pride of place as the president who turned national attention toward 
the other end of the continent – or in the words of Henry Nash Smith, “the intellectual 
																																																						
8 Even Paul Kramer, one of the most careful students of American empire, accepts the boundaries between 
antebellum and postbellum imperialisms. He describes a “first” continental empire and a “second, overseas 
commercial empire;” Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the 
Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 10-11. He does, however, provide a 
shrewd critique of this historiography, especially the work of New Left scholars like LaFeber and Williams, 
and draws attention to how the America’s colonial rule in the Philippines explicitly drew on European 
models. 
9 This is the central argument of Norman Graebner’s often overlooked work on antebellum American 
imperialism. “The determining factor that charted the course of the American nation across the continent to 
the Pacific was the pursuit of commercial empire,” he argues; Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in 
American Continental Expansion (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1983, reprint edition, first published 
1955). My work is heavily indebted to Graebner’s analysis, while extending well beyond his 1848 end 
point and stressing the sectional character of this westward movement. David Igler has also attempted to 
close this historiographic gap between America’s two empires. He argues that by the early nineteenth 
century, American vessels were becoming increasingly dominant in the Pacific trade, and thereby 
“anticipated and ultimately influenced [the United States’] geopolitical and military interests of the mid-
nineteenth century;” Igler, Great Ocean, 26. 
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father of the American advance to the Pacific.”10  Yet a decade before he used his 
executive power to dispatch Lewis and Clark on their journey to the mouth of the 
Columbia, Jefferson promoted the intended transcontinental exploration of the French 
botanist Andre Michaux.  Writing on behalf of the American Philosophical Society and 
fellow patrons of the project, the Virginian instructed Michaux on “the chief objects” of 
the exploration: “to find the shortest & most convenient route of communication between 
the US. & the Pacific ocean, within the temperate latitudes.”11  Diplomatic complications, 
however, ultimately scuttled the operation and Michaux never reached the Pacific coast – 
although he did win fame for his subsequent works on North American flora. 
The transcontinental pioneers were, of course, Captain Merriweather Lewis and 
his lieutenant, William Clark, who set out ten years after Michaux’s aborted expedition.  
Jefferson’s instructions to Lewis, though more detailed, repeated much of what had been 
previously directed to the French adventurer.  Lewis was to explore the waters of the 
Missouri in order to discover “the most direct & practicable water communication across 
this continent.”  As Jefferson envisioned it, this expedition was to provide a deeper 
understanding of the continent’s geography, and especially its waterways, in order to 
facilitate speedier access to the Pacific slope.  While Jefferson had stressed the scientific 
																																																						
10 Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1950, 1970), 15.  
11 Thomas Jefferson to Andre Michaux, January 23, 1793. Manuscript/Mixed Material. Retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib006813 (accessed May 10, 2016). Jefferson was also 
keenly interested in the animal history of the continent and instructed Michaux that “the Mammoth is 
particularly recommended to your enquiries, as it is also to learn whether the Lama, or Paca of Peru is 
found in those parts of this continent, or how far North they come.” Jefferson had devoted much of his 
Notes on the State of Virginia, published just several years earlier in 1785, to a study of North America’s 
fauna, and his instructions to Michaux clearly reflect this enduring interest. The book was largely a rebuttal 
to Francois Barbe-Marbois’s claims that the North American continent gave rise to a feebler variety of 
animal life compared to Europe’s specimens.  
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value of Michaux’s mission, his interests this time were more explicitly commercial.  
Lewis was to scout for furs along the Pacific coast, and most importantly, whether or not 
trade could be conducted along this transcontinental route “more beneficially than by the 
circumnavigation now practiced.”  Upon “your arrival on that coast,” Jefferson 
continued, “endeavor to learn if there be any port within your reach.”12  Indeed, 
communication with a Pacific port was a central objective of this mission, as it would 
provide a source of contact with other maritime powers in the region, as well as an outlet 
to the Asian trade beyond.  It was the lure of such outlets that would guide American (and 
Texan) policymakers through the coming decades. 
By the 1830s, developments in neighboring Mexico prompted U.S. leaders to 
think more expansively about their nation’s future growth.  President Andrew Jackson 
not only attempted to annex Texas to the United States after the 1836 rebellion there, but 
also to acquire a piece of the Pacific coast.13  He instructed his minister to Mexico, 
Anthony Butler, to enter negotiations in order to purchase the region surrounding the 
harbor of San Francisco.  In Jackson’s mind, this was “a most desirable place of resort of 
our numerous vessels engaged in the whaling business in the Pacific, far preferable to any 
																																																						
12 Thomas Jefferson to Merriweather Lewis, June 20, 1803, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Original 
Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1804-1806, 8 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 
1904-1905), 7:247-252. See also Thomas Jefferson to Meriwether Lewis, July 4, 1803, Manuscript/Mixed 
Material. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib012551. (Accessed May 
10, 2016). For more on Jefferson’s hopes for a “great, free and independent empire” on the Pacific coast, 
see Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2000), 118. 
13 In fact, Jackson had been lusting after Mexican territory since his earliest days in office. See, for instance, 
Andrew Jackson, “Notes for Instructions to Joel Roberts Poinsett,” August 13, 1829, The Papers of Andrew 
Jackson Digital Edition, Daniel Feller, editor. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015— 
http:rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JKSN-01-07-02-0267 [accessed August 3, 2016]. 
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to which they now have access.”14  Whaling may have been a primarily New England 
business venture, but slaveholding presidents like Jackson’s recognized its importance to 
the national economy.  At this point, expansion was a national endeavor, and projects for 
the Pacific were not yet colored by the controversy over slavery.  While Jackson’s 
successor, Martin Van Buren of New York did not pursue this diplomatic campaign for 
California, by the early 1840s John Tyler, yet another slaveholding executive and a 
Virginian, renewed the effort.  His ministers proposed a bold bargain to Great Britain, 
another nation with imperial designs on the Pacific.  Tyler and his ministers offered to 
cede American territorial claims in Oregon north of the Columbia river in exchange for 
British aid in securing California from Mexico.  The bargain failed, but not for lack of 
effort or creativity.15    
Conceived in conquest, the Republic of Texas continued an aggressive policy of 
territorial expansion until its annexation to the U.S. a decade later in 1846.  Like Andrew 
Jackson and John Tyler, the proslavery politicians of Texas set their sights on the ports of 
the Pacific.  “As a separated Power, the splendid harbours [sic] on the South Sea or 
Pacific Ocean, will be indispensable for us,” wrote the republic’s minister to the U.S., 
Memucan Hunt, in April 1838.  “The possession of the harbor of St. Francisco,” he 
																																																						
14 Quoted in Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, 70. Andrew Jackson is far better remembered for his 
conquest of Indian territories than his maritime ambitions, and few of his recent biographies have noted his 
broad Pacific vision; see, for example, W.H. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times (New York: 
Doubleday, 2005); and Jon Meacham, American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House (New York: 
Random House, 2008). Conversely, Daniel Walker Howe has characterized Jackson as aggressive in 
pursuit of overseas commerce and keenly interested in the Pacific; see Howe, What Hath God Wrought: 
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 363-364. 
15 For a brief treatment of these efforts, see John Mack Faragher, Eternity Street: Violence and Justice in 
Frontier Los Angeles (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 76; Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, 
70-72; Sellers, Market Revolution, 413. 
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continued, was alone worth the effort and expense required to seize the southwestern half 
of the continent.16  As Texans like General Thomas Jefferson Green boasted, their nation 
occupied a central position for the channeling of this Pacific commerce – a natural 
thoroughfare between the American slave states and the ports of California.  Soon, Green 
predicted, a series of railroads and canals would unite these two halves of the continent, 
via the Lone Star republic.17  The same year that Texas won its independence, the New 
Orleans Bee envisioned an even grander transcontinental network.  Within a decade, the 
Bee predicted, a railroad from New Orleans to California would be constructed, making 
the Gulf South one of the great commercial centers of the world.18  Here was the 
slaveholding vision of Pacific empire taking shape: the Deep South, Texas, the Pacific 
West, and Asia naturally invited commercial integration, and once achieved, would grant 
America’s slave economies a substantial share of global trade.  
Yet as Memucan Hunt and others recognized, Pacific ambitions could potentially 
set Texas on a collision course with the United States, whose leaders simultaneously 
																																																						
16 Memucan Hunt to Richard A. Irion, April 13, 1838, in George Pierce Garrison, ed., Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907-1908), 
Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 323-325. 
17 Green’s musings on transcontinental communication are from Green to Archer, December 26, 1836, in 
the Telegraph and Texas Register, September 16, 1837, cited in William Campbell Binkley, The 
Expansionist Movement in Texas, 1836-1850 (Berkeley: University of California, 1925), 23-24. See also 
Green’s comments on Texas’s geostrategic centrality in Thomas J[efferson] Green, Journal of the Texian 
Expedition against Mier (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1845), 412. 
18 The paper foresaw a grand contest for transcontinental communication and Asian trade fought between 
New Orleans and New York; New Orleans Bee, May 13, 1836, excerpted in the Richmond Enquirer, May 
27, 1836. Ultimately, New Orleans would lose out to Memphis as the favored eastern terminus of southern 
railroad promoters. Historians have traditionally dated the agitation for a southern transcontinental railroad 
to the U.S.-Mexico War, when America gained military control over California. See, for instance, Robert S. 
Cotterill, “Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad, 1845-1850,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 5 
(March 1919), 403. Even Robert Russel’s detailed account of the Pacific railroad debates gives scant 
attention to this pre-1846 history; Robert R. Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast 
as an Issue in American Politics, 1783-1864 (Cedar Rapids: Torch Press, 1948). Yet as the writings of 
Green and the Bee indicate, there was real interest in a southern route to the Pacific while California 
remained within Mexican borders. 
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maneuvered to claim ports like San Francisco.19   When the Congress of Texas passed a 
resolution extending the republic’s jurisdiction to the California coastline, Daniel 
Webster remarked that “Texas was too grasping and might excite the jealousy of other 
nations.”20  Texan expansionists would not, however, bow to the foreign policy objectives 
of the U.S. or to the legitimate territorial claims of Mexico.  On the contrary, Texan 
policymakers operated under the assumption that they could redraw the North American 
map with no input from their much larger neighbor to the south.  The republic’s leaders 
winked at (or even endorsed) several invasions of Mexican territory, including the failed 
1841 effort to seize New Mexico and the valuable Santa Fe trade.  Such defeats did little 
to dim the imperial horizons of Texans, however.  In his farewell message of December 
1844, President Sam Houston sounded a familiar note.  “If we remain an independent 
nation, our territory will be extensive – unlimited,” he proclaimed.  “The Pacific alone 
will bound the mighty march of our race and our empire.”21 
More American in outlook than some of his Texan colleagues, Thomas Jefferson 
Green nonetheless shared their far western preoccupations.  Both a politician and a 
soldier of fortune, Green chased various opportunities in a long public career that took 
him across the southern half of the continent and back again.  A brigadier general in the 
Texas revolutionary army and later a major general in the California militia, Green also 
served on the legislatures of North Carolina, Florida, California, and the Republic of 
																																																						
19 Again see Hunt to Irion, April 13, 1838, pp. 323-325, in Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
Republic of Texas, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 323-325. 
20 Webster’s comment is quoted in a letter from James Reily to Anson Jones, March 11, 1842, Garrison, 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 540-542. 
21 Quoted in Binkley, Expansionist Movement in Texas, 121. 
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Texas.  In 1842, he was appointed second in command of the so-called Mier expedition, a 
failed Texan raid into Mexican territory south of the Nueces River, that ended in the 
capture of the entire unit of over two hundred invaders – though Green and a number of 
others eventually escaped.  Rebuffed in one imperial venture, he soon set his sights on a 
far grander theater for expansion.  In his memoir of this ill-fated expedition, published in 
1845, he called for the seizure of Mexican California and the establishment of American 
control across this terrain, “the most desirable portion of this continent.”  The land 
between the 28th and 42nd parallels possessed “a soil and climate of unsurpassed capability 
for grazing and agriculture,” as well as mineral wealth “equal, if not superior, to any in 
the world”.  But perhaps more enticing were the natural harbors that dotted this long 
coastline – Guaymas, San Diego, San Gabriel, Monterey, and San Francisco, among 
others.  With an eye to America’s continued commercial expansion, Green argued, like 
Hunt and others, that “the port of San Francisco, or some other port in the south, is 
absolutely necessary.”22  
Texans like Green were hardly the only, or even the most prominent slaveholders 
to fantasize about the possibilities of California’s harbors.  The untapped potential of the 
Pacific coastline was a favorite topic of conversation for John C. Calhoun while in 
Washington in the early 1840s.  His musings left a strong impression on a young 
slaveholding congressman from Mississippi, William McKendree Gwin.  As Gwin 
recalled in his memoirs, Calhoun predicted that a future city on the bay of San Francisco 
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– which at that point constituted little more than a cluster of ramshackle buildings – “was 
destined to be the New York of the Pacific Coast.”  In fact, it would be “more supreme,” 
Calhoun claimed, as San Francisco “would have no such rivals as Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Baltimore.”  It was only a matter of time before American claimed that territory, he 
insisted, at which point the United States would control “the direct route of the great 
commerce of Asia.”23 Gwin and Green were clearly wooed by such promises of Pacific 
ascendency, as both politicians set out for California in 1849.  And once there, as we 
shall see, they promoted a distinctly proslavery vision of empire in the Far West. 
Calhoun, of course, remained in Washington and South Carolina, where he used 
his considerable influence to advocate a strong American position on the Pacific.  In an 
1843 debate over whether the United States should assert its exclusive right to Oregon 
and break its joint ownership with Britain, Calhoun again stressed the importance of 
Pacific harbors.  He cited the British victory in the Opium War as evidence that soon 
Japan’s ports would soon be opened to the West, as had China’s per the recently 
concluded terms of surrender.  America and Europe could then bid for the commerce of 
“the whole of that large portion of Asia, containing nearly half of the population and 
wealth of the globe,” he continued.  “No small portion” of this vast Asian commerce “is 
destined to pass through the ports of the Oregon Territory to the valley of the Mississippi, 
instead of taking the circuitous and long voyage round Cape Horn.”24  Pacific enterprise, 
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as Calhoun recognized, was an inherently imperial venture.  Indeed, the commercial 
empire, to which so many southerners and northerners alike appealed, was no misnomer.  
Expanded trade with China had been made possible through overwhelming military force 
– as it would be with Japan, as well – and America needed to maintain a position of 
geostrategic strength to claim its share of this wealth.25   
Calhoun’s views on Pacific outlets aligned with the general maritime agenda of 
some of the South’s most influential political thinkers.  As Matthew Karp has argued, the 
buildup of the antebellum American navy was overseen primarily by slaveholders and 
their allies.  In the final two decades before the Civil War, nine of the twelve secretaries 
of the navy hailed from slave states, while southern-born senators controlled the 
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Committee on Naval affairs for sixteen of those years.26  The Georgia planter Thomas 
Butler King held that committee chair for several years, during which time he became a 
particularly prominent proponent of naval expansion in the Pacific world.   From 1842 to 
1860, a Virginian, Matthew Fontaine Maury, served as the superintendent of the Depot of 
Charts and Instruments in Washington.  He would win international recognition as one of 
the nation’s most gifted cartographers, oceanographers, and champions of 
transcontinental communication and trans-Pacific commerce.27  Meanwhile, another 
Virginian, the slaveholding Thomas ap Catesby Jones, commanded the Pacific Squadron.  
With their emphasis on internal improvements for the South, global commerce, and 
American sea power, leaders like Maury and King typified the proslavery campaign for 
Pacific empire.  As the United States continued moving West, they would remain at the 
heart of this great project.  
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, slaveholders proved some of the 
most forceful promoters of an American empire on the Pacific.  To be sure, several 
northern policymakers, including Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams, matched 
them in their expansionist zeal.  And again, the merchants and sailors who conducted the 
face-to-face transactions throughout the Pacific world were overwhelmingly Yankee in 
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origin.  Yet scholars have overplayed the northern character of early America’s 
commercial development.  After all, the ports of the Pacific would have remained nothing 
but an American fantasy if not for the territorial advances made by slaveholding 
presidents – Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, Tyler’s annexation of Texas, and later 
Polk’s conquest of northwest Mexico.  Such additions, however, also enflamed the 
simmering controversy over slavery, and ensured that by the mid-1840s, the Pacific slope 
would assume the character of a sectional battleground.     
 
Railroading to Empire 
Few projects fueled sectional discord quite like the struggle to determine where 
America’s first transcontinental railroad should run.  Although expansionists like Thomas 
Jefferson Green and the editors of the New Orleans Bee had called attention to 
transcontinental communication since the 1830s, it was not until 1845 that the railroad 
became a major national issue.  Not coincidentally, that year also marked the beginning 
of a rapid acceleration in the Pacific trade due to the recently concluded Treaty of 
Wanghsia	between China and the U.S.28  From that point forward, Pacific empire became 
nearly synonymous with railroad development.  And American expansionists would 
increasingly divide over the question of slavery.    
The New York merchant Asa Whitney, recently returned from a two-year stint in 
China, was the first to bring the railroad to national prominence.  On January 28, 1845, 
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Whitney put forward a memorial to the House of Representatives, requesting the 
construction of a rail line from the Great Lakes into Oregon.29  A tireless promoter of this 
route, Whitney accrued significant support, but also powerful opposition, especially from 
proslavery railroaders, who saw the linking of the Great Lakes and the Pacific Coast as a 
death knell for southern commerce.  Although every “patriotic and thinking citizen” 
desires the accomplishment of a Pacific railroad, an anonymous contributor to the 
Charleston Courier wrote in January 1847, Whitney’s proposed route was entirely 
impractical.  Its shortcomings were clear and numerous, the writer added: not only would 
it be subject to inclement weather and far too northerly to benefit most of the nation, 
Whitney’s railroad was also intended to be a private enterprise.30  De Bow’s Review 
added to the criticism coming from southern presses, and soon the Baltimore American 
was the only paper in the region to stand by Whitney’s plan.31    
When Whitney first proposed the construction of a transcontinental railroad in 
1845 he did not anticipate the sectional strife that such a plan would provoke.  But 
conflict and debate went hand-in-hand with any project that promised such wealth to a 
given region.  Whitney’s memorial had barely reached the Capitol when a powerful 
coalition of southern railroad promoters emerged, refusing to stand idle as Whitney 
attempted to snatch Pacific commerce for northern cities.  Such feelings of sectional 
rivalry spurred James Gadsden to write to John C. Calhoun in October, 1845, urging the 
elder statesman’s attendance at the upcoming Memphis Convention.  He saw the 
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Convention as an opportunity to ally the western states with “the Great Commercial and 
Agricultural interests” of the South, rather than “the Tax gathering and Monopolizing 
interests of the North.”32  Gadsden insisted on viewing the West as a natural outgrowth of 
the South.  By linking the regions with “iron avenues,” he argued, they would achieve 
“Southern equality in… trade.”33  In pursuing this dream of trans-regional 
communication and southern commercial regeneration, Gadsden would become one of 
the leading antebellum railroad advocates on either side of the Mason-Dixon line. 
A common trope in the endorsement of any railroad scheme was a pledge of 
nationalism and a rhetorical renunciation of sectional impulses.  Railroaders, North and 
South, claimed to work for the common good, rather than for regional aggrandizement.  
Rarely, however, should we take such claims at face value.  After all, railroad promoters 
generally held strong local ties and regional agendas, and their transcontinental appeals 
could only target, and therefore enrich, very specific parts of the country.  Anyway, even 
those with truly national intentions would have been foiled by the state of antebellum 
American railroads.  The railroad system simply did not cohere.  Railroads at the time ran 
on over twenty different gauges, and while the 4 feet 8 ½ inch gauge accounted for 
roughly half the total mileage, most of the South ran on a five-foot gauge.  Anytime a 
gauge changed, freight had to be transported at considerable cost to the next train, 
sometimes miles away.34  Thus any cities on the main trunk of a transcontinental railroad 
would likely receive the lion’s share of the commerce, while cities linked by connecting 
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branches would have to content themselves with the scraps.  Despite all the claims to the 
contrary, transcontinental railroad debates were sectional matters.   
Such hollow claims of sectional disinterestedness were frequently marshaled by 
the delegates of the Memphis Convention of 1845, who gathered in November to 
promote communication between the Mississippi Valley and the Southeast.  In a frenzy 
of press coverage and general public enthusiasm, 580 delegates from sixteen states, 
including Calhoun as president, converged on Memphis.35  The vast majority, however, 
hailed from slave states.  Indeed, this was a convention of southerners, by southerners, 
and for southerners.  And nothing interested them as much as railroad construction.36  At 
stake was “commercial empire,” according to Gadsden, and while the construction of 
railway lines from Southeastern cities into Memphis was the first order of business, the 
Charlestonian could not refrain from advocating a route all the way to the shores of 
California.37  Others shared his Pacific aspirations.  Another delegate, for instance, 
eagerly looked forward to the day when a line would connect Charleston to California, 
and the “vast trade” of “Golden Carthy [sic] and the Orient Ind” would pour into 
American harbors.38  Calhoun, too, conservatively predicted that the U.S. would have a 
Pacific railroad within the next generation.39   
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The Memphis Convention gave southerners the opportunity to come together and 
articulate, as a powerful commercial and political bloc, an alternate vision to Whitney’s 
transcontinental proposal.  Of course, there was no perfect southern consensus.  New 
Orleans interests, for instance, viewed the gathering at Memphis as a threat to its 
stranglehold on the western trade, and they continued to favor river transportation over 
the promises of a transcontinental railroad.40  Yet the very presence of almost 600 
influential and like-minded leaders in the same place testifies to a growing coalition 
committed to the creation of a commercial empire oriented on a south-west axis, 
buttressed by railroads reaching all the way into California.  As historian Robert Cotterill 
noted, southern railroad promoters were more systematic and far-seeing than their 
Northern counterparts, keeping the prize of western commerce steadily within their 
sights.41  That California was a Mexican possession at this point seemed almost irrelevant 
to men like Gadsden.  The horizons of southern commercial expansionists stretched well 
beyond the borders of the nation.  
That year also marked the emergence of a powerful new voice in slaveholding 
expansionism and transcontinental communication.  James Dunwoody Brownson (J.D.B.) 
De Bow published the first issue of his Commercial Review of the South and West in New 
Orleans in January 1846.42  Although the periodical struggled financially at first, it would 
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soon become what De Bow’s biographer calls “the most recognizable journal in the 
antebellum South.”43   In monthly installments, De Bow and his corps of contributors 
articulated the platform of a modernizing South.  Here was a periodical that promoted 
railroad development, urban growth, and industrialization as a bulwark, rather than an 
impediment, for slave agriculture.  The Far West occupied a central place in De Bow’s 
plans for regional development, and as the sectional crisis intensified, so too did his 
interest in the commercial expansion of the South.44   Over the coming years he would 
establish himself as one of the most active chroniclers of southern railroad development 
and most vocal boosters of westward expansion.45 
The Pacific – and to a significant degree, the issue of a transcontinental railroad – 
was at the heart of America’s greatest imperial undertaking.  The U.S.-Mexican War 
added 1.2 million square miles of territory to the United States and secured, at long last, 
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the harbors of California for American commerce.  James K. Polk’s administration 
achieved through military force what previous slaveholding presidents, like Andrew 
Jackson and John Tyler, had attempted through diplomatic coercion.  From the very 
outset of the conflict, it was the deep-water harbors of California that most enticed the 
slaveholding president.  In fact, even before war had broken out, Polk’s secretary of the 
navy, George Bancroft, instructed the commander of the Pacific Squadron, John D. Sloat, 
to direct his attention to California’s ports. “If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico 
has declared war against the United States,” he wrote, “you will at once possess yourself 
of the port of San Francisco.”  That harbor, Bancroft later elaborated, was to be 
considered “the most important public object.”46  What made this harbor especially 
attractive, according to the former minister to Mexico, Waddy Thompson, was both its 
size and its proximity to timber.  “To say nothing of other harbors in California, that of 
San Francisco is capacious enough for the navies of the world,” Thompson, a South 
Carolinian, wrote in his 1846 memoir. “Its shores are covered with enough timber… to 
build those navies.”  If the U.S. hoped to enlarge its commerce with the Pacific – which 
Thompson valued at over $50 million annually – it required “a place of refuge for our 
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ships.”47  By 1848 Thompson’s fantasies had become reality.  The U.S. now had its 
empire on the Pacific. 
  To be sure, there were other inducements to the conquest of the Mexican 
northwest, especially in the eyes of slaveholders.  If Thompson’s descriptions were to be 
believed, California possessed an agricultural climate not unlike the plantation South. 
Although he did not comment on the possibility for slave labor in California, Thompson 
did note tellingly that southern staples like “sugar, rice, and cotton find there their own 
congenial climate.”48  In his highly critical account of the war, an anonymous army 
officer made more explicit the parallels between the slave South and the Far West.  “In 
California, Sonora, and New Mexico, as good wheat, corn, and tobacco can be raised as 
are produced in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, or Tennessee,” he wrote, “and as good 
cotton as Alabama or Mississippi can produce, may also be grown in California.”49  This 
would have certainly been welcome news to certain slaveholding expansionists.  But 
again, the central objective of the proslavery administration was not an increase in 
territory – as fertile as some of that soil may have been.  Instead, Polk and his ministers 
had their eyes set on a grander prize: a Pacific world of commerce. 
That much became clear during the treaty negotiations with Mexico in 1848, 
when the railroad question again came to the fore.  Although the U.S. did not go to war 
against Mexico for the express purpose of securing a suitable Pacific railroad route, 
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Polk’s government made transcontinental communication an important part of the peace 
process.  Unfortunately for southern railroad promoters, even with California secured, the 
favored route to San Diego still did not pass entirely within U.S. territory.  Proslavery 
railroaders, therefore, lusted after even more territory, or at least a right-of-way through 
Mexico.  With the Mexican military on the ropes, J.D.B. De Bow now saw no excuse to 
begin negotiations without the southern railroad in mind.  Securing rights of passage 
through Mexican territory should be a “sine qua non in our treaty with that republic,” he 
insisted.50  Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis hoped for more Mexican territory in order to 
“secure the railroad route to San Diego.”51  So too did Secretary of State James 
Buchanan.  In a letter to Nicholas Trist, then negotiating in Mexico, Buchanan urged the 
diplomat to secure the Gila valley along the 32nd parallel, which had been deemed prime 
real estate for railroad construction.52  Ultimately the U.S. would not win quite as much 
land as Buchanan or Davis had hoped, but Trist’s negotiations did secure a right-of-way 
for railroad development through northern Mexico.53 And as Jefferson Davis would learn 
several years later as secretary of war, this was not the last time southern railroad 
champions would turn their attentions to Mexico.54  
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With vast new holdings in the Far Southwest, the American map appeared more 
inviting than ever for southern railroaders.  Their movement attained a newfound 
coherence and visibility shortly after the war, largely due to a series of widely reprinted 
letters by Matthew Fontaine Maury, superintendent of the U.S. Naval Observatory and 
ardent champion of a southern transcontinental route.55  In a letter to Calhoun, dated 
March 29, 1848, Maury gave full latitude to his globetrotting imagination and prophesied 
a glorious future for the U.S. as the world’s undisputed commercial powerhouse – once 
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts were linked by rail.  “[C]ommercially speaking, our 
country is in the centre of the people of the earth, and occupies a position for trade and 
traffic with them which no nation that ever existed has held,” he exulted.  Mustering an 
impressive array of astronomical measurements to calculate the best route, Maury 
rebutted Whitney’s plan and concluded that the train should run from Monterrey to 
Memphis, and branch from there to all parts of the eastern seaboard.  If this could be 
accomplished, he imagined, “you might then drink tea made in Charleston within the 
same month in which the leaf was gathered in China.” Left unstated by Maury – yet very 
much implicit in this notion of rapid exchange – was an enticing prospect to any planter: 
one might then buy cotton products in China within the same month in which the staple 
was picked from the South Carolina lowcountry.  With such ease of access to Asian 
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markets, America would supplant Britain as the leading force in global trade.56  Several 
months later, in another letter, Maury continued to hammer the importance of 
communication with the West.  “The chief seat of the wealth and power and greatness of 
these United States” would not reside on the eastern seaboard for long, Maury claimed.57  
Westward went the course of American prosperity. 
Beneath Maury’s national triumphalism ran a strong chord of sectional 
aggrandizement. At the commercial crossroads of the world, the United States was 
destined to draw a commanding share of European and Asian trade, and, so long as the 
spine of this traffic ran through slave country, the South would be the primary 
beneficiary.  Untold riches lay before southern markets, if only the government could be 
convinced that Memphis was indeed the most desirable eastern terminus for a 
transcontinental railroad.  As Maury made clear, transcontinental expansionism already 
contained the promise of a transpacific commercial empire.  California, therefore, was 
not to be the end point of American dominion, but rather a pivotal stepping-stone in a 
truly global network of trade.  This was economic expansionism at its finest.  And the 
South had a new champion in Maury.  
The railroad, as Maury, De Bow and others argued, was the surest antidote to the 
South’s commercial ailments.  The North’s fast-growing edge in industrial development 
was luring business and immigrants, thus leading free states to outpace the South not only 
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in economic capacity but also in population, and thereby upsetting the always precarious 
balance of congressional representation.  Meanwhile slaveholders saw their commerce 
carried away on Northern ships, as they themselves were becoming more dependent on 
Europe and the North for manufactures.58  To stem this tide, De Bow called for the 
development of a “commercial Empire” centered in the slave South.  “As a Southron, we 
confess a deep and abiding interest in these schemes to connect the two oceans,” he wrote 
in 1849.  “Our own cities must revive under their influence, and commerce visit again 
and rule in her wonted marts.”59  Direct trade with the Pacific world – conducted along a 
southern transcontinental railroad and with southern-owned ships operating out of 
California’s ports – would no doubt facilitate such a revival.  Cotton would play a key 
role.  Expansionists like De Bow firmly believed that Asian markets clamored for 
southern agricultural products, especially cotton, and that with trade routes across the 
Pacific, America would claim a dominant share of global trade.60  The world, and the 
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South in particular, would grow rich through slave-grown staples.  Cotton was King in 
the Atlantic world; the railroad, these expansionists predicted, would bring its dominion 
to the Pacific as well. 
To bolster these great expectations, southern expansionists could look to the 
quickening pace of trade throughout the Pacific. An upswing in American commerce 
with China was particularly encouraging.  Between 1845 and 1860 American exports to 
China had quadrupled, with the total value of imports and exports growing from $9.5 
million to $22.5 over that same period.  Most promising of all for slaveholders was the 
increased Chinese demand for American cotton goods – which, along with California 
gold, ranked as America’s most important export to Asia.  Commercially-minded 
southerners like Maury expected this trade to be self-perpetuating, once Chinese 
consumers developed a dependence on American exports.  “By constant and familiar 
intercourse with our people, they will soon learn to want and taught to buy,” he argued.61  
Not to be discounted was the small but growing trade between China and the Pacific 
coast after 1849, carried out by ships that had initially transported cargo to California’s 
gold fields.62    
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Of course, America’s Pacific shipping was still dominated by northern firms, and 
even so, it represented only a fraction of the nation’s total global trade.  Furthermore, 
Britain commanded the largest share of the China market, thanks in large part to its 
control of opium sourced from India.  The outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851, led 
by the Christian millenarian Hong Xiuquan, convinced some traders and policymakers 
that the toppling of the Qing dynasty would bring about more favorable relations with the 
U.S.  But as the war dragged on – ultimately claiming an estimated 20 to 70 million lives 
– it became increasingly clear that the U.S. could not expect a sea change in trade 
relations.63  The joint British and French operation against the Qing dynasty from 1857 to 
1860, known as the Second Opium War, only further destabilized an already volatile 
region.  In short, this was a particularly tumultuous era in China, over which American 
slaveholders, in particular, had little control.  But no amount of bloodshed seemed to dim 
their outlook on the potential for Asian trade, which was to be ferried, they predicted, 
along a far southern transcontinental railroad.  For these slaveholding expansionists, the 
Pacific was the future.       
A study of these proslavery railroad projects adds a new geographic dimension to 
the growing scholarship on what one group of historians have described as the “Old 
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South’s modern worlds.”64  Antebellum planters eagerly sought commercial networks 
and diplomatic influence on a global scale – not least in the Pacific Basin.  Although 
obstacles were high, the South had the means to surmount them through a combination of 
technology, capital, and federal power.  These southerners clung to neither strict 
constructionism nor rural seclusion.  Rather, they lobbied for a massive mobilization of 
state power and looked westward to a new field of commercial and political opportunity.  
There they saw the consumers of Asia, the gold of California, and a network of potential 
political allies.     
 
The Natural Limit(lessness) of Slavery 
The recent conquest of the Mexican Northwest fired the global imaginations of 
expansionists like Maury, but it also touched off vigorous disputes about the future of 
American slavery.  From the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in 1846 to the 
Compromise of 1850, the question of slavery in what was now the American Southwest 
divided Congress into warring factions.  Some of the most influential politicians of the 
day insisted that slavery was naturally confined to the southeastern portion of the United 
States, that it could not extend into the newly acquired territories by simple laws of 
climate.  “What more do you want?” Henry Clay asked in early 1850.  “You have got 
what is worth more than a thousand Wilmot provisos. You have nature on your side – 
facts upon your side – and thus truth staring you in the face, that there is no slavery in 
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those territories.”65  Daniel Webster famously reiterated this point in no mixed terms.  
“Now, as to California and New Mexico, I hold slavery to be excluded from those 
territories by a law even superior to that which admits and sanctions it in Texas,” he 
argued in the Senate.  “I mean the law of nature – of physical geography – the law of the 
formation of the earth.”66  Even those who hailed from further south than Webster’s 
Massachusetts and Clay’s Kentucky cast doubt on the profitability of slave agriculture in 
the Southwest.  Waddy Thompson, who had once written glowingly about California’s 
agricultural potential, now argued that the region offered more in liabilities than in 
profits.  The land was ill-suited to the cultivation of cotton and sugar on a grand scale, he 
wrote to John C. Calhoun, while transportation across the remote desert regions would 
pose perpetual problems.67  
  Others, however, were justifiably skeptical of this natural limits thesis, what the 
New York Daily Times later dubbed a “clap-trap” argument, drummed up merely to 
defeat the Wilmot Proviso.68  Indeed, David Wilmot himself noted that African slavery 
had found its way into New Mexico as early as 1847.69  Few were more critical of the 
natural limits argument than Horace Mann, a Whig congressman and educational 
reformer.  In a series of publically circulated letters, Mann scolded Webster for his 
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shortsighted acquiescence to the westward expansion of slavery.  The institution would 
not obey the dictates of a “thermometer,” Mann warned.  “Slavery depends, not upon 
Climate, but upon Conscience,” he wrote in 1850.  “Wherever the wicked passions of the 
human heart can go, there slavery can go.”  Even if slave agriculture proved unprofitable, 
however, the growing households of the Southwest would soon call for 100,000 domestic 
slaves, he predicted.  Furthermore, who was to say that substantial quantities of gold 
would not be found in New Mexico, as it had been in California a year earlier?  “This is 
the very kind of labor on which slaves, in all time, have been so extensively employed,” 
Mann rightfully noted.70  Mann’s message was clear: unless checked by some external 
power, slavery would roll inexorably westward. 
In an exceedingly rare occurrence, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi agreed with the 
antislavery New Englander, Horace Mann.  There was no reason, Davis argued again and 
again, to assume that slavery would not be profitable and adaptable in the Mexican 
cession.  After all, most abolitionists clearly did not subscribe to the natural limits thesis 
themselves, he asserted.  Otherwise, why go to such lengths to restrict slavery in the new 
territories?  Rather than natural limits, Davis suggested, there were natural incentives for 
the expansion of slavery.  Although much of the region remained unknown, reports from 
hunters indicated that the lower Colorado River boasted “widespread and fruitful 
valleys,” according to Davis.  Furthermore, there was always the prospect of further gold 
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discoveries, especially in the valleys around the Gila River.71 Like Mann, Davis predicted 
that slaves would soon be used profitably in mining operations in New Mexico.  To 
buttress these claims, Davis solicited reports on the mineral opportunities in the Gila 
Valley from the ongoing U.S.-Mexico joint boundary commission.  The news he received 
from the commissioner, John R. Bartlett, was certainly heartening.  Bartlett had it on 
good authority that the area around the Gila possessed a “richness… as a mineral region 
unsurpassed in New Mexico, both in Gold Silver & Copper.”72  Davis and his fellow 
advocates for the western expansion of slavery were being vindicated.  It certainly looked 
as if human bondage would pay in the Southwest.  
As politicians in Washington debated the adaptability of slave labor to the Far 
West, emigrants to the region put these theories to a very real test.  In January 1848, gold 
was discovered at Sutter’s Mill near Sacramento, California, setting off a mad scramble 
for the Pacific coast by December of that year.  Among the tens of thousands of 
emigrants from China, Chile, Mexico, Hawaii, Australia, America, Europe and 
elsewhere, came a much smaller – but by no means insignificant – population of black 
slaves from the American South.  Historians estimate that southern slaveholders forcibly 
transported between 500 to 600 bondspeople to California during the gold rush, though 
more recent evidence has suggested that as many as 1,500 black slaves may have reached 
the state by the early 1850s.73  In making the journey with their slave property, the 
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southern argonauts of the late 1840s were overturning decades of historical precedent, as 
slavery had been abolished in California for 23 years under Mexican law before the U.S. 
seized the territory in 1846.74  But even the passage of California’s free soil constitution 
in late 1849 did not seem to present a serious impediment to slaveholders bound for El 
Dorado.  If there were natural, historical, or even legal barriers to slave expansion, the 
southern emigrants who brought their bondspeople into California did not pay heed.  
As David Wilmot had noted, African slavery was not entirely alien to the Far 
West during the pre-gold rush period.  During the U.S.-Mexico War, a handful of 
southern officers, like John S. Griffin of Virginia, brought along personal slaves on their 
military campaigns.75  Yet the vast majority of black slaves, as with the vast majority of 
emigrants in general, came to California during the gold rush period of the late 1840s.  
Most traveled with their masters along the overland trails, the most popular southern 
route being the Gila River trail along the 32nd parallel.  Next to the more central Platte-
Humbolt route, the Gila trail was the second most heavily trafficked overall, carrying 
some 12,000 migrants in 1849 alone.  Most gold seekers, of course, traveled without 
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bondsmen.  But if contemporary newspaper accounts and the memoirs of former 
argonauts are any indication, encounters with slaves along the overland trails were not 
uncommon occurrences.76  Bondspeople and their masters could also be found aboard 
steamers bound for the Pacific coast.  More expensive but speedier options, the routes 
around either Cape Horn or across the Isthmus of Panama carried perhaps as many 
African Americans as did the overland trails – although a number of these would have 
been freedpeople.77     
Whether traveling by sea or by land, transporting valuable slave property across 
such vast distances and into a frontier mining community was a risky undertaking.  As an 
able-bodied slave could fetch up to $1000 at auction, slaveholders had to be relatively 
confident of high returns to hazard such a journey.  Perhaps no slaveholder was as 
optimistic about the prospects for bonded labor in California as the former minister to 
Brazil and future Virginia governor, Henry A. Wise.  The Far West would be a lucrative 
dumping ground for the surplus slave population of the Upper South, he argued.  
According to Wise’s calculations, if the Missouri Compromise Line was to be extended 
to the Pacific and slavery legally protected in gold country, Virginia alone would stand to 
gain over $1 billion through the sale of bondspeople to California.78  Wise’s figure may 
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have been absurd, but the experience of masters in mining regions indicated that tidy 
sums could indeed be expected from slave labor among the diggings.  Decades before the 
discovery of gold in California, white masters had used slave labor to great effect in the 
placer mines of North Carolina. When in the goldfields of California, North Carolinian 
masters often replicated these older mining strategies, organizing slaves into large gangs 
under the direction of overseers.  
Most slaveholding gold seekers, however, traveled with fewer slaves – generally 
one or two – and worked alongside their chattel on more modest claims.79  Even these 
smaller operations could be highly lucrative.  One South Carolinian, for instance, was 
offered $300 per month for the hire of his slave Scipio, though he refused, believing that 
Scipio would be more valuable by his side.80  The gamble may have paid off if Scipio 
proved anywhere near as lucky or skilled as the two slaves of a Mississippi emigrant, 
who reportedly earned their master $5000 by the product of their diggings over two 
months.  According to reports received by a Mississippi paper, slaves could fetch as 
much as to $3,000 to $4,000 on the San Francisco market.81  As in the South, California 
slaves could also be used as collateral, or even as stakes in a game of cards.  According to 
one California observer, a slave by the name of Harry “changed owners about every 
Saturday night,” as the prize in a weekly game of freeze-out poker.  “The fortunate 
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winner would have Harry’s services at picking, shoveling or running a rocker for the 
week.”82  
The correspondence of George McKinley Murrell illustrates the manifold 
advantages that slaveholders could derive from their bonded labor in the diggings of 
California.  Setting out from his family’s plantation in Bowling Green, Kentucky in the 
spring of 1849, Murrell traveled with Reuben, one of his father’s 27 slaves.83  By 
September, the two had reached Sacramento and commenced a modest mining venture.84  
Although Reuben had some success in the diggings that fall, Murrell soon began renting 
his slave’s labor to the boarding house at which they lodged.  In fact, it seems unlikely 
that Murrell would have been able to cover his expenses without the profits he accrued 
from Reuben’s work, which “more than pays my board although that is $4.00 per day.”85  
Months later, it was still the profits from Reuben’s labor that secured a roof over his 
master’s head.  Working as a cook for $10 a day, Reuben generated a steady source of 
income in a country that could be notoriously inhospitable to unlucky miners like 
Murrell.  “I have Rheubin hired out at $10.00 a day and foolish I was that I did not have 
him hired out all the time,” Murrell wrote. “I might have been a great deal better off.  
$10.00 a day is big wages & but few hands can get it now.”86  The versatile Reuben even 
learned to bake, which enabled Murrell to profit from bread sales, “as the miners don’t 
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love to cook.”87  Murrell was quick to learn that in gold country, where male miners 
predominated, domestic skills like cooking and baking came at a premium.  As another 
southern emigrant complained to his brother, “A servant is not to be had at any price,”  
and thus his wife was “constrained to do her own house work and cooking.”88  Under 
such conditions, the gamble of bringing a valuable slave into gold country certainly paid 
off for miners like Murrell.  
But if the profits from slave labor in gold country were steady, the risks could be 
substantial.  Murrell, like other white masters in California, was on his guard against a 
perceived abolitionist influence in the diggings.  According to Murrell, he and Reuben 
resided “in the midst of the most fanatical of the abolition party,” although he professed 
an abiding faith in Reuben. “I do not think that their contaminating & poisoning 
principles has in the leas weakened his fidelity & devotedness to me,” he added.89  
Similarly, a Louisiana slaveholder, Jesse Holcomb Chaney, witnessed the workings of 
antislavery forces in California with great unease. “The abolitionist will go and sit by him 
[his slave] when while at work and beg him to leave me,” he noted.  While Chaney 
reported no problems with his slave, he noted that in general, California slaveholders 
“have much trouble about our slaves.”90  Hinton Rowan Helper, while certainly no friend 
of the southern slaveholding class, also made note of the “meddling abolitionists” who 
attempted to “entice away” black slaves in California’s gold fields.  Yet, similarly, he 
																																																						
87 Murrell to Samuel Murrell, Jan. 29- Feb. 1, 1851, Murrell Correspondence, HEHL 
88 Mr. Foregeaud to his brother, April 9, 1849, in Charleston Courier, June 19, 1849, Bieber collection, 
HEHL. 
89 Murrell to Elisebeth R. Murrell, Nov. 8, 1850, Murrell Correspondence, HEHL. 
90 Jesse Holcomb Chaney to Robert Chambliss Chaney, July 10, 1850, in Chaney, William A., ed., “A 
Louisiana Planter in the Gold Rush,” Louisiana History 3 (spring 1962). 
	 58 
estimated that few slaves actually made good on abolitionists’ offers, due to “their 
attachment to their masters.”91   
A sense of fidelity may have deterred many slaves for seeking their freedom in 
California, but it was a different sort of fidelity than the one Murrell and Helper had in 
mind.  In gold country, slaves were thousands of miles from their homes, their friends, 
and their families.  Escape on the frontier of California may have meant freedom, but it 
would also likely mean lifelong separation from loved ones in the South.  With Murrell as 
his transcriber, Reuben corresponded with this friends on the plantation in Bowling 
Green, expressing a genuine desire to return to them. “There is no country like home,” 
Reuben dictated to Murrell, “if I can just only live to get back.”92  Such a reunion, 
however, was not to be.  Two years after his departure from Kentucky, Reuben was swept 
up in a current while helping a traveler cross a river in the gold diggings.93  Reuben lost 
his life and Murrell lost his steadiest source of income.  There was more than one way to 
lose a slave in gold country.   
Even if their bondspeople did not run away, southern argonauts had to adjust to a 
new master-slave dialectic in the gold diggings.  As historian Stacey Smith illustrates, 
slaves themselves recognized the new opportunities available to them in an open frontier, 
and they exploited their masters’ anxieties to renegotiate the conditions of their 
enslavement.  In a number of instances, slaves reached agreements with their masters to 
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work in California for a set period of time – usually several years – in exchange for their 
freedom.94 California slaves often secured for themselves what was known as a Sunday 
claim, the right to keep the earnings from their mining on what would have otherwise 
been a day of rest.  With these earnings, bondspeople were able to purchase their own 
freedom, as well as the freedom of their family members back in the South.95  In his study 
of antebellum California’s African American community, Rudolph Lapp estimates that 
hundreds of slaves secured their family members’ as well as their own freedom through 
these means, collectively spending as much as $750,000 in the process.96  Slaves were 
eager to claim a share of California’s wealth, with or without the blessings of their 
masters.  A Tennessee slaveholder, who had settled in a small gulch with his three slaves, 
faced open rebellion when he attempted to claim the gold dust that his chattel had 
recently washed out.  As he approached the gold, his bondsmen warned him to take his 
hands of their earnings.  He was welcome to work with them on shares, they continued, 
but they would dig no more as slaves.97  White masters now had to negotiate, rather than 
merely command. 
To safeguard their property against such rebellion, slaveholders often journeyed 
and settled with kin and close friends, those they could trust to oversee their chattel.  
They were especially mindful of the fact that California’s placers were “so hidden and 
																																																						
94 An enslaved woman in Kansas hoped to achieve her liberty in such a manner. A Missouri slaveholder 
offered to purchase her, take her to California, and free her within two years, but when her master, “found 
out that I had a chance to be free, he refused to sell me;” James Redpath, The Roving Editor: Or, Talks with 
Slaves in the South States (New York: A.B. Burdick, 1859), 321.  
95 Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 51-54. 
96 Lapp, Blacks in Gold Rush California, 70-74. 
97 C[harles] W[arren]Haskins, The Argonauts of California, being the Reminiscences of Scenes and 
Incidents that Occurred in California in Early Mining Days (New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert, 1890), 
70. 
	 60 
retired,” that slaves “could not in many instances be recaptured,” as one southern gold 
seeker put it.  Thus masters did all in their power to maintain surveillance and to cloister 
their human property from interference.98  These slaveholding miners often organized 
informal posses to discipline and police bondspeople, thereby bringing to California an 
analogue to the slave patrols of the plantation South.  Generally settling in the Southern 
Mines – which lay close to the end of the southern overland trail – slaveholders 
concentrated in Mariposa, Tuolumne and Calaveras counties.99  In essence, these 
slaveholding argonauts carved out miniature Souths across the western landscape.   
Prominent among them was the settlement of Colonel Thomas Thorn of Texas.  
Having organized a caravan of 200 wagons from Texas to California, Thorn settled with 
a small southern community and thirty slaves in the gold fields of Mariposa.  He 
attempted to instill discipline through severe beatings, although like other slaveholders in 
California, his command was far from absolute.  His slaves proved susceptible to the 
influence of antislavery forces in the area and the lure of freedom along the sparsely 
policed frontier.  Several successfully escaped, while at least one other purchased his 
freedom.100 
Like Thorn, Thomas Jefferson Green sought to recreate a slaveholding 
community within California, and like Thorn, Green soon discovered the limits of his 
mastery.  Since his days in the Republic of Texas, Green had been an advocate of 
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slaveholding expansion to the Pacific.  Now in charge of his own mining company, he 
aimed to make good on his vision for the American West.  Along with a dozen or so 
fellow Texans and their fifteen slaves, Green settled the mining colony of Rose’s Bar in 
the summer of 1849.  Because his company made claims not only in their own names, but 
also in the names of their bondsmen – a common practice among slaveholding miners – 
Green’s company soon attracted the attention of the non-slaveholders of the region.  A 
committee of white miners approached Green, but was quickly rebuffed by the Texans.  
In response, a second committee formed and passed a resolution “that no slaves or 
negroes should own claims or even work in the mines,” according to the memoir of one 
of the committee members, Edwin Sherman.101  This committee then approached Green 
for a second time, and again received threats of violent resistance.  But Sherman and the 
free miners held their ground.  “If you want to keep your slaves, you will have to go back 
to Texas or Arkansas,” Sherman threatened, “or by tomorrow morning you will not have 
one slave left, for the miners will run them out and you will never get them back.”  The 
warning was apparently real enough for Green and his company, who moved off their 
claim, with their slaves, the next day.102  
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As Stacey Smith notes, historians have mistakenly marked this confrontation as 
“California’s standard free-soil creation story.”103  A victory for the white miners of 
Rose’s Bar, Green’s flight has been seen as the last gasp of a brief slaveholding 
experiment in gold rush California.  Yet, this was a turf war; not an abolitionist 
movement.  Like many white miners in California, Sherman’s group only opposed slave 
labor insofar as it encroached on their own claims.  Because “slaves were not citizens,” 
Sherman and his allies argued, “their owners could not take up pre-emption claims for 
them.”104  Morally ambivalent on the issue of slavery and unconcerned with the plight of 
bondspeople in general, supporters of a free soil California sought simply to secure the 
region for free white labor.  They would score some victories, notably at Rose’s Bar and 
in the state’s founding document, but such success did not amount to a complete 
repudiation of California’s proslavery politics.  Just as gold rush California proved a 
lucrative field for many slaveholders, it would continue to attract southerners and their 
proslavery political culture in the coming years.  As Green himself would demonstrate, 
southern dreams of Pacific expansion had hardly been extinguished.   
 
Pacific Lost? 
As emigrants continued to pour into California, the political struggle over the 
Pacific railroad intensified.  A flurry of memorials poured into Congress in 1849, a 
number of which suggested St. Louis as the desirable eastern terminus, as opposed to 
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Whitney’s Great Lakes and Maury’s Memphis proposals.  The debate immediately 
spilled beyond the halls of Congress, however, as newspapers and commercial 
conventions across the country joined the fray.  As in 1845, Memphis was again a 
hothouse for railroaders.  While St. Louis attracted the largest gathering of the sort that 
year with roughly 1000 delegates in attendance, the 400 representatives at Memphis put 
together, by all accounts, a less fractious and more successful convention (that is, after a 
cholera outbreak in the city pushed the event from July to November.)  Again, the 
organizers of the convention looked toward Asia and its “six hundred millions of people,” 
and advanced the far southern route as shorter and more temperate than its northern 
competitors.  “We shall do what Christopher Columbus was attempting when he 
discovered a new world,” the corresponding committee boasted – “find a direct passage 
to the East Indies by going west.”  Especially heartening to the committee was growing 
network of railroads in the South, thus ensuring that a route from Memphis would have 
speedy access to the slave states of the Southeast as well as the new markets of the Far 
West.105  In attendance were men from fifteen different states – including Asa Whitney 
himself, who received a respectful hearing – though, again, southerners dominated the 
rolls and the agenda.  Most delegates strongly favored the construction of a route from 
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Memphis to San Diego, not least among them the Convention’s president, Matthew 
Fontaine Maury.106 
Thanks to the work of those at Memphis and elsewhere, by 1849 southern railroad 
aspirations were on the rise.  True, transcontinental promoters still had to contend with a 
maelstrom of competing claims.  But the Gila route, along the 32nd parallel and into San 
Diego, was fast becoming a regional favorite.  Published that year, a report and 
accompanying series of maps drew authoritatively on the explorations of Fremont, 
William Emory, and others to mount the evidence in favor of a far southern route.107  Asa 
Whitney, who had never ceased campaigning for his northern route, recognized that the 
tides were fast turning against him, and thus struck a defensive posture in his 1849 
pamphlet, A Project for a Railroad to the Pacific.  He devoted a substantial portion of the 
work to an attack on the Gila route, which he viewed as his major rival.  The land along 
the 32nd parallel is barren, he argued, and lacked the resources necessary to support 
railroad construction.  Whitney also claimed that the route would exclude too many 
important American cities from its trade.108  Other opponents of the southern route would 
reiterate such objections in the years to come, a gauge of just how popular the 32nd 
parallel had become.  
																																																						
106 Russel, Improvement of Communication, 47-50; Cotterill, “Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad,” 409-
411; Roberson, “The South and the Pacific Railroad,” 166-167. For the resolutions of a similar meeting in 
Texas, which also advanced a far southern route, see Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston), 
March 15, 1849, Bieber Collection, HEHL. 
107 Robert Creuzbaur, Route from the Gulf of Mexico and the Lower Mississippi Valley to California and 
the Pacific Ocean, Illustrated by a General Map and Sectional Maps: with Directions to Travellers 
(Austin, TX: H. Long & Brother, 1849). Like other southerners at the time, Creuzbaur called for “the 
purchase of some territory along the south bank of the Gila,” in order to “remove the only objection which 
could be urged against the construction of a national rail-road along this route,” p. 3. This would be 
accomplished several years later with what became known as the Gadsden Purchase (Chapter 2). 
108Asa Whitney, A Project for a Railroad to the Pacific (New York: George W. Wood, 1849), 25-28. 
	 65 
Coupled with favorable reports on the use of slave labor in gold country, such 
progress on the railroad campaign pointed to a bright future for proslavery claims on the 
Far West.  Yet just as southern hopes were soaring to new heights, a crushing blow came 
from California.  With its billowing population and pressing land claims, California’s 
elites quickly assembled a constitutional convention in September 1849 in order to hurry 
the territory’s transition to statehood.  As it had at the national level, the question of 
slavery occupied a central place in the proceedings of the convention at Monterrey.  To 
the surprise of some and relief of many, the assembled delegates unanimously resolved to 
bar the institution from California’s borders.109  “What surprised us perhaps more than 
anything else was the unanimity with which the clause prohibiting slavery was passed,” 
one former delegate recalled.  “We had expected very considerable opposition from the 
Southern element.”110  Southern-born delegates were indeed powerfully represented at the 
convention, but they quickly fell in line with the prevailing opinion against slavery.111  
Those with their fingers on the pulse in California recognized that the passage of the 
antislavery clause was a foregone conclusion well before the convention assembled.  The 
territory’s press had largely come out against the institution, while participants at local 
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meetings held across the state expressed opposition to both slavery and black 
immigration.  As early as June 1849, a California emigrant predicted that “a Convention 
will be held… and slavery will be excluded by a unanimous vote.”112  With the passage of 
the antislavery clause, the California constitution would read: “Neither slavery, nor 
involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this 
State.”113   
As with the confrontation at Rose’s Bar, the prohibition on slavery in California 
was, by no means, a moral crusade against human bondage.  If anything it was a crusade 
against African Americans.  A number of delegates sought not only to bar slavery from 
California, but also black laborers more generally.  Although their efforts ultimately 
failed – primarily because the convention recognized that such restrictions would 
endanger California’s chances at congressionally-recognized statehood – they engendered 
a lively debate within the convention.  Morton McCarver, a Kentucky Democrat, worried 
that unless California also banned African American immigration, slaveholders would 
easily circumvent the state’s antislavery constitution.  Masters would bring slaves by the 
hundreds into California as indentured laborers, he argued at length, only to set them free 
after they had worked a set term in the gold mines.  The fact that this practice was already 
employed by a number of slaveholders in the diggings gave some credence to 
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McCarver’s arguments.114  Others, like Lansford Hastings – who would later achieve 
notoriety for his role in the Donner Party’s ill-fated journey – concurred.  “If [blacks] are 
introduced at all, I think they had better be introduced as slaves,” he argued, “for a free 
negro is the freest human being in God’s world.”115  The president of the convention, 
Robert Semple of Kentucky, predicted that a well-known Louisiana planter would, alone, 
transport 1,000 contracted slaves into California in this manner.116  Although such 
estimates stretched credulity, delegates were right to suspect the slipperiness of 
slaveholders, who would devise various stratagems in order to dodge the restrictions on 
their peculiar institution.  Indeed, time would show that a constitutional ban on slavery 
would not extinguish unfree labor within the state. 
The southern delegates’ role in the convention should not be read as an abdication 
of their proslavery agenda for the West, but merely as a recalibration of their overall 
strategy.  A decisive influence on the antislavery measure came from what may seem, at 
first blush, an unlikely source, William McKendree Gwin.  Born in Tennessee, educated 
in Kentucky, and groomed in Mississippi, Gwin still owned a large plantation in Natchez, 
which he worked with some 200 slaves.  Ideologically committed to slavery and southern 
expansion, Gwin nevertheless led his peers in urging the adoption of an antislavery clause 
for the constitution.  He did so by shrewd political calculation. As John Augustus Sutter, 
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a fellow delegate, recognized, “When the question of slavery came up men from the 
south kept very quiet, as they wanted offices.”117  Gwin, a former U.S. Representative 
from Mississippi, had come to California in search of a grander prize.  He coveted a 
senate seat and recognized that waging unwinnable battles was no way to endear himself 
to the future legislators who would elect him.  In short, Gwin had read the writing on the 
wall, recognized that a proslavery constitution was a lost cause, and thus opted to save his 
political capital for more promising contests.118 
One such contest was over the demarcation of California’s borders.  Along with 
Henry Halleck of New York, Gwin pressed for the creation of a vast state, with an eastern 
boundary that would extend to the Rocky Mountains.  The intention, Gwin argued, was to 
draw the state’s borders in a way that would invite the partitioning of California into 
multiple states.  “I should like to see six States fronting on the Pacific in California,” 
Gwin urged the delegation.  “I want the additional power in the Congress of the United 
States of twelve Senators instead of four.”  Gwin imagined the formation, in due time, of 
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20 states west of the Rockies.119  Although Gwin himself never admitted to any particular 
proslavery bias – and, in fact, dismissed the notion that slavery would take hold in the 
southern half of California – he no doubt hoped that at least several of these states would 
welcome the South’s peculiar institution.120  His fellow delegate Elisha Crosby 
recognized as much when he wrote, some years later, “The only argument for dividing 
the State into north and south was found in the slavery question the north to [be] free and 
the south slave.”121 
Gwin was certainly not the only southerner to contemplate state division in the 
Far West.  As he lobbied at the Monterrey convention, Mississippi’s two senators Henry 
Foote and Jefferson Davis were waging a campaign in Congress to extend the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific coast, which would necessitate the splitting of California.  
Foote proposed that Congress draw a line at the 35 deg. 30’ parallel (roughly at 
Bakersfield) and break off the southern section of California as the separate territory of 
Colorado.122  Indeed, we might mark the proposals of Gwin, Foote, and Davis as the 
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beginning of a decade-long California state division movement – a movement that drew 
strength from proslavery expansionists who hoped to carve out a piece of the Pacific 
coast as a counterweight to California’s free soil constitution.123  
The convention’s delegates finished their deliberations by October 1849, crafting 
a final document that outlawed slavery but not black immigration, and that drew the 
state’s eastern boundary at the Sierra Nevada rather than the Rockies.  Submitted for a 
popular vote in November, the constitution passed easily, 12,061 in favor and 811 
against.  Sixty-six of those negative votes came from Mariposa county, where gold 
seeking southerners wanted a constitution without restrictions on slavery.124  But they 
represented an extreme minority in a territory that had largely shunned the sectional 
issues that would delay statehood. 
Those within the South, however, were not so willing to concede defeat.  
Slaveholders in Jackson, Mississippi cooked up a scheme to effectively overrule the free 
soil constitution through the power of immigration.  They planned to raise a force of 
5,000 white settlers and 10,000 slaves to colonize the mining and agricultural regions of 
California.  According to one northern observer, by March 1850 there were already “a 
few stray specimens” of this would-be colony in California by the spring of 1850.  
Ultimately, of course, this mass migration never materialized.  As even the most petulant 
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slaveholding expansionists would have recognized, such an undertaking would hazard 
millions of dollars in slave property with no clear sign of payoff.125         
The fiercest struggle over California’s fate took place in Congress.  In the debates 
over what would become the Compromise of 1850, southerners put up a particularly stiff 
fight to secure at least a portion of California for slaveholding settlement.  A relatively 
junior senator during these debates, Jefferson Davis distinguished himself by opposing 
the antislavery agenda for the West, what he called the “robber’s law.”126  With a small 
group of fellow southern statesmen, Davis pledged to “avail ourselves of every means… 
to prevent the admission of California as a State unless her southern boundary be reduced 
to 36 deg. 30 min.”127  The new territories of New Mexico and California belonged 
largely to the South by right of conquest, he insisted on several occasions, as the slave 
states sacrificed a disproportionate amount of blood and treasure to wrest that land from 
Mexico.128  Upon the passage of the statehood bill, Davis even considered physically 
taking the document from the speaker of the Senate and “tearing it to pieces.”129  James 
Henry Hammond invoked a familiar trope when he predicted that the South would be 
made a “Hayti” after it had lost California to free labor.130  The loss was particularly 
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galling, as southerners believed a free California would erode their power within the 
Senate and thus threaten proslavery interests not just in the West, but at a national level. 
 
Conclusion 
Scholars – perhaps taken in by the alarmist tone of their subjects – have given 
great weight to the Compromise, representing it as a breaking point in the history of 
slaveholders’ western ambitions.131  But southern expansionists were too nimble, too 
resilient, and too ambitious to seriously consider raising the white flag at such an early 
juncture.  Despite their hysterical rhetoric, slaveholders quickly rallied from this setback.  
Indeed, such rhetoric belies an undercurrent of optimism that ran through southern 
thinking about the Far West, both before and after the Compromise votes.  Perhaps no 
one was more sanguine than the very man who so quickly conceded on the slavery issue 
within California.  After a contested vote within the statehouse in late 1849, William 
Gwin won election to the U.S. Senate with a six-year term, along with the western 
military celebrity John C. Fremont, on a half-year term.  Gwin managed to convince a 
sufficient number of legislators that the election of a southern senator was a necessary 
counterbalance to Fremont and essential to California’s chances at statehood.  “I was 
induced to vote for him as U.S. Senator because he was known as an extreme Southern 
man,” Crosby recalled.  “If another northern man had been selected it would have been so 
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November 2, 1848, for the resolutions of the South Carolina committee, on which he served as vice 
president, disputing the Wilmot Proviso. 
131 See, again, Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 97-125. 
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palpable a cut or insult to the South that the State never would have had a chance of 
admission.”132 
Whether or not California could have achieved statehood without Gwin’s election 
is debatable.  But he himself wasted no time in speculating once his position was secured.  
Although he went to Washington as a representative from a free state, Gwin’s political 
allegiance lay squarely with the slave South.  California’s press recognized as much when 
they attempted to out the newly elected senator as “an ultra pro-slavery man.”133  Indeed, 
from his time as a U.S. representative from Mississippi in the 1840s, to his years as a 
U.S. senator from California in the 1850s, Gwin worked to further the interests of 
slaveholders.  His election quickly eased the anxieties of southerners like Jefferson Davis, 
who had prematurely assumed that a free California would inexorably tilt the 
congressional balance of power away from the South.  At the helm of the state’s 
proslavery Democratic party over the coming decade, Gwin marshalled the necessary 
votes to align California with the slave states on major sectional issues like the Kansas-
Nebraska Act and the Lecompton Constitution.  Meanwhile, he established a monopoly 
on the federal patronage for positions within California and packed these offices with his 
southern friends.  California may have adopted a free soil constitution with Gwin’s 
																																																						
132 Crosby, Memoirs, 41-43, 61. Gwin’s election was a narrow one, however, and even some southerners 
opposed his election. “Gwynn [sic] I consider a vulgar, treacherous, mendacious, dishonest man, the most 
vulgar, treacherous, mendacious & dishonest that I ever had the misfortune to meet with or a state was 
cursed with in a representative,” wrote the Virginian Edmund Randolph to his wife. “Of course I did 
everything I could to prevent his election and came very near succeeding;” Edmund Randolph to Tarmesia 
G. (Meux) Randolph, December 22, 1849, Virginia Historical Society. 
133 Sacramento Transcript, April 25, 1850, available at the Center for Sacramento History. Thanks to John 
Suval for pointing me to this particular article. 
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blessing, but over the course of the next decade, he ensured that the state would embrace 
the politics of slavery (Chapter 3).      
Gwin’s sectional allegiance shone through in his advocacy for a transcontinental 
railroad.  As a senator from the free state of California, he claimed to work in the 
interests of Union, rather than for the aggrandizement of a particular section.  But his 
ambitious plan for a Pacific railway, fully unveiled by 1853, called for a road that ran 
almost entirely through slave country, with only branch lines radiating into the North.  In 
this plan, Gwin followed squarely in the footsteps of the proslavery expansionists of the 
preceding decade.  Like John C. Calhoun, J.D.B. De Bow and Matthew Fontaine Maury, 
Gwin saw in Pacific ports and transcontinental communication the formula for American 
empire.  And he recognized that whichever section won that railroad would control both 
the political allegiance of the West and the commercial prospects of the Pacific.  Gwin’s 
political projects over the coming decade made clear what historians have often 
overlooked: southern expansion was never entirely about the acquisition of more slave 
territory.  If slavery was to be barred from California, the Pacific could still be yoked to 
the South – Gwin, Maury, and others rightly reasoned – by a bond of iron. 
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Chapter 2 
THE GREAT SLAVERY ROAD, 1850-1859 
 
 
His bondsmen may have been driven from California’s gold fields in 1849, but 
five years later Thomas Jefferson Green still saw a bright future for the slave South in the 
Far West.  In the summer of 1854, Green traveled to east Texas to celebrate the Atlantic 
and Pacific Railroad Company as it broke ground on its proposed transcontinental 
undertaking.  “This road is emphatically the Southern, yea, what the abolitionist truly 
calls the ‘great slavery road,’” he exulted.		To Green this represented a particularly 
promising chapter in the longstanding campaign by southerners to extend both their labor 
system and their political influence across the western half of the continent.  After nearly 
a decade of lobbying, slaveholding railroaders had made serious headway in their plans 
for a Pacific connection.  Crucially, they had recently orchestrated the purchase of 
roughly 30,000 square miles of Mexican territory to make way for a proposed Pacific 
railroad along a far southern route.  With such a railway – built “by Southern labor both 
white and black” – slavery would inexorably spill into the far western territories and 
substantially boost the South’s political influence at the national level, Green predicted.1  
Simply because their railroad was bound for the free state of California did not make it 
any less of a proslavery project. 
																																																						
1 Green’s speech near Marshall Texas was excerpted in the Texas State Gazette, July 29, 1854. The made 
special note of Green’s sterling credentials as a proslavery expansionist and as a leader of California’s state 
division movement. “We are glad to find that Mr. Green has the credit in California of starting the question 
of division of that State, knowing that the Southern end would prefer slavery.” For more on this movement, 
see chapters 3 and 4. 
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Free or not, California was still viewed as a crucial – perhaps the crucial – 
component to the southern dream of a western empire, a fact that has largely escaped the 
scholarship on this period.  The Compromise of 1850 did little to alter or diminish the 
slaveholding imperial imagination.  Southern expansionists continued hammering the 
themes of the previous decade’s railroad campaign.  First, they argued, a far southern 
route would yoke the Far West to the slave South, both commercially and politically. 
“[W]hen the road is finally completed to the Pacific,” the Arkansas State Gazette and 
Democrat optimistically projected, “the State of California, and the States which will 
intervene between that and Texas, being so intimately identified with us, in their 
commercial relations, will, as a matter of course, from interest as well as sympathy, join 
with our division of the country, as a common community, contending for common 
rights.”2  And second, the road would provide commercial outlets to the Asia trade and its 
600 million potential consumers.  “The Eastern World!” Judah Benjamin proclaimed in 
1852. “Its commerce makes empires of the countries to which it flows, and when they are 
deprived of it they are empty bags, useless, valueless.”3  The economic fortunes of the 
slave South, of course, were firmly tied to the Atlantic world and, particularly, to the 
manufacturing might of Great Britain.  But for many southerners like Benjamin, the 
future lay across the Pacific, in the commercial promise of China.   
Despite the grand visions it inspired and the political divisions it created, this 
railroad campaign has received little in the way of recent scholarly attention, and 
																																																						
2 Quoted in Robert R. Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in 
American Politics, 1783-1864, 26. 
3 Benjamin is quoted in the New Orleans Picayune (no date), reprinted in the Arkansas Whig, 22 January, 
1852. 
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historians have never fully explored these efforts in the context of slaveholding 
internationalism.4  Scholarly oversights might be partly attributable to the unspectacular 
results of this project.  After all, antebellum southerners never succeeded in constructing 
their great slavery road.  And yet their efforts – including several near-misses – merit 
closer study by scholars of American empire.  Whereas proslavery filibusters have more 
effectively captured the historical imagination, it was southern commercial expansionists 
who presented the greater threat to antislavery politics.  In contrast to would-be 
conquistadors like William Walker and Henry A. Crabb, slaveholding railroad promoters 
largely controlled the levers of power in Washington and sustained a prolonged and 
multi-pronged campaign to extend their political vision across the continent.   
Through their railroad boosterism, southerners articulated some of the most 
ambitious imperial objectives of this era.  They actively pursued a project that would 
subdue and settle the West, tap the burgeoning markets of the Pacific coast, boost the 
industrial capacity of the slave states, and unite the southern half of the continent along 
what would become America’s great commercial highway.5  And these were no mere 
pipe dreams, as their political opponents recognized.  Indeed, northern leaders were 
desperate to check these proslavery aspirations and to advance competing visions of their 
																																																						
4 The most complete account remains Robert R. Russel’s prosaically titled, Improvement of Communication 
with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in American Politics. Other helpful studies include, Jere W. Roberson, 
“To Build a Pacific Railroad: Congress, Texas, and the Charleston Convention of 1854,” Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 78 (October 1974); Roberson, “The South and the Pacific Railroad, 1845-1855,” 
Western Historical Quarterly 5:2 (April 1874); Robert Spencer Cotterill, “Improvement of Transportation 
in the Mississippi Valley, 1845-1850” (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1919). 
5 For invocations of “commercial empire” and the need to “bind South and West,” the rhetoric of 
slaveholders in the pages of De Bow’s Review and at the numerous southern commercial conventions of 
this period is explicit. See, for instance, the 1852 Southwestern Convention at New Orleans, reported in the 
Arkansas Whig, January 22, 1852; and “Southern Atlantic and Mississippi Railroad,” De Bow’s Review 
1 (January 1846), 22-33.  
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own.6  The result was the longest-lived political controversy of the period, which lay at 
the root of other sectional flashpoints like the Gadsden Purchase and Bleeding Kansas.  
Indeed, the story of the sectional conflict is largely a story of the railroad.  
 
The Great Slavery Road at High Tide 
While railroad promoters focused primarily on regional development during the 
two years after the Compromise of 1850, national plans again took center stage beginning 
in early 1853.  As public interest in transcontinental railroad plans reached “fever heat,” 
according to the American Railroad Journal, national policymakers looked to the Pacific 
Coast with renewed hope.7  That year Congress devoted more time and attention to 
Pacific railroad proposals than to any other subject.8  Southern railroad expansionists had 
good timing, if nothing else.  In the White House was Franklin Pierce, friendly to 
proslavery interests and expansionists in general, while at the head of the war department 
sat Jefferson Davis, his most trusted advisor.  Cabinet members were known to make 
speeches favorable to southern plans in Pierce’s company, the President offering no 
objection.9   Davis, in particular, lent his powers to western development projects, and 
																																																						
6 William Seward was perhaps the most ambitious imperial visionary of the North during the late 
antebellum period. And his empire, as Eric Foner has argued, was fundamentally incompatible with 
slavery; Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 51. For more on Seward’s imperial imagination, see Jay 
Sexton, “William H. Seward in the World,” The Journal of the Civil War Era 4:3 (September 2014), pp. 
398-430. Seward’s place in American historiography as the progenitor of the nation’s postbellum overseas 
empire has left little room for slaveholders; see for instance, E.N. Paolino, Foundations of the American 
Empire: William Henry Seward and United States Foreign Policy (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 
1973). 
7 American Railroad Journal, August 27, 1853, p. 545. 
8 John P. Davis, The Union Pacific Railway: A Study in Railway Politics, History and Economics (Chicago: 
S.C. Griggs, 1894), 44; and Paul Neff Garber, The Gadsden Treaty (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 1923), 23. 
9 Roberson, “The South and the Pacific Railroad,” 169. 
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most of all, to the southern transcontinental railroad.  He would oversee the Pacific 
railroad surveys of 1853, while on the side sponsoring a scheme to import camels to the 
American Southwest.10  In short, these were flush times for southerners with global 
aspirations.  
But above all it is California’s leading politician, William Gwin, who deserves 
credit for reinvigorating the old debate.  Born in Tennessee, educated in Kentucky, and 
with land and slaves in Mississippi, the California senator did not disguise his southern 
sympathies.  Gwin generally followed his southern brethren in voting, and, despite his 
claims to the contrary, continued to promote the best interests of his native section in his 
spirited campaign for a transcontinental railroad.11  That campaign began in 1851, when 
Gwin read to the Senate the California resolutions for a federally funded transcontinental 
railroad – though Gwin would not launch headlong into railroad agitation until two years 
later.  On January 13, 1853, the California transplant pitched his plan for a multi-branch 
transcontinental railroad. Starting from San Francisco, the line would sweep down the 
valley of California and begin radiating eastward through the Southwest.  Although he 
urged his colleagues to lay aside “sectarian principles” and scorn “all sectionality,” 
Gwin’s own regional bias was unmistakable.  His proposed lines would run primarily 
through slave country – Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Louisiana and Texas – with 
additional lines into Puget Sound in the Pacific Northwest and Dubuque, Iowa, small 
																																																						
10 As William J. Cooper writes, “Jefferson Davis made his chief concern the great American West;” 
Cooper, Jefferson Davis, American (New York: Vintage, 2001), 274-277. 
11 For biographical information on Gwin, see Lately Thomas, Between Two Empires: The Life Story of 
California’s First Senator William McKendree Gwin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). The only 
published single biography on Gwin, Thomas’s work curiously lacks information on Gwin’s railroad 
agitation. 
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concessions to the North for a railroad that otherwise resembled many southern 
expansionists’ fantasies.12  Unfortunately for Gwin and his southern allies, the bill never 
gained enough traction to pass. 
Although southern railroad advocates failed to realize their ambitions through 
Congressional legislation in 1853, they had no intention of discontinuing the fight.  
Instead, they turned their attentions again to the Mexican border, where land disputes 
around the Mesilla Valley seemed to open a door for the southern route.  Since 
negotiations over the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, southerners had been calling for 
more land along the Mexican border to facilitate railroad construction across Texas and 
eventually to the Pacific.  In 1850, for instance, Duff Green engaged an agent in Mexico 
to help bring about a negotiation of a “large grant of land including the valley of the Gila, 
and extending the whole length of the northern boundary of Mexico, with the right of 
occupation and of making a railroad.”13  Such audacity and persistence – hallmarks of 
proslavery railroad promoters – paid off when the U.S. reentered formal negotiations with 
Mexico in 1853 in order to establish a firmer boundary between the two nations, and in 
the process, purchase an arid and dusty stretch of land in what is now southern New 
Mexico and Arizona – seemingly uncultivable terrain.  The only crop in mind, however, 
was iron rails bound for the Pacific.  
It was no coincidence that James Gadsden, the most outspoken proponent of a 
southern transcontinental railroad, was chosen to carry out these negotiations.  No 
																																																						
12 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session (January 13, 1853), 280-284. For a brief summary of 
Gwin’s railroad measures, see, Arthur Quinn, The Rivals: William Gwin, David Broderick, and the Birth of 
California (New York: Library of the American West, 1994), 142-144. 
13 Duff Green to John M. Clayton, March 12, 1850, read in Congress on January 23, 1852, Congressional 
Globe, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, 339. 
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southerner could match the railroad credentials of Gadsden.  According to De Bow, the 
South Carolinian was “the life of all these [western railroad] movements, and their 
pioneer.”14  Two driving ambitions had recently propelled Gadsden to public prominence: 
his missions to unite the South and the West and to check the anti-slavery program of 
northern politicians. He moved aggressively to achieve both these goals in the early 
1850s.  In 1851 he headed a group of planters who petitioned the California assembly to 
form a slaveholding colony in the southern part of the state, and planned to bring 500 to 
800 slaves into the breakaway territory.15  His California-bound slaveholders would be 
preceded by a mounted corps and a team of engineers to survey the route to the Pacific, 
which could be used as both a stage coach, and later a railway. “Open such a way, and 
the Railroad follows,” Gadsden declared, thus wedding his plans for a Pacific slave 
colony with his transcontinental railroad promotion (Chapter 3).16  Writing of these plans 
to Thomas Jefferson Green, then a California state senator, Gadsden projected a bright 
future for slaveholders in the Far West.17   
Although his scheme for a California slave colony eventually came to naught, 
Gadsden’s bold expansionism and undisguised proslavery agenda clearly caught the eye 
of President Pierce, who at Davis’s urging, appointed the Charlestonian to broker a land 
purchase from Mexico.  That Gadsden’s unconstitutional plans for California slavery did 
																																																						
14 “Internal Improvements,” De Bow’s Review 3 (May 1847), 447. See also the Charleston Courier, 
February 8, 1851, for more praise for Gadsden’s “untiring” contributions to Southern railroad development.  
15  In the absence of a standalone biography on Gadsden, Garber’s brief sketch of the South Carolinian still 
stands as the best available treatment; see Garber, Gadsden Treaty, 74-80. 
16 James Gadsden to M. Estes, December 10, 1851, in the Charleston Courier, February 7, 1852. 
17 At times Green matched Gadsden in his zeal for a southern Pacific railroad and the audacity of his 
proslavery agenda. James Gadsden to Thomas Jefferson Green, December 7, 1851, William Alexander 
Leidesdorff Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif. (HEHL). 
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not hinder – and in fact, may have even enhanced – his political prospects, goes to show 
how thoroughly the proslavery agenda had infiltrated federal policymaking by the early 
1850s.  Before departing for Mexico, Gadsden sought the counsel of his unofficial 
sponsor, Davis. “I should be pleased to hear from you, and to receive any suggestions of 
importance relative to the mission,” he wrote in May 1853. “I shall need the countenance 
& encouragement of my Southern Friends, as my appointment to Mexico is said to have 
been induced by my being a Southern Man.”  As if there was any doubt, Gadsden 
pledged to “uphold & apply” the “principles of the South” in his forthcoming 
negotiations.18   Although Gadsden disguised his brazenly proslavery motives in his 
public correspondence and statements, few were under any illusions.  He went to Mexico 
as Davis’s handpicked man, an agent of the South, and a champion of the great slavery 
road.19 
Opponents of southern expansion condemned Gadsden’s work. When he returned 
to Washington in late December 1853 with a treaty calling for $15 million in exchange 
for nearly forty thousand square miles of Mexican territory, critics came out in force. 
“The friends of the Southern Pacific Railroad are the only bona fide supporters of the 
treaty,” a correspondent to the Philadelphia Public Ledger complained, “and it might just 
																																																						
18 James Gadsden to Jefferson Davis, May 23, 1853, Jefferson Davis Papers, Special Collections & 
Archives, Transylvania University, Lexington, KY. My thanks to Susan Brown at Transylvania University, 
Special Collections & Archives, for making Gadsden’s correspondence available to me.   
19 In his official instructions to Gadsden, Secretary of State William L. Marcy reminded Gadsden of “the 
sole object [we] have in desiring a change in the treaty line on this frontier – an eligible route for a rail-
road;” Marcy to Gadsden, July 15, 1853, in David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts 
of the United States of America, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1948), 
6:342-347. The official organ of the Mexican government immediately recognized that Gadsden’s 
negotiations were part of a scheme “for the construction of a Railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific,” 
as quoted in the Texas State Gazette, September 17, 1853. See also Freeman’s Journal, August 11, 1853, 
quoted in the Philadelphia Public Ledger, August 16, 1853. 
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as well be called a ‘purchase of the right of way for a railroad to the Pacific,’ as by any 
other name.”  That such an important diplomatic mission had been entrusted to a patently 
proslavery schemer was a serious breach of political conduct, the correspondent added.20  
According to the National Era, Gadsden’s negotiations had not only opened the way for a 
Pacific railroad “favored by Southern Nullifiers” but also handed the present 
“Slaveholding Administration” an opportunity to create two or three additional slaves 
states from the new territory.21  During deliberations in the House of Representatives, hot-
headed Missourian Thomas Hart Benton deemed the treaty a monumental waste of 
money. A longtime supporter of a central transcontinental route, Benton ridiculed the 
prospects for railroad construction through this new territory, “a country so utterly 
desolate, desert, and God-forsaken, that Kit Carson says a wolf could not make his living 
upon it.” He accused the treaty’s architects of orchestrating a vast conspiracy to push a 
Pacific railroad through barren borderlands and into New San Diego, a yet-to-be-built 
city where southern speculators would make untold fortunes.22 
 In the spring of 1854, the treaty passed over the strenuous objections of 
congressmen like Benton, although the Senate shaved nine thousand square miles and $5 
million off the final agreement.23  Gadsden griped about the scaled-down version of his 
																																																						
20 Philadelphia Public Ledger, April 11, 1854. 
21 National Era, March 2, 1854, 34, May 4, 1854, 70. 
22 Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., appendix, 1031–36 (1854). For more on Benton, see Arenson, Great 
Heart of the Republic, 28–47. Even some proslavery expansionists opposed the purchase, however. 
William Gwin, for instance, refused to endorse the treaty because it failed to secure a sufficient amount of 
land from Mexico; William McKendree Gwin, Memoirs on the History of the United States, Mexico, and 
California, 1850-1860, Library of Congress, Ac. 5250, 68-69.  
23 For overviews of the Gadsden Treaty negotiations, see Garber, Gadsden Treaty; Russel, Improvement of 
Communication, 130–49 and Louis Bernard Schmidt, “Manifest Opportunity and the Gadsden Purchase,” 
Arizona and the West 3 (Autumn 1961): 245–64. Rachel St. John situates the Gadsden Purchase in the 
broader history of American schemes on Mexican territory; see St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the 
Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 40–41. 
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original deal, but his negotiations had resulted in a decisive victory for proslavery 
expansionists: the final strip of land, measuring about thirty thousand square miles, 
provided crucial real estate for a southern railroad.  Furthermore, it signaled that southern 
imperialists possessed the political capital necessary to advance their designs in the West 
at a time when sectional compromise was proving increasingly elusive.  The last major 
territorial acquisition of the era, the Gadsden Purchase moved Jefferson Davis and his 
allies one step closer to fulfilling their continental ambitions. 
 As Congress wrangled over Gadsden’s treaty, Albert Pike of Arkansas stepped 
forward at a Charleston commercial convention with perhaps the most ambitious plan yet 
for a southern railroad.  Deprecating the federal government for both its inaction and its 
alleged northern bias, Pike proposed the formation of a Pacific Railroad Company, jointly 
owned by a confederation of southern states, to build a road by the Gila route.  This 
company, Pike elaborated, would be authorized to negotiate with Mexico and Indian 
tribes for a right-of-way, a necessary measure should the Gadsden Treaty fail in 
Congress.24  Politicians’ appeals to patriotism were mere lip service, Pike argued; the 
selection of the Pacific railroad route was inescapably a sectional issue.  If southerners 
wished to prevent their section from sliding even further behind the North, therefore, they 
would have to take matters into their own hands.  “Who ever heard of a Northern man 
giving another an advantage in a matter of trade!” he added to great applause.  A railroad 
built by Congress would be a railroad along a northern line – and the South would be 
																																																						
24 “The Great Southern Convention at Charleston, No. 2,” De Bow’s Review 17 (July 1854), 97. 
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stuck with the bill.  Only by uniting and building the railroad themselves could 
southerners prevent the North from capturing the Pacific.25 
 Pike’s proposal met stiff resistance from many of the Convention’s delegates, 
including prominent advocates of southern railroad development.  Matthew Fontaine 
Maury, for instance, deemed it “unlawful,” while others agreed that only the federal 
government had the right to negotiate with foreign powers.  The scheme, they argued, 
was impractical at best and probably even unconstitutional.  Other prominent railroaders 
like Gadsden, however, sided with Pike, who ultimately carried the day, tapping strong 
sectional feeling with another bombastic appeal for what he called “a sort of declaration 
of independence on the part of the South.”26  Interrupted frequently by loud applause, 
Pike promised action and a southern railroad at long last. “For my own part, I would 
rather go and buy the right of way, than walk into the halls of Congress and ask them to 
give,” he roared to  immense applause.27  Voting by states, the Convention adopted his 
resolution unanimously, and resolved “to secure to the South, so far as may be in their 
power, the exclusive benefits and advantages of the commerce of the Pacific.”  Per Pike’s 
appeal, the Convention also resolved that “the Southern States, corporations and people, 
are entirely able to build said road, and that no time should be lost in doing so.”  Finally, 
still viewing Californians as allies in the South’s push to the Pacific, the Convention 
agreed to invite the state to unite in the proposed organization.28   
																																																						
25 “The Great Southern Convention at Charleston, No. 3,” De Bow’s Review 17 (August 1854), 210-213. 
26 “The Great Southern Convention at Charleston, No. 6,” De Bow’s Review 17 (November 1854), 491-496, 
505. See also Charleston Courier, April 18, 1854 for more coverage on the sixth and final day of the 
Convention, including Pike’s speech. 
27 De Bow’s Review 17 (November 1854), 502. 
28 The Convention’s resolutions can be found in De Bow’s Review 16 (June 1854), 636-640. 
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Outside the Convention’s halls, however, southern interest in Pike’s resolution 
proved less enthusiastic.  Although the Louisiana legislature eventually granted a charter 
in 1855, no company was ever organized under it.29  Nevertheless, Pike’s campaign 
invigorated southern railroad agitation, underscoring slaveholders’ enduring, often 
pigheaded commitment to the Pacific and their readiness to drum up potentially 
dangerous sectional impulses on behalf of commercial expansionism.  Indeed, Pike’s 
resolution is a gauge of just how far sectional feeling had progressed since the start of the 
transcontinental railroad debates, and just how important the Pacific had become to 
slaveholding interests.  Pike and his numerous allies were quite willing – perhaps even 
eager – to risk secession for commercial independence.  Here was a southern declaration 
of independence roughly seven years before formal separation. 
Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis opened yet another front in the southern railroad 
campaign. Passed in March 1853, the Pacific Railroad Survey bill authorized Davis, as 
secretary of war, to assemble teams to carry out a reconnaissance of the Trans-
Mississippi West over a ten-month period—though topological work eventually stretched 
into late 1854.30  The act was born out of a belief that scientific objectivity could break 
the congressional logjam and settle the railroad question once and for all.  Whereas 
sectional motives guided the nation’s statesmen, its engineers could presumably put aside 
politics in the interest of topological precision.  Under great national scrutiny, six 
federally appointed engineers surveyed a total of four major routes: a northern route 
																																																						
29 Jere W. Roberson, “To Build a Pacific Railroad: Congress, Texas, and the Charleston Convention of 
1854,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 78 (October 1974), 117-139; Russel, Improvement of 
Communication, 190. 
30 Gwin himself was instrumental in effecting the passage of this bill; see Gwin, Memoirs, 72. 
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between the 41st and 42nd parallels, a central route along the 38th parallel, a south-central 
route along the 35th parallel, and an extreme southern route along the 32nd parallel.31   
Yet scientific objectivity met its limits in Davis.  Feigning sectional indifference, 
the secretary of war proved eager to channel this opportunity to the South’s advantage, a 
fact not lost on political rivals like Thomas Hart Benton.32  To maintain the appearance of 
impartiality, Davis tactfully (or perhaps cunningly) appointed mostly Northern 
topological officers.  In his detailed summary of the surveys, however, Davis let his 
sectional bias shine.  Starting with the northernmost survey, he systematically argued that 
every route except that along the 32nd parallel faced severe obstacles: cost, length, 
climate, or a combination of all three. Meanwhile he dismissed, as mere trifles, serious 
impediments to the far southern route, such as a lack of water and timber.33  “A 
comparison of the results,” Davis stated, “conclusively shows that the route of the 32nd 
parallel is, of those surveyed, ‘the most practicable and economical route for a railroad 
from the Mississippi river to the Pacific ocean.’”  For him, this was a foregone 
conclusion.  But for many others, his highly suspect summary was further proof of 
southern intrigue and slaveholders’ disturbing determination to drive the railroad through 
their section at any price.  The Pacific railroad surveys thus brought no resolution to this 
increasingly fraught and increasingly sectionalized debate.34  
																																																						
31 The best source on these surveys remains William H. Goetzmann’s, Army Exploration in the American 
West, 1803-1863 (New Haven: Yale University, 1959), 262-303. 
32 Goetzmann, Army Exploration, 266, 278. See “Report on the Secretary of War, December 3, 1855” in 
Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson: 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1923), vol. 2:567-570. 
33 Jefferson Davis, Report of the Secretary of War on the Several Pacific Railroad Expeditions 
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Had optimism been able to roll iron and lay track, southerners would have driven 
their railroad into California before the ink dried on the Gadsden Treaty.  Yet the Texas 
State Gazette was not just whistling Dixie when it reported, “The prize is within her reach 
– she will not fail to grasp it.”35  By 1854, a commercial empire stretching into the Pacific 
seemed well within reach for slavery’s cotton economy.  Gadsden had negotiated a 
favorable purchase of land from Mexico.  Davis was in control of the railroad surveys.  
Arkansas and Texas were poised to extend their railroad networks and link them with 
other burgeoning southern lines.  And President Pierce seemed favorable to southern 
expansionist aims.36  Further, slaveholders could count on a powerful body of southern 
Californians to support a route through slave country.  In the summer of 1853, delegates 
at a San Diego convention resolved to promote the route along the Gila River into their 
city, and dispatched Colonel John B. Magruder to press their case in Washington.37  
Another advocate of San Diego as the western terminus, Hinton Rowan Helper, captured 
the spirit of commercial manifest destiny that animated many of his fellow southerners at 
the time.  “There is a destiny in commerce,” Helper wrote in his California memoir, “and 
fate seems determined to pour the riches of the world into our lap.”38  Indeed, the winds 
of history were blowing in a distinctly southerly direction. 
																																																						
35 Texas State Gazette, August 6, 1853 
36 For the rising tide of southern optimism, see Russel, Improvement of Communication, 161.  
37 San Antonio Ledger, July 28, 1853. Magruder was a native Virginian and future Confederate general (see 
Chapter 5). 
38 According to Helper, “It is now generally admitted that the Southern route is the most practicable.” 
Although his memoir of California painted a dismal picture of gold country – a reflection of Helper’s poor 
luck among the diggings – he could not dispute California’s potential as a trans-Pacific trading hub. And 
thus he was a vocal champion of southern communication with the Pacific coast. For more on his views on 
a far southern railroad, including lengthy quotations from Davis’s Pacific railroad survey report, see Hinton 
Rowan Helper, The Land of Gold: Reality Versus Fiction (Baltimore: Henry Taylor, 1855), 283-293. His 
most famous publication, The Impending Crisis of the South, in which he harshly criticized slavery as an 
impediment to the economic growth of the region, was still two years off.  
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Railroad Bound 
 
 When advocating for their preferred route, proslavery railroaders boasted of a 
number of advantages: flatter terrain, warmer climate, shorter distances.  But perhaps the 
most compelling advantage the South possessed, according to some, lay in its large, 
unfree labor force.  As southern railroad boosters regularly noted, an enslaved workforce 
kept costs down and construction on schedule.  “Because it is cheaper, can be kept under 
better discipline” and “worked both in summer and winter,” slave labor gave the South a 
distinct edge in railway construction, bragged the president of the Charleston and 
Savannah Railroad in 1855.39  One Virginian railroad promoter and stockholder 
quantified such benefits.  With an enslaved labor force, “the grading, masonry, and 
mechanical work on railroads, and the entire construction of canals, will be less than half 
the cost it would be under the system of contracts,” he estimated.  Contracts worked well 
enough in the free states, he argued, but the South should play to its peculiar 
advantages.40   
The numbers are indeed telling. Railroad construction in northern and western 
states, at an average of roughly $30,000 per square mile, cost double what it did in the 
South.41  According to the ledger books of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac 
Railroad, a railroad corporation could own a slave’s labor for a year for roughly $120, 
																																																						
39 “Superiority of Slave Labor in Constructing Railroads,” DBR 18 (March 1855), 404. 
40 R.G. Morris, “Slave Labor upon Public Works at the South,” DBR 17 (July 1854), 76. 
41 For this estimate, see William G. Thomas, The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of 
Modern America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 24. 
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compared to the weekly wages of about $7 to $10 for free white workers.42  In addition to 
the expense of their weekly wages, white workers in the South – often of Irish or German 
extraction – brought with them the specter of labor strife.  Why risk the trouble of wage 
strikes, walk-offs, drinking binges, and European ethnic rivalries when cheaper, more 
regulated slave labor could be had?43 
This logic led to massive concentrations of slaves on southern railroad works.  For 
instance, out of a total labor force of 643, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad employed 
435 slaves on its projects in 1856.  The overall number of slaves working in southern 
railroad construction would only climb in the years following.  The most careful student 
of the subject found that in 1860, thirty-seven southern companies used at least one-
hundred enslaved laborers in railroad construction.  The Atlantic & Gulf line in southern 
Georgia oversaw a workforce of twelve-hundred slaves – a larger population of bonded 
laborers than could be found on any single plantation in the South.  Such projects 
generally hired slaves from nearby planters on an annual basis, rather than owning them 
outright, due to the high cost of able-bodied slave men, who were deemed most suitable 
for railroad work.  According to recent estimates, southern railroads collectively 
																																																						
42 The payrolls and annual slave contracts of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad are 
scattered throughout the large collection of the company’s records at the Virginia Historical Society. I have 
drawn my estimates from the documents found in Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Papers, 
Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 45, August 1839; folder 366, March 1858; and folder 422a, January to February 
1861, VHS.  
43 On the problems with free white labor in southern railroad construction, see Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., 
“Railroads and Slavery,” Railroad History 189 (fall-winter 2003), 45, 55; and Aaron W. Marrs, Railroads 
in the Old South: Pursing Progress in a Slave Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 
55-67, 81-82. To be sure, slave labor was not without its risks. Bondspeople could and did run away, be 
pulled back to their plantations during harvest season, and incur fines for violating local laws. For the arrest 
and the subsequent fining of two slaves for breaking curfew, see letters “To the Corporations of Bowling 
Green,” April 25, 1860, Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Papers, Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 
422a, Jan.-Feb. 1861, VHS. 
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employed an average of 10,000 slaves per year at the end of the antebellum period.  But 
some scholars suggest that that number may have been as high as 20,000 by the eve of 
the Civil War.44  
Such labor practices may have suited the needs of corporations in the Southeast, 
but how would railroad construction adjust to the vaster spaces and sparser populations of 
the American Southwest?  Here was a pressing question for anyone who seriously 
contemplated a Pacific railroad.  The Virginian surveyor Andrew Belcher Gray, who 
knew the region as well as any white American, suggested two possibilities.  “The 
Papigos and Pimas Indians, by proper management, might be made very useful, in 
working upon the road where there is not much rock excavation,” he argued.  What 
“proper management” might entail, Gray did not elaborate, although he might have 
contemplated the use of Indian slaves, who circulated widely throughout the region.  He 
also pointed to the possibilities of cheap Mexican peon labor.  Because they were 
“regularly acclimated” and accustomed to hard labor, peons “might be very useful,” Gray 
suggested.  “I have seen some good stone work done by these peons in Chihuahua and 
Sonora,” he added.45  Between the African slaves of the Southeast and the Mexican peons 
and Native Americans of the Southwest, southerners like Gray could imagine an entire 
continent of unfree labor, ready to serve the needs of their Pacific railroad.   
																																																						
44 The most reliable estimates are in Kornweibel, “Railroads and Slavery,” 34-36. For the tally on the 
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, see Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 55. A 1970 study suggested the 
total figure of 20,000 slaves, which is cited in Mark A. Yanochik, Mark Thornton, and Bradley T. Ewing, 
“Railroad Construction and Antebellum Slave Prices,” Social Science Quarterly 84 (September 2003), 727. 
45 A[ndrew] B[elcher]Gray, Southern Pacific Railroad. Survey of a Route for the Southern Pacific R.R., on 
the 32nd Parallel (Cincinnati: Wrightson & Co., 1856), 85. For more on these unfree labor practices in the 
American Southwest, see Chapter 3. 
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Southern railroad corporations extracted as much labor for as little cost as 
possible.  Railroad slaves often worked in regimented gangs, driven by overseers with 
construction quotas to meet.  Because railroads generally rented rather than owned slaves, 
overseers were advised against beating the black laborers under their watch, yet that 
hardly mitigated against mistreatment.  In fact, their status as rented slaves seemed to 
invite especially harsh floggings on the black laborers on the Hamburg and Charleston 
Rail Road.  “There they were, cutting and slashing all the time,” a former railroad slave 
recalled of the overseers on the line.  “After we were whipped we had to go straight back 
to our work. They did not care whether we got well or not, because we were other 
people’s niggers.”46  No wonder, then, that some masters took out life insurance policies 
for the slaves they rented to railroad companies.47  And no wonder that some slaves 
protested against mistreatment by running away, as did eighty-four bondspeople on the 
Montgomery and West Point Railroad between the years 1845 and 1850.48  But for those 
who stayed – and for those who were caught and returned – the possibility of death, or at 
least serious injury, remained ever-present.  “There was hardly a day that some of the 
slaves did not get crippled or killed,” the anonymous former slave on the Hamburg and 
																																																						
46 [Anonymous], “Recollections of Slavery by a Runaway Slave,” in the Emancipator, October 11, 1838; 
The entire recollection was serialized in six parts, appearing on August 23, September 13, September 20, 
October 11, October 18, and October 21. That masters would seek compensation for the maiming or killing 
of their valuable human property provided at least some security for slaves, although this does not appear to 
be the case on the Hamburg and Charleston line.    
47 Richmond Fire Association, Life Insurance Agreement, Feb. 17, 1858, in Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac Railroad Papers, Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 366, March 1858, VHS. Under this policy, a Virginia 
master paid $16 to ensure his slave, Emmanuel, for up to $800.  However, the agreement stipulated that 
Emmanuel would not be covered in the case of suicide or death “by means of any invasion, insurrection, 
riot or civil commotion.” 
48 Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 66. Railroad corporations were in the business of tracking down 
runaways. See, for instance, a runaway slave ad, unknown publication details, in Richmond, Fredericksburg 
and Potomac Railroad Papers, Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 296, April 1855, VHS. 
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Charleston line recalled. “There were more killed there than at any other place I ever 
worked at.”49 
  Even in the absence of whippings, railroad work was backbreaking.  From 
clearing brush, chopping down trees, and removing boulders to excavating cuts, leveling 
terrain, and laying track, railroad slaves conducted their work almost entirely by hand.  
Some railroad companies allowed slaves to work on Sundays and holidays for pay, but in 
general, bondspeople were provided only a meager allowance of food and clothing, along 
with shoddy accommodations.  According to the abolitionist journalist, James Redpath, 
who toured railroad construction sites in North Carolina in the late 1850s, enslaved 
workers were housed in “miserable shanties along the line” and fed “one peck of Indian 
meal, and two pounds and a half of bacon a week.”50  The Montgomery & West Point 
Railroad spent twice as much per year to feed a horse or mule as it did a slave.51   
Railroad work was particularly devastating for slave families.  Although some companies 
hired female slaves for jobs like washing and cooking, construction sites were a largely 
male world.  And as such, husbands were separated from wives, sons from parents, and 
fathers from children whenever railroad contractors visited the plantation for recruitment.  
As Redpath lamented of such conditions, “Poor fellows! in that God-forsaken section of 
the earth they seldom see a woman from Christmas to Christmas.”52  
																																																						
49 “Recollections of Slavery by a Runaway Slave,” the Emancipator, October 11, 1838. The narrator 
himself eventually ran away from the line, because “I knew I could not be worse treated than I was on the 
rail road”; Emancipator, October 21, 1838.  
50 James Redpath, The Roving Editor: Or, Talks with Slaves in the South States (New York: A.B. Burdick, 
1859), 136-138. 
51 Kornweibel, “Railroads and Slavery,” 46 
52 Redpath, The Roving Editor, 138 
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Slaves not only worked the railroads, they also rode them – though very rarely of 
their own free will.53  Indeed, railways became the favored means of transporting slaves 
quickly and cheaply for sale across the southern interior.  Some corporations incentivized 
this commerce by shipping bonded children for free and by offering discount rates for 
adult slaves.  On the South Carolina Railroad, for instance, slaves and dogs traveled for 
the same price.54  For Jacob Stroyer and many other slaves, railroad depots were the sites 
of tragic human spectacles, to which bondspeople were driven “like so many cattle” and 
packed onto cars for sale.  Decades later, he was still haunted by the memory of such a 
station, where a group of slaves from his plantation, including his sisters, had been loaded 
onto train cars.  As the cars began to pull away “the colored people cried out with one 
voice as though the heavens and earth were coming together,” Stroyer recalled.  “We 
heard the weeping and wailing from the slaves as far as human voice could be heard.”55  
For Stroyer and thousands of others this was tragedy, but for southern planters 
and businessmen it was a highly lucrative commerce.  Scholars have argued that railroad 
development fueled the steep rise in slave prices during the 1850s.  By opening vast new 
areas for agricultural development and by increasing the demand for bondspeople on 
construction projects, railroad growth placed a high premium on slave labor.56  This was a 
self-perpetuating cycle: as lines were extended into the southern hinterland, more acreage 
																																																						
53 A very few slaves, however, rode the rails en route to their freedom – most famously, Frederick 
Douglass. Henry Williams, with the help of Henry David Thoreau, also escaped to freedom via train; 
Thomas, Iron Way, 36  
54 Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 111-112, 154; Kornweibel, “Railroads and Slavery,” 53-54. 
55 Jacob Stroyer, My Life in the South: New and Enlarged Edition (Salem: Salem Observer, 1885), 42-44. 
56 Yanochik, et. al. “Railroad Construction and Antebellum Slave Prices,” 723-730. The arrival of a railroad 
could also accelerate the pace of slave labor on plantations, as one North Carolina slave related to James 
Redpath. Because of the railroad, “it is so much easier to carry off the produce and sell it now; ‘cause they 
take it away so easy; and so the slaves are druv more and more to raise it;’” Redpath, Roving Editor, 127. 
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came under the cultivation of slave labor, which in turn made more bonded workers 
available for hire by railway corporations.57  It did not take a particularly fanciful 
imagination to foresee this cycle repeating itself across the Far West with the 
construction of a Pacific railroad.  Indeed, Thomas Butler King of Georgia pointed to the 
mutual relationship between slavery and railroad construction in promoting his 
transcontinental enterprise, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.  With a reliable rail 
connection, Texas would become a planter’s paradise, Butler argued, drawing 
slaveholding emigrants from the worn out soils of the East into the untapped cotton 
frontier of the West.58 As King, James Gadsden, and others had insisted for years, an 
empire of slavery and plantation commerce would thus march in step with the railroad. 
Recent trends in railroad development across the South buoyed the hopes of such 
expansionists.  Southerners had been early and eager adopters of the railway.  At 136 
miles, the line from Charleston to Hamburg, completed in 1833, was the longest railroad 
in the world at the time.59  But it was not until the 1850s that southern railroad 
construction took off, on the backs of enslaved laborers.  During that decade, the slave 
states laid down over 8,300 miles of track, as well as a staggering number of junctions, 
depots, and terminal points, thereby providing their white citizens with better railroad 
facilities and infrastructure than could be found in many parts of the North.  Every 
																																																						
57 Railroads were a boon not only to planters in agricultural areas, but also to businessmen in urban ones. In 
fact, railroads had the power to create towns where none existed before and to transform isolated 
backwaters into thriving emporia. On the growth of Atlanta and its relationship to the railroad, see G.H. 
Stueckrath, “The Cities of Georgia – Atlanta”, DBR, 27, October 1859, pp. 462-468. 
58 [T. Butler King], First Annual Report to the Board of Directors of the Southern Pacific Railroad 
Company Chartered by the State of Texas (New York: American Railroad Journal Office, 1856), 17. 
59 Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 11-12. Such a feat was made possible, no doubt, by the frenzied pace 
at which the Charleston and Hamburg drove its slaves, as noted in “Recollections of Slavery by a Runaway 
Slave,” in the Emancipator, October 11, 1838. 
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slaveholding state more than doubled its total rail mileage in the 1850s.  Outside of the 
Northwest – where development also proceeded at a feverish pace – only New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and Delaware matched that rate of growth.60  Cotton, slaves and railroads 
constituted three mutually reinforcing pillars of the southern economy in the 1850s, and 
for anyone with a stake in such enterprises, these were flush times.  From the perspective 
of successful southern railroaders, perhaps the Pacific did not seem so very far away.   
While writers from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Leo Marx have disparaged slavery’s 
relationship to the railroad and the modern world in general, the southern expansionists of 
the 1850s were anything but backward looking.61  Indeed, American slaveholders pursued 
the most advanced technologies and promoted the most extensive public works on the 
continent – and perhaps the globe.62  As Walter Licht suggests, had South had won its 
independence, it would have ranked among the top six most industrially advanced nations 
in the world.63  Nothing showcased slaveholders’ commercial savvy or modernizing 
																																																						
60 Thomas, The Iron Way, 20-28; for a table on national railway construction between 1850 and 1860, see 
Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 5. 
61 In an 1844 speech on slave emancipation in the British West Indies, Emerson announced, “Slavery is no 
scholar; in improver; it does not love the whistle of the railroad; it does not love the newspaper, the mail-
bag, a college, a book, or a preacher who has the absurd whim of saying what he thinks; it does not increase 
the white population; it does not improve the soil; everything goes to decay;” Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
“Address on the Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies,” in The 
Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson,  edited by Edward Waldo Emerson (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin 
and Company, 1904), 11: 125-126. Cite Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). Marrs addresses both of these works in 
Railroads in the Old South, 2-3. 
62 By the 1830s the U.S. possessed two times as much railroad mileage as all of Europe; Daniel Walker 
Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 563-564. Southerners did, however, adopt some feudal (or at least early modern) cultural 
practices, notably the code duello. For more on this and southern honor culture more generally, see Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982). 
63 Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), 36. For more on southern industrialization and slave labor, see Charles B. Dew, Bond of Iron: 
Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); and Frank Towers, The Urban South 
and the Coming of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004). 
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impulses quite like their commitment to railroad development.64  That southerners 
advanced slave labor to achieve this end does not signify that they had turned their 
collective backs on the modern age.  In fact, as Matthew Karp has argued, mid-century 
southerners had good reason to believe that liberalism was on the wane, unfreedom on 
the rise, and that a political economy built on plantation agriculture was the surest means 
to international ascendency.65  After all, as cotton boomed and slave prices soared in the 
U.S., abolitionist Britain began importing coolie laborers to its West Indian sugar 
colonies, an implicit concession that slave emancipation had proved bad for business.  
Slaveholders may have lamented their dependence on northern industry and shipping, but 
global developments seemed to indicate that the path forward – and ultimately the road to 
the Pacific – would be blazed by slave, and not free, labor. 
If southerners were economically ambitions and forward-facing, can we then call 
them capitalists?  This question has been at the center of a growing body of literature, 
which traces the enterprising spirit, acquisitive nature, and global connectedness of 
slaveholding Americans.  Historians like Walter Johnson, Seth Rockman, Sven Beckert, 
and Edward Baptist, among others, have powerfully illustrated how global capitalism fed 
off the slave-grown products of the American South.  And they have shown how 
																																																						
64 In the first major study of the South’s antebellum railroad system, Ulrich Bonnell Philips ironically 
stressed the isolationism of the region, arguing that “individualism and conservatism prevailed in the South 
to a marked degree, and operated against joint undertakings and new enterprises;” Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, 
A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 1860, new introduction by Aaron W. Marrs 
(Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1908, 2011). Marrs rejects this 
interpretation in both his introduction to Phillips’s work and in his own monograph on the subject; see 
Marrs, “Introduction,” xx-xxiv and Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 2-3, 7, 197-198. 
65 Matthew Karp, “The World the Slaveholders Craved: Proslavery Internationalism in the 1850s,” in 
Andrew Shankman, ed., The World of the Revolutionary American Republic: Land, Labor, and the Conflict 
for a Continent (New York: Routledge, 2014). On the productivity of American slave labor more generally, 
see Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro 
Slavery (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974). 
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slaveholders, in turn, embraced an international market that made them among the richest 
individuals on the continent.66  Yet this literature, while providing fruitful ways of 
thinking about the American South in its wider world, has perhaps overstretched.  The 
problem stems partly from imprecise terminology.  Without a working definition of 
capitalism, the concept lacks specificity and consistency – and often, by extension, 
usefulness.  When, say, Eugene Genovese deployed the term, he had in mind very 
different defining characteristics than those described by James Oakes, for example.67  At 
																																																						
66 Edward Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New 
York: Basic Books, 2014) is hardly the only work in this canon, contrary to what its title might imply. 
Scholars have been grappling with the relationship between slavery and capitalism since at least Eric 
Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 1994). For more 
recent reflections, see James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York: 
Norton, 1982); Thomas Bender, ed. The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in 
Historical Interpretation (University of California Press, 1992); Walter Johnson, “The Pedestal and the 
Veil: Rethinking the Capitalism/Slavery Question” Journal of the Early Republic 24 (summer 2004); 
Johnson, Soul By Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999); Tom Downey, Planting a Capitalist South: Masters, Merchants, and Manufactures in the 
Southern Interior, 1790-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Seth Rockman, 
“What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic, 32 (Fall 2014); Sven 
Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic 
Development (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Sven Beckert, “Slavery and 
Capitalism” Chronicle of Higher Education (December 12, 2014); and Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A 
Global History (New York: Knopf, 2014). For works that often deal more implicitly with this question, but 
still foreground the modern economic thinking of slaveholders, see Mark M. Smith, Mastered by the Clock: 
Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997); Joyce Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Bruce Eelman, Entrepreneurs in the Southern 
Upcountry: Commercial Culture in Spartanburg, South Carolina, 1845-1880 (University of Georgia Press, 
2010); John F. Kvach, , De Bow’s Review: The Antebellum Vision of a New South (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2013); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the 
Global Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and Marrs, Railroads 
in the Old South.  
67 For years, Eugene Genovese has been the preferred whipping boy for scholars of slavery and capitalism. 
Yet in refuting his theories, these historians sometimes forget that Genovese’s slaveholders were never 
divorced from the world of nineteenth century capitalism. Genovese never lost sight of the fact that, 
“slaveholders operated in a capitalist world market, they presided over the production of commodities, and 
they had to pay attention to profit-and-loss statements,” Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The 
World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage, 1976), 297. His most influential and carefully argued work on 
the subject is The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South 
(New York, 1965). Perhaps historians writing today should heed his warning: “if every commercial society 
is to be considered capitalist, the word loses all meaning.;” see pp. 14-23 for this discussion.  
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times, this new scholarship risks conflating commercial savvy with a genuine capitalist 
ethos, and thereby blurring the line between the political economies of the antebellum 
North and South.68  This depiction of capitalist slaveholders is not a portrait that 
antebellum southerners themselves would have recognized.69  They defined themselves 
and their political economy in stark contradistinction to what they believe existed in the 
North, and their dependence on chattel slavery created an ideological worldview – while 
certainly profit-oriented – profoundly at odds with that of their Yankee counterparts.70  
For them, capitalism was more than just a set of economic practices; it was a social 
system.71  Antebellum America was a house divided against itself in more ways than one. 
The proslavery push to the Pacific was meant to further distinguish and liberate 
the southern political economy from what they called the northern, industrial yoke.  As 
Albert Pike had proclaimed in Charleston in 1854, a southern transcontinental railroad 
																																																						
68 In his influential account of smallholding slaveowners, James Oakes is perhaps most guilty of this 
conflation. His problem stems, in part, from a lack of precision in his terms; see Oakes, Ruling Race. As 
Steven Hahn points out, “what landed elite in modern history, no matter how reactionary, has not been 
acquisitive. The Prussian Junkers, who hardly came to be known for their liberality, set an egregious 
standard as they colonized eastward, subjugated the peasantry, and continued to follow rough business 
traditions;” Steven Hahn, “Capitalists All!” Reviews in American History 11 (June 1983), pp. 219-225.  
69 And it is a portrait that many of those living in the southern backcountry would have found particularly 
inaccurate; see Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of 
the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
70 For a particularly thoroughgoing and angry articulation of the differences between the free, industrial 
North and slave, agricultural South, see George Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters 
(Richmond, A. Morris, 1857). Also see James Henry Hammond’s famous “Cotton is King” speech, given 
in defense of the proslavery Lecompton Constitution for Kansas. Hammond similarly proclaimed the 
superiority of the southern agricultural, slave system, arguing that northerners were merely “our factors,” 
who “bring and carry for us;” Cong. Globe, 35th congress, 1st session (March 4, 1858), 962. 
71 As Stephanie McCurry has argued, the ideology of slavery reinforced a unique set of social relations 
within the South, premised on a man’s mastery over his entire household – children, women, and slaves. 
These southern yeoman prized a political culture and political economy that they believed to be at odds, 
fundamentally, with that of the North. How else can we explain their willingness to hazard everything in a 
bid for independence? See Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender 
Relations, and the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
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would be, in effect, a declaration of commercial independence from the North, while also 
ensuring stronger ties to the rest of the world.  Slaveholders craved additional markets 
across the globe for their agricultural products, markets that could be reached without the 
interference of northern processing and shipping.  Direct trade with the 600 million 
consumers of Asia was the ultimate objective.  And if the vision was grandiose and the 
details fuzzy, this proto-nationalist campaign for regional autonomy was nothing to scoff 
at, as the proslavery victories of 1853 and 1854 had made clear.  In the process, 
southerners aimed to strengthen their ties to the American Southwest, linking the region 
to the agricultural economy and the political ideology of slavery.  The struggle for the 
West became particularly fractious because these were not just two capitalist economies 
with different labor forces.  These were competing visions of empire.    
 
The Limits of Southern Railroading  
Proslavery victories appear even more remarkable when considering the strength 
of northern opposition and the depth of intra-regional competition.  The expansionists of 
the Deep South had to contend against a vast field of rivals, from the well-organized 
railroad promoters of the North, to the strict constructionists of the Democratic Party, to 
the numerous competitors across the South itself.  Indeed, many of the greatest 
challenges that proslavery imperialists faced came from within their own section.  As 
historian William Freehling has argued, there were ‘many Souths’ in the slaveholding 
states during the antebellum period, and despite numerous efforts to close ranks against 
the perceived threat of Yankee encroachment, southerners succumbed to internal 
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divisions more often than not.72  Such rivalries were exacerbated by the potential spoils of 
railroad development.73  
From Asa Whitney’s first petition in 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War, 
northerners agitated for a range of routes across free soil.  Increasingly during the 1850s, 
voting on Pacific railroad bills followed sectional lines, and antislavery forces proved 
eager to divert attention from the popular 32nd parallel route.  For well over half a decade, 
Whitney kept up his one-man campaign for a railroad into the Pacific northwest, although 
he eventually discontinued the fight by the early 1850s.74  Other northerners picked up the 
torch, however.  A free soil possibility gained greater visibility with the work of 
Theodore Judah, a Yankee engineer and surveyor, whose efforts, years later, would pave 
the way for the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad.  Initially, however, he was 
widely derided as “Crazy Judah” for his suggestion that a railroad might cross 
California’s Sierra Nevada, then thought to be an insurmountable range.75  By the end of 
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the decade, the soldier, explorer, and expansionist William Gilpin gave the far northern 
route a sensationalist twist in his imaginative The Central Gold Region (1860).  He 
argued that the center of American power would eventually shift to the Mississippi River 
with Denver as the metropolis of an American empire that would face west toward Asia.  
The ultimate objective was “to disinfect ourselves of inane nepotism to Europe” and 
establish a firmer Pacific orientation, a geopolitical reordering that would be 
accomplished with a transcontinental railroad terminating at the mouth of the Columbia.  
Thus, Gilpin revitalized interest in Whitney’s original far northern terminus, while 
articulating a more ambitious vision for the future of American empire on the Pacific.76 
But the most dogged opponent of the Gila River route came from within the South 
itself.  Missouri senator Thomas Hart Benton rarely missed an opportunity to scold 
proslavery congressmen for their sectional bias (although he was motivated by self-
interest as much as the next politician).  Recall that Benton lambasted, in no mixed terms, 
the Gadsden Purchase and the southern route it was designed to expedite, as well as the 
railroad surveys under the aegis of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis.  Instead, he put 
forward, again and again, a route that would begin at St. Louis and follow a more central 
path along the 35th parallel to San Francisco.77 Fellow Missourians, like John S. Phelps, 
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were also critical of the far southern road, as too distant from the main arteries of 
American commerce.78  Thanks to the persistence of Benton, Phelps, and others within 
Missouri, St. Louis would become the primary competitor to Memphis as the preferred 
eastern terminus within the South.  Yet slaveholding expansionists ultimately had the last 
laugh.  Benton’s hostility to the westward extension of slavery earned him powerful 
enemies.  The Missouri legislature denied him a sixth senate term in 1851, and by 1855, 
his opposition to Kansas-Nebraska ultimately drove him out of the House as well.  A 
congress free of Thomas Hart Benton was a distinct victory for champions of a great 
slavery road.79       
The advocates of a line across the 32nd parallel also had to contend with a rival 
further south.  New Orleans shipping interests rightfully saw the Memphis movement as a 
threat to their stranglehold on the western trade, and thus remained less committed to 
railroad construction so long as they controlled southern river transportation.  
Businessmen in New Orleans would eventually join the transcontinental railroad frenzy, 
but before then, many within Louisiana considered various connections through Mexico 
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and Central America as the most viable paths to the Pacific.80  J.D.B. De Bow, who 
operated his Review out of New Orleans, was among the most prominent early defenders 
of a route across Mexico’s Isthmus of Tehuantepec.  Led by Pierre Soule and Judah 
Benjamin, the Tehuantepec Railroad Company sought a right-of-way through Mexico, 
rather than construction through Texas, in order to preserve the commercial power of 
New Orleans.81  Despite the high-profile support and lobbying of these expansionists, a 
railroad across the Mexican isthmus was not constructed until 1894, under the presidency 
of Porfirio Diaz and roughly three decades after American slavery itself had been 
abolished.82        
Other central American projects proved more rewarding – despite substantial 
initial investments.  After five years, $8 million, and the deaths of thousands of workers, 
the New York based firm of William Aspinwell finally succeeded in constructing a 
railroad across the isthmus of Panama by 1855.  Until Vanderbilt slashed prices for his 
competing route across Nicaragua, Aspinwell ruled the shipping business that carried 
goods, gold, and immigrants to California and back again.  The company netted $6 
million in profits in its first seven years of operation, and at one point commanded the 
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highest price, per share, of any stock on the New York Stock Exchange.  The proslavery 
push for a transcontinental railroad was, in many ways, an attempt to cut into the profits 
of these private shipping enterprises, and to demonstrate that southerners could also 
compete in large-scale transportation enterprises.83 
Among Democratic railroad promoters, the issue of funding presented a potential 
sticking point.  Should individual states pay for railroad construction within their borders, 
or should the federal government bankroll the entire project?  In other words, was such a 
sweeping federal undertaking – which even the most conservative estimates placed at 
over $100 million – compatible with the states’ rights position so many southern 
politicians claimed to represent?84  As Gwin grumbled in his memoirs, it was often these 
strict constructionists, along with “extremists, north and south,” who stymied railroad 
bills.85  It was probably men like Zedekiah Kidwell of Virginia who Gwin had in mind.  
“Government was instituted for the protection of its citizens against foreign invasion and 
domestic insurrection,” Kidwell declared in a minority report on an 1856 Pacific railroad 
bill, “and not to enter into the freighting business, or into railroad building, for the benefit 
of the trading and travelling classes.”  Even if it could be built, he argued, such a railroad 
would require “a sum of money greater, probably, than is yearly earned by all the 
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shipping of all the oceans of the world!”86  Of course, southern Democrats like Kidwell 
did not have a monopoly on strict constructionism.  The abolitionist and New York 
congressman Gerrit Smith opposed a Pacific railroad for similar reasons, as he outlined in 
an 1854 speech, published as Keep Government Within Its Limits. “Let Government build 
this road,” he claimed, “and there will be no assignable limits to its future departure from 
its own province, and to its future invasion of the province of the people.”87 
 Slaveholders who opposed federal funding on such a massive scale could have 
found a more suitable alternative in the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company of Robert 
Walker and Thomas Butler King, a private enterprise.  Both Walker and King came to the 
railroad business with well-established proslavery bona fides.  Walker, although born in 
Pennsylvania, had come of age politically in Mississippi and served as James K. Polk’s 
treasury secretary.  President Franklin Pierce later attempted to appoint him minister to 
China, but Walker declined.  King, another transplant from the North, represented 
Georgia in the House of Representatives through the 1840s, where he distinguished 
himself as one of the South’s foremost naval expansionists, promoting steamship lines in 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.  During the gold rush, he moved to California to seek 
higher political office, though he was bested by William Gwin in the state’s first 
senatorial election.  Chartered in 1852 and capitalized at $100 million, their Atlantic and 
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Pacific Railroad proposed to follow the line favored by the Deep South’s expansionists.  
This was the project that Thomas Jefferson Green praised so highly as the “great slavery 
road.”  And like so many proslavery enterprises of this ilk, it soon attracted the criticism 
of the northern press.  Cornelius Peebles, the editor of the New York Examiner, 
dismissed Walker as a “flibberty-gibbet,” who was heading a team of “Southern 
slaveholders” in the process of committing “a gross fraud on the stockholders of the 
Company.” A southern company running on northern capital, the entire enterprise was 
not worth a fraction of the $100 million they claimed for their stock, Peebles argued.88  
Ultimately Walker and King failed to secure a charter to construct a line through Texas – 
which probably came as no surprise to Peebles – and thus the Atlantic and Pacific 
Railroad Company effectively folded. 
 But the board members did not concede defeat so easily.  They reorganized and 
renamed the operation, not once but twice, and continued fighting for transit rights 
through Texas.89  In an effort to win favor for their project, they commissioned Andrew 
Belcher Gray of Virginia to conduct a survey of the American Southwest.  A more 
seasoned surveyor or keener advocate for the far southern route could have hardly been 
found anywhere in the country.  Gray had served as the chief surveyor of the US-
Mexican boundary commission, and his report was used to justify the $10 million 
congressional allocation for the Gadsden Treaty.  His subsequent survey, under Walker 
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and King’s renamed Texas Western Railroad Company, reiterated his earlier findings 
about the feasibility of a railroad through the Southwest.  Gray’s operation was 
substantial, and once again showcased the lengths to which southerners were willing to 
go to promote their preferred route.  Five months and 2,2000 miles later, Gray and his 
company of 26 men – who hailed almost exclusively from Texas, except for one 
Kentuckian and Gray himself, a Virginian – compiled perhaps the most exhaustive 
argument to date for the great slavery road.  Published in 1856, the report was a brief for 
the practicality of railroad construction as well for the riches, both agricultural and 
mineral, that could be found across this route.  For a total cost of $45 million, Gray 
predicted, the South could secure a highway for the transport of “cotton, tobacco, wheat, 
corn, hemp and wool,” across the West, and in the process, transform “the whole valley 
of the Rio Grande, from Santa Fe to the Presidio del Norte, the extensive interior of 
Sonora, Chihuahua, New Mexico, and Texas,” into a tributary for plantation commerce. 
The road would ultimately terminate in the port  of San Diego, where Gray had invested 
personally.90 
Even as they cheered such private enterprises, a majority of proslavery leaders 
agreed on the necessity of federal aid for such a project.91  The buccaneering spirit of 
individual politicians explains much of this logic.  After all, railroading was big business, 
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and slaveholding leaders were just as eager to snatch the financial fruits of internal 
improvements as their Yankee counterparts.  On the matter of railroad development, 
southern politicians had been reaping the rewards of federal largess since 1850, when 
Congress began offering free land to railway corporations in order to incentivize 
settlement and development.  The land was distributed in a checkerboard pattern, with 
alternating plots either available for sale to the public or given gratis to railroad 
companies. As historian Scott Reynolds Nelson illustrates, southern politicians were 
particularly adept at bending railroad legislation to proslavery ends.  Senator David Rice 
Atchison of Missouri and his proslavery allies, for example, capitalized on land 
giveaways for the benefit of themselves and their allies.  Because of this clique, writes 
Nelson, “when land grants to railroads began in 1850, most went either through southern 
states or toward them.”92 
Southern Democrats could easily shelve their state rights scruples when properly 
enticed by the financial windfall of a transcontinental railroad through their region.  
Centralization at the federal level, which so many slaveholders decried through the 1850s 
and beyond, was only considered a menace when it threatened slavery and southern 
economic interests.  Strict constructionism generally took a backseat to imperial 
imperatives.  For example, slaveholders relinquished their state rights doctrine when 
presented with the opportunity to acquire Louisiana from France in 1807.  They 
embraced federal power when, in the 1830s, the military cleared valuable plantation real 
estate by forcibly relocating Indians from lands in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and 
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Mississippi.  They cheered the annexation of Texas and the conquest of New Mexico and 
California, again made possible only through overwhelming federal force.  They cried 
foul when several northern legislatures turned state rights to their own advantage by 
passing so-called Personal Liberty Laws in opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  
And they endorsed the federal judiciary when it handed down its proslavery ruling in the 
Dred Scott case.  As the long history of proslavery politicking makes clear, the only 
consistent element of the southern state-rights mantra was its inconsistency.93  State rights 
was a banner to be unfurled whenever politically and economically expedient, then 
quietly stashed when the full force of the federal government was needed.94   
In their maneuverings at the federal level, the slaveholding advocates of westward 
expansion achieved a pyrrhic victory by mid-decade.  Bleeding Kansas is remembered 
today as perhaps the decisive flashpoint in the nation’s spiral towards civil war.  At the 
time, however, it was seen largely as the byproduct of the intractable Pacific railroad 
feud.  Indeed, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 had its roots in opposition to the great 
slavery road.95  As observers noted, railroad construction would have to be accompanied 
by white settlement along its path, and Nebraska, prime terrain for a central railway, had 
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been guaranteed to native populations since 1834.  So long as Indian Country remained 
closed to white settlement, the odds on a northern route winning the Pacific railroad were 
slim.  On the other hand, the 32nd parallel route ran through lands – if occupied by 
potentially hostile Indian tribes – at least open to white settlement.  When it appeared as 
if the southern route had become the clear favorite, northerners moved with alacrity.  
Benton took an early lead in campaigning for a railroad from St. Louis and for the 
accompanying organization of Nebraska, and soon thereafter Willard Hall and William 
Richardson spearheaded a bill in the House.  Just as the Senate was debating one of 
William Gwin’s southern-oriented Pacific railroad proposals in 1853, Hall made a plea 
for a more northerly route, accompanying the opening of Nebraska. “Why, everybody is 
talking about a railroad to the Pacific ocean,” he complained.  “In the name of God, how 
is the railroad to be made if you will never let people live on the lands through which the 
road passes?” Without the organization of Nebraska, he rightly noted, Congress would 
likely be forced to settle on some point in Texas as the road’s eastern terminus.96   
Overwhelming opposition from southerners in the Senate, including William Gwin, 
effectively killed the original bill. 
Stephen Douglas revived the Nebraska question the next year, but this time with 
the support of the South.  To gain these crucial votes, he made what many northerners 
regarded as a Faustian bargain: his bill repealed the Missouri Compromise line, split the 
western territory into two halves – Nebraska and Kansas – and left the slavery question to 
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the dictates of popular sovereignty.  Ironically, a bill that had, as one of its aims, the 
facilitation of another railroad route, ultimately served to derail the Pacific railroad 
debate.97  The ensuing conflict between free soilers and proslavery squatters in Kansas 
pushed sectional tensions to a near breaking point and thus effectively foreclosed the 
possibility of compromise over a transcontinental railroad by about 1856.  Northerners 
would not countenance a southern route, while southerners closed ranks against 
construction along a northern line.  Congressmen would continue to agitate for various 
Pacific railroad routes, but with increasing jadedness.  Of all the casualties produced by 
Bleeding Kansas, the most politically consequential was the Pacific railroad.98 
	
	
Jefferson Davis’s Camels and the Far, Far West 
And yet, southern dreams of a Pacific empire did not die on the bloodied soil of 
Kansas.  As railroad bills languished in a factionalized Congress, some southerners 
turned their attention to corollary projects in their ongoing efforts to link South and West 
and harness the Pacific trade for their plantation economy.  Jefferson Davis, for instance, 
sought to import camels from the Levant in an attempt boost infrastructural development 
in the Southwest, while another group of southerners looked to Hawaii as the next 
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available field for American expansion.  Slaveholders thus proved eager to exploit 
overseas resources and harness international strategies to further their expansionist aims.   
When Davis first introduced his esoteric plan for an American camel corps in 
1851, he was almost laughed out of the Senate.  But when his fellow senators finally 
stopped snickering, they had to take stock of a very serious proposal.  Beginning with a 
modest appropriation of $30,000 for the importation of 30 camels and 20 dromedaries, 
Davis expected to eventually revolutionize transportation in the American Southwest, 
using animals that he believed could overcome the region’s powerful Indian tribes and 
provide protection for both settlers and mail routes.  Davis praised the camel as the “ship 
of the desert,” destined to become “the greatest stroke of economy which has ever been 
made in regard to transportation.”99  After four years of lobbying, he finally won his 
camel corps by 1855, and dispatched a team of officers to the Levant with detailed 
instructions on how and where to acquire the animals.  A year later, thirty-four camels 
from North Africa and the Middle East made their first appearance in Texas.100  
Davis’s camel scheme was of a less patently proslavery nature than his railroad 
agitation, although it still had a decidedly southern flavor to it.  After all, these camels 
were bound for the Southwest, across terrain that Davis and others hoped would soon 
host a southern transcontinental railroad.  As he recognized, railways and overland roads 
would not build themselves.  They had to be carved out of Indian country and guarded 
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against Native peoples.  Furthermore, almost 2000 miles separated the Pacific Coast from 
the Mississippi Valley, with no major intervening rivers crossing east to west.  Camels, 
Davis reasoned, would help subdue this region and therefore expedite travel for 
westward-bound settlers.  To Davis, easy transit across this southernmost corridor would 
facilitate the expansion of proslavery interests.  “If we had a good railroad and other 
roads making it convenient to go through Texas into New Mexico, and through New 
Mexico into Southern California,” Davis mused privately to a friend in 1855, “our people 
with their servants, their horses and their cows would gradually pass westward over 
fertile lands into mining districts, and in the latter, especially, the advantage of their 
associated labor would impress itself upon others about them.”101  By this logic, 
slaveholding imperialism did not require grand conquests; it simply called for 
infrastructural development.  And camels could play a vital part in bringing that about.    
For years to come, Davis would defend his camel corps against accusations that 
the project was a thinly veiled proslavery plot.102  He had always been careful to maintain 
a nationalist, rather than sectional, posture whenever discussing the project, yet criticism 
persisted.103  Amid rising sectional tensions, Congress refused to appropriate funds for the 
experiment in 1858, 1859, and 1860.  By 1859 more than 80 camels were scattered across 
forts in California and Texas, but popular support for the experiment had waned.   
According to historian Thomas Connelly, the public could never quite look beyond the 
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camel’s “personal habits of regurgitating on passersby or blowing a bloody bladder out of 
its mouth when frightened, its acute halitosis and general bad odor, its fierceness during 
rutting season, its voluminous sneeze, its shedding of large clumps of hair until it looked 
perfectly hideous, and its awkward appearance.”104  Camels, in short, did not endear 
themselves to American travelers.   
Quixotic though this project may seem in hindsight, the camel corps highlights 
Davis’s commitment to southwestern development and his versatility in bringing such 
dreams to fruition.  Davis sought global solutions in order to master American space.  He 
endured the initial derision of Congress to pull off an expensive and logistically difficult 
operation.  After all, camel transport was a key component to his imperial vision, a link in 
a transportation network that would bring the slaveholding South into the Far West.   
As Davis’s camels made their way across the Southwest, another group of 
southerners turned their attention overseas to a budding field of interest: Hawaii, or the 
Sandwich Islands as they were often known.  If transcontinental railroad ambitions had 
been partly checked by mid-decade, the related project of commercial, and perhaps 
territorial, expansion into the Pacific’s islands sustained the imperial inclinations of 
proslavery partisans.  From their perspective, the Pacific appeared more like the far, far 
West than the Far East.  Ever since Asa Whitney’s first railroad memorial, the connection 
between a transcontinental railway, the Sandwich Islands, and Asian trade were firmly 
linked in the American mind.105  In the first of many articles on Hawaii, an 1847 issue of 
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De Bow’s Review made that connection more explicit.  “Taken in connection with the 
great purposes of a canal now contemplated between the oceans, or a railroad, [the 
Sandwich Islands have] a most special bearing and application.”106  If a transcontinental 
railroad boosted Pacific commerce in the way many predicted, Hawaii would become an 
ever-more essential link – as a coaling station, commercial entrepot, and exporter of 
agricultural goods –  between the United States and the 600 million consumers of Asia.  
And there was reason to believe that whichever section controlled the railroad might also 
control the political fortunes of the Sandwich Islands.    
Like J.D.B De Bow, William Gwin was enchanted by the Hawaiian Islands and 
pushed aggressively for annexation.  In an unanticipated Congressional debate regarding 
Cuba in December 1852, Gwin attempted to divert attention from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific.  “There are other islands beside Cuba in which the United States are interested,” 
he reminded his colleagues.  “There are a set of islands called the Sandwich Islands, 
which we in California look upon as our summer residence.  And when the Senator from 
Virginia talks about ripe fruit, it ought to be known that that fruit is ripe also, and ready to 
fall.”107  It was no coincidence that the same men pushing for the Pacific railroad were 
the ones calling for annexation – or at least the commercial domination – of Hawaii.  
Pacific expansionism and the transcontinental railroad were part of the same imperialist 
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thrust.  And proslavery writers and politicians comprised a key component of this 
movement.  
 For those interested in the Pacific islands, labor stood out as a particularly thorny 
problem.  In her 1852 work, The Sandwich Islands as They Are, Not as They Should Be, 
Elizabeth Parker, wife of an American official in Hawaii, argued that the fertile islands 
could not afford to maintain free labor.  “Whether, eventually, these Islands should be 
annexed to the United States, or become an independent republic, the introduction of 
slavery is indispensable to their value,” she wrote.  With the sort of determinism that 
marked many of her contemporaries’ outlooks, Parker added, the “nature of the climate” 
dictated that “slavery will certainly exist, ere many years be passed.”108  Although no 
other Pacific enthusiast would so explicitly endorse the introduction of slavery to the 
Sandwich Islands, proslavery advocates like Francis Poe fretted over a distinct labor 
problem on the islands, due to the alleged indolence of the natives.109  Under the name of 
Dr. Wood, another observer in De Bow’s Review echoed concerns about native indolence, 
yet saw coolie labor from China as a poor substitute.  Instead, he wondered whether the 
Hawaiian economy would not benefit from a return to a feudalism.  In language echoing 
proslavery polemics, Dr. Wood suggested that the islanders’ “naturally inoffensive 
natures and child-like docility” and “their disposition to be guided” rendered them fit 
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subjects for a type of ameliorated serfdom.  Under such a system, the rich soils of the 
islands would finally reach their full potential, yielding stores of coffee, sugar and 
cotton.110  While southerners never reached a consensus on a favored labor system for 
Hawaii, most agreed that more exploitative methods were needed to rouse the native 
population from its inborn sloth.  Fortunately for these expansionists, Anglo-Americans 
were coming to represent an increasing proportion of the islands’ population, especially 
among the elite and landholding echelons of society.  Like the diminishing Indian tribes 
of the continental United States, the Sandwich Islanders, according to many observers, 
were marching steadily toward extinction.111  Demography, climate, location – all of 
these factors seemed to invite American expansion into the Pacific.112  
 Southerners’ calls for expansion into the Pacific isles – especially those that 
littered De Bow’s Review throughout the 1850s – smacked of what could be called 
maritime manifest destiny, a rhetoric that rang with the same bombast as the ongoing 
railroad boosterism.  A glance at American commercial developments in the Pacific was 
cause enough for nationalist chest-thumping, according to De Bow.  “With Great Britain 
we are now contending for the sceptre of the seas; and it behooves us, like her, to watch 
the mass of the world, and open relations with the uttermost isle,” the Review declared in 
a familiarly triumphalist mood.  “There is a glorious field before us, and we have nothing 
to dread from the rivalry of any contemporary nation. The hardy spirit of our enterprise 
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has lost nothing since the days of Burke.”113  As railroad promoters never failed to 
mention, a transcontinental highway would assure commercial dominance in the Pacific, 
effectively realizing the dream of Columbus: to reach Asian markets from the west.114  
Finally in possession of the continent, the United States seemed poised to continue 
expanding across the Pacific. 
	
The Lesser Slavery Road 
Perhaps even more so than the camel corps or the allure of the Sandwich Islands, 
the campaign for an overland mail route revived the expectations of proslavery 
expansionists.  Nearly forgotten by scholars today, the Butterfield overland mail road was 
a cause célèbre of the late antebellum era and one of slaveholders’ greatest coups.  The 
project did not begin as a sectional affair, however.  In March 1857 Congress passed a 
$600,000 appropriation for the construction of an overland road from an undetermined 
point in the Mississippi Valley to San Francisco. The price tag was high but the payoff, 
many congressmen reasoned, would be substantial.  Not only would this new road 
provide faster, more regular mail service to the Pacific coast, but it was also expected to 
offer a safe overland trail for westering emigrants.  If successful, this route was also 
anticipated to become the precursor to the long-awaited Pacific railroad.  Iron rails, went 
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the logic, would follow this emigrant’s trail, and east and west would finally be 
connected along a well-traveled, federally-financed corridor.  
To avoid the sort of sectional standoff that had so frequently stymied Pacific 
railroad bills, the route’s location was left to contractors, who began submitting bids in 
summer 1857.  There was just one problem, however, and his name was Aaron V. 
Brown, U.S. postmaster-general.  Former law partner of James K. Polk, congressman, 
governor of Tennessee, and a champion of Texas annexation, Brown had established his 
credentials as an avowedly “strong Southern man.”115  Recently appointed postmaster-
general by President Buchanan, Brown disliked all nine routes proposed by the bidders, 
likely because none passed south of Albuquerque.  So Brown took it upon himself to 
designate a new route and forced all contractors to conform to his geographic strictures.  
In direct violation of the congressional act, Brown stipulated a bifurcated route beginning 
at St. Louis and Memphis (his hometown), then converging at Little Rock, before 
swinging through Texas to El Paso, Fort Yuma, and Los Angeles, and finally up the 
valleys of California to San Francisco.  In total, his route added 600 miles to the longest 
alternative bid.   
In an era of brazen proslavery maneuvers, Brown’s re-routing of a congressional 
act ranked near the top of the list.  Although this overland road would not necessarily 
serve the expansion of chattel slavery itself, it would advance the interests of the slave 
states through which it passed.  As the logic went, settlers from these states would fan out 
along the route, and even if they failed to bring their slave property with them, they 
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would certainly bring their proslavery politics, further strengthening ties between the 
South and the Far Southwest.  As the Pacific railroad was ultimately expected to trace 
this mail route, Brown’s maneuver also marked a signal victory for the prospects of the 
“great slavery road.”  “The route for a Southern railroad and the establishment of the 
Great Overland Mail line upon that route, are considered parts of the same system,” the 
Sacramento Daily Union lamented in December 1857.  “[U]ndertaken with the view of 
connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific,” these two projects were “devised” to enable “a 
population from the Southern States [to] naturally take possession of the country over 
which the railroad and mail line will pass.”116  Between the mail route and anticipated 
railroad, the westward flow of migrants and commerce would follow a decidedly 
southern course, thereby ensuring a continental reach for proslavery politics.  Just as 
Davis pursued the lodestar of sectional aggrandizement at the expense of national 
interests, Brown ran roughshod over Congressional mandates to advance a pro-southern 
agenda in the West.117 
Postmaster Brown did little to disguise his southern partisanship in his official 
report.  Like Davis before him, he dismissed more northern routes as excessively cold 
and inaccessible.  Along a northern route, the mail would not reach the Pacific coast in 
the 25-day window stipulated by the act.  In addition to these delays, Brown argued, 
travelers would also be imperiled.  He imagined passengers along an Albuquerque route, 
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“benumbed by the cold for more than a week, overcome by the loss of sleep.”  Such a 
route, “under circumstances of so much severe exposure, would, in a few years, mark 
every station with the fresh graves of its victims,” Brown grimly concluded.118  He 
rightfully argued that the southernmost route was flatter and warmer, but implausibly 
claimed that it also suffered from less water scarcity than the alternatives.  He invited 
northern opposition when he boasted that his mail route would link up with a vast 
southern transportation network, feeding off “all the great railroads of Virginia, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky… and New Orleans and 
Texas.”119   
Brown struck a decidedly imperialist note in the final part of his report.  Not only 
would this road contribute to southern transportation fortunes, help populate western 
territories, and bind the eastern U.S. to the Pacific, it would also facilitate southwestern 
empire along the U.S-Mexico border, potentially serving as a springboard for future 
conquests.  “In time of peace it will shed its blessings on both nations,” he argued, 
“whilst in time of war it will furnish a highway for troops and munitions of war, which 
might enable us to vindicate our rights, and preserve untarnished our national honor.”120  
Again, western transportation facilities and empire fit hand-in-glove.  Fittingly, Brown 
drew on another great western expansionist to justify his work: Jefferson Davis.  He cited 
Davis as the ultimate authority, “who collected a larger amount of reliable information on 
this subject than any other person,” and who also favored this southernmost route.121  
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Indeed, Brown’s arguments for a southern overland mail route and Davis’s earlier 
arguments for a southern transcontinental railroad are largely indistinguishable.  
Although Davis’s report only deepened the conflict over the Pacific railroad, it enjoyed 
something of an afterlife through Brown’s maneuverings and thus helped achieve a 
substantial proslavery victory in southwestern transportation.    
With a southern overland mail route thus secured, the slave states applauded their 
newest champion.  The Alexandria Gazette called Brown’s report “clear, simple, and 
comprehensive,” while the Memphis Daily Appeal cheered him as “able and masterly.”122  
Brown, after all, had become a hometown hero in Memphis, and the Appeal took note.  
“The citizens of Memphis, especially, should thank and remember him for the strong 
stand he has taken for their city as a terminus, and for the unanswerable arguments he has 
so successfully brought to bear to sustain it,” the paper argued.123  Shortly after the 
opening of the route, an observer in Texas noted that already “settlements are rapidly 
extending westward along the route.  Even at such an early stage in the road’s history, he 
concluded, “the Overland Mail Route is really a magnificent enterprise, and one of the 
greatest achievements of American progress.”124  President Buchanan, a strong southern 
sympathizer despite his Pennsylvania origins, was equally jubilant. “It is a glorious 
triumph for civilization and the Union,” he announced. “Settlements will soon follow the 
																																																						
122 Alexandria Gazette, Dec. 10, 1857. 
123 Memphis Daily Appeal (no date) reprinted in Charleston Mercury, March 8, 1858. 
124 W.T.G. Weaver to Sherman Patriot, Nov. 19, 1858, reprinted in Dallas Herald, December 15, 1858. See 
also De Bow’s Review, December 1858, pp. 719-723. 
	 124 
course of the road, and the East and the West will be bound together by a chain of living 
Americans, which can never be broken.”125 
Northern outrage was proportional to the audacity of Brown’s act.  The Chicago 
Tribune called it “One of the greatest swindles ever perpetrated upon the country by the 
slave holders,” while an equally indignant Ohio State Journal dubbed it “a shameful 
outrage” and a “revolution of law.”126  The road would enrich not only the slave states, 
the Journal added, but Brown himself, who purportedly owned real estate across the 
route he selected.127  Meanwhile the National Era protested, “The South demanded the 
sacrifice of the public convenience upon the altar of Slavery propagandism, and the South 
must be gratified at every cost.”128  The San Francisco press echoed many of these 
complaints, noting that all mail and passengers would have to be routed through Los 
Angeles, a proslavery bastion, before ultimately reaching the much more populous areas 
around the San Francisco Bay.  “Under the miserably short-sighted policy of the 
Executive,” the San Francisco Bulletin complained, “California is made to suffer, and the 
public Treasury is robbed” – and all for a route that passed too far south to attract a 
critical mass of passenger traffic.129  These faultfinders could have applied to this 
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overland road what was once said of the regional San Antonio-San Diego line: It was a 
route “from no place through nothing to nowhere.”130 
Northern and border state congressmen also lambasted Brown’s road, linking it to 
a longer history of proslavery scheming in the Far Southwest.  In a lengthy and 
impassioned speech, Representative Francis Blair of Missouri connected the dots 
between the Gadsden Purchase, Davis’s Pacific railroad surveys, the camel corps, and 
now this overland mail route. “Why was it that an appropriation of $10,000,000 to 
purchase Arizona, appropriations to import camels, to bore artesian wells, and to print an 
endless series of the most costly books… could be made during the dominancy of the so-
called Democracy, and no effort whatever made to find a line for the central route?” Blair 
demanded.  The answer, of course, was simple.  The “southern faction” forced the hand 
of both the executive and Congress to “dictate absolutely its policy.”  The newest 
outrage, Brown’s overland mail road, was yet another example of proslavery 
expansionists sacrificing national interests and considerable capital to advance their 
sectional agenda, Blair added.131  In later debates in the senate, other critics piled on.  
Lyman Trumbull slammed the postmaster general for overriding congressional will to 
build a road “as crooked as an ox-bow” and a good deal longer than originally 
advertised.132  To Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, the new mail road would pass 
along a “desert route, now and hereafter to be known, I trust, as the disunion route.”133  
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As these congressmen recognized, the stakes were high in the contest for western 
transportation, and slaveholders again held the winning hand. 
Despite hearty protest, in September 1857 A.V. Brown awarded the contract to 
John Butterfield, a New York expressman and personal friend of President Buchanan.  
Twice-weekly mail service was to begin one year later, a formidable task even with the 
resources at Butterfield’s disposal.  He had to construct a road that ran over 2800 miles of 
terrain that, for much of its expanse, was sparsely populated, rugged, and short on water.  
There was also the problem of Indian tribes.  To secure the right-of-way through their 
lands, Butterfield would distribute more than $10,000 per year to Native Americans in 
the region.  His team also dug a series of wells along the route and constructed roughly 
200 stations.  For the transport work ahead, the line purchased 100 coaches, 1000 horses, 
500 mules, and recruited nearly 800 men.  All told, it was an impressive undertaking, and 
by 1860 the Butterfield line was carrying more letters than the U.S. steamship service.134  
Although the vast majority of westward migrants continued to use the central overland 
trail, settlements along the Butterfield route grew considerably, especially in Texas.  The 
population of chief towns along the route nearly doubled, while smaller settlements also 
sprung up along its path.  In these new towns, the line’s stations often served as the 
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commercial center.135  Ultimately the line would not outlive the sectional crisis that it did 
so much to exacerbate.  The famed but short-lived Pony Express, which followed a 
central route, originated in 1860 as a response to the far southern Butterfield road.  With 
secession, the Butterfield company moved its operations to the central line, although 
Confederates continued to move over the old route.136     
The Butterfield line could be considered the postscript to over a decade of 
proslavery scheming for a transcontinental railroad.  Southerners did not win their “great 
slavery road,” but with the construction of the overland mail route, they secured what 
many considered the next best thing.  The Butterfield line only accelerated the migration 
and commercial exchange that had been conducted between the slave states and the 
Desert West for decades.  And it stood as a physical representation of the connections 
between South and Southwest.  That the route was established over the fierce resistance 
of northern politicians highlights just how adept southerners had become in advancing 
their western agenda.  Between the Gadsden Purchase, the Pacific railroad surveys, 
Jefferson Davis’s camel corps, and finally the overland mail route, slaveholders 
consistently outmaneuvered their adversaries to dictate infrastructural policy for the Far 
West.  And in the process, they facilitated the westward movement of southern-born 
settlers, a demographic phenomenon that would have significant consequences for 
sectional politics in places like New Mexico, Arizona, and California.137  
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Conclusion 
 
 Even as sectional battle lines hardened, proslavery railroad promoters persevered 
in their old crusade.  Within Congress, Jefferson Davis continued agitating for a southern 
route almost until the eve of secession.138  And William Gwin, perhaps the most tireless 
campaigner of all, still hoped to bind East and West along one continuous rail line.  More 
emphatically than any other major figure of the time, he continued to articulate the dream 
of commercial empire that southern railroad advocates, in particular, had made so 
familiar over the course of the last decade.  Rising to speak on December 14, 1858, he 
proceeded to deliver one of his most impassioned speeches on behalf of the Pacific 
railroad.  Rehashing many of the old arguments about the bounties of Asian trade, Gwin 
spoke with a sense of urgency seasoned by a career of failed transcontinental schemes.  
He predicted that the railroad would, if built, quickly double the nation’s wealth and lead 
the United States past Great Britain as the dominant commercial power of the world.  
Especially promising to Gwin was the untapped market of Asian cotton consumers.  In 
words that could be considered an antebellum anthem for American economic 
imperialists, Gwin declared:  
Commerce is power and empire. Its conquests are greater, more universal 
and enduring than those of arms… Give us, as this railroad would, the 
permanent control of the commerce and exchanges of the world, and in the 
progress of time and the advance of civilization, we would command the 
institutions of the world – not like the colonies of Rome, by the sword and 
vassalage, but by that irresistible moral power which would ultimately 
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carry our institutions with our commerce throughout the sphere we 
inhabit.139 
 
Such a statement would have found countless adherents roughly forty years later.  
By that time, the credo of economic expansionism had worked its way into the nation’s 
very marrow.  Gwin himself would have been especially pleased by developments in the 
Pacific – the railroad had been built, Hawaii had been annexed, and the wealth of Asian 
markets was increasingly flowing into Pacific harbors. The United States entered the 
twentieth century as a newly minted world power, fully conscious of its growing 
commercial clout.  But such an empire did not emerge suddenly and without warning 
from the spoils of the Spanish American War, nor was it the vision of enterprising 
Yankees alone, as the traditional narrative might have us believe.  Indeed, it was decades 
in the making.  And some of its earliest and most persuasive visionaries were southerners, 
like William Gwin, James Gadsden, and J.D.B. De Bow.  Their western ambitions did not 
die in 1850, nor did they stop short at California’s coast; they endured through the decade 
and stretched across the entire Pacific world.  Proslavery filibusters have more 
successfully captured the historical imagination, but their imperial vision was often 
dwarfed by the ambitions of railroad promoters.  With iron rails rather than the sword, 
these expansionists sought to bind South and West, arrest sectional decline, and open vast 
new markets for southern trade.  And for at least a few years in the 1850s, the world truly 
seemed theirs for the taking.  
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Chapter 3 
THE SOUTHERNIZATION OF ANTEBELLUM CALIFORNIA,  
1850-1859 
 
When California was admitted to the Union as a free state in 1850, its troubles 
with slavery had, paradoxically, only just begun.  The very next year, James Gadsden 
spearheaded a national movement to settle a colony of two-thousand bondspeople and 
their white masters on the Pacific Coast.  As they moved across the Southwest, this slave 
colony would pioneer the preferred route for a far southern transcontinental railroad, 
Gadsden predicted, thereby linking the enslaved East with the re-enslaved West.1  Brazen 
(and unconstitutional) though his scheme may appear in hindsight, Gadsden was in good 
company at the time.  Indeed, his plan was merely the opening wedge in a decade of 
proslavery operations on the ostensibly free soil of California.  And while black slave 
labor never became a cornerstone of the state’s economy, the ideology upon which it 
rested would achieve a dominant position in California’s political discourse.  
Disproportionally represented in the statehouse, the local courts, and Congress, southern 
emigrants to California bent the state’s political path toward a distinctly proslavery end.  
They marginalized free soil politics and ensured that the slave South and the Far West 
were separated by a thin – and at times imperceptible – line.  
As Steven Hahn has argued, slavery was a national institution in antebellum 
America.  With the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, runaways could 
expect no refuge, though they may travel thousands of miles from the heart of the 
																																																						
1	James Gadsden to Thomas Jefferson Green, Dec. 7, 1851, William Alexander Leidesdorff Collection, 
HEHL; James Gadsden to M. Estes, December 10, 1851, in the Charleston Courier, February 7, 1852. 	
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plantation belt.  Meanwhile, masters roamed the streets of northern cities and sojourned 
throughout the federal territories with their slave property – practices that received a 
judicial blessing from Chief Justice Roger Taney’s court in the 1857 Dred Scott 
decision.2  And yet the dominant historical narrative still defines the slavery extension 
controversy in geographically narrow terms.  Kansas, in these accounts, marks the 
western limit of the sectional crisis of the 1850s.3  To be sure, several local histories have 
explored California’s relationship to slavery and the statewide political struggles that 
resulted.  But, often lacking a national framework, these histories lose sight of the 
broader issues that made California’s antebellum politics so fractious in the first place.4  
The political history of American slavery should be viewed through a wide-angle lens 
that incorporates both the eastern and western halves of the nation – from grand visions 
of empire to the local initiatives that brought the sectional crisis into the Far West.  As 
																																																						
2 Steven Hahn, The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2009), chapter 1; for more on enlarging the geographic scope of the sectional crisis, see pp. 22, 51. In his 
recent work, James Oakes charts the events that led to the Thirteenth Amendment, arguing that liberty and 
union were always linked in the Republican wartime agenda; Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of 
Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013). This argument, however, papers 
over the deep-rooted and wide-ranging proslavery sentiment in antebellum America, and the profound 
misgivings that even many Republicans had about emancipation, as we shall see.   
3 Again, the list of such works is extensive. For a sample of books that confine the slave controversy to the 
eastern U.S. after 1850, see James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine, 1989); 
Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of 
the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997); William Earl Weeks, Building the 
Continental Empire: American Expansion from Revolution to the Civil War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); 
and David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1976). 
4 Even Stacey’s Smith’s pioneering work, which argues strongly for a continental perspective on the 
coming of the Civil War, does not fully explore how local struggles over slavery in California impacted the 
national discourse, or vice versa; Stacey L. Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle over 
Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
The exception is Leonard Richards’s content-rich yet analytically thin, The California Gold Rush and the 
Coming of the Civil War (New York: Vintage, 2007).     
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antebellum Americans recognized, the struggle over slavery unfolded on a truly 
continental scale.   
The proslavery political culture of California should be understood, this chapter 
argues, as the outgrowth of the slave South’s expansionist agenda.  One of Jefferson 
Davis’s many California correspondents, Lewis Sanders, recognized the connection 
between the imperial projects of the South and local politics in the West when he wrote 
of the need for internal improvements.  “Of all things most desired here is a national road 
or high way” along a southern route, he reminded Davis.  By encouraging migration from 
the slave states, he continued, such a road would give southern interests “a controlling 
influence in the country and thereby put a check to mad fanaticism.”		Sanders need not 
have worried about California being overwhelmed by the “pestilence” of New England, 
however.5			Slaveholders may have failed in their grand plans for a Pacific railway, but 
they succeeded in achieving one of the road’s major objectives: to politically link the 
South and the Far West.  With slaveholding leaders like William Gwin at the helm, 
California voted more like Virginia than Vermont throughout the 1850s, thereby ensuring 
that the South would continue to wield a disproportionate influence within Congress.  In 
their fealty to proslavery doctrine, California’s politicians proved that southern political 
expansion was no mere pipe dream.  Indeed, Californians gave shape and substance to 
proslavery visions of empire in the West.  
																																																						
5 Lewis Sanders to Jefferson Davis, March 19, 1858, Jefferson Davis Papers, Special Collections & 
Archives, Transylvania University, Lexington, KY.  Crucially, Sanders wanted this mass movement of 
southerners in the West to be accomplished “by silent means”. He fretted that, if antislavery forces in 
England and the American Northeast caught wind of such a project, they would descend on California in 
droves and thus recreate the bloody political standoff of Kansas. This was a common fear of southern 
expansionists during this period; see chapter 4. 
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	Somewhat counterintuitively, this frontier state, thousands of miles from the 
major debates then unfolding in Washington, provides an especially illuminating 
perspective on the sectional crisis.  In fact, antebellum California can be understood as 
both a political bellwether and as a microcosm of the struggles that convulsed the entire 
nation.  With a larger, more urban population in the northern part of the state and a 
smaller, more agricultural and more proslavery population in the southern section, 
California’s demography roughly approximated that of the nation as a whole.  As within 
the federal Congress, a smaller and better organized faction of proslavery politicians 
exercised an outsized influence in the California legislature.  Furthermore, in both 
California and at the national level, the Democratic coalition that had ruled through much 
of the period fractured along sectional lines in the wake of the Kansas controversy.  Even 
some of the violent episodes of sectional controversy, like the caning of Charles Sumner, 
were prefigured in California’s political fracas.  Finally, the secessionist impulses that 
motivated the fire-eating faction of the slaveholding class in the South had an analogue in 
southern California’s own separatist movement.  California can thus be seen as a regional 
stage on which its political actors played out a national struggle.   
 
James Gadsden’s California 
From its inception, California’s legislature made clear that the state’s free soil 
constitution did not guarantee free soil politics.  This was the same legislature that had 
elected William Gwin to the U.S. Senate, after all, and it was also the legislature that 
placed brazen slaveholding expansionists in senior roles.  Having recently been chased 
out of Rose’s Bar with his company of fifteen slaves, Thomas Jefferson Green found a 
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comfortable position as the chairman of the Finance Committee of California’s governing 
body.  Dismissed by a fellow senator as “unsuitable a man as could be” who “made 
nonsense of everything that was done,” Green nevertheless wielded powerful influence 
within the statehouse.  What became known as the ‘Legislature of a thousand drinks’ 
earned its appellation from Green’s frequent invitations to imbibe from his massive 
whisky supply just outside the main hall.6  Such liberality, along with his personal fortune 
and his military reputation gave Green a stature that few in that body could match. The 
fact that six fellow Texans also sat in this first legislature only reinforced his influence.	7		
It was leaders like Green who ensured that James Gadsden and proslavery schemers of 
his ilk would receive at least a respectful hearing.   
Although the legislature had not yet split along party lines in 1849-1850, divisive 
sectional and racial issues did indeed creep into its proceedings, as they would continue 
to do for the next decade.  By 1850, the state’s southern senators took a stand on the 
national slavery issue, resolving that “any attempt by Congress to interfere with the 
																																																						
6 Elisha Oscar Crosby, Memoirs of Elisha Oscar Crosby: Reminiscences of California and Guatemala from 
1849 to 1864, Charles Albro Barker, ed. (San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1945), 58. Green counted 
among his allies a group of boisterous “hangers on and lobbyists.” Perhaps it was such characters that led 
John Augustus Sutter to remark that only “one third” of the representatives “were good men the rest bad.” 
“They appeared in the legislative halls with revolvers & bowie-knives fastened to their belts,” he recalled, 
“and were drinking rioting and swearing nearly all the time;” John Augustus Sutter, Personal 
Reminiscences, Mss, BANC, 201. Edmund Randolph of Virginia gave a particularly colorful account of the 
rustic conditions of this first legislature. “We have been exceedingly uncomfortable thus far,” he wrote his 
wife in December 1849. “All this hot work has been carried on in mud half leg deep and under most pitiless 
wintry storms; wind hail & rain, and almost no accommodations… Like everything else in California, it 
surpassed all that I have seen elsewhere;” Edmund Randolph to Tarmesia G. (Meux) Randolph, December 
22, 1849; see also Randolph to Tarmesia Randolph, December 28, 1849, both in Edmund Randolph Papers, 
VHS. 
7 Green is perhaps best remembered today for sponsoring the bill that created the University of California. 
For a proud report of Texas’s prominent position in early California politics, see Democratic Telegraph 
and Texas Register (Houston), Feb. 21, 1850, Bieber Collection, HEHL. In a legislative body that 
numbered 16 senators and 36 assemblymen, the Lone Star state was thus well-represented. For biographical 
details on this first legislature, see Biography of First Cal. Legislature, 1850, MSS, California State Library. 
The manuscript contains biographical entries composed an inscribed by individual legislators. 
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institution of slavery in any of the territories of the United States would create just 
grounds of alarm in many of the States of the Union.”8  That same year, legislators passed 
a law prohibiting African Americans, mulattoes, and Indians from testifying against 
whites in a court of law.  Returning to issues raised in the constitutional convention one 
year earlier, lawmakers also introduced bills to bar black migration into the state and to 
require the deportation of all manumitted slaves.  These bills failed, but the message 
came across loud and clear: California was to be a white man’s state.9   
To be sure, southern-born lawmakers did not have a monopoly on racially 
restrictive legislation, although they proved, on the whole, more eager to adopt such 
statutes.10  In fact, it was the Democratic record on racial politics which helped give that 
party its undisputed legislative majority – aside from a brief Know Nothing insurgency – 
through the antebellum period.  California’s Democrats and Whigs, and later 
Republicans, agreed on some of major issues of the day, especially the need for federal 
spending on western infrastructure.  On an annual basis, the state’s various parties all 
adopted pro-Pacific railroad platforms, for instance.  But Democrats – or more 
specifically, the powerful southern-born faction of the party – distinguished themselves 
																																																						
8 They also resolved that “the discussion of abstract questions [i.e. slavery]… appear to be forced onward 
only for unholy, unpatriotic, and partisan purposes.” David Broderick of New York blunted the proslavery 
edge of these resolutions by inserting the following amendment: “That opposition to the admission of a 
state into the union with a constitution prohibiting slavery, on account of such prohibition, is a policy 
wholly unjustifiable and unstatesmanlike, and in violation of that spirit of concession and compromise by 
which alone the federal constitution was adopted, and by which alone it can be perpetuated.” For all of 
these resolutions see California State Senate Journal, 1849-1850, pp. 372-374. See also Delilah L. Beasley, 
“Slavery in California,” Journal of Negro History 3 (January 1918), 38-39. 
9 As Hinton Rowan Helper observed of California’s free blacks, they were “slaves to no single individual 
but to the entire community;” Helper, The Land of Gold: Reality Versus Fiction (Baltimore: Henry Taylor, 
1855), 275.	
10 For commentary on the political makeup within in early California, James J. Ayres, Gold and Sunshine: 
Reminiscences of Early California (Boston: Gorham Press, 1922), 115-116. For more on the racist 
lawmaking in this early period, see Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 56-61.  
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by branding their political adversaries as abolitionist subversives and racial egalitarians.  
This was an especially effective tactic in a state that harbored a large working-class white 
community, jealous of its political prerogatives and profoundly uneasy about black and 
Chinese immigration into the state.11  Not all of these white voters were overtly 
proslavery, of course.  But a critical mass of them were indeed deeply anti-abolitionist, 
and they often supported the southern wing of the Democratic party, as the faction most 
likely to block African American advancement and thus preserve white rule. 
California’s proslavery faction further entrenched its position through aggressive 
electioneering and strict party discipline.  Fremont, who had drawn the short straw when 
appointed to the U.S. Senate in late 1849, served less than a year in office before he came 
up for reelection.  The abolitionist merchant, John Batchelder Peirce, saw little hope for 
the Pathfinder, due to his free soil politics.  “I am fearful we shall send a pro Slavery 
man,” he wrote to his wife from San Francisco in December 1850. “For the active 
Politicians here are Southern men.”12  Peirce later speculated that the state’s political 
profile had formed in such a way because “the Northern men are engaged in business 
leaving Political affairs to those who have nothing else to do.”13  There could be some 
truth to this assumption.  At its height, the population of California residents originating 
																																																						
11 Western voters in general favored policies of black exclusion. As Eugene Berwanger has noted, the 
“frontier against slavery” was also a frontier for white supremacy; Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier 
Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery Extension Controversy (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1967). 
12 John Batchelder Peirce to Hitty Peirce, December 29, 1850, John Batchelder Peirce Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS). 
13 Peirce to Hitty Perice, January 13, 1851, Peirce Papers, MHS. 
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from slave states stood at just 33 percent, yet southerners prevailed in election after 
election.14   
In any case, Peirce’s supposition that Fremont could not survive politically in 
such a proslavery climate was certainly accurate.  No amount of celebrity could help the 
Pathfinder overcome the base of ultra southern legislators who threw their weight behind 
Solomon Heydenfeldt, a strong proslavery man born in Charleston, South Carolina.  Also 
on the ballot was Thomas Butler King, the Georgia planter who had made his name as a 
naval expansionist and would later partner with Robert J. Walker in a southern 
transcontinental railroad scheme.  In this crowded field, Fremont came nowhere near the 
necessary votes for reelection, even after a dizzying 142 ballots.  Nor did any other 
candidate, however, and thus the legislature decided to postpone the election until 
January 1852.  This would not be the first time that Fremont faced humiliation at the 
hands of California’s proslavery faction.           
The ousting of Fremont represented an early victory in a decade that was to see 
the proslavery advantages mount.  In the postponed senatorial election a year later, John 
B. Weller came out triumphant.  Although born in Ohio, Weller was married to the 
daughter of a slaveholding Virginia congressmen and his political allegiances reflected 
those connections.  He would become California’s leading Doughface – a proslavery 
Democrat from the North in the mold of James Buchanan – who had opposed the Wilmot 
																																																						
14 On the demography of early California, see Doris Marion Wright, “The Making of Cosmopolitan 
California: An Analysis of Immigration, 1848-1870,” California Historical Society Quarterly 19 
(December 1940). Her tables on p. 339, detailing the population of California residents by state of origin in 
1850, 1860, and 1870, are especially instructive.	
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Proviso and spoke in favor of slavery’s further expansion.15  Together, he and Gwin gave 
southern interests a strong backing in Congress.  With such representation, one California 
pioneer could write – with only some exaggeration – that “the State of California was as 
much under the control of the Southern wing of the Democratic party as South Carolina, 
and voted in Congress for Southern interests to all intents and purposes.”  It was a place, 
he continued, “as intensely Southern as Mississippi or any other of the fire-eating 
States.”16  
It was also a place that nurtured the imperialist fantasies of James Gadsden.  
Several years before signing the treaty with Mexico that bore his name, Gadsden began 
conspiring with Thomas Jefferson Green and others to plant a slave colony on 
California’s ostensibly free soil.  Green was the appropriate correspondent for such an 
adventure.  The Texan had overseen one of the largest slave migrations into California 
just a few years before, when he carried a group of fifteen bondspeople into the diggings 
of Rose’s Bar.  Gadsden thus wrote to Green in December 1851 to outline his vision for a 
slaveholding territory in California that would marry southern-style plantation agriculture 
with western-style mining operations, somewhere near the San Joaquin River in Central 
California.  “We must introduce rice and cotton and sugar,” Gadsden mused, along with 
the continued exploitation of California’s mineral resources.  With such lucrative 
																																																						
15 Weller would also join Gwin in endorsing the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision, the 
Lecompton Constitution, and Breckinridge’s 1860 presidential campaign. For a treatment of Fremont’s 
failed bid for reelection and of Weller’s ultimate victory, see Richards, The California Gold Rush and the 
Coming of the Civil War, 114-117. 
16 John Carr, Pioneer Days in California (Eureka, CA: Times Publishing Company, 1891), 346. 
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slaveholding enterprises, “no power can vie with that which is washed by the Pacific,” he 
argued.17   
But Gadsden’s colony was to be more than just a mining and agricultural venture; 
it was also to serve as the opening wedge for the construction of a Pacific railroad along a 
far southern route.  Writing to another proslavery ally several days later, Gadsden 
explained how his colony could blaze a trail across the Far West and thus mark out a 
suitable path for future railway development.  “Open such a way, and the railroad 
follows,” he projected.  With federal protection, “you will see us with some 500 to 800 
domestics with 200 to 300 axes, opening the highway to the cultivation and civilization 
of the shores of the Pacific.”18 
In early 1852, Gadsden rallied over 1200 prospective settlers from South Carolina 
and Florida and petitioned the California government to enable them to settle in the state 
with their 2000 slaves. Along with Thomas Jefferson Green, Gadsden enlisted the aid of 
Isaac Edward Holmes, a former South Carolinian congressmen-cum-San Francisco 
lawyer, and Archibald Peachy, originally of Virginia and now chair of the Judiciary 
Committee.  It was Peachy who introduced Gadsden’s petition to the California 
legislature, which then sent it to the Committee on Federal Relations.19  There, however, 
																																																						
17 James Gadsden to Thomas Jefferson Green, Dec. 7, 1851, William Alexander Leidesdorff Collection, 
HEHL. Green and Gadsden probably met during their time in Florida in the 1830s. Clearly their visions for 
proslavery expansion in the American West were closely aligned. For background on this letter, as well as 
Gadsden’s proposed colony, and the career of Thomas Jefferson Green, see Parish, John C. “A Project for a 
California Slave Colony in 1851,” Huntington Library Bulletin 8 (Oct. 1935), pp. 171-175. Gadsden’s 
plans for cotton cultivation in California may have been more prescient than any at the time recognized. 
Shortly after the Civil War, planters began cultivate the crop in the rough vicinity of where Gadsden had 
hoped to settle his slaveholding colony; see Chapter 6.	
18 James Gadsden to M. Estes, December 10, 1851, in the Charleston Courier, February 7, 1852. The letter 
was reprinted in a number of outlets, including the National Era, February 19, 1852. 
19 California State Assembly Journal, 1852, pp. 159-160. 
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the plan finally and quietly died.20  Thus, much like the stillborn 1850 Mississippi plan 
for a California slave colony, Gadsden’s scheme never moved far beyond the realm of 
imagination.  Yet these efforts were reflective of a resilient political movement that 
refused to cede the Far West to free labor.  In fact, that such a memorial, in brazen 
disregard of California’s constitution, would even receive a hearing in the legislature 
speaks volumes about the proslavery currents then sweeping through the state’s 
governing body. 
Gadsden himself carried no slaves into California, but a handful of fellow 
southerners continued to move their human property westward in defiance of state law.21  
Frederick Douglass’ Paper reported, for instance, on a Maryland slaveholder who was 
preparing to transport his slave into California as late as December 1852.22  More 
alarming, though, were the reports coming from South Carolina that year.  According to 
the Charleston press, the steamship Isabell made at least two journeys with California-
bound slaveholders and their chattel property aboard, carrying first 39 slaves and then 55 
slaves in these two trips.  “It would seem that this slave emigration is not an accident, or a 
spontaneous movement,” the National Era fretted, “but that it is part of a system of 
measures concerted between Slavery-Propagandists on the Atlantic and Pacific 
seaboards.”  California was technically free soil, the paper continued, but the state 
																																																						
20 For more on Gadsden’s memorial to the California legislature, see Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 48; 
Richards, California Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War, 125-127; Powell, “Southern Influences in 
California Politics,” 105-106. 
21 There are hints that abolitionist forces in Massachusetts were attempting to send men to California, in an 
effort, it seems, to combat slavery in the West. A passing reference to this activity can be found in Charles 
F. Hovey to Samuel May, June 14, 1852, Samuel May Papers, Boston Public Library. 
22 Frederick Douglass’s Paper, December 3, 1852, reprinting an article that initially appeared in the New 
York Tribune. 
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nevertheless continued to harbor black slaves and their masters in isolated mining 
communities “where the only law is that of force.”  In such circumstances, “how are 
[slaves] to know their rights, and who is there to assert them?”23  This is precisely the 
logic that moved Robert Givens to write to his father in September 1852 on the security 
of slave property in California.  “I don’t consider there is any risk in bringing Patrick 
[one of the family’s slaves] alone… as no one will put themselves to the trouble of 
investigating the matter,” he wrote.  “When he gets in, I should like to see any one get 
him out.”24 
Despite the best efforts of Gadsden and aside from the noteworthy trips off the 
Isabell, slaveholders never mustered the importation, en mass, of bondspeople to the 
West.  Yet they did devise a number of stratagems to ensure that slavery would continue 
in free-soil California under other guises.  A common strategy was to establish 
agreements with slaves themselves in order to bind their labor for a fixed term.  Taken 
into California as presumed slaves, African Americans would only win their freedom, per 
these agreements, after working for a set number of years or after earning a certain 
amount of money.  In this way, the contract – a hallmark of free labor ideology – became 
a tool for the perpetuation of bondage.25  For many African Americans, this meant that 
they would not win freedom until years after the passage of California’s antislavery 
																																																						
23 “Slavery and California,” National Era, February 19, 1852, p. 30. 
24 Robert R. Givens to his father, September 10, 1852, Robert R. Givens letters to family, BANC. For more 
first-hand commentary on the westward movements of slaveholders during this time, see Carr, Pioneer 
Days in California, 346; and Anna Lee Marston, ed., Records of a California Family: Journals and Letters 
of Lewis C. Gunn and Elizabeth LeBreton Gunn (San Diego, n.p. 1928), 171. 
25 On the ideological power of the contract, see Amy Dru Stanly, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, 
Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). For more on these particular contracts, see Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 57-60.  
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constitution.  For instance, it took Peter Green, the former slave of Thomas Thorn 
(Chapter 1), until 1855 before a justice of the peace certified that his “obligation has been 
complied with” and that he was “legally discharged.”26  Similarly, Biddy Mason and 
thirteen fellow slaves only won their release from their master in 1856, after having been 
transported to California from Texas in 1851.27  In other cases, aspiring masters sought 
the unpaid labor of African Americans by claiming legal guardianship over them.  John 
Rowland, for instance, went to court in order to adopt Rose, an African American child, 
maintaining that her mother was unable to provide adequate care and thus Rose should be 
relocated to a white home.28  Framed as an act of charity, Rowland’s intention was very 
likely to bind Rose as an unfree domestic laborer. 
The landscape of unfreedom in the Far West consisted of more than just African 
American slaves.  The state’s shrinking, but still substantial, Indian population provided a 
ready source of bound labor for many landowning Californians.  American emigrants to 
California readily adopted forms of Indian debt peonage that had flourished under 
																																																						
26 “Thomas Thorn, State of California, County of Mariposa,” in “California Freedom Papers,” Journal of 
Negro History 3 (January 1918), 48-49. Other documents in this collection record the efforts of several 
others to win their freedom, and who, like Green, endured a deferred emancipation. For more on these 
arrangements, see Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 57-60; Beasly, Negro Trail Blazers, 84. 
27 Mason’s party consisted of two slave families who were carried to California by their master, Robert 
Smith, in 1851. Knowing that he could no longer safely keep his slaves in California by mid-decade, Smith 
attempted to transport Mason and her fellow slaves back to Texas by mid-decade. But they sued for their 
freedom in 1856, winning their release upon the ruling of southern California’s leading jurist, Benjamin 
Hayes. Mason would become the foremost member of Los Angeles’s free black community during this 
period. For a transcript of the Hayes ruling, see National Anti-Slavery Standard, April 5, 1856.  
28 “Guardianship of Rose, a negro minor child,” Los Angeles Probate Court Records, 1850-1910, No. 45, 
HEHL. My thanks to Sarah Barringer Gordon for drawing my attention to this document in the 
Huntington’s collections. For more on John Rowland see, Donald E. Rowland, John Rowland and William 
Workman: Southern California Pioneers of 1841 (Spokane, WA: Arthur Clark, 1999); For an illustration of 
Rowland’s Los Angeles estate – which bears a striking resemblance to a southern plantation – see John 
Albert Wilson, History of Los Angeles County, California, with Illustrations Descriptive of Its Scenery, 
Residences, Fine Blacks and Manufactories (Oakland: Thompson & West, 1880) 
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Mexican rule.  Cave Couts, a transplanted slaveholder from Tennessee, established a 
large ranch near San Diego, making use of Indian debt peons, bound apprentices, and 
convicts.  To the best of his ability, Couts recreated a southern plantation in the American 
West, substituting cheaper, unfree Indian laborers for black slaves.29  The parallels 
between Couts’s rancho and a southern plantation were not lost on the nineteenth-century 
historian Hubert Howe Bancroft, who noted that, even after the Civil War, “everything 
about Guajorne [Couts’s estate] had the air of the home of a wealthy southern planter.”30   
Los Angeles also featured its own Indian “slave mart”.  After a long work week, 
several hundred Indians customarily gathered on Saturdays near Los Angeles’s Calle de 
los Negros to drink, gamble, and fight.  Municipal authorities would wait until these 
Indians were thoroughly inebriated by sundown on Sunday, and then drive the most 
incapacitated into an open-air coral.  On Monday morning these Natives would be 
auctioned off to the highest bidders for a week of labor.  If they were paid at all, it was 
often in alcohol, thereby ensuring the whole process could begin again the next 
weekend.31  By the 1850s this Indian auction had become the second most important 
																																																						
29 Michael Magliari, “Free Soil, Unfree Labor: Cave Johnson Couts and the Binding of Indian Workers in 
California, 1850-1867,” Pacific Historical Review 73 (August 2004). Magliari is one of the foremost 
experts on Indian slavery in California. The history of unfree Indian labor in the West, he argues, upsets the 
conventional chronology of slavery and emancipation. Not until well after the Civil War did California 
become a truly free state by extinguishing its longstanding system of unfree Indian labor. For more, see 
Michael Magliari, “Free State Slavery: Bound Indian Labor and Slave Trafficking in California’s 
Sacramento Valley, 1850-1864” Pacific Historical Review 81. For similar arguments about the 
periodization of emancipation and the various forms of unfree labor in the West, see Stacey L. Smith, 
“Emancipating Peons, Excluding Coolies: Reconstructing Coercion in the American West,” in Gregory P. 
Downs and Kate Masur, eds., The World the Civil War Made (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2015). 
30 Hubert Howe Bancroft, “Personal Observations during a tour through the Line of Missions of Upper 
California,” MSS, typescript, 187-?, 22-23, BANC. 
31 According to Horace Bell, one of southern California’s keenest early memorialists, “Los Angeles had its 
slave mart, as well as New Orleans and Constantinople – only the slave eat Los Angeles was sold fifty-two 
times a year as long as he lived, which did not generally exceed one, two, or three years, under the new 
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source of municipal revenue, second only to the licensing fees imposed on Los Angeles’s 
drinking and gambling venues. The practice would continue into the early 1870s.  In their 
search for bound labor, Californians learned to look beyond the black-white binary.  
 
A State Divided Against Itself 
Although individual slaveholders certainly derived significant advantages from 
the exploitation of Native peoples, when southern imperialists imagined the possibilities 
for unfree labor in the West, they spoke primarily of black slavery.32  Perhaps most 
promising for proslavery expansionists was the long-lived state division campaign, 
intended to create, many presumed, a slaveholding territory in southern California.33  
																																																						
dispensation;” Bell, Reminiscences of a Ranger; or Early Times in Southern California (Los Angeles: 
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Reflecting the demographic and political divisions of the nation as a whole, the lower 
half of California was more distinctly southern in origin and proslavery in outlook than 
the northern portion of the state.  It was, therefore, a natural target for slaveholding 
imperialists.  If only the southern counties could be split from California, they reasoned, 
this territory could jettison the antislavery constitution of 1849 and become a magnet for 
southern emigrants and their human chattel.  This is precisely what Mississippi’s two 
senators, Henry Foote and Jefferson Davis, had in mind when, during the debates of 
1850, they attempted to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific coast.34  And 
it also may have motivated William Gwin’s earlier attempts to enlarge the state 
boundaries during the constitutional convention debates.35  In many ways the state 
division movement represented a continuation of James Gadsden’s scheme by other 
means.  Gwin, Foote, Davis, and Gadsden were all driving at the same objective: to 
override California’s free soil constitution and secure a foothold for slavery on the Pacific 
coast.36 
																																																						
Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery, completed and edited by Ward M. 
McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. ???? – it’s likely that McAfee, and not 
Fehrenbacher, is responsible for the brief section on California state division. 
34 For Foote’s amendment and the extensive debate that followed, see Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 
1st session, appendix, 1485-1504; see also, 31st Congress, 1st session, 602-604. See also William W. 
Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 505-507. 
35 Elisha Crosby believed that Gwin, at this early date, was already conspiring to introduce slavery into 
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seeking to have the state admitted, promised the southerners that if they would admit the state he would 
further the plan of colonizing the southern portion of California with Southern people,” Crosby wrote in his 
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One of the first state division efforts centered on Los Angeles, where leading 
citizens called a meeting in September 1851 to rally support and pledged “to use every 
effort to produce a separation of the Southern portion of the State from the Northern.”37  
A subsequent convention attracted thirty-one delegates from the counties of Los Angeles, 
San Diego, Santa Barbara and Monterey, who reiterated complaints of inequitable 
taxation and unanimously endorsed a plan for the formation of a separate territory in 
southern California.38  Over the subsequent decade, the state legislature fielded petitions 
for state division on a nearly annual basis.39  The justifications for such an action – in 
addition to the ubiquitous tax complaints – were regularly rehearsed: the sheer size of the 
state; the distance separating southern residents from their capital; and the regional 
imbalance in legislative representation.40 
In all the pleas for state division mustered by southern Californians, one issue 
remained conspicuously unstated – that of slavery.  Yet few were blind to the sectional 
implications of this campaign.  As slaveholders had argued since the 1840s, southern 
California constituted ideal terrain for the extension of the South’s peculiar institution.  
Robert Givens, son of a Kentucky slaveholder, predicted that if California were to be 
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divided, “the southern division will become a slave State.”  He continued, “It is settled 
almost entirely by Southerners, and they will exert themselves to the utmost extent to 
carry the day.”41   Hinton Rowan Helper noted similar developments with similar 
consequences.  “The applicability of slave labor to the soil of Southern California is now 
becoming a theme of discussion in that region, and it is probable that the experiment will 
one day be tried,” he wrote.  The state division issue had already “occupied the attention 
of the legislature,” Helper continued, “and while it is generally admitted that the people 
are about equally divided upon the measure, it is universally conceded that, in case of its 
adoption, the southern portion will establish the laws and institutions of Virginia and 
Louisiana.”42  
As Givens, Helper, and others recognized, southern Californians themselves were 
especially zealous in the cause of slavery.  Between the Indian slave mart of Los Angeles, 
the plantation-style rancho of Cave Couts, and a small slaveholding Mormon population 
in San Bernardino, residents of the region had already demonstrated a decided interest in 
systems of unfree labor.43  Demography alone gave the slave states a claim to southern 
California.  Of the U.S.-born population living in Los Angeles County in 1860, 52 
percent hailed from the slave South.  To be sure, this represented only a slim majority of 
the Anglo-American population, but at a time when only about 39 percent of the nation’s 
																																																						
41 Robert R. Givens to his father, September 10, 1852, Givens letters, BANC. John Batchelder Peirce 
tracked this state division movement as well. “We are hav’g a scheme matured to make South California a 
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43 For more on the Mormon slaveholding colony in San Bernardino, see Lapp, Blacks in Gold Rush 
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population as a whole had been born south of the Mason Dixon line, Los Angeles could 
indeed be considered a comparatively southern place.44  
Los Angeles’ geographic position helps explain its southern character.  The 
second-most heavily traveled overland route to California, the Gila River trail, terminated 
in southern California.  At the height of the gold rush in 1849, roughly 6,000 Anglo-
Americans traveled over this trail, a majority of whom came from Texas.  Although most 
would continue northwards to the gold fields near Sacramento, a number of these 
argonauts eventually settled in the Los Angeles area.45  
What made southern California particularly hospitable to proslavery interests was 
not necessarily the numerical advantage that white southerners in the region enjoyed, but 
rather, the political culture they created.  In California, proslavery Democrats wielded 
power well beyond their numbers, and that was no less true in the southern part of the 
state.  With the support of their Spanish-surnamed allies, proslavery migrants made free 
soil politics anathema in Los Angeles County.46  While William Gwin pulled the strings 
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of the proslavery Democratic machine from his senate seat in Washington, his close 
friend Joseph Lancaster Brent – a Maryland native and future Confederate general – 
presided as the party boss of Los Angeles.  A staunch supporter of slavery and a 
perennial ally to the region’s Mexican-born elite, Brent ensured that his fellow 
southerners were well positioned in local governance.  As he noted in his memoirs, Brent 
had become “so decidedly the leader in Los Angeles politics” by mid-decade, “that… no 
one could be elected whom [he] did not support, and no one defeated whom [he] 
befriended.”  Charles E. Carr, a Louisiana native and California state legislator, would 
later claim that Brent carried Los Angeles in “his vest pocket.”47  Thanks to partisans like 
Brent, antebellum Los Angeles could be considered the far western outpost of the slave 
South.  And as such, it offered a tempting and attainable target for proslavery 
expansionists. 
In 1852 the state legislature made a particularly cunning play for state division.  
Spearheaded by Henry Crabb, the son of a prominent Tennessee slaveholder, a group of 
politicians began agitating for a new constitutional convention in order to remedy, they 
argued, certain points on taxation and public expenditures. Their true intention, however, 
was likely to legalize slavery in the Far West by splitting off the southern part of the state 
as a separate territory.  Their call for a new convention passed the state assembly but 
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narrowly failed in the senate, due to clever obstructionist efforts of the antislavery 
stalwart David Broderick.48  But the fight was far from over (see Chapter 4).  Too much 
was at stake – not just the matter of slavery in the Far West, but also of southern 
representation in Congress.  Even if bonded labor never took root along the Pacific, an 
independent southern California – with its population of staunch southern partisans – 
would nevertheless provide a powerful bulwark for proslavery politics at the national 
level.	
A former Illinois congressman by the name of Abraham Lincoln saw the far-
reaching consequences of this political movement then unfolding at the edge of the 
continent.  As southerners continued to press for California state division, Lincoln looked 
on with growing unease.  In a list of resolutions that he drafted yet never delivered, he 
addressed a number of proslavery initiatives, including the re-opening of the African 
slave trade, the Kansas-Nebraska controversy, and California’s territorial movement.  His 
draft of January 1855 urged Congress, “To resist, to their utmost, the now threatened 
attempt to divide California, in order to erect one portion thereof into a slave-state.”49  
Here was the slave power at work, Lincoln’s resolutions suggested, from the shipping 
lanes of the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacific.50      
Although foiled in their early attempts at state division, California’s southern-
born politicians fought for proslavery rights on more than one front.  While some free 
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50 For a treatment of the slave power thesis and its adherents, see Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The 
Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 
	 151 
states like Massachusetts challenged the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, California’s 
politicians ensured that the Pacific slope would remain a particularly inhospitable place 
for escaped bondspeople and their abolitionist allies.  One San Francisco paper, for 
instance, cheered slave catchers in their hunt for Frederick Douglass and hoped for his 
return “to perpetual labor in the most menial capacity at the South.”51  In 1852 the 
California legislature voted to burn all abolitionist circulars that had found their way into 
the state, thereby handing southern slaveholders a far western ally in their campaign to 
ban and eradicate antislavery literature.52  True, California’s abolitionists scored some 
victories in the early 1850s, driving out the occasional slaveholder who had dared to 
trespass on free soil.  But those victories were rather limited in scope, as abolitionist John 
Batchelder Peirce confessed to his wife.  “As to your fears about my taking too active a 
part in the anti slavery affairs here – I don’t do anything,” he wrote in the summer of 
1851.  “I can’t for there is nobody to cooperate with scarcely. We have no organized 
society here and nothing to act on but now and then a slave case.”53 
Western abolitionists like Peirce suffered a bruising defeat in 1852 with the 
passage of California’s fugitive slave act.  Although California had effectively outlawed 
slavery in 1849, there were still hundreds of enslaved blacks in the mining regions, 
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according to Peirce’s own estimates, and no legislation to define the status of those who 
had been carried into the state prior to the passage of its antislavery constitution.  The 
1852 law – drafted by Henry Crabb, who was simultaneously lobbying for a new 
constitutional convention – clarified matters in a distinctly proslavery manner.54  Crabb’s 
bill mandated state aid for the recapture of fugitives, and, more crucially, allowed masters 
to return to the South with their slave property.  California’s free soil constitution, it 
stipulated, did not guarantee freedom for the black slaves still laboring within the state.  
The bill sailed through the state assembly, 42 to 11, and passed in the senate, 14 to 9, 
with aid from James Estell of Kentucky, who owned more than a dozen slaves on his 
Solano County farm.55  As it was initially intended, the act gave masters one year in 
which to return to the South with their human chattel, but it was extended for an 
additional two years by the state’s proslavery legislature.56 
Whereas historian Leonard Richards described the law as “largely symbolic,” 
Stacey Smith has convincingly demonstrated that it had very real consequences for 
California’s 2,000 resident African Americans, both slave and free.  Crabb’s bill, she 
argues, amounted to a “three-year suspension of the antislavery constitution” and exposed 
California’s blacks to fraud and kidnapping.  Because African Americans could not 
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testify against whites in California’s courts, they were especially vulnerable to charges of 
fugitivism and therefore re-enslavement.  Indeed, with the fugitive slave law in hand, 
California’s jurists, on the whole, ruled in defense of slaveholders.  In dozens of cases 
between 1852 and 1855, they rejected the freedom claims of African Americans and 
remanded them to their owners.   
The state Supreme Court rendered a particularly consequential ruling in the case 
of three previously liberated African Americans, Robert Perkins, Carter Perkins, and 
Sandy Jones.  The men had been carried to California during the gold rush, only to be 
emancipated in 1851, shortly before their master returned alone to Mississippi.  But upon 
the passage of the fugitive slave law one year later, their former owner’s cousin 
reclaimed the ostensibly liberated slaves.  When their case came before the supreme 
court, the two presiding judges, both southern-born Democrats, ruled in favor of the 
master’s cousin, effectively re-enslaving the three African Americans and giving firm 
legal backing to state’s fugitive slave law.  It was a ruling that, in many ways, prefigured 
the Dred Scott decision of 1857 by sustaining slaveholders’ rights to carry their human 
property across free soil without risk.  The highest court in California had spoken: slavery 
was national.57   
Such decisions deepened the divisions between antislavery and proslavery forces 
within the state, and attracted national and international attention to California’s political 
battles.  The Perkins case, in particular, galvanized the small abolitionist community in 
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California, which would continue to press freedom suits for the enslaved and to lobby 
against the ban on black testimony.58  But in such a proslavery state, theirs was an uphill 
battle.  Abolitionists as far away as Britain recognized as much when, in 1854, one 
antislavery advocate noted that America had effectively “extended the legalization of the 
traffic to California” – a reference, most likely, to the security that masters enjoyed under 
the state’s fugitive slave bill.59   
Martin Delany, a leading black abolitionist, similarly lamented proslavery 
developments in the Far West.  “California by three successive acts of the legislature, has 
granted to slave-holders the right to take their slaves into the State, for and during the 
term of three consecutive years;” he claimed in an 1855 speech in Pittsburg, “and now 
seriously contemplates its permanent establishment, which doubtless will be 
consummated during the next year.”60  The wholesale reintroduction of slavery to 
California never came to pass, as Delany and others had feared, but southerners would 
continue to wield an outsized influence in the legislature and in courtrooms across the 
state.  They pressed their advantages as California divided against itself.  Half a decade 
after the passage of its antislavery constitution, California was less free than ever. 
 
William Gwin’s California 
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 Perhaps the most remarkable fact of California’s early political history is the 
degree of control that proslavery southerners were able to maintain despite their 
numerical disadvantages.  They owed much of this success to one man in particular, 
William McKendree Gwin.  The Mississippi planter-cum-California kingpin built an 
extensive network of proslavery Democrats within the state, giving shape to the political 
faction that would become known as the Chivalry.  Although the etymology of the name 
is somewhat obscure, the Chivalry originated in the early 1850s as a pejorative for the 
proslavery wing of California’s dominant Democratic party – most likely as a play on the 
feudal sensibilities of antebellum southerners.61  Through the decade, Gwin served as the 
de facto leader of this faction, and used his influence at the national level to fill 
California’s federal posts with his southern friends.  Gwin was as generous to his allies as 
he was unrelenting with his enemies, and, like many southerners in California, he 
resorted to the duel when sufficiently antagonized.62  Resilient and ambitious in equal 
measures, Gwin weathered the vagaries and violence of California politics to steer the 
ship of state in a consistently southern direction.  Indeed, under his direction, antebellum 
California became something of a client to the slave South.  
 When not lobbying for federal appropriations or a Pacific railroad through slave 
country, Gwin was often calling in personal favors to staff California’s plum posts with 
likeminded southerners.  As the state’s ranking senator through most of the decade, Gwin 
essentially wielded veto rights over any federal appointment to California.  Even during 
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his two years out of office, from 1855 to 1857, he spent much of his time in Washington 
as a presidential confidant.  Gwin distributed these plums in return for political fealty.  
And there were plenty of positions to go around: the state required a legion of appointees 
to staff its courts, the postal service, the Indian Office, the land office, the San Francisco 
Custom House, and a number of lesser positions.  The Collector of Ports of San Francisco 
alone controlled a staff of 80 to 200 men.  While California’s mines yielded diminishing 
returns, federal jobs continued to pay, and to pay well, through the decade.  In this way, 
Gwin and the Chivalry enforced a strict sense of party discipline that helped them 
overcome their relatively small base of southern-born voters within the state.  In 
distributing these plums, Gwin was transparently sectional.  He “proved treacherous to 
his northern friends and always favored the south,” the former state senator Elisha Crosby 
recalled.  “No northern man, no friend at the north who was known to be strongly against 
slavery ever received anything at his hands. Every thing he did was in favor of Southern 
interests.”63  The San Francisco Customs House came to be known as the Virginia 
Poorhouse, “from the number of scions of the first families of Virginia that were stowed 
away there on fat salaries.”64 
But if Gwin’s allies were legion, so too were his enemies.  In the scramble for 
political office, those overlooked by the Chivalry machine often turned to Gwin’s main 
rival, David D. Broderick, a Democrat from New York.  John Bigler, the state’s governor 
from 1852 to 1856, did just that after finding himself consistently outmaneuvered by 
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Gwin in the contest for spoils.  Writing to his brother – then serving as governor of 
Pennsylvania – Bigler complained that the Pierce administration “listens to Gwin” and 
that “we are not heard or consulted.”65  Hitching his political fortunes to the anti-Chivalry 
faction, Bigler  reinforced the influence of Broderick and ensured that the biggest threat 
to Gwin’s control would come from within the Democratic party itself.  While Gwin 
headed the Chivalry, Broderick marshaled what became known as the Shovelry, a faction 
of mildly antislavery northerners who sought to block the overtly pro-southern agenda 
that currently prevailed within California.  By mid-decade if not earlier, the Shoverly – a 
play on the working-class roots of leaders like Broderick, the son of a stonemason – 
represented a powerful alternative and consistent check on the proslavery politics of 
California’s southern leadership.    
Like Gwin, Broderick inspired (and demanded) strong demonstrations of loyalty 
from his political allies.  He was, after all, an acolyte of New York’s hierarchical 
Tammany machine, and he carried those lessons to California, where he became an “able, 
powerful and autocratic leader of his wing of the party,” in the words of the 
contemporary observer, James J. Ayres.66  The Chiv leader, Milton Latham, was merely 
repeating a common refrain when he described Broderick as one with “the peculiarity of 
tying to him his supporters in the most wonderful degree.”67  He was “implacable as an 
enemy, but unswervingly true to his principles and his friendships,” Ayres recalled. “the 
																																																						
65 John Bigler to William Bigler, April 14, 1854, William Bigler Papers, Box 6, Historical Society of 
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66 Ayres, Gold and Sunshine, 119. 
67 Milton Latham to James Mandeville, November 18, 1856, James Mandeville Papers, Box 8, HEHL. 
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idol of the rougher classes, [Broderick]… controlled them to his iron will by a supremacy 
that brooked no question.”68  In many ways, the leaders of the Chivalry and Shovelry 
factions were natural counterpoints.  Broderick, the product of the bare-knuckle ward 
politics of New York’s working-class communities, resented the aristocratic hauteur of 
Gwin, the wealthy planter.69  Yet despite their vastly disparate backgrounds and 
constituencies, both leaders employed similar tactics in order to gain an edge in the 
rough-and-tumble political climate of antebellum California.  Both the Chivalry and the 
Shovelry resorted to bullying, ballot stuffing, and outright violence to win votes.70           
Broderick was by no means an abolitionist, but the brazen agenda of the state’s 
Chivalry leaders consistently drew the New Yorker into the controversy over slavery and 
black rights – or lack thereof.  As early as 1850, Broderick, then in the state senate, 
helped defeat an act to exclude African American migration into California.  His 
opposition to Gwin intensified in 1852 after the Chivalry leader blocked Broderick’s bid 
for the open U.S. Senate seat and instead secured the election of the doughface John B. 
Weller.  That same year, Broderick distinguished himself in the struggle against the 
proslavery faction when he took a stand – albeit a futile one – against Henry Crabb’s 
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fugitive slave bill.  Broderick had more luck in another contest against Crabb, when he 
derailed the Tennessean’s attempts to call a new constitutional convention, which, many 
assumed, was intended to force a division of the state.  The next year, Broderick 
triumphed over the proslavery wing of the party when he helped secure the gubernatorial 
election of John Bigler over several southern-born rivals.71  With each successive 
struggle, the gulf widened between the two factions of the Democratic party. 
A breaking point came in 1854 with the national controversy over the Kansas-
Nebraska act.  Overriding the objections of Broderick and other antislavery moderates, 
the Chivs in the statehouse passed a joint resolution approving the Stephen Douglas’s bill 
in May of that year.  California thus became the only free state aside from Douglas’s 
Illinois to endorse the legislation that overturned the Missouri Compromise and permitted 
the introduction of slavery into a northern territory.72  Perhaps California’s Chivs saw in 
Kansas the first domino in a chain that would push slavery to the Far West.  This is 
certainly what the slaveholding senator David Rice Atchison had in mind when he wrote, 
“If Kansas is abolitionized, Missouri ceases to be a slave State, and New Mexico 
becomes a free State; California remains a free State.” But, he continued, “If we secure 
Kansas as a slave State, Missouri is secure; New Mexico and Southern California, if not 
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all of it, become a slave State.”73  As Atchison and many across the South and West 
recognized, California’s free soil constitution was anything but permanent.  Indeed, the 
same California legislature that endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska act would continue to give 
protection to slaveholders within the state, by passing an extension of the fugitive slave 
act with three-to-one support in the senate.74     
The issue of slavery became, at times, a fighting matter in California.  Before 
Bleeding Sumner, there was Bleeding Colby.  In April 1854, a proslavery state senator 
attacked one of his free soil colleagues with a cane, thereby anticipating by two years 
Preston Brooks’s infamous assault on Charles Sumner on the U.S. Senate floor.  The 
affray took place shortly after the extension of the fugitive slave act within the California 
legislature.  When one lawmaker pointed out that the state Supreme Court had, in fact, 
ruled in favor of the fugitive slave law – a reference to the Perkins decision, no doubt – 
Senator Colby of Sacramento responded that such judicial opinions could not prevent him 
from entertaining contrary views.  The staunchly proslavery Senator Leake of Calaveras 
County took issue with the remark, and shortly thereafter “obtained possession of a heavy 
cane,” according to a report in the Sacramento Daily Union.  Once the senate had 
adjourned for the day, Leake advanced upon Colby with the cane and, according to the 
same report, “struck him several blows…over the head.”  Colby managed to wrestle his 
assailant to the ground before several colleagues intervened and ended the melee.  
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Apparently Leake’s aim was not as true as Preston Brooks’s would be two years later, 
and Colby escaped with several scratches on his head.75								  
California was again a political bellwether during the elections of September 
1854.  In the wake of Kansas-Nebraska, rifts among California’s Democrats reflected the 
divisions that had been exposed within the party’s national leadership as well.  The 
Chivalry and Shovelry broke off into rival conventions during the summer of 1854, and 
ran on separate tickets and separate platforms in the fall elections.  Among other 
measures, Gwin’s platform reaffirmed support for the Kansas-Nebraska Act, endorsed 
Robert Walker’s Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (what Thomas Jefferson Green called “the 
great slavery road”), and nominated for Congress Philemon Herbert of Alabama and 
James W. Denver of Virginia.   
In spite of rising discomfort over slavery’s expansion and the organization of a 
Know-Nothing Party within the state, the proslavery wing of the party overwhelmed their 
free-soil opposition in the elections – a result that even surprised some party insiders.  
“The returns as they came in astonished every one, but none more than the Whigs & 
Broderickites,” one Democratic operative wrote.  “It [the Chivalry] has made a clean 
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sweep.”76  Especially promising was the election of two Chivs to U.S. Congress, Herbert 
and Denver, who would continue to promote southern interests at the national level.77   
The divisions between the two wings of the Democracy would provide an opening 
for the newly formed Know Nothing Party the next year, whose candidates upended the 
old balance of power by winning the governorship, as well as majorities in the assembly 
and state senate.78  Yet this was not a death blow to southern interests in California, since 
most Know Nothing leaders, like David Terry of Texas and Henry Foote of Mississippi, 
professed strong proslavery views.  In fact, Terry even supported the reopening of the 
African slave trade.  In any case, the Know Nothing insurgency was short-lived.  
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Democrats succeeded in blocking Foote’s bid for the open U.S. Senate seat in the 1856 
race, and by the winter of that year, political operatives could confidently predict that the 
Chivalry would “rout them horse and foal next fall.”79  True to such political forecasts, 
the American Party was driven from power in September 1856, and the Chivs regained 
their dominant position within the statehouse.80  
Although the enduring divisions within the Democratic Party denied Gwin re-
election to the U.S. Senate, he continued to exert his political influence during a two-year 
lull, before reclaiming his seat by 1857.81  Like Gwin himself, his Chivalry faction 
weathered numerous threats to its power, beating back a Know Nothing insurgency and 
continuing to check the formidable opposition of Broderick’s Shovelry.  Between the 
fugitive slave act, the endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the election of Chiv 
representatives to Congress, and the tireless scheming for a division of the state, 
proslavery Californians consistently allied their state with the slave South.  Even though 
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plans for the full-scale importation of slavery to California had foundered, the enduring 
power of Chivalry politics provided a safe haven for southerners in the West and a 
safeguard for proslavery interests within Congress.   
 
The Dismal Career of California Republicanism  
 There was no greater testament to the strength of proslavery politics in California 
than the chronic troubles of the state’s early Republican Party.  In most other states, the 
divisiveness of the Kansas-Nebraska Act opened a wedge for Republican politics and 
profoundly weakened Democratic machines after 1854.  Not so in California.  Aside from 
the brief Know Nothing interlude, Democrats swept every election within the state and 
dealt the Republican party a string of humiliating defeats, up until 1860.  Free soil, free 
labor, free men – this rallying cry, by and large, fell on deaf ears in antebellum 
California. 
 By the time California’s Republican party formed in the spring of 1856, 
antislavery politicians had already founded chapters in most every other free state of the 
union.  Slow to organize, the state’s Republican machine was also small in numbers.  “No 
record, I venture to say, can be found of a political organization starting out with fewer 
adherents,” recalled Cornelius Cole, the founding member.  Aside from a few personal 
friends, including the merchants Collis Huntington, Mark Hopkins, Leland Stanford, and 
the Crocker brothers, the entire early membership “could be counted on one’s fingers,” 
	 165 
Cole added.82  The first state convention in April 1856 in Sacramento attracted delegates 
from only thirteen of California’s forty-two counties, with over half the delegates coming 
from either San Francisco or Sacramento itself.  Unlike their Democratic adversaries, 
most of these early adherents to Republicanism were political novices.83 
 The 1856 presidential campaign of John C. Fremont threw hard light on these 
organizational weaknesses.  Fremont carried eleven of sixteen free states, with majorities 
as large as 78, 64, and 61 percent in parts of the Northeast.  Yet in California he captured 
barely 19 percent of the vote, his weakest showing in any free state.  The Pathfinder, one 
might suspect, could have counted on greater support from the state that had made him its 
first U.S. senator, and where he had earned early celebrity as the leader of the Bear Flag 
rebellion.  But controversy over a floating land grant that Fremont held in Mariposa 
antagonized voters in California’s mining districts, and Chiv opponents made the most of 
his disputed claims.  The Mariposa issue, however, only partly explains his electoral rout.  
In the state elections of September 1856, after all, the Republican Party fared even worse 
than Fremont himself, polling just 18 percent across California.84 
 As state senator Colby had learned in 1854 and as Republican candidates found 
two years later, to speak openly against slavery in antebellum California was to court 
danger.  Among the southern-born majority of Sonoma County, for instance, “The name 
of ‘black Republicans’ stunk in their nostrils worse than that of a horse-thief,” according 
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to memorialist John Carr.85  While Democrats and Know Nothings ran their party rallies 
without incident, the threat of violence loomed over every Republican gathering during 
these early years.  A mob interrupted the state’s first Republican meeting in April 1856, 
hounding the speaker and overturning his platform.  Matters hardly improved from there.  
Throughout the 1856 campaign, proslavery zealots regularly disrupted meetings, pelted 
speakers with rotten food, and even pulled a Republican candidate from his speaking 
stand.  If a man “was known to have any free-soil sentiments,” Carr recalled, “he was 
spotted at the ballot-box, and likewise socially.”86 Such threats took on a particularly dire 
aspect with the appearance, in May 1856, of a handbill entitled “TO ARMS!”  It called 
for the lynching of all Republican leaders, “and as many of the Attaches of said traitors as 
may be deemed necessary to restore the public quiet and put a stop to such treasonable 
practices.” 87   
In their tactics of violent intimidation, these anti-Republican obstructionists bore 
some resemblance to the proslavery squatters then operating in Kansas, and likewise 
earned the epithet “border ruffians” from California’s beleaguered free soilers.  As a 
prominent California jurist recalled, these border ruffians ensured that, “to be an 
abolitionist or a freesoiler was certain destruction to the aspirations of any person for 
political preferment.”88 Antebellum California’s political landscape was a battlefield, and 
proslavery forces mustered in superior numbers to sustain their electoral edge. 
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 While mobs assailed Republican rallies, California’s politicians bolstered their 
own credentials through rhetorical assaults on free soilers, abolitionists, and African 
Americans, generally.  Democrats repeatedly denied the petitions of California’s black 
community to lift the ban on their testimony in court.89  In an effort to overturn this ban, 
the state’s African American leaders organized the Colored Conventions of 1855, 1856, 
and 1857 – giving California more meetings of this sort than any state other than Ohio – 
yet they could make little headway against the prevailing anti-black sentiment within the 
legislature.90  These were the same lawmakers, after all, who regularly derided 
Republicans as  “nigger worshippers,” “Black Republicans,” “fanatics,” “abolitionists,” 
“wooly heads,” “negrophilists,” and “white niggers.”  Benjamin Franklin Washington of 
Virginia – the chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, who would run the 
leading Democratic paper during the Reconstruction era (Chapter 6) – accused 
Republicans of attempting to transform black into white.91  Meanwhile, southern 
California’s preeminent orator, E.J.C. Kewen, blasted Republicans for forming “a party 
‘conceived in sin, and brought forth in iniquity’,” who had unfurled “their black, piratical 
ensign” in defense of “traitorous principles.”92  California’s Democrats were particularly 
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outraged at the election of N.P. Banks as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives – 
an indication how popular free soil politics had become outside of the South and Far 
West – and they made opposition to his appointment a central point in their anti-
Republican crusade.93 
Against this avalanche of derision, violence, and electoral defeat, California’s 
Republicans quickly moderated their official positions.  To counter the frequent claims – 
albeit almost entirely false – that they harbored racially egalitarian views, California 
Republicans did all in their power to distance themselves from the stigma of abolitionism.  
While the state party platform in 1856 had opposed the expansion of slavery into the 
territories, Republicans thereafter abandoned this plank in favor of popular sovereignty.  
Meanwhile, the few Republicans within the statehouse proved to be far from progressive 
on racial issues.  For instance, they voted for a Chinese exclusion bill, for a homestead 
law which denied homesteading rights to blacks and Chinese, and for a bill to declare null 
and void all marriages between whites and “negroes, mullatoes or Mongolians.”  This 
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was not the racially enlightened Republican Party of Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, 
Free Men.94  
In the 1857 state election, the machine’s leaders took a step that was probably 
unique in the history of the Republican party: they nominated a slaveholder for governor.  
Although he had voted for the admission of California as a free state while representing 
North Carolina in Congress in 1850, Edward Stanly still owned one bondsperson in his 
native state at the time of his gubernatorial nomination seven years later.  During the 
campaign, Stanly endeavored to show “that the Republican party was not an Abolition 
party,” in his own words.  To that end, he cited his past congressional record, 
highlighting his opposition to both the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia 
and the Wilmot Proviso.  “A declaration by Congress that the South should never have 
any more slave States, I could not support,” Stanley reassured a Sacramento audience 
during his campaign.  When it came to slavery, there was “only… one evil,” and that was 
the “degradation of labor.”95  At the polls, Stanly and the recalibrated platform on which 
he ran performed slightly better than had Republican candidates the previous year, 
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capturing 22.5 percent of the vote.96  Yet their prospects remained bleak.  Republicans 
were still, by and large, political outcasts in California.   
That same year, however, Republicans scored a victory by proxy in the election of 
the antislavery Democrat David Broderick to the U.S. Senate.  Since 1852, Broderick had 
been vying for the seat, but his ambitions were consistently checked by Gwin’s 
proslavery faction, until finally the New Yorker mustered the necessary support in the 
1857 contest.97  More promising still, Broderick’s politicking had seemingly secured 
California’s share of the federal patronage for the Shovelry.  In what some called “the 
corrupt bargain,” Broderick threw his support behind his nemesis, sealing Gwin’s 
election for the second senate seat, and in return, Gwin agreed to hand over the federal 
patronage to Broderick’s discretion.  Although the two future senators tried to conceal 
their arrangement, it soon became known that Gwin had signed and sealed a document to 
this end – what became known as the “scarlet letter.”  Soon, both Chivarly and Shovelry 
leaders were embroiled in scandal.98  But no amount of scandal could fully sour 
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on the election, see Stanley, “The Republican Party in California,” 59-60; and Gerald Stanley, “The Politics 
of the Antebellum Far West: The Impact of the Slavery and Race Issues in California,” Journal of the West 
16 (1977), 19-20. 
97 Reports on the buildup to the election and the politicking of the 1857 contest can be found in… To Gwin 
[signed only “your friend”], November 10, 1856, Box 8; David Blanchard to Mandeville, Nov. 16, 1856, 
Box 8; William B. Norman to Gwin, Dec. 20, 1856, Box 8; Gwin to Mandeville, Dec. 25, 1856, Box 8; all 
in Mandeville papers, HEHL. 
98 Indeed, Broderick and Gwin did a poor job of concealing their bargain. Soon after the election, one 
correspondent reported on the “rumored contract between Gwin and Broderick and a great deal of howling 
on the part of those who have always opposed Gwin,” P.L. Solomon to James Mandeville, Mandeville 
papers, Box 8, HEHL.  Another observer wrote, “Gwin has sold his friends for the sake of being elected. 
He has signed a contract giving Broderick the entire Federal patronage of California,” John G. Hyatt to 
Charles M. Hitchcock, January 20, 1857, Hitchcock Family Papers, BANC. For years afterward, Gwin 
would deny that he entered into any such contract with Broderick. In an August 1859 he asserted that he 
had willingly given up the patronage with no expectation that Broderick would, in return, support his 
candidacy for the U.S. Senate; William M. Gwin, An Address of Hon. W.M. Gwin to the People of the State 
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Broderick’s hard-won victory.  At long last, it looked as if there might be a chance for 
California’s moderate antislavery forces to exert control at the national level.   
 
The Chivalry at High Tide  
 Broderick would not have long to savor his victory.  If he had expected support 
from President Buchanan – whose campaign he backed in 1856 – he was to be sorely 
disappointed.  The president’s administration was staffed with southerners as well as 
northerners with proslavery sympathies, like Buchanan himself.  Thus Broderick won 
himself few friends with his opposition to the recent Dred Scott decision, which 
Buchanan’s official organ, the Washington Union had endorsed.  And while Gwin 
initially remained aloof from the internecine struggles of Washington, the two 
Representatives from California, Charles L. Scott and Joseph McKibbin quickly joined 
forces against Broderick.99  The deck was thus stacked against him, as Broderick quickly 
realized.  When he finally secured a meeting with Buchanan, the president was notably 
cold.  And when he pushed to have his friend John Bigler installed as collector of ports of 
San Francisco – one of the richest plums in the state – Buchanan instead handed the 
position to the Chiv favorite and proslavery ultra, Benjamin Franklin Washington.    
“Broderick is defeated, & is now in open hostility” to the Buchanan administration, 
																																																						
of California, on the Senatorial Election of 1857, Giving a History Thereof, and Exposing the Duplicity of 
Broderick, also Extracts from Speeches Delivered at Various Places upon the Political Issues of the Day 
(San Francisco: Daily National, 1859). 
99 According to Charles Scott, Gwin “was utterly powerless, by reason of the contract that he had entered 
into to relinquish the patronage of the state.” But Scott, McKibbin and others in Washington presented “a 
solid & undivided force” against Broderick; Charles L. Scott to Mandeville, March 18, 1857, Box 8. As 
Gwin himself noted, “Scott & McKibben have assumed to control the patronage of the State against 
Broderick,” Gwin to Mandeville, March 19, 1857, Box 8, both in Mandeville papers, HEHL. 
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gloated Charles Scott in April 1857.100  Gwin exulted as the humiliated Broderick rushed 
back to California “in a great rage” after less than a month in Washington, in a desperate 
attempt to secure the gubernatorial election of an antislavery ally.101  But he was again 
checkmated by the Chivalry, who succeeded in electing the doughface Weller.102  By 
outmaneuvering Broderick, California’s leading politicians would continue to enrich 
office-seeking southerners in the West and to endorse proslavery legislation at the 
national level.  
 Observers from the slave states were especially relieved by the humbling of 
Broderick.  The sectional struggles of California’s Democrats had become well known to 
those outside the state, and slaveholding leaders like Jefferson Davis took a particularly 
lively interest in western politics.  As one of the keenest continental expansionists, Davis 
recognized that the political fortunes of the Far West were closely linked with those of 
the slave South – one of the reasons he battled so diligently for a far southern 
transcontinental railroad.  By 1853, if not earlier, Davis had been warned of the 
“miserable New York tacticians” in California and the Broderick faction who “are at 
heart against the South, against state rights, and favor all schemes of speculation, by 
legislation or otherwise,” in the words of Mississippi emigrant, Lewis Sanders.  Yet he 
could take heart from the fact that Democrats would be denied office in California if they 
																																																						
100 Scott to Mandeville, April 2, 1857, Box 8, Mandeville papers, HEHL. 
101 Gwin to Mandeville, April 3, 1857, Box 8, Mandeville papers, HEHL. By this point, Gwin had 
effectively reneged on his pledge to refrain from the patronage struggles, and had would continue to nurture 
a close personal friendship with Buchanan. See Gwin to Mandeville, April 5, 1857, Box 8, for comments 
on “visiting the Cabinet and the President with whom I had talks they will not forget.” 
102 For accounts of the 1857 struggles between Broderick and the Chivalry, see Richards, The California 
Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War, 196-200; Quinn, The Rivals, 227-251; Thomas, Between Two 
Empires, 142-165.  
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did not demonstrate sufficient opposition to “free soil and abolition tendencies.”103  
Watching these political developments in the West, Davis concluded that, “the country on 
the Pacific is in many respects adapted to slave labor, and many of the citizens desire its 
introduction.”  If only the South could secure a favorable railroad route, he continued, 
slavery could expand westward and “future acquisitions to the South would insure to our 
benefit.”  The result, he concluded, would be greater Congressional power for 
slaveholding interests.104	         
The relationship between proslavery forces in the South and West, as Davis’s 
correspondence illustrates, was symbiotic.  While Davis coveted California’s support in 
order to bolster southern influence within Congress, Californians in turn looked to leaders 
like Davis to ensure that the state’s antislavery forces would not gain the upper hand in 
Washington.  Davis’s efforts on behalf of proslavery Californians became indispensable 
upon the election of Broderick to the U.S. Senate.  As one western correspondent wrote, 
“Southern men here begin to look to you as their champion in the future Congresses to 
stave off the stealing land and other bills that will be introduced by Broderick, an 
uneducated low brute as he is.”  Citing the bargain between Gwin and Broderick, he 
predicted the state’s offices “will be filled with shoulder strikers & black republicans, 
Spare us this.”  He continued, “You have many personal friends as well as admirers in 
																																																						
103 The quote about “New York tacticians” comes from Lewis Sanders to Jefferson Davis, March 5, 1853; 
the rest from Sanders to Davis, April 9, 1853, both in Jefferson Davis Papers, Special Collections & 
Archives, Transylvania University, Lexington, KY. My thanks to Susan Brown at Transylvania for making 
these and other letters available to me. It should be noted, however, that Sanders was no friend of Gwin, 
despite their common commitment to slaveholding rights, an indication that, although the Chivalry was a 
well-regulated political machine, it was plagued, like any other party faction, by deep internal divisions.  
104 Jefferson Davis to William R. Cannon, December 7, 1855, Lynda Lasswell Crist, ed., The Papers of 
Jefferson Davis, 1853-1855, Vol. 5, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 142. 
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this state, and every man friendly to the South & her institutions here, do not wish traitor 
politicians to ride over this community.”105  As such correspondents recognized, 
California was not an island unto itself.  Southerners belonged to a transcontinental 
community with shared political agendas.  And they advanced those objectives by 
checking Broderick’s ambitions in Washington.   
Over the coming years, slavery’s allies in the West kept up the fight.  In 
September 1857 Kansas’s territorial legislature, dominated by slaveholders, met in 
Lecompton to draft a constitution in order to formally legalize bondage and to override 
the proposed free soil Topeka Constitution of 1855.  The territory’s free-state majority 
boycotted the ensuing vote for ratification, and even Robert J. Walker, the solidly 
proslavery territorial governor (and spearhead for the “great slavery road”), resigned his 
office rather than implement a constitution that clearly lacked popular support.  
Nevertheless, Buchanan gave Lecompton his executive endorsement, thereby igniting an 
intra-party struggle along sectional lines – pitting the president and southern Democrats 
against Stephen Douglas and many of fellow northern Democrats.  That rift was 
replicated within California’s congressional leadership, with Gwin and Scott supporting 
Lecompton and Broderick and McKibbin opposing it.106  As Buchanan’s support waned 
and the Democratic Party unraveled, one might have expected California’s proslavery 
																																																						
105 W.R. Isaacs MacKay to Jefferson Davis, January 13, 1857, in Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1856-1860, 
Vol. 6, pp. 99-101; see also Sanders to Davis, March 19, 1858, Transylvania Special Collections. 
106 The National Anti-Slavery Standard, April 10, 1858 published a list of the 31 U.S. senators and 
representatives who favored the Lecompton constitution, which included the names of William M. Gwin 
and Charles L. Scott. 
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partisans to moderate their position.  Instead, they redoubled their efforts and brought the 
Far West even deeper into the slave South’s political fold. 
 Indeed, while the Lecompton controversy invigorated antislavery politics 
throughout much of the country, it seemed to have the opposite effect in California.  The 
state legislature lost little time in endorsing the proslavery constitution for Kansas, while 
the Chivalry press gained fresh fodder in its campaign against free soilers, blasting 
opponents of the Buchanan administration as “freedom shriekers,” “abolitionists,” and 
“Black Republicans.”107  Meanwhile, Gwin, as chair of the Senate Caucus Committee, 
punished the Democratic mutiny by booting Broderick from the Committee on Public 
Lands and removing Douglas from his chair on the Committee on Territories.  Gwin 
would later justify his action by citing Douglas’s position on popular sovereignty. 
Douglas was not fit for the office because he believed, in Gwin’s words, that “a 
Territorial Legislature could lawfully by non-action or hostile legislation exclude slavery 
from such Territory.”  Gwin, on the other hand, argued that slaveholding rights in the 
territories were inviolable, regardless of what local voters may decide.108  California’s 
preeminent politician made his position clear: slavery was truly national, and western 
leaders would work to keep it that way.   
																																																						
107 For California’s endorsement of the Lecompton Constitution, see Statutes of California, 1858, 353-354. 
For more Democratic race-baiting, see the Sonora Democrat’s response to anti-Lecomptonites, reprinted in 
the Daily Globe, February 5, 1858. 
108 The quote from Gwin comes from his 1859 Grass Valley speech, excerpted in Stephen A. Douglas, 
Letter of Judge Douglas in Reply to the Speech of Dr. Gwin at Grass Valley, Cal, (no publisher, no date), 
BANC. The pamphlet was a reprinting of Douglas’s letter to the Daily National of San Francisco, written 
August 16, 1859 and published September 16, 1859. In it, Douglas argues that Gwin opposes the very 
fundamentals of popular sovereignty, and thereby places him at a proslavery extreme. 
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They did so in a particularly brazen fashion within California’s Supreme Court in 
February 1858.  Several months earlier, a Mississippi slaveholder, Charles Stovall had 
moved to Sacramento with his bondsman, Archy Lee.  Once on California’s free soil, Lee 
escaped, only to be recaptured by Stovall and dragged before two separate courts in order 
to defend his right of ownership.  When both courts ruled against Stovall, he took his case 
to the state Supreme Court, which – to the shock and outrage of California’s antislavery 
population – overturned the previous rulings and remanded Lee to slavery.  That the 
state’s fugitive slave code had lapsed roughly three years earlier mattered little to justices 
Peter Burnett and David S. Terry, both southern by birth and advocates for slaveholding 
rights in the West.  In what historian Rudolph Lapp calls a “judicial absurdity,” the 
justices ruled that Stovall’s poor health and unfamiliarity with California law merited an 
exception to the state’s free soil constitution and granted him permission to return to 
Mississippi with his slave property.   
Galvanized by the clear miscarriage of justice, a group of abolitionists intercepted 
Stovall before he could return to Mississippi and secured a final hearing for Lee before a 
federal court, the U.S. District in San Francisco.  There, Lee finally won his freedom.  
But the efforts of California’s African Americans exacted a heavy toll.  The legal fees 
took so much money from the black community that their newspaper, the Mirror of the 
Times, folded.109   And shortly after the final verdict, California’s pro-Lecompton faction 
																																																						
109 The case and its aftermath was covered extensively in California’s press. For detailed reports, see 
Sacramento Daily Union, March 8, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 1858; Daily Alta California, February 6, March 6, 9, 
April 20, May 31, 1858. For records of the several trials, including affidavits from Stovall and Archy Lee’s 
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Lee: A California Fugitive Slave Case (Berkeley: Heyday, 1969); Lapp, Blacks in Gold Rush California, 
148-152, 236, see p. 149 for Lapp’s “judicial absurdity” remark; Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 76-78.  
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proposed a new fugitive slave law and a bill to ban black immigration into the state, 
which passed the assembly before failing in the senate.110  Whether or not Senator James 
Henry Hammond of South Carolina had been apprised of these developments is 
uncertain.  But when he looked to the western states and territories in March 1858, he 
could assure his southern brethren that “there is no antagonism between the South and 
[California and Oregon], and never will be.”111     
Unable to express their grievances at the polls, California’s African Americans 
instead voted with their feet.  In April 1858 over 200 blacks, including Archy Lee 
himself, left California for Victoria, British Columbia.  “Many of the collored [sic] 
people of California will select their future houses in the British possessions,” Billington 
Crum Whiting, a lawyer and former state senator wrote.  “They are pleased with the idea 
of being allowed to vote, to testify in courts & to sit on juries.”112  An estimated 400 to 
800 African Americans from California settled in Victoria before the war, amounting to 
one of the largest movements of free blacks prior to the Great Migration of the early 
twentieth century.  The discovery of gold in British Columbia proved especially enticing 
to prospective migrants, as did the possibility of escape from the discriminatory political 
																																																						
110 For the voting record on Assembly bill No. 411, “An Act to restrict and prevent the immigration to and 
residence in this State by Negroes and Mulattoes,” see California State Assembly Journal, 1857, pp. 811-
812, 822-824. 
111 This was said during Hammond’s famous “King Cotton” speech, Cong. Globe, 35th Congress, 1st 
Session, (March 4, 1858), pp. 959-962. Broderick responded with a lengthy speech of his own. “Cotton 
king!” he scoffed at Hammond. “No, sir. Gold is king.” By Broderick’s estimates, the value of California’s 
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that future historians would ascribe the Lecompton Constitution to “the fading intellect, the petulant 
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Session, appendix, 193. 
112 Billington Crum Whiting to Susan Helen Whiting, May 19, 1858, Billington Crum Whiting Papers, 
HEHL.  
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and legal culture of California.113  “Other parts of the world are unpolluted by the 
pestilential presence of the negro-hater,” reported Frederick Douglass’ Paper, in an 
article that urged California’s blacks to seek the mineral riches and enlightened policies 
of British Canada.  “Here can the black American go as a man.”114 
Stacey Smith refers to the Supreme Court decision in the Archy Lee case as “the 
dying gasp of slaveholder rights in California.”115  But there was still plenty of life left in 
the Chivalry.  Philip Roach, a leader in the proslavery faction of California’s Democratic 
Party, made this much clear in his 1859 correspondence with Jefferson Davis.116  In a 
June letter, Roach enclosed the Chiv party platform as well as a list of candidates for 
twelve of the top offices, noting that “we have many fire-eating men as you will note by 
their places of nativity.”  Indeed, the entire slate of candidates – with the exception of a 
single Pennsylvania doughface – was either southern-born or had come to California after 
prolonged residence in the South.117  Much like some of Davis’s other western 
																																																						
113 That California’s blacks would seek another mining community is understandable, as many had 
originally emigrated to the Pacific coast in search of gold. On African American migrants and the 
California gold rush, see Frederick Douglass’ Paper, April 1, 1852. 
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For a brief biography, see Dunbar Rowland, ed., Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and 
Speeches, Vol. 2 (Jackson, Mississippi: Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1923), 442.  
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correspondents, Roach wrote as if California constituted part of the Mississippi senator’s 
constituency.  He praised Davis for past efforts and urged him to continue his advocacy 
for both a Pacific railroad and the Butterfield overland mail road.  “When this question 
arises in Congress [of increased funding for the overland road],” Roach wrote, “I hope 
that you will merit our gratitude by its earnest advocacy.”118  In turn, he assured Davis 
that he would do his utmost to prevent a particular rival from securing a congressional 
nomination.119  Thus, as the sectional controversy intensified, the West’s Chivs and the 
South’s political leaders continued to operate in tandem. 
Per Roach’s predictions, proslavery loyalists carried the state in the 1859 
elections.  In the three-way gubernatorial race, the Chiv candidate, Milton S. Latham, 
won in a landslide, capturing nearly 62 percent of the vote.  Leland Stanford, the 
Republican candidate, captured less than 10 percent – the most dismal showing from his 
party in a decade punctuated by electoral disappointment.  Republicans even lost their 
former stronghold of San Francisco to Lecompton Democrats.  Furthermore, in the race 
for the state’s two U.S. House seats, California voters elected a pair of fire-eating 
																																																						
Cope, Kentucky; for attorney general: T.H. Williams, Kentucky; for clerk of the supreme court: C.S. 
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Democrats, Charles L. Scott of Virginia and John C. Burch of Missouri.  It would seem 
that Californians’ anxieties over abolitionism trumped their anxieties over slaveholding 
expansion, in an election that can be seen as a referendum on the Lecompton Constitution 
and the status of slavery in the territories.  Aside from these electoral victories, proslavery 
Democrats also succeeded in filling California’s federal positions with southern-born 
men.  Virginians now served as the collector of the port of San Francisco and as navy 
agent; Missourians held the San Francisco surveyorship as well as the superintendency of 
the mint; two Georgians ran the state’s Indian agency; and a Texan headed the office of 
appraiser general.  The only non-southerner in a major federal post was James W. 
Mandeville, a longtime Gwin ally from New York.120 
California’s antislavery forces suffered their gravest loss that fall, not at the polls, 
but on a remote field near Lake Merced.  Aside from the Hamilton-Burr affair, no duel in 
American history had such far-reaching political consequences as the one between David 
Broderick and David Terry in September 1859.  Broderick had a legion of political 
adversaries, but few as hot-blooded or as deadly as Terry.  The son of a Mississippi 
planter, Terry spent his formative years in Texas, before migrating to California with a 
company of fellow southerners and five slaves.  As Stephen J. Field recalled, “Mr. Terry 
had the virtues and prejudices of men of the extreme South in those days,” and he aired 
those prejudices freely, whether on the bench of California’s supreme court or in public 
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diatribes.121  It was one such diatribe that ignited the feud with Broderick, who was 
almost equally quick to anger.122  Their first attempt at a duel on September 12, 1859, 
ended in their arrest, though they were soon released and reconvened, along with their 
seconds and a crowd of 73 spectators, the following day.123  There, Broderick’s hair-
trigger pistol prematurely discharged, leaving the skilled marksman Terry with a clean 
shot.  He sighted along the barrel, took aim, and delivered the mortal blow.124  Broderick 
expired three days later, the last U.S. senator to be killed until Bobby Kennedy in 1968.125   
Broderick’s body was still warm when antislavery Californians began to cry foul. 
Chiv opponents claimed that Broderick’s gun was designed to misfire, while Terry had 
practiced extensively with hair-trigger pistols.  Quite simply, “the duel was unfair,” 
																																																						
121 Field, Personal Reminiscences, 124. Terry was known to carry a bowie knife and a pistol on his person, 
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California, 345. 
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according to California jurist Annis Merrill.126  But the conspiracy ran deeper than that, 
according to others.  Indeed, they claimed that Broderick’s death was part of a 
premeditated plan to remove from office the most powerful threat to a Chivalry political 
monopoly.  “It became apparent before the election that a settled & fixed determination 
had been agreed upon by the southern chivalry to kill of [sic] Broderick & thereby create 
a vacancy in the senate to be filled by one of their own kind,” Billington Whiting wrote to 
his wife.  Broderick had thus become merely “another victim to gratify the sectional 
malice of southern politicians.” 127  Southerners had, after all, been conspiring to advance 
their proslavery interests in the West since before statehood, and there was little reason to 
believe they had significantly modified their strategies. 	True to form, the Chivalry lost 
little time in filling Broderick’s seat with Henry P. Haun, a moderately proslavery 
Democrat from Kentucky.128 
California’s antislavery leaders now wielded a cudgel with which to bludgeon the 
dominant Chivalry faction.  Although Broderick had remained a Democrat to his dying 
day, beleaguered Republicans were particularly eager to claim the mantle of the West’s 
antislavery martyr.  Edward Baker, the Republican leader and Archy Lee’s defense 
attorney, delivered the eulogy at Broderick’s funeral – “the largest and most imposing 
that had been seen up to that time in San Francisco,” according to one observer.129  Baker 
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reinforced rumors of a Chiv conspiracy by quoting Broderick’s supposed last words: 
‘They have killed me because I was opposed to the extension of slavery and a corrupt 
Administration.’”  In eulogizing Broderick, Baker clearly hoped to bury Gwin.  He thus 
harped on proslavery malfeasance.  “Never in the history of political warfare has any man 
been so pursued,” Baker claimed.  “It has been a system tending to one end, and the end 
is here.”  The result, he lamented, was a state without direction, caught in the grasp of a 
merciless slave power.  His eulogy ended on a note of despair: “Who now can speak for 
California?”130   
 
Conclusion 
The answer was not at all heartening.  True, charges of conspiracy had struck a 
chord with California’s voters and badly damaged the reputation of the Chivalry 
machine.  But with a congressional delegation monopolized by slaveholding interests and 
a statehouse controlled by Lecompton Democrats, California had probably never seemed 
further from its free soil origins than it did during the fall of 1859.131  From the 
perspective of California’s ailing antislavery faction, there was no clear end in sight to 
the long reign of southerners in state politics.  Lecompton Democrats shrugged off the 
																																																						
portrait of Broderick, ringed in black crepe. In California, trophy hunters began seeking Broderick’s 
autograph, and his supporters erected a monument at his gravesite in Lone Mountain Cemetery, San 
Francisco. For the text of the New York funeral address, see John W. Dwinelle, A Funeral Oration upon 
David C. Broderick, Late Senator from California, Delivered at the Chapel of the New York University, on 
Sunday Evening, Nov. 20th, 1859 (Rochester: Benton & Andrews, 1859). On Broderick autograph 
collectors, see John G. Downey to Lewis Jacob Cist, Oct. 18, 1861, Joh G. Downey Papers, BANC.	Baker 
would himself become an antislavery martyr just a few years later, when he was killed at the Battle of 
Ball’s Bluff in October 1861. 
130 Edward D. Baker, Oration of Colonel Edward D. Baker over the Dead Body of David C. Broderick, a 
Senator of the United States, 18th September, 1859 (New York: De Vinne Press, 1889), 7-9, 13.  
131 In the legislature of 1859, 19 of the 30 state senators were southern-born, while northerners had a slight 
edge in the assembly, 40 to 34; Powell, “Southern Influences in California Politics,” 143.  
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moral outrage that followed in the wake of Broderick’s death.  “It is astonishing how 
virtuous men become after they are dead,” the southern-born bookseller Jefferson 
Martenet wrote from San Francisco.  “Obituary addresses are lies, barefaced lies.”132  
Meanwhile the abolitionist press looked to political developments in the Far West with 
increasing disquiet.  Reporting on the fallout from Broderick’s death – which had created 
“a sensation in the Federal metropolis” – the Washington correspondent to the National 
Anti-Slavery Standard painted a particularly gloomy picture.  “California is perhaps the 
most hopeless State in the Union,” he wrote.  “She is overrun by Southern lawyers and 
bankrupt slaveholders.  It will take twenty years to give California an anti-slavery 
sentiment.”133 
Furthermore, the state’s proslavery partisans were a particularly resilient lot.  
Southerners did not fold their tents after the passage of a free-soil constitution in 1849, 
nor did they surrender their political claims when slaveholders like Thomas Jefferson 
Green had been driven from the gold fields.  Instead, they consolidated their power in a 
well-oiled political machine that exercised a virtual monopoly on federal patronage in 
order to preserve the plums of the state for southern-born loyalists.  Meanwhile, through 
the statehouse and the courtrooms, they crafted laws that gave enormous protection to 
slaveholders and imperiled the liberties of the state’s black population.  And finally, they 
tapped deep-rooted currents of anti-black racism in the West to marginalize a Republican 
Party that had otherwise been surging across the free states of the Union.  With such a 
																																																						
132 Jefferson Martenet to his mother, October 3, 1859, Martenet correspondence, HEHL. Martenet was a 
relatively moderate Whig through much of the decade, but amid rising sectional tensions, his loyalties 
drifted toward the Lecompton wing of the Democratic Party. 
133 National Anti-Slavery Standard, October 22, 1859. 
	 185 
deeply entrenched proslavery elite, the state’s free soil constitution was never secure, 
whether from conspirators like James Gadsden or advocates of state division like Henry 
Crabb.  California never became a slave state, but it certainly voted like one through 
much of the antebellum period. 
Westering slaveholders did not confine themselves to the Pacific Coast, however.  
While California’s antebellum political history has attracted close scholarly inquiry for 
decades, if not longer, students of the subject have largely overlooked a corollary 
narrative: the emergence of a small but committed proslavery community directly to the 
east.  During the 1850s, New Mexico, Arizona, and even Utah welcomed southern 
emigrants, who, in turn, brought the Desert West into the political orbit of the slave 
South.  In many ways, this history serves as something of a postscript to the great slavery 
road.  Although slaveholders failed to construct a Pacific railway, their ancillary 
achievements – the Gadsden Purchase the overland mail road, most significantly – helped 
ease the way for southern emigration across the region and thereby created a foothold for 
proslavery interests in these territories.  California constituted merely the far western rim 
of a proslavery corridor that stretched across the continent. 
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Chapter 4 
SLAVERY’S SUNBELT AND THE SECTIONAL CRISIS  
IN THE FAR SOUTHWEST, 1850-1861 
 
 
Snatching odd moments during sentinel duty at Fort Fauntleroy in New Mexico, 
William Need penned an urgent message to Secretary of War Simon Cameron in 
September 1861.  Thousands of miles from the killing fields of Manassas, Virginia, 
where the Union army had gone down in defeat several months earlier, an equally 
ominous development was unfolding along the borderlands of the American Southwest. 
“The Texas rebels and Arizona cut-throats, like the ancient Goths and Vandals, are at the 
very gates,” threatening the entire western half of the continent, Need warned.  That 
threat was especially dire, he added, as the territory lacked both the means and the will to 
beat back the rebel invaders.  Indeed, New Mexico had been in the hands of proslavery 
military and political forces for years, and now, with Confederate secession, a 
longstanding southern plot to capture the Southwest seemed nearly inevitable.  To 
ascertain the nature of rebel ambitions in the Southwest, Need wrote, Cameron should 
look no further than the Confederate chief himself.  For more than a decade, Jefferson 
Davis had coveted the region, especially Arizona, “his beau ideal of a railroad route to 
the Pacific.”  The region, Need continued, “was to him the terra incognita of a grand 
scheme of intercommunication and territorial expansion more vast and complicated than 
was ever dreamed of by Napoleon Bonaparte in his palmiest days of pride and power.”1 
																																																						
1 William Need to Simon Cameron, September 27, 1861, Official Records of the War of the Rebellion 
(hereafter OR) Series I, Vol. L, Part I, 635-641. 
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Need’s fears were justifiable.  And his assessment of Jefferson Davis’s western 
ambitions was hardly exaggerated.  Southern leaders had indeed expended considerable 
political capital in an attempt to spread their influence over the Southwest, and many of 
their efforts had been crowned with success.  Southerners leveraged their power to help 
pass a slave code in Utah in 1852 and an even more far-reaching proslavery statute in 
New Mexico in 1859; they bested northern Congressional opposition to construct an 
overland mail route through slave country and into California; and they backed two 
nearly successful territorial movements in southern California and southern New Mexico.  
In reconstructing these proslavery operations, this chapter argues that the sectional 
conflict reached into a region traditionally ignored by political historians of the 
antebellum period.  Proslavery leaders transformed the Southwest into a sectional 
battleground and, by the outbreak of the Civil War, achieved a subtle political conquest 
of the region.   
As previously noted, scholarship on slaveholding imperialism has focused 
inordinate attention on a small group of dramatic actors and episodes – border ruffians in 
Bleeding Kansas, filibusters and diplomats in Cuba, and William Walker’s armies in 
Nicaragua. But these ventures distract from a more prolonged and ultimately more 
successful campaign to extend a proslavery political order across the Far West.  Although 
a handful of historians have studied the slave controversy in isolated western territories, 
by stepping back and examining the cumulative effect of proslavery politics across the 
entire region, a slave power comes into focus that was both more nimble and more 
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expansive than scholars have recognized.2  Indeed, by the late 1850s, southerners created 
what we could call a proslavery Sunbelt, a transcontinental sphere of influence stretching 
from the coastal Carolinas in one direction to southern California in the other.  It was a 
region, as Need recognized, beholden to a numerically weak but politically powerful 
faction of southerners.  And a region that would pose serious problems for Unionists on 
the eve of the Civil War. 
What has become known as the Sunbelt – a region sweeping from the 
southeastern United States to California – is the subject of a sophisticated and growing 
body of scholarship.  Although historians have backdated the beginnings of this Sunbelt, 
it remains, by virtually all accounts, a twentieth-century development.3  This chapter 
adopts the spatial framework of the Sunbelt to present a new way of thinking about 
nineteenth-century American regionalism.  To be sure, many of the factors that 
distinguish today’s Sunbelt – military spending, conservative politics, Christian faith, and 
																																																						
2 For more geographically focused regional studies, see Loomis Morton Ganaway, New Mexico and the 
Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861 (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1976, reprint of 1944 edition); Leonard 
Richards, The California Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: Vintage, 2007); Mark J. 
Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula Blush? New Mexico Territory’s Unique Slave Code, 1859-
1861,” New Mexico Historical Review 87: 2 (spring 2012), pp. 209-242; Newell G. Bringhurst, “The 
Mormons and Slavery – A Closer Look,” Pacific Historical Review 50 (August 1981). Although it treats 
the slavery controversy only briefly, the most complete overview of the region during this period remains 
Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1966, revised edition, 2000).  
3 See, for example, Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, 
and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York: Norton, 2011). Other seminal works in Sunbelt 
historiography include Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth 
Since World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to 
Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994); Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in 
the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk, 
eds., Sunbelt Rising: The Politics of Space, Place, and Region (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2014); Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds. The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Sean P. Cunningham, American Politics in the Postwar Sunbelt: 
Conservative Growth in a Battleground Region (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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metropolitan development – were not yet in evidence during the mid-nineteenth century.4  
But thinking anachronistically about the Sunbelt does indeed have its conceptual payoffs.  
Most crucially, by moving a twentieth-century framework into an antebellum setting, we 
combat the inclination to view the Far West as a land apart.5  Great distances may have 
separated, say, miners in Arizona from planters in Mississippi, but they often saw 
themselves in common cause, committed to the political ideology of slavery and a shared 
legislative agenda.  Slaveholders looked to New Mexico, Arizona and California as a 
natural extension of the South, and they built a broad political coalition across this 
southern corridor of the continent.  If, as the Sunbelt paradigm premises, there is a strong 
political affinity that links the present-day South and Southwest, scholars would be wise 
to trace the origins of that association to the antebellum period.  That regional identity 
long predated air conditioning, the presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater, or the 
spread of Christian evangelicalism.  It took root in the 1850s, when the slave South 
moved into the Far West.  
 
Slavery Among the Saints 
																																																						
4 For reflections on the meaning and historiography of the Sunbelt, see David Goldfield, “Writing the 
Sunbelt,” OAH Magazine of History 18 (October 2003), pp. 5-10 and Goldfield, “Searching for the 
Sunbelt,” OAH Magazine of History 18 (October 2003), pp. 3-4.	
5 Again, there remains a historiographical divide between work on the nineteenth-century South and West. 
Several scholars of the Texas borderlands and American empire have been successful at bridging this 
divide. See Andrew J. Torget, Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas 
Borderlands, 1800-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Sarah Rodriguez, 
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State University Press, 1991). See also A. Hope McGrath, “An Army of Working-Men: Military Labor and 
the Construction of American Empire, 1865-1915” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2016).  
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 Against a rising tide of abolitionism, slaveholders began articulating a new 
conception of their peculiar institution by the mid-1830s, emphasizing the harmonious 
bond between master and slave and the divine nature of that relationship.  No longer was 
slavery a necessary evil, as Thomas Jefferson and others argued; it was now, in the words 
of John C. Calhoun, a “positive good.”6  Southern religious leaders took a particularly 
active role in this proslavery campaign, countering the religiously inspired attacks of 
northern abolitionists by pointing to the scriptural justifications for human bondage.  By 
the early 1840s, the Virginian Baptist minister Thornton Stringfellow had emerged as 
perhaps the most persuasive polemicist of this new creed.  As God had blessed the 
patriarchs of the Old Testament with slaves and his divine favor, Stringfellow wrote in 
1841, “it would seem that the institution was one furnishing great opportunities to 
exercise grace and glorify God, as it still does, where its duties are faithfully 
discharged.”7  The African race was divinely destined for slavery by the curse of Canaan, 
Stringfellow argued, which condemned Canaan and his supposedly dark-skinned 
offspring to perpetual servitude as punishment for the sins of his father, Ham.8  Slavery 
																																																						
6 John C. Calhoun, “Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, Delivered in the Senate, February 6th, 
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7 Thornton Stringfellow, “A Brief Examination of Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery,” in 
The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830-1860, ed. Drew Gilpin Faust 
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color. The nature of Ham’s sin is also ambiguous. According to the scripture, Ham “uncovered” the 
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was, above all, a merciful institution, Stringfellow continued, a boon to both master and 
slave alike, and a source of protection and security for a race unprepared for 
independence.9  Such arguments were central to the southern evangelical revival of this 
period, a revival, as Stephanie McCurry has argued, that strengthened domestic 
dependencies, endowing masters with a theological justification for their absolute 
authority over wives, children and slaves.10 
 This religious defense of slavery found adherents in what may seem an unlikely 
place: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith 
in western New York.  Indeed, Smith and other Mormon writers articulated these 
proslavery religious arguments several years before Strinfgellow’s major essay on the 
subject.  Like southern writers during this period, Mormons stressed the scriptural 
justification for slavery.  “The fact is uncontrovertable [sic],” Smith wrote in 1836, “that 
the first mention we have of slavery is found in the holy bible, pronounced by a man who 
was perfect in his generation and walked with God.”  Similarly, Smith cited the curse of 
Canaan, arguing that what God had fixed, abolitionists had no right to undo.11  Other 
Mormons followed their prophet’s lead.  They stressed the protection that slavery 
provided to bondspeople and again referenced Biblical justifications, particularly the 
curse of Canaan.  According to one such writer, abolition would unleash “a reckless mass 
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9 Stringfellow, “Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery,” 165-167. 
10 Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the Political 
Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 171-
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University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
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of human beings, uncultivated, untaught and unaccustomed to provide for themselves the 
necessaries of life – endangering the chastity of every female who might by chance be 
found in our streets.”12  Stringfellow could not have said it better himself. 
 This early Mormon commitment to proslavery polemics was no doubt conditioned 
by the need for fresh recruits to the faith.  At the time of these writings, Smith and the 
majority of the Saints lived in Missouri, and thus had to tow the proslavery line in order 
to avoid alienating the local population.  After being expelled from that state, however, 
Smith’s views shifted radically.  During his 1844 presidential bid, he publically attacked 
the institution of slavery and called for the compensated emancipation of all slaves by the 
year 1850.13  This was as close as any prominent Saint would come to preaching abolition 
for the next twenty years, however.  After Smith’s assassination and the Mormon exodus 
to Utah, church leaders would return to the earlier arguments in defense of slavery.  
Although slaveholding would never become economically central to Mormon Utah, the 
Saints ensured that it would at least be politically and theologically viable.      
 When, in 1847, roughly 150 of the faithful followed Brigham Young across the 
continent into what would become Utah, they brought with them a handful of slaves.  
Still standing in central Salt Lake City, the Brigham Young monument, which records the 
names of Utah’s first white inhabitants, also bears testimony to the presence of three of 
																																																						
12 “The Abolitionists,” in Latter Day Saints’ Messenger and Advocate 2:7 (April 1836), 299-301; see also 
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13 Joseph Smith, General Smith’s Views of the Powers and Policy of the Government of the United States 
(Pontiac, Mich.: Jackson Print, 1844), 1-6. See also, Bringhurst, “The Mormons and Slavery,” 331-332. Of 
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these enslaved pioneers, Green Flake, Hark Lay and Oscar Crosby.14  Due to shaky 
census data in such a far-flung territory, the exact number of slaves in early Utah is 
difficult to ascertain.  The census of 1850 lists twenty-six slaves and twenty-four black 
freedpeople, although the actual numbers may well be higher, according to some 
historians.15  By one early pioneer’s count, thirty-four black slaves accompanied the 
Mississippi Company as it traveled west to Utah during this period.16  The antislavery 
press back east took note of these forced migrations of enslaved people, with the New 
York Evening Post predicting in 1851 that Utah is “just as likely to be a slave as a free 
State.”17  In Utah itself, the official Latter-Day Church establishment did little to refute its 
associations with slavery.  “The laws of the land recognize slavery,” church leader Orson 
Hyde wrote in 1851.  “If there is a sin in selling a slave, let the individual who sells him 
bear that sin, and not the church.” Anyway, he added, “All the slaves that are there appear 
to be perfectly contented and satisfied.”18	 
 Testimony from former slaves themselves tells a different story, however.  Along 
with a party of several other enslaved people, Alex Bankhead was forcibly transported to 
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1851), 63.	
	 194 
Utah from Alabama in 1847.  In the late 1890s, Bankhead provided his reminiscences of 
slavery among the Saints for Salt Lake City’s black newspaper, the Broad Ax.  He 
recalled a small community of fellow slaves who would congregate in a large room on 
State Street to “discuss their condition.”  Together they would “gaze in wonderment at 
the lofty mountains, which reared their snowy peaks heavenward, and completely forbade 
them from ascertaining how they could make their escape back to the South, or to more 
congenial climes.”  Their condition in Utah “was far from being happy,” according to 
Bankhead, and “many of them were subjected to the same treatment that was accorded 
the plantation negroes of the South.”19  Although slaves could and did join the Mormon 
church, they were admitted in subordinate positions.20  And church membership did not 
necessarily guarantee better treatment.  Utah may have represented the promised land for 
certain Mormon leaders, but it was nothing of the sort for their enslaved laborers.   
 Brigham Young himself held an ambiguous position on slavery, but one largely 
consistent with earlier Mormon defenses of the institution.  In his governor’s message of 
January 1852, he addressed both Indian and African slavery at length.  “[W]hile servitude 
may and should exist, and that too upon those who are naturally designed to occupy the 
position of ‘servant of servants,’ [i.e. Africans, the descendants of Ham],” Young 
proclaimed, “yet we should not fall into the other extreme, and make them as beasts of 
the field.”  He called for the humane treatment of those relegated to “servitude,” which, 
he believed, may eventually ameliorate the condition of “the poor, forlorn, destitute, 
																																																						
19 Broad Ax, March 25, 1899. Note: this interview was transcribed and paraphrased by the paper’s 
publisher, Julius Taylor, and thus does not reflect exact quotes from Bankhead. For more on Bankhead and 
the Broad Ax, see Coleman, “Blacks in Utah History,” 121-123. 
20 Christensen, “Negro Slavery in the Utah Territory,” 299. 
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ignorant savage, or African, as the case may be.”21  Here, Young took a position not 
inconsistent with the proslavery paternalism of the South, which held that bondage would 
prove a blessing to the bondspeople themselves. When Horace Greeley questioned Young 
on these views several years later, the Mormon leader was even more explicit.  Slavery, 
according to Young, was a “divine institution, and not to be abolished until the curse 
pronounced on Ham shall have been removed from his descendants.”  Nevertheless, 
Young did not believe that chattel slavery could flourish in Utah, and that ultimately it 
would come into the Union as a free state.22 
 At Governor Young’s request, the Mormon legislature legalized slavery in 
February 1852.  The act passed the same year that the church establishment took its 
official stand on plural marriage, thereby linking slavery and polygamy, what 
Republicans would later call the “twin relics of barbarism.”  Compared to southern slave 
codes, Utah’s “Act in Relation to Service” provided more protections for the enslaved 
themselves.  For instance, if a slaveholder was proven guilty of “cruelty or abuse, or 
neglect to feed, clothe, or shelter his servants in a proper manner” the so-called “contract” 
between master and slave could be rendered null and void.  Masters were also obligated 
to send their slaves to school for “not less than eighteen months, between the ages of six, 
and twenty years.”  And slaveholders were also subject to fines or imprisonment if they 
transported slaves out of the territory against their will.23  What constituted the will of the 
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enslaved, however, was far from clear.  Despite these various protections, much of Utah’s 
proslavery statute would have been familiar to southern migrants.  As was the case in 
most southern states, those guilty of intercourse with either free or enslaved blacks were 
subject to heavy fines – between $500 and $1000 in Utah.24  Furthermore, the act gave 
Utah’s white inhabitants full license to both buy and sell slaves.  Budgets and bills of sale 
bear testimony to a limited slave trade within the territory and indicate that slaves 
continued to fetch high prices – as much as $800 to $1000 – throughout the decade.25  
Although “An Act in Relation to Service” applied certain brakes on the inherent cruelty 
of the institution, Utah’s slaveholders, because of their social position and the lack of 
surveillance in a frontier community, still possessed immense power over the lives of the 
enslaved. 
“An Act in Relation to Service” – the first legislative enactment to formally 
protect slavery in a far western territory – cannot be explained by economic factors.  At 
that time, the territory harbored only twelve slaveholders and perhaps as few as sixty to 
seventy slaves.  Simply put, human bondage was not a driving force in Utah’s economic 
development.  However, those twelve slaveholders hailed from Utah’s elite circles – a 
member of the Council of Twelve Apostles, the first mayor of Salt Lake City, and Utah’s 
territorial representative in Congress.26  Thus, this proslavery statute can be seen as both a 
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concession to an elite minority of slaveholders within the territory and as an incentive to 
aspiring migrants from southern states.  With the act, the Mormon legislature broadcast 
its receptiveness to the South’s peculiar institution and its commitment to protecting 
property in other humans.  Utah, as Young himself recognized, was not destined to 
become a plantation society, but its political allegiances nevertheless betrayed a strong 
southern bias. 
In defending slavery, the issue foremost in the minds of Mormon leaders was not 
southern immigration, however.  Rather, the most pressing concern was the maintenance 
of another peculiar institution: polygamy.27  Utah’s leaders looked to the South as a 
natural ally when polygamy came under attack in the early 1850s, and southern 
slaveholders and Mormon Saints alike spoke out against federal incursions into their 
social systems.  The Millennial Star explicitly linked the proslavery and pro-polygamy 
defense as early as 1853. “The State laws of the North have nothing to do with the 
domestic relations of the South,” the Star argued.  “So it is in regard to Utah; she asks not 
the interference of any state of this Union to dictate to her what kind of policy she must 
adopt in her legislative enactments.”28  
The Deseret News, a Mormon mouthpiece, took an especially hard line against the 
North regarding the slavery controversy, cheering both the Kansas Nebraska Act and the 
Dred Scott decision.29  “African slavery in South Carolina is a legalized domestic 
																																																						
27 I have been convinced of this point in conversations with Sarah Barringer Gordon. For the connections 
between proslavery and polygamist defenses, see her forthcoming work, Sarah Barringer Gordon and Jan 
Shipps, “Convergence in the Kingdom of God: The Mountain Meadows Massacre in American History,” 
Journal of the Early Republic (forthcoming).  
28 “A Word with Our Opponents,” Millennial Star 15:17 (April 23, 1853). 
29 Deseret News, April 13, 1854. On the Dred Scott decision, the paper was especially jubilant, if 
premature: “Those ‘twin relics of barbarism’ can now flourish wherever the people will it in any of the 
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institution, and was and is at least permitted so to be by the federal compact to which 
Massachusetts was a party,” the Deseret News argued in 1857, “while white slavery, 
adultery, whoredom and other gross abominations… are nevertheless extensively 
practiced and securely domesticated [in Massachusetts].”30  In response to the Republican 
attack on the “twin relics of barbarism,” the Latter-Day Church establishment urged 
support for the Democratic Party with a strident proclamation: “The Democratic party is 
the instrument, in God’s hand, by which is to be effected our recognition as a sovereign 
State, with the domestic institutions of Slavery and Polygamy, as established by the 
patriarchs, and prophets of old.”31  As the Latter Day elite and the Mormon press made 
clear, Utah’s affinity for the slave South ran deep – indeed much deeper than scholars 
have recognized.32 
Ultimately, slaveholding leaders never mustered the support for Utah and plural 
marriage that the Saints had hoped they would, although some southerners certainly felt 
drawn to the anti-government position of polygamists.  “As a Southern man, my 
sympathies are with the Mormons,” one slavery apologist wrote to the Richmond South 
in 1857.  “The same measure that is dealt out to them for their polygamy, would be dealt 
out to us for our slaveholding.”33  Other proslavery partisans, however, proved less 
sympathetic.  To the chagrin of Mormon leaders, Democrats in Congress opposed Utah’s 
																																																						
Territories of the United States, and Uncle Sam can attend to his own legitimate business without troubling 
himself any further about them.” Deseret News, May 20, 1857.  
30 Deseret News, February 4, 1857. 
31 Quoted in The Independent, Nov. 13, 1856, p. 368 and the National Era, November 20, 1856, p. 188.	
32 An exception is Bringhurst, “Mormons and Slavery,” 333.	
33 Reprinted in the National Era, December 24, 1857, p. 206. 
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bids for statehood, while the proslavery President James Buchanan launched a federal 
invasion force in the short-lived Utah War of 1857-1858.34   
Nevertheless, Mormon leaders would never fully relinquish their proslavery 
leanings.  The Deseret News went so far as to defend the international slave trade in a 
June 1859 editorial.  The paper made its case by first reiterating the standard theological 
defense of the institution: “Slavery is not ‘forbidden by Divine Law’ – on the contrary, 
most liberal provisions have been made, by that law, regulating, sustaining, perpetuating 
the ‘institution’ even from the day it was said: ‘Cursed by Canaan; a servant of servants 
shall he be unto his brethren.’”35  That individual slaves were occasionally subject to 
inhumane treatment “furnishes no just grounds for reprobating the system,” the News 
continued.  Rather, by de-criminalizing the international slave trade, Congress would 
present an olive branch to the South and thereby mitigate the dangers of sectional strife.  
Not only could political disaster be averted, but the enslaved themselves might, in fact, 
benefit from such a trade, the News continued.  “[I]s it not evident that, when brought to 
this country and placed under the careful supervision of the humane southern planter, the 
condition of the native African will be at least in some degree improved?”36  From the 
political mouthpiece of a frontier territory, populated mostly by northern white families, 
came many of the hallmarks of the classic proslavery defense: biblical justifications for 
human bondage, insistence that antislavery forces would have to give ground to appease 
the South, and paternalistic assurance that enslavement would ameliorate the condition of 
																																																						
34 See Deseret News, January 20, 1858. 
35 Deseret News, June 1, 1859. 
36 Deseret News, June 1, 1859.	
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Africans.  Even in the absence of a plantation economy, Mormon Utah had nevertheless 
embraced much of the proslavery creed.  Slavery would remain legal in Utah until 
Congress abolished the institution in the territories in June 1862.  
 
The Politics of Slavery in New Mexico 
When New Mexico became a U.S. territory in 1850, it was neither slave nor free. 
While Congress had admitted California to the Union as a free state at that time, the 
newly formed territories of New Mexico and Utah were left to decide for themselves 
whether to permit slavery within their borders.  Those hoping New Mexico would act as 
speedily as Utah in drafting a proslavery statute could expect little aid from the large 
majority of Mexican-born residents, who evinced only a marginal interest in sectional 
politics.37  And while southern military and political officials had carried a small handful 
of black slaves into the territory, New Mexico showed little promise as a plantation 
society.38  Yet from the outset, New Mexico harbored a prominent proslavery element, 
determined to bring the new territory into the slave South’s political orbit.  Over the 
coming decade, this southern contingent would grow ever more powerful, charting an 
increasingly proslavery course for New Mexican politics.   
																																																						
37 According to the 1850 census, New Mexico had a population of over 60,000 (inclusive of Native 
Americans), although fewer than 800 were white Americans; see De Bow, Statistical view of the United 
States… Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census, 332; and Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona 
and New Mexico, 1530-1888: The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Vol. XVII (San Francisco: The History 
Company, 1889), 642. 
38 Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 57. Millard Filmore’s appointment as the first 
chief justice of the territorial supreme court was Grafton Baker, a Mississippi lawyer, who came to the 
territory with one of his slaves. 
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Commerce was a powerful adhesive agent in bringing together the Desert West 
and the slave states of the South.  The main commercial artery through the territory, the 
Santa Fe Trail, connected New Mexico’s capital with Independence, Missouri. According 
to Thomas Butler King, trade between Missouri and New Mexico was worth $5 million, a 
compelling reason, he argued, to accelerate this commerce with a transcontinental 
railroad through the region.39  Commercial prospects brightened further with the arrival of 
the Butterfield overland mail road, which ran through slave country and across the Far 
West.  The road “was working wonders in this region,” one visitor observed, “opening 
the country, and inducing the enterprising to venture from home and to try their fortunes 
in a new land.”40  Meanwhile, the territory’s delegate to Congress, Miguel Otero, lent his 
support to William Gwin’s campaign for a far southern transcontinental railroad.  From 
the perspective of New Mexico’s commercial elite, most roads ran to the South.  
The territory’s first Congressional delegate, Hugh N. Smith, warned of proslavery 
schemes within New Mexico as early as 1850.  To Smith, an antislavery partisan, the real 
threat lay less in the expansion of chattel slavery, per se, than in the more insidious 
spread of southern political influence across the Far West. “The cement of this strength in 
the South is not so much the interest in slave property, but the political power dependent 
on it,” he wrote.  “The great struggle is to secure for the decaying popular force of that 
section an equal weight in the Senate of the United States with the rapidly progressive 
																																																						
39 [T. Butler King], First Annual Report to the Board of Directors of the Southern Pacific Railroad 
Company Chartered by the State of Texas (New York: American Railroad Journal Office, 1856), 18. 
40 J.T. Sprague to W.W.H. Davis, May 13, 1860, quoted in Lamar, The Far Southwest, 92.	
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population and multiplying free states of the Union.”41  A proslavery New Mexico, he 
suggested, could ultimately bolster the South’s waning influence in Congress.  Eastern 
antislavery forces took seriously this threat to the Southwest and established several 
abolitionist leagues in the early 1850s.  Organized in 1851, the Free Territory League 
sought to establish and support antislavery newspapers while also financing legal counsel 
in Santa Fe.42  Meanwhile, the agent of another abolitionist league was sent to the 
territory to assume the editorship of the Santa Fe Weekly Gazette.  New Mexico was 
quickly becoming a sectional battleground.   
These early antislavery activities produced more in the way of political backlash 
than abolitionist zeal, however.  The Santa Fe Gazette, for instance, remained in the 
hands of its antislavery editors only briefly before taking on distinctly Democratic 
leanings by 1853.43  As the sectional controversy intensified, the Gazette – by then New 
Mexico’s most prominent publication – moved further and further into the proslavery 
fold.  The paper trumpeted its allegiances – “a friend of the south” and a fierce opponent 
of the “the fanatics and disunionists of the North.”44  During the Kansas controversy, the 
Gazette’s Virginia-born editor, Samuel Yost, heaped scorn on “Black Republicans” and 
endorsed the proslavery Lecompton Constitution.45  Like the Deseret News, the Gazette 
also criticized American attempts to police the international slave trade.  When a 
Georgian planter offered to purchase some 200 to 300 slaves from a captured slave ship 
																																																						
41 Hugh N. Smith, Address of Hugh N. Smith, of New Mexico, to the People of that Territory (Washington: 
no publisher, 1850), 2.  
42 On the activities of the Free Territory League, see National Era, September 25, 1851, p. 154.	
43 On that backlash and the Gazette’s political about-face, see Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional 
Controversy, 58. 
44 Santa Fe Gazette, September 12, 1857. 
45 Santa Fe Gazette, January 16, August 21, November 27, 1858. 
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rather than return the human cargo to Africa, the Gazette offered only praise.  “These 
savage negroes…under the discipline and tuition of kind and humane masters, would in a 
few years have become civilized and Christianized,” the paper argued.  With a heavy 
dose of planter paternalism, the Gazette continued, “As slaves, their condition morally, 
physically, and intellectually, would be improved.”46  Those in the South took note of 
such proslavery partisanship in New Mexico.  A correspondent to the Richmond 
Enquirer, for instance, envisioned a bright future for proslavery interests in the Far 
Southwest, predicting, “New Mexico is bound to be a slave State.”47 
That prediction proved prescient.  Although not yet a state, New Mexico joined 
Utah by formally legalizing black slavery within its borders, passing a particularly robust 
slave code in early 1859.  Like Utah, New Mexico had an economically and numerically 
marginal population of black slaves – somewhere between ten and fifty, by one recent 
estimate.48  But like Utah, New Mexico coveted southern support and thus the territory’s 
politicians proved eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the slave states.  That New 
Mexico’s population was overwhelmingly Mexican and therefore far removed from the 
sectional controversy had little impact on the politics of the territory, which were 
controlled by a handful of elites, largely sympathetic to the proslavery cause.   
The backdoor politicking that led to the passage of An Act to Provide for the 
Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory showcased the long reach of the slave 
																																																						
46 Santa Fe Gazette, November 13, 1858. The paper would later argue that the U.S. campaign against the 
international slave trade was simply too costly to justify the results; see Gazette, July 3, 1860.	
47 Richmond Enquirer, quoted in the Sacramento Daily Union, December 28, 1857. 
48 Mark J. Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula Blush? New Mexico Territory’s Unique Slave 
Code, 1859-1861,” New Mexico Historical Review 87: 2 (spring 2012), 209-210. 
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South in western territorial affairs.  That process began with Miguel Otero, New 
Mexico’s congressional delegate, whose Spanish surname belied his deep southern 
connections.  Otero’s marriage into a prominent Charlestonian family entrenched him in 
elite southern society and entangled his territorial mission in sectional politics.  He 
recognized that New Mexico required federal favors to promote economic development, 
finance its territorial government, and to provide protection from Indian attacks.  And he 
also recognized that his connections, along with his territory’s southern leanings, made 
New Mexico a natural ally of proslavery politicians.  A slave code, as his southern allies 
had assured him, would help “attract greater… political attentions from the States,” and 
also “elevate our own class of free laborers.”49   
At the insistence of Reuben Davis of Mississippi, Otero tapped his network of 
southern-born allies within New Mexico’s territorial system to request the drafting and 
passage of a slave code.50  The deck was stacked heavily in Otero’s favor by the regional 
origins of this leadership: the territorial secretary, Alexander M. Jackson, hailed from 
Mississippi; the publisher of the Santa Fe Gazette was a native of Missouri; a justice on 
the territorial supreme court (and Otero’s brother-in-law), William J. Blackwood, came 
from South Carolina; and the governor, Abraham Rencher, had migrated from North 
Carolina.  All strongly favored their native section and the passage of a slave code.  Thus, 
																																																						
49 Miguel Antonio Otero to Charles P. Clever, December 24, 1858, Ritch Collection, Henry E. Huntington 
Library, San Marino, Calif.  
50 See also Otero to Alexander Jackson, December 16, 1858, in, John A. Bingham, “Bill and Report of John 
A. Bingham, and Vote on Its Passage, Repealing the Territorial New Mexican Laws Establishing Slavery 
and Authorizing Employers to Whip ‘White Persons’ and others in their Employment, and Denying them 
Redress in the Courts” (Washington: Republican Executive Congressional Committee, 1860), 1. 
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slavery’s Sunbelt was stitched together through a web of familial connections and wide-
ranging political networks.51 
A small handful of southern-born politicians helped rush the slave bill through 
New Mexico’s legislative process, bypassing a roll call in the house and thereby 
preventing members from registering a negative vote.  By February Governor Rencher 
had signed An Act for the Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory, giving New 
Mexico a far more draconian slave statute than the one passed in Utah some seven years 
earlier.  Compared to Utah’s proslavery statute, the New Mexico act provided fewer 
protections for the enslaved and stipulated harsher punishments for those interfering with 
slave property.  There were stiff fines and prison terms for enabling slaves to escape, for 
stealing slaves, for furnishing slaves with free papers, for enticing slaves to absent 
themselves from service, for inciting slave rebellion, and for arming slaves.  Slaves could 
be whipped for public disorderly conduct or for “insolent language, or signs, to any free 
white person.”  They were also prohibited from testifying in court against whites.  Like 
the Utah code, New Mexico’s closely policed the color line, outlawing intermarriage 
between white and black, and sentencing to death any black person, free or enslaved, 
guilty of raping a white woman.  In line with many southern states, New Mexico’s bill 
made slavery a perpetual institution, in that it “totally prohibited” the emancipation of 
slaves within its borders.52 
																																																						
51 For more on the background to this slave code, see Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula 
Blush?”, 210-212; and Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 60-68.	
52 “An Act to provide for the protection of property in Slaves in this Territory,” in Laws of the Territory of 
New Mexico. Passed by the Legislative Assembly, Session of 1858-59 (Sante Fe: A. De Marle, 1859), pp. 
64-80. 
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One could dismiss this slave code as needlessly detailed for a territory that 
harbored so few owners of black slaves.  With thirty-one sections, An Act to Provide for 
the Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory was far and away the longest bill 
passed by the New Mexico legislature during the 1858-59 session.  But as Alexander M. 
Jackson, New Mexico’s territorial secretary and the likely author of the code, recognized, 
it represented a crucial, if largely symbolic, victory for the slave South.  Slaveholders had 
recently failed to pass the Lecompton Constitution in Kansas, meaning free labor would 
likely prevail there.  The slave code in New Mexico, then, enabled southerners to save 
face and flex their muscle elsewhere in the West.  Although the passage of the law did 
not prompt a mass migration of slaveholders to the territory, it did signal that the peculiar 
systems of law in the South would now hold sway in far-flung territories.53  In many 
ways, it represented the institutionalization and elaboration of the Dred Scott decision, 
handed down in March 1857, legally affirming slaveholding rights in the territories.  As 
Jackson would later write to Jefferson Davis, “[T]his legislation perfected the title of the 
South to New Mexico.”54 
Others within New Mexico and across the South were no less jubilant.  Shortly 
after the act’s passage, a New Mexican correspondent wrote to the Memphis Daily 
																																																						
53  During the debate over the compromise that bore his name, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, turned to the 
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(March 1861), 1313. 	
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Appeal to spread the good word.  The correspondent confirmed what many southerners 
had already come to believe, writing, “This action of the legislative power of New 
Mexico should be the more gratifying to the South for the reason that it is but the truthful 
reflex of the sentiments and disposition of the people of the Territory.”  He insisted that 
New Mexico would provide a lucrative market for human chattel, evidenced by the recent 
sale of a “third rate negro girl” for the large sum of $1000 in gold.  But perhaps most 
gratifying of all to southern expansionists were the implications that New Mexico’s slave 
code had for a transcontinental railroad.  With bondage formally protected in New 
Mexico, such a railroad could utilize slave labor, “the most efficient and the most 
reliable,” and thereby follow a southern route to the Pacific.55  The proslavery 
Washington States wrote in equally grand terms about the imperialist prospects of New 
Mexico’s legislation.  “[N]ot only does slavery thus secure a firm foothold in the 
Territory of New Mexico – almost an empire in itself – but the position affords the South 
every facility of expansion in the very direction most inviting to its institutions,” the 
States reported.  The paper predicted that soon Arizona and Nevada – which had yet to be 
organized as territories – along with parts of Mexico, would fall under slavery’s sway.  
Slaveholders may have lost Kansas, the paper continued, but “they have secured ample 
indemnity in a quarter where, instead of being a sickly exotic, slavery will take root in a 
congenial soil, and flourish of its own inherent vigor.”56 
Antislavery politicians and writers, not surprisingly, proved unwilling to cede this 
western victory to the South.  From his office at the New York Daily Tribune, Horace 
																																																						
55 Memphis Daily Appeal, March 6, 1859. 
56 Washington States (n.d.) quoted in Sacramento Daily Union, May 11, 1859. 
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Greeley raged against New Mexico’s proslavery legislation for well over a year.  If the 
code represented a “mere scheme on the part of some scurvy politicians to curry favor at 
Washington,” then why make it so elaborate and so far-reaching, Greeley asked.  This 
“most inhuman and piratical Slave-Code” was more than just a symbolic act, he 
concluded, but rather, a serious attempt on the part of southern schemers to transform the 
Southwest into a bona fide slave society.57  Greeley envisioned a region overrun by 
slaveholders – “zealous proslavery Propagandists” filling federal offices, slaveholding 
army officers monopolizing western military posts, “platoons” of “Border Ruffians” 
moving west from Kansas, and  “the scum of Southern rascaldom” moving east from 
California.  In New Mexico, Greeley noted gravely, “Slavery rules all.”58  These fears 
were exaggerated, to be sure, but Greeley was certainly correct in assuming that the 
Southwest had become a very hospitable place for proslavery partisans. 
While Greeley editorialized, antislavery politicians both in Santa Fe and 
Washington organized campaigns to repeal New Mexico’s slave code.  In early 1859, 
New Mexico’s speaker of the house made the first attempt at a repeal.  But, after 
branding him an abolitionist and a black Republican, opponents quickly stripped him of 
his speakership and then overwhelmingly rejected his effort.59  In May 1860, Ohio 
Representative John Bingham took the fight to Washington with a federal bill to 
“disapprove and declare null and void” New Mexico’s slave code, as well as its 
																																																						
57 New York Daily Tribune, March 10, 1859 and July 31, 1860. 
58 New York Daily Tribune, December 31, 1860. Several months later, on the verge of civil war, Otero 
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59 Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula Blush?”, 216-218. 
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legislation regarding the punishment of bound peon laborers.60  Although those in Santa 
Fe had held firm against any repeal efforts, Bingham and his Republican allies reasoned 
that, under the 1850 law establishing New Mexico as a territory, Congress retained the 
power to override any obnoxious act of the territorial legislature.  Bingham’s repeal bill 
passed narrowly in the House, 97 to 90, but then failed in the Senate.61 Yet up until the 
eve of the Civil War, Bingham continued his agitation against the slave code – legislation 
that, in his words, “would bring blushes to the check [sic] of Caligula.”62  He never 
mustered the necessary support, however, and New Mexico’s law remained on the books 
until 1862.63 
The law was important in catapulting New Mexico into the national debate over 
slavery, not necessarily in opening the floodgates to African bondage in the Far West.  
Westerners in search of unfree workers could find cheaper alternatives in the centuries-
old Indian slave trade, as did Cave Couts in California (Chapter 3).64  More affordable 
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still, they could acquire debt peons.  Along with enslaved Indian labor, peonage of mostly 
Mexican-born peasants constituted part of a vast complex of unfree labor in the West.  
According to W.W.H. Davis, a longtime resident of the region, African slavery simply 
would not pay in a territory so thoroughly suffused with cheap peon labor.   “The present 
labor of the country is so much cheaper than any that could be introduced, that a person 
would hardly be justifiable in risking his capital in slaves with so little prospect of 
profitable return,” Davis remarked in his 1857 account.65  For roughly $5 in monthly 
wages, landholding New Mexicans could secure indebted workers.  Once under contract 
they could then trap these peones in an endless cycle of debt by maintaining prohibitively 
high prices on all goods at local stores, which masters generally controlled themselves.  
Peones could only break from this arrangement by paying off their debt, a virtually 
impossible feat, according to Davis.66   
Treatment of peones was regularly cruel.  A statute passed the same year as New 
Mexico’s slave code gave masters carte blanche in the correction of their peones, so long 
as they did not resort to clubs or whips. “No court of this Territory shall have jurisdiction, 
nor shall take cognizance of any cause for the correction that masters may give their 
servants for neglect of their duties as servants,” the statute read, “for they are considered 
as domestic servants to their masters, and they should correct their neglect and faults.”67  
Furthermore masters were not obligated to provide for peones in sickness or in old age.  
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the Territory of New Mexico, 1858-1859, pp. 24-26. In his campaign against New Mexico’s slave code, 
Bingham also took aim at this peonage statute; see “Bill and Report of Bingham.” 
	 211 
“When he becomes too old to work any longer, like an old horse who is turned out to die, 
he can be cast adrift to provide for himself,” Davis wrote.68  Although peones could not 
be bought or sold at market, like black chattel slaves, their condition was hardly any 
better, according to Davis. “Peonism is but a more charming name for a species of 
slavery as abject and oppressive as any found upon the American continent,” he wrote.69  
Black chattel slavery may have never taken root in New Mexico, but the territory clearly 
possessed its own peculiar institution.  Like the slave South, the economy of New Mexico 
ran on unfree labor, and its legislators were dedicated to its preservation.  Indeed, it took 
until 1867 and an act of Congress to abolish peonage in New Mexico.70 
 
Bleeding Arizona?  
 No region in New Mexico was more ardently proslavery than the southernmost 
part.  Known generally as “Arizona” or “Arizonia,” this region comprised much of the 
land carved out by the Gadsden Purchase, the treaty authored by James Gadsden to 
facilitate the construction of a Pacific railroad along the 32nd parallel.  Although railroad 
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bills would continue to languish in Congress, the purchase paid dividends for proslavery 
expansionists in other ways, namely by attracting a sizeable number of southerners, 
mostly Texans, to the valley along the Mesilla River.  These southern émigrés 
congregated primarily in the town of Mesilla, numbering roughly 2,500 residents and 
strategically situated in a rich agricultural region along the route linking Texas to 
California.  It was also proximate to gold, silver, and copper mines – exactly the sort of 
repositories that Jefferson Davis hoped, and Horace Mann feared, would one day be 
operated by slave labor (Chapter 1).71  In these early years, however, few southern 
migrants carried their slaves into Arizona.  But they did bring their ardent proslavery 
sympathies, illustrating once again that the political reach of the South could continue 
stretching westward in the absence of chattel slavery itself.  By the mid-1850s, Arizona 
was essentially a satellite of the plantation South, a vital link in slavery’s Sunbelt.72 
 Arizona presented a particularly tempting field for proslavery expansionists 
because of its well-documented richness in agricultural and mineral resources.  Make no 
mistake, several travelers in the region argued, Arizona’s arid landscape belied its natural 
abundance.  The riches of southern New Mexico’s mines had been known to American 
expansionists since the 1840s, if not earlier (Chapter 1).  But more recent investigations 
had revealed the presence of a potentially even more valuable resource: cotton.  The 
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Virginian surveyor, Andrew B. Gray, drew attention to the opportunities for staple crop 
cultivation in the Southwest in an 1856 report, following his extensive exploration of the 
region for Robert Walker’s Pacific railroad project.73  His encounters with the Pimo and 
Maricopa Indians convinced Gray of the agricultural fertility of the region, especially 
along the Gila River.  In their Indian villages he found wheat, corn, tobacco, and most 
promisingly, cotton.  Upon examining a sample, Gray determined that their product was 
“not unlike the celebrated Sea Island cotton,” with its “exceedingly soft and silky” fiber.  
“Large tracts of land on the Gila and in other portions of this district, appear to possess 
the same properties of soil,” he concluded, “and where, I have no doubt the finest cotton 
will soon be extensively raised and brought to its highest state of perfection by proper 
cultivation.”74   
While Gray speculated, James Gadsden experimented and collaborated.  Upon 
receiving a handful of Arizona cotton seeds from a friend at Fort Yuma, Gadsden 
proceeded to grow a small crop in his native South Carolina.  The conclusions were 
highly promising, he reported to his fellow expansionist, Matthew Fontaine Maury.  
Shortly thereafter, the Washington States obtained a sample of Gadsden’s crop and 
concluded, “If Arizona is to furnish us with cotton-fields capable of producing such a 
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material as this, it will be an additional inducement to Southern people to occupy it.”75  
The Gadsden Purchase lands, as Gadsden himself now recognized, were even more 
valuable than previously imagined.  Indeed, the Gila River valley seemed a natural 
extension of the southern plantation ecosystem.  After all, Arizona – and southern 
California for that matter – rested at the same latitude as Gadsden’s South Carolina.   
As promising as the Mesilla Valley may have been in its agricultural and mineral 
potential, the region remained so far distant from the major northern New Mexican 
settlements, especially Santa Fe, that white migrants in the south began to nurture a sense 
of separate identity.76  In January 1855, James A. Lucas, a member of New Mexico’s 
territorial legislature and an ardent proslavery partisan, first introduced a bill for separate 
territorial status for Doña Ana County, which included Mesilla.  It was quickly tabled by 
the territorial legislature, but Lucas organized another campaign in the summer of 1856, 
and in August that year a convention from Tucson petitioned Congress with a memorial 
signed by 260 residents.  Mesilla held its own territorial convention in September 1858 
and another in June 1859.  By then, Arizona’s territorial agenda was generating serious 
national consideration.77 
 The expansion of slavery was not an explicit mission of this territorial movement, 
but observers on both sides of the Mason Dixon line recognized that the creation of a new 
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territory in such a proslavery region would amount to a major coup for the South.  Not 
surprisingly, northern politicians came out in force against Arizona’s territorial bid, while 
southern leaders rallied in support.  With J.D.B. De Bow as its president, the 1857 
commercial convention at Knoxville warmly endorsed Arizona’s territorial campaign.78   
That same year, President Buchanan, gave his executive blessing to Arizona.  He would 
continue to recommend separate territorial status for Arizona, even after losing out in his 
other western proslavery initiative over Kansas’s Lecompton Constitution.79  A number 
of slaveholding congressmen, including Thomas Jefferson Rusk of Texas, William Gwin, 
and Jefferson Davis also formally supported Arizona’s organization as a territory.80  
Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi was more explicit, when, in December 1860, he 
called for the transfer of New Mexico’s slave code into Arizona, which “shall not be 
repealed during the territorial existence of said Territory.”81 
 Not all slaveholders, however, proved so eager for the prompt organization of 
Arizona, despite its potential.  James Gadsden himself took a surprisingly reluctant and 
nuanced position.  In a November 1857 letter to the Charleston Courier, Gadsden urged 
caution in endorsing Arizona’s territorial bid, as premature action on the part of 
southerners might give “a pretext at Washington for reviving the agitations of Kansas on 
the soil of Arizona, and by which another Walker Squatter Sovereignty would inevitably 
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rob the South of its inheritance before it was prepared to take possession.”82  Like many 
proslavery imperialists, Gadsden saw Arizona as the South’s rightful “inheritance,” but 
he also worried that territorial organization might spur abolitionist crusaders into action, 
who would invade the region and set up another western antislavery government, as they 
were currently doing in Kansas.83  In essence, Gadsden envisioned Arizona as another 
Bleeding Kansas, as sectional adversaries migrated west to the next available theater.  
And past experience, he reasoned, indicated long odds for the South. 
 News from Kansas confirmed what Gadsden most feared: an abolitionist invasion 
of the South’s rightful “inheritance.”  A January 1858 letter from the antislavery bastion 
of Lawrence, Kansas to the Boston Journal reported, “A great deal of interest is 
manifested here relative to the proposed Territory of Arizona.”  According to the Kansas 
agent, “A great many Free State men have stated their determination to go in the spring, 
or when the difficulties are settled here… the principal reason for going being the desire 
to help the cause of free institutions there.”84  Southern papers seized on rumors of 
abolitionist migration to galvanize a proslavery reaction.  “The last mail brought the 
startling news that societies were forming in the New England States and that men had 
been organized into companies and regularly drilled in Kansas, for the purpose of 
abolitionizing Arizona by force of arms,” warned the Texas State Gazette.  “Their 
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success in Kansas has summoned from the haunts of crime in their great cities, hordes of 
paupers and vagabonds to enlist in the new foray against slavery.”  According to the 
paper, “[N]o severer blow could be inflicted upon the South and her hopes than the 
occupation of this territory by armed antislavery propagandists.”  By planting antislavery 
forces in a “Southern clime” (i.e. Arizona), abolitionists would effectively cut off 
slavery’s escape valve by blocking “acquisition of new slave States at the Southwest, 
where alone we can look for expansion.”85  Like Gadsden, the Gazette saw great potential 
in the American Southwest, including northern Mexico, and struck a decidedly protective 
posture whenever threats emerged along this long southern corridor.  
 But when other proslavery expansionist looked westward to Arizona, they saw 
potential rather than calamity.  To be sure, “an angry struggle” lay ahead, in the words of 
J.D.B. De Bow, as Arizona was both well suited to slavery and situated at a critical 
crossroads for transcontinental communication.86  The Baltimore Sun agreed: “There are 
strong indications of an intention to transfer the Kansas struggle to Arizona.”  But given 
Arizona’s fertility – especially with regard to cotton cultivation – and mineral wealth, 
“There is a better chance for the establishment of slavery in the latter than there ever was 
in the former Territory,” the paper projected.87   
Reports of southern migration to the Southwest were particularly heartening to 
advocates of proslavery expansion.  The Columbus (Georgia) Times confirmed that one 
General Henningsen had begun recruitment efforts across several southern cities to 
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“collect emigrants for Arizona.”  According to the paper, Henningsen intended “to 
succeed in colonizing that territory with southern men, with the ultimate purpose of 
impressing the institutions of the South upon the political fortunes of that country.”88  
With a scheduled departure for July 1859, this mobile and politically motivated 
population of young men was prepared to defend a region they viewed as a natural 
appendage of the slave South.  The New Orleans Daily Picayune likewise predicted a 
steady expansion of southerners through the Southwest.  As emigration to the Northwest 
waned, future settlers would instead head for the more salubrious climate along the 
southern corridor.  The cumulative effect of this movement would be a decisive victory 
for the slave South. “In Utah, New Mexico and Arizona it [slavery] exists by local law,” 
the Picayune stated triumphantly, “and as additional accessions to this field of wealth 
shall be acquired from Northern Mexico, as will assuredly by the case in a very short 
period, the demands of slave labor will then be clearly a necessity.”89  By these accounts, 
the future hopes of the slave South lay in the Southwest. 
 Ultimately Bleeding Arizona never materialized, largely because antislavery 
forces failed to migrate in sufficient numbers to spark any armed conflict.  Perhaps 
bloodshed could have been expected had Arizona been organized into a territory before 
the Civil War.  But any conflict would have been one-sided.  Despite the Mexican-born 
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majority, Arizona’s proslavery white population would continue to dictate the political 
path of the proposed territory.90  
 As Arizona continued to attract ambitious young southerners, one of the region’s 
preeminent citizens, Sylvester Mowry, redoubled his efforts for territorial recognition.  
Although born in Providence, Rhode Island, Mowry wed his political fortunes to the 
southern element in the region, and was in turn named Arizona’s unofficial delegate to 
Congress three times over.  He brought greater visibility to Arizona’s territorial bid 
through a series of lectures and publications, not in the least by promoting the region’s 
natural fertility.  In his Memoir of the Proposed Territory of Arizona (1857), he 
extensively cited Virginian Andrew B. Gray’s report on the prospects for cotton 
cultivation in the Southwest.91  By invoking Gray’s survey and his speculations about 
cotton, Mowry expanded on the familiar notion that Arizona represented a natural 
extension of the plantation South.  Here was a region, he argued, which would support 
“all the fruits known to a Southern clime—grapes, wheat, corn, and cotton in great 
abundance.”92 
 Mowry elaborated on some of these themes in an 1859 address to the American 
Geographical & Statistical Society.  That Mowry gave this address in New York did little 
to temper his proslavery commitment; in fact, he likely understood that New York 
financiers had provided much of the capital for the South’s plantation regime.93  Again he 
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stressed the suitability of Arizona’s soil for plantation agriculture.  “Rice, sugar and 
cotton are best adapted to the soil of the Colorado bottom,” Mowry claimed, suggestively 
noting that, “the extreme heat of the climate in the summer months will prevent white 
labor from agricultural pursuits to any great extent.”94  He thus avoided an outright 
endorsement of slave labor, while strongly suggesting that free labor would be untenable.  
Mowry enhanced his proslavery bona fides with a plug for the extreme southern Pacific 
railroad, “not only the most practicable, but probably the only practicable route.”95  He 
appended to this address a lengthy excerpt from Jefferson Davis’s January 1859 speech 
on the Pacific railroad.  There was thus little mistaking where the loyalties of Mowry, and 
Arizona more generally, lay. 
 With no decisive action coming from Congress on the territorial issue, Arizona’s 
white residents took matters into their own hands.  In April 1860, a convention of 31 
delegates, with James A. Lucas presiding as president, met in Tucson to draft a territorial 
constitution.  Although the delegates sidestepped the direct mention of slavery during the 
proceedings (not unlike the delegates at the American Constitutional Convention of 
1787), their actions and endorsements betrayed their proslavery leanings.  Not only did 
Arizona’s delegates formally approve the “the pure, wise, and patriotic administration of 
our venerable President James Buchanan,” they also created a new county in honor of 
future Confederate General Richard S. Ewell and a member of the convention, who had 
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been stationed at nearby Fort Buchanan.96  The convention elected as provisional 
governor Lewis S. Owings, a Texan, who in turn selected his fellow Texan, James A. 
Lucas as territorial secretary.  The territorial constitution, drafted by the convention, 
again made no direct mention of slavery, as the authors likely realized that any outright 
endorsement of the institution would only enflame sectional discord and potentially 
scuttle their hopes for territorial recognition.  But, crucially, it did recognize the laws of 
New Mexico “to be in full force and effect in this, the Territory of Arizona.”97  New 
Mexico’s slave code thus became Arizona’s slave code. 
The constitution and published proceedings were largely symbolic.  Congress, to 
no one’s surprise, refused to recognize the rogue document and Arizona thus remained 
part of New Mexico territory.  But it would also remain a region apart, even more 
committed to a proslavery agenda than the rest of New Mexico.  As the nation spiraled 
toward disunion, Arizona’s residents would let their sectional allegiance shine.    
 
A State Still Divided Against Itself  
While southern New Mexicans battled for separate territorial status, a similar 
movement was intensifying directly to the west.  For years, a prominent assortment of 
Californians – many of them of the proslavery variety – had advocated for state 
division.98  California, they pointed out, was substantially larger than any state east of the 
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Mississippi, too cumbersome an expanse of territory to be administered by a small 
legislative body in Sacramento. Furthermore, the southern part of the state was poorly 
represented in this legislature and unfairly taxed as a result.  Thus, the only equitable 
solution to such an unbalanced administration was to split the state just south of San Luis 
Obispo, and convert this lower section into an independent territory.  Although several 
historians have studied this state division movement, none place developments within 
California alongside the concurrent campaign unfolding in Arizona.99  Taken together, 
these territorial movements constitute an integral, if ultimately unsuccessful, component 
of the proslavery campaign in the Southwest.  By literally redrawing the American map, 
southern partisans hoped to bolster their waning representation in Congress and to 
strengthen their political grip across the lower corridor of the continent.  
 If southern partisans wanted to disguise their proslavery agenda, they could not 
have found a better figurehead for the movement by the late 1850s.  Andres Pico hardly 
fit the criteria for a slave power conspirator.  A landowner of mixed African, Native 
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American, and European ancestry, Pico belonged to the wealthy class of Californios who 
had ruled the region during the Mexican era and were yet to be entirely dispossessed 
under American control.  Some of his own property, however, had fallen victim to the 
burdensome system of American taxation, which placed disproportionately heavy levies 
on land – largely as a measure to reduce the size of Mexican-owned ranchos and thereby 
make more land available for white settlers.100   
During the 1850s, the aggrieved Pico and many of his fellow Californios joined 
forces with southern California’s dominant political faction, the proslavery wing of the 
Democratic party known as the Chivalry.101  It was an unlikely alliance, to be sure, one 
that fused the proponents of racial slavery with California’s large Mexican-born 
population.  But it was also a highly effective pairing in the mixed-race political climate 
of southern California, and one that produced the most successful initiative for state 
division to date.  Pico, as a member of the state assembly and one of the leading figures 
of this alliance, put forward this measure in early 1859.102  His bill called for the division 
of California just below San Luis Obispo and the creation of the territory of Colorado 
from the state’s southern counties.  The land mass reserved for this southern territory 
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mapped almost perfectly onto Foote’s explicitly proslavery proposal nine years before 
(Chapter 1) – Pico didn’t even bother to change the name.  
 The Pico bill may have carried a Spanish, rather than a southerner’s surname, but 
the proslavery undercurrents to the state division movement had become unmistakable in 
the sectionally charged atmosphere of 1859.  This was, after all, a year that would witness 
John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, Senator David Broderick’s death at the hands of a 
Chiv rival, and open talk of southern secession.  Even before Broderick’s death, however, 
California’s moderate antislavery press regularly aired charges of a Chivalry conspiracy. 
The Sacramento Daily Union established itself as the state’s firmest editorial 
opponent of state division, a movement that the paper insisted smacked of proslavery 
scheming.  The proposed territory of Colorado, according to the Union, “was only the 
ground-work for a new Southern State on the Pacific.”103 As the measure worked its way 
through the state legislature, the paper grew increasingly anxious, not just for the fate of 
California, but for the state of the Union itself. “Southern empire on the shores of the 
Pacific is what the leaders of the ultra slavery party in Congress have long coveted above 
all things, and it is not likely they will neglect the opportunity which a division of this 
State will present,” warned the Union in late March 1859.  In this bid for a western 
empire, slaveholders would not stop at the division of California and its “inevitable” 
conversion to slave territory, however. “To connect the South with her domain on the 
Pacific, and bind the intermediate Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, a Pacific 
Railroad terminating at San Diego will be of the first necessity.”104  The proposed 
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territory of Colorado was therefore merely a part – albeit an important one – in a much 
larger enterprise to link the entire Southwest to the slave economy.  New Mexico, 
Arizona, southern California, and a transcontinental railroad to bind them all – this was 
slavery’s Sunbelt at its core.   
 Historians have long recognized the proslavery cast to California’s state division 
movement.105  As contemporaries noted, the Pico party line on state division – as a 
measure to provide tax relief for southern California’s landowners – was simplistic at 
best and duplicitous at worst.  Such grievances could have been addressed through an 
amendment to the tax code, rather than splitting the state in two.106  In his careful analysis 
of the assembly and senate votes on the bill, historian Ward McAfee identified a distinct 
Chiv preference for state division, though the vote did not perfectly follow sectional 
lines.  In the senate, for instance, the Virginian and future Confederate officer Cameron 
E. Thom abstained, while the fire-eating John C. Burch voted against the bill.  Perhaps 
they worried about the ability of southern emigrants to transform the territory of 
Colorado into a slave state – a fear echoed by southern expansionists like James Gadsden 
in his writings on the Arizona territorial movement.107  Ultimately, however, their 
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reasoning remains obscure, as does the precise logic of the legislators who ensured 
passage of the Pico bill by votes of 33 to 25 in the assembly and 15 to 12 in the senate.108  
A smoking gun that would link state division to a bald proslavery gambit is yet to 
surface.  Southern-born politicians in California did not openly campaign for state 
division as a slaveholder’s issue, after all.  In the heated political atmosphere of 1859, 
Chiv Democrats exercised rhetorical restraint around sectionalized issues like Pico’s bill, 
lest their proslavery bias jeopardize the passage of southern-friendly legislation.  But no 
amount of circumspection could disguise the fact that the Pico bill represented another 
victory for the expansionists of the slave South.  
 Onlookers in the slave states made that much clear.  Southern expansionists 
cheered the state division movement on Pacific Coast, and – as the Sacramento Daily 
Union feared – mapped these developments onto their larger imperial imaginary.109  
Speaking at a Vicksburg convention in the summer of 1859, Henry Foote chided the 
growing body of southern secessionists by arguing that slavery could be best preserved, 
and even extended, within the Union.  Just look westward, he urged his audience. “Give 
[slavery] fair scope and verge, and it will expand itself in all congenial territories.” He 
assured the crowd that “in less than two years from this time, if we are wise, we will have 
a slave State in Southern California. The State has been divided within the last six months 
for that purpose.”  Arizona was also fertile ground for slavery, he continued, and even the 
																																																						
108 For the full text of “An Act granting the consent of the Legislature to the Formation of a different 
Government for the Southern Counties of this State,” Statutes of California, 1859, pp. 310-311. 
109 Although several treatments nod to southern interest in the Pico controversy, historians are yet to fully 
trace the trans-regional impact of California’s state division movement. 
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Pacific Northwest beckoned as a field for further expansion.110  Foote’s faith in the 
popular will of westerners was well founded.  After all, California’s legislators had 
effectively carried out what Foote himself had attempted to do through congressional 
mandate nine years earlier.   
Like Foote, the Baltimore Sun mused on the broader implications for state 
division, explicitly linking the territorial movements in Arizona and California.  The 
Washington correspondent to the Sun reported that while southerners were making 
“preparations for the colonization of Arizona… on a large scale,” Californians were 
endeavoring to establish a territory in the southern part of their state, “in order to add to 
Arizona, and thus constitute a new State, and probably a slave State.”  According to the 
correspondent, “This would seem to be the best prospect that is now offered in any 
quarter for the early admission of any new slaveholding States.”111  Although southern 
California was not likely to fuse with Arizona, as the Sun projected, the instinct to group 
																																																						
110 Foote’s speech is found in “The Southern Convention at Vicksburg, Part 2,” De Bow’s Review 27 
(August 1859), 216.  Foote envisioned, not the proto-sunbelt of many southern expansionists’ fantasies, but 
an even larger domain of slavery that would effectively encompass the entire Pacific West. True to form, 
the Sacramento Daily Union reprinted portions of Foote’s speech to confirm the paper’s suspicions of a 
national proslavery conspiracy at work in California. “It has also been suspected for some time past,” the 
Union reported, “that the slavery propagandists in this State were acting in concert with their brethren and 
sympathizers in the Southwestern Atlantic States, and Foote’s positive declaration seems to confirm the 
suspicion;” Union, August 17, 1859. Foote was so convinced of the proslavery nature of the Pacific Coast, 
that, while serving in the Confederate Congress in October 1862, he proposed a resolution, “recognizing 
the practical neutrality of the States of California and Oregon, and of the Territories of Washington and 
Nevada.” His resolution suggested “the advantages which would result to the people thereof upon an 
immediate assertion on their part of their independence of the United States; and proposing, upon their so 
doing, the formation of a league, offensive and defensive, between said States and Territories and the 
confederate States of America,” in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, 
with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc., 11 volumes (New York: G.P. Putnam, 
1863), 5:90. 
111 Baltimore Sun, April 1859, excerpted in Los Angeles Star, May 28, 1859; see also, McAfee, 
“California’s House Divided,” 127. 
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these two would-be territories in a discussion of slaveholding expansion was certainly apt 
– though not a pairing that historians have repeated.  
 The press in the Deep South also tracked the vote on Pico’s measure.  Reprinting 
an article from the New York Tribune, the Georgia Weekly Telegraph (Macon) noted that 
“The prospect of dividing California, no doubt with the idea of the erection of the 
southern part of it into a new Slave State,” was again under consideration.112  In a 
November 1859 article, the Columbus (Georgia) Daily Enquirer was even more explicit 
about slavery’s prospects in the West.  By that point, the state division measure had 
passed both houses of the state legislature, and moved to a popular referendum by 
southern California’s voters, who endorsed the territory of Colorado by a three-to-one 
margin.  The Enquirer provided a breakdown, by county, of the popular vote in southern 
California, before musing on the possibilities for slave agriculture in the would-be 
territory.  “[T]he prevalent opinion is that cotton, tobacco, and perhaps sugar, can be 
profitably cultivated,” the paper noted; “in fact, the main object of its own residents in 
demanding the division is understood to be the raising of these Southern products and the 
introduction of slavery.”113   
Southerners had been eyeing California as a probable site of plantation agriculture 
for well over a decade by this point, but their dreams had never been so close to 
actualization.  Indeed, in this state division movement we might detect something of a 
																																																						
112 Weekly Georgia Telegraph (Macon), May 17, 1859. 
113 Columbus (Georgia) Daily Enquirer, November 1, 1859. As the Enquirer reported, a total of 2457 
southern Californians voted for the territory, and only 828 against; for more southern reports on California 
state division, see New Orleans Daily True Delta, November 12, 1859 and December 11, 1859; San 
Antonio Ledger and Texan, February 11, 1860. 
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coda to James Gadsden’s earlier attempts to carve out a slaveholding colony on the 
Pacific coast.114  Gadsden had died several months before the state legislature passed the 
Pico bill, but his spirit lingered in this initiative that would make way, most likely, for the 
re-introduction of slavery to California.  That reports of California state division reached 
the South via the Butterfield overland mail road, across Gadsden Purchase lands, seems 
additionally fitting.   
 But in all the optimism surrounding southern reports of California’s division ran a 
chord of doubt.  By September 1859 the measure had passed both houses of the state 
legislature, received the governor’s signature, and won the approval of a vast majority of 
southern California’s voters.  Yet it still required Congressional approval in order to be 
made law.  And there was reason to expect a hard fight ahead, especially with a new 
Republican plurality in the House of Representatives. “If the Black Republicans think 
there is reason to fear the making of a slave State by this movement, they will of course 
resist it to the bitter end in Congress,” the Columbus Daily Enquirer fretted, “and if they 
permit it to pass with a view of making a struggle for the possession of the Territory, we 
shall probably have the Kansas troubles re-enacted on the Pacific shore.”115  Again, 
Bleeding Kansas cast a long westward shadow that extended into the territorial struggles 
of Arizona and southern California. 		
																																																						
114 Again, see James Gadsden to M. Estes, December 10, 1851, in the Charleston Courier, February 7, 
1852; James Gadsden to Thomas Jefferson Green, December 7, 1851, William Alexander Leidesdorff 
Papers, Huntington Library; see also John C. Parish, “A Project for a California Slave Colony in 1851,” 
Huntington Library Bulletin 8 (Oct. 1935), 171-175. 
115	Columbus (Georgia) Daily Enquirer, November 1, 1859.	
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	 Southerners could at least find some solace in the fact that the man responsible for 
communicating the Pico bill to Washington was Governor Milton Slocum Latham.  
Although born in Ohio, Latham had spent several years in Alabama before coming to 
California, and had thoroughly established his bona fides as a Lecompton Democrat.  A 
proponent of “proper subjugation” for African Americans and the right of slaveholders to 
carry their human property into the territories, Latham enjoyed the backing of 
California’s Chivalry faction.116  But if slaveholding expansionists expected the governor 
to stand firmly on their side, his official Communication was a disappointment.  Although 
he recognized that southern Californians nurtured justifiable grievances, their attempt to 
split the state was “for the present, at least, impolitic.”117  Latham may have been a 
southern sympathizer, but he was first and foremost a politician, and he saw the way the 
wind was blowing in Congress by early 1860.  An outright endorsement of the bill would 
have likely smacked of proslavery intrigue – a risky play at a time when sectional 
feelings ran at fever pitch in the wake of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry.  
																																																						
116 Latham’s views on slavery are most clearly articulated in an April 1860 senate speech, a response to 
William Seward’s “irrepressible conflict” address; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 1727-
1729. See also William F. Thompson, “The Political Career of Milton Slocum Latham of California” (PhD 
dissertation, Stanford University, 1952).	See also Or Rappel-Kroyzer, “The California Political System at 
the Dawn of the Civil War,” (masters thesis in progress, Tel Aviv University)		
117 Communication of Governor Latham to the President of the United States in Relation to the Division of 
the State of California (Sacramento, 1860), 4. The communication was one of the few pieces of official 
business that Latham completed as governor. In fact, his five-day term makes him the shortest serving 
executive in California history. He had replaced another doughface Democrat, John B. Weller, the governor 
originally responsible for signing the Pico bill in April 1859. Upon the death of David Broderick, Latham 
was appointed to the U.S. Senate by his Chiv allies in the statehouse. Latham, however, was not a 
consistent Chiv ally, nor did he enjoy a particularly easy relationship with William Gwin. For more on this 
particular rivalry, see George Wallace to Milton S. Latham, February 23, March 29, and March 30, 1860, 
all in Papers of Milton S. Latham, California Historical Society, Sacramento, CA. My thanks to Or Rappel-
Kroyzer for drawing my attention to these letters and for his own observations on this period in California’s 
political history. 
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Ultimately the bill died in the Senate judiciary committee, although California’s 
legislature would continue to agitate for state division.  In spring of 1860, a majority 
report endorsed the continued attempts to divide the state of California. The minority, on 
the other hand, urged caution in the present political climate.  “The civil discord which 
now so trammels Congress and threatens our Federal Union had its origin in questions 
growing out of our territorial organization,” it read, “and California, occupying a position 
so eminently conservative, should be the last to offer another opportunity for the 
enactment of new Kansas difficulties.”118 
 Before falling victim to rising sectional tensions, the would-be territory of 
Colorado represented a high-water mark in a decade of proslavery separatism on the 
Pacific coast.  From Foote’s attempts to divide the state during the congressional debates 
of 1850, to Gadsden’s 1852 petition for a slaveholding colony along the coast, to the 
momentarily successful initiative of 1859, slaveholders had seen in California a golden 
opportunity for expansion.  Their failure to formally organize a slave territory on the 
Pacific should not obscure the substantial political inroads they made into an ostensibly 
free state.  In fact, the popularity of Pico’s measure speaks to the resilience of proslavery 
politics in California, in the teeth of the sectional crisis then gripping the nation.  If the 
antebellum campaign for state division had died in the Senate judiciary committee, the 
																																																						
118 Journal of the House of Assembly of California at the Eleventh Session of the Legislature (Sacramento: 
C.T. Botts, 1860), 228-233. See also, Sacramento Daily Union, January 27, 1860; Los Angeles Star, March 
10, 1860; Sacramento Daily Union, March 15, 1860. 
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dream of a southern empire along the Pacific would live on.  Slaveholders who coveted a 
piece of the Far West would not have long to wait. War was brewing. 
 
Southern Secession, Western Separatism 
 
 On December 20, 1860, South Carolina adopted secession ordinances and broke 
from the Union.  From there, the rebellion rippled west – much further west, in fact, than 
most historians recognize.  Indeed, from the perspective of anxious Unionists in the Far 
Southwest, the entire region – from New Mexico and Arizona into California – appeared 
poised to follow South Carolina’s lead.  The territory of New Mexico, for instance, 
remained firmly within the South’s political orbit after Lincoln’s election: northern New 
Mexico was economically tied to Missouri while the southern part of the territory was 
strongly linked to Texas; the major newspapers, the Santa Fe Gazette and the Mesilla 
Times, continued to disseminate proslavery views; and the territory’s governor, secretary, 
and the majority of the local military commanders hailed from below the Mason Dixon 
Line.119  Meanwhile, in California, secessionists met secretly in an attempt to mobilize the 
																																																						
119 The outbreak of the war triggered an exodus of military commanders from New Mexico to the 
Confederate South, including Colonel William Wing Loring, the departmental commander, Colonel George 
B. Crittenden, the chief of staff, Major Henry Hopkins Sibley, Major James Longstreet, Captains Richard 
S. Ewell, Cadmus M. Wilcox, and Carter L. Stevenson, and Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler; see Alvin M. 
Josephy, Jr., The Civil War in the American West (New York: Vintage, 1991), 34. Ewell, originally from 
Virginia, had previously commanded the garrison at nearby Fort Buchanan and supported Arizona’s bid for 
territorial status. As the Union unraveled he downplayed the depth of sectionalism among New Mexico’s 
military officers. “Every one here is on the tenter [sic[ hooks of impatience to know what the Southern 
States will do,” he wrote from Albuquerque. “The truth is in the army there are no sectional feelings and 
many from extreme ends of the Union are the most intimate friends;” Richard S. Ewell to Bettie Ewell, 
January 22, 1861, in Donald C. Pfanz, ed., The Letters of General Richard S. Ewell: Stonewall’s Successor 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 161-162. Like so many others from New Mexico, Ewell 
resigned his commission in the U.S. army upon Virginia’s secession. He eventually rose to the rank of 
lieutenant general in the Confederate army, the third-highest ranking commander in the Army of Northern 
Virginia, behind Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet, who had also served in the territory.   
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state’s military forces on behalf of the rebellion.120  True, Abraham Lincoln had carried 
California, but he did so with just 32 percent of the ballots – the lowest proportion of 
votes he received in any free state.121  Some of the state’s preeminent citizens even 
contemplated a separatist movement of their own, in order to form an independent Pacific 
Republic.122  
Over a decade of robust proslavery activity within California gave hope to 
secessionists that the Pacific Coast might peel off from the Union if it came to civil 
war.123  And indeed, leading figures within the state had been surprisingly explicit on this 
																																																						
120 One of the most colorful accounts of these early secessionist plots in California comes from one of the 
conspirators himself; see Ashbury Harpending, The Great Diamond Hoax and other Stirring Incidents in 
the Life of Ashbury Harpending, edited by James H. Wilkins (San Francisco: James H. Barry, 1913), 25-42. 
According to Harpending, such schemes “may seem chimerical at this late day, but then, take my word, it 
was an opportunity absolutely within our grasp,” p. 30. Secretary of War and future Confederate general 
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Thousand easy,” Martenet to his mother July 30, 1860; also see Martenet to mother, September, 7, 1860, 
both in Jefferson Martenet papers, HEHL. Lincoln did especially poorly in southern California, where the 
leading figures had all campaigned for Breckinridge.  For the pro-Breckinridge campaign within Los 
Angeles County, see Los Angeles Star, September 8, September 29, and November 3, 1860. For more on 
the election see, Richards, The California Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War, 224-229; Etta Olive 
Powell, “Southern Influences in California Politics before 1864” (M.A. thesis, University of California-
Berkeley, 1929); Gerald Stanley, “The Republican Party in California, 1856-1868” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Arizona, 1973), 88-109.   
122 Benjamin Hayes, the leading jurist of southern California and a Maryland native, was a keen observer of 
both secessionist activity within the state and plans for a so-called Pacific republic. See Benjamin Hayes, 
Pioneer Notes from the Diaries of Judge Benjamin Hayes, 1849-1875, Marjorie Tisdale Wolcott, ed. (Los 
Angeles: Marjorie Tilsdale Wolcott, 1929), 251-256. Volume 7 within the Hayes Scrapbook collection at 
the Bancroft Library also tracks secessionist activity and the Civil War in the Southwest. 
123 There was also a movement within Oregon and Washington, which has been detailed by an older 
generation of scholars. See Dorothy Hull, “The Movement in Oregon for the Establishment of a Pacific 
Coast Republic,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 17:3 (September 1916); Keith Murray, “Movement for 
Statehood in Washington” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 32:4 (Oct. 1914); Walter Carleton Woodward, The 
Rise and Early Political Parties in Oregon, 1843-1868 (Portland: J.K. Gill, 1914); Joseph Ellison, “Designs 
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point.  Shortly after he delivered California’s state division petition to Congress, Milton 
S. Latham, now a U.S. Senator, outlined the possibility for a grander sort of western 
separatism in a spring 1860 speech.  He projected that, in the event of civil war, 
California would declare its independence and form part of a vast western republic, 
extending as far as the Rocky Mountains.  Alternating between grim projections of 
eastern devastation and boastful remarks on western superiority, Latham argued that an 
independent California would shield itself from “fratricidal strife and mutual ruin.”  With 
the state’s abundant resources and natural advantages, Latham queried, “Why should we 
trust to the management of others what we are abundantly able to do ourselves?”124The 
senate speech kicked up a minor firestorm in the West, and Latham, ever the opportunist, 
soon retracted his remarks on Pacific secessionism.125   
But others picked up where the senator left off, and often made explicit 
connections between western separatism and southern secession.126   In a December 1860 
letter, Charles L. Scott, one of the two U.S. Representatives from California, gave a full-
throated endorsement to independence movements in both the South and West.  “In my 
																																																						
for a Pacific Republic, 1843-62,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 31:4 (December 1930), pp. 319-342. My 
thanks to Knute Berger for introducing me to the Pacific Northwestern component of this story. 
124	Before moving to his comments on Californian independence, Latham devoted much of the speech to 
an attack on abolitionism. He argued that “the South claims nothing but her constitutional rights,” and 
defended slaveholders’ prerogative to the “protection and enjoyment” of their human property within the 
federal territories. Cong. Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 1727-1729. 
125 With convenient historical amnesia, Latham insisted “there is not a word of truth” in the assertion that 
California “would form a Pacific Republic” in the event of southern secession; Cong. Globe, 36th Congress, 
2nd session, p. 27. For the national critique of western separatism, see Alta California, December 11, 1860 
(which called it a “burlesque upon disunion”); San Francisco Bulletin, November 27, 1860 (branding it a 
“suicidal step”) and December 24, 1860; New York Herald, Dec. 14, 1860 and January 5, 1861. 
126 Ashbury Harpending, one of the major pro-Confederate conspirators in California, claimed that the 
“Republic of the Pacific” was to be “a preliminary” for a Confederate takeover of the state; Harpending, 
The Great Diamond Hoax and other Stirring Incidents in the Life of Ashbury Harpending, 30-31. For more 
on the direct links between Confederate support and western independence, see Los Angeles Southern 
News, March 1, 1861. 
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heart of hearts I warmly sympathize with the South,” he wrote, “and cordially endorse 
and fully justify them in not remaining in the Union under the President elect.”  Although 
California boasted a large southern-born population, Scott noted, it would pursue its own 
path to independence.  “If this Union is divided and two separate confederacies are 
formed,” he vowed, “I will strenuously advocate the secession of California and the 
establishment of a separate republic on the Pacific slope.”  He believed California’s 
mineral resources, agricultural wealth, and access to the Pacific trade would assure its 
independence and its success.  But an independent California would retain close ties with 
the South, he predicted, namely through the construction of a long-awaited railroad 
between the two regions.127  California’s governor John C. Weller and U.S. 
Representative John C. Burch made a similar projections, while Senator William Gwin, 
although more circumspect, privately hoped that California would break from federal 
control.128  Thus, at one point or another, the state’s entire congressional delegation 
supported a western separation.129 
We should not be entirely surprised.  A minority position, to be sure, Pacific 
separatism nevertheless tapped a deep-seated western bitterness toward the federal 
																																																						
127 Charles L. Scott to Charles Lindley, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee of California, 
Dec. 21, 1860, printed in the San Francisco Bulletin, January 16, 1861. Similarly, the Los Angeles Star 
predicted that an independent California would pave to way to a southern Pacific railroad. “A trans-
continental railroad would be built between New Orleans and San Diego in less than two years,” Los 
Angeles Star, December 8, 1860; see an article on the same subject in the December 22, 1860 issue. See 
also William Carey Jones to the San Francisco Herald, December 15, 1860, in Benjamin Hayes 
Scrapbooks, Vol. 19, no. 10, BANC.  
128 For Burch’s position, see Red Bluff Independent, January 8, 1861; Sacramento Daily Union, February 
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Gwin to Joseph Lancaster Brent, March 27, 1863, Brent papers, HEHL. 
129 Support for a Pacific republic emanated from a minority of Californians, but given the political power of 
some of its keenest champions, it can hardly be considered a fringe position.  
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government and a very American tendency to imagine bold geopolitical 
reconfigurations.130  National loyalties and the American map itself – as secessionists 
from South Carolina to Arizona had made clear – were in a state of dramatic transition.  
And California had never rested comfortably with the free soil status quo.  From James 
Gadsden’s would-be slave colony, to the proposed territory of Colorado, southern 
schemers were constantly on the lookout for ways to redraw western boundaries and open 
loopholes in the state’s antislavery constitution.  The Pacific republic debates can thus be 
seen as a postscript to a decade of proslavery operations within the West, as well as a 
prelude to the pro-Confederate activity that would menace large parts of the state during 
the war years.131   
Ultimately, California remained true to the United States.  Within the legislature, 
unionists prevailed over separatists and pledged California’s loyalty to the northern war 
effort.  By 1861 William Gwin was out of office while his Chivalry faction had lost face 
due to its deep associations with the secessionist South.  Furthermore, the federal 
patronage was now in the hands of a Republican administration, driving Chiv loyalists 
from the plum posts that they had occupied for so long. 132  Yet while western separatism 
																																																						
130 In fact, the possibility of a western republic predated the secession crisis. For a long and detailed 
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132 For Lincoln’s undoing of this Chivalry bulwark, see Abraham Lincoln, “Memoranda on Federal 
Appointments,” c. April 1, 1861, Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 8 vols. 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 4:304-306.  
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had been discredited, it could not be eradicated.  As it had since the gold rush, the slave 
South continued to cast a long shadow over the Pacific Coast (Chapter 5). 
Meanwhile, New Mexico’s leading political figures did little to disguise their anti-
administration sentiments.  Miguel Otero, for instance, blamed disunionism, not on the 
rash actions of slaveholders, but upon Republicans and the “accursed negro.”133  
Although Otero remained neutral during the conflict, his wife was an avowed secessionist 
and he never surrendered his fierce anti-abolitionist views.134  Similarly, The Santa Fe 
Gazette looked gloomily upon a future of Republican rule.  “Abolitionism has become a 
fixed principle among the Northern citizens as is plainly enough manifested by the vote at 
the recent presidential election,” the paper lamented.135  Several months later, Alexander 
Jackson, one of the region’s most eager secessionists, wrote to his friend Jefferson Davis 
to encourage “the assignment of New Mexico to the Southern Confederacy,” an action 
that he believed “will certainly be in consonance with the wishes of a majority of her 
people.”136  Yet he added a caveat: no matter how pro-Confederate New Mexico’s 
residents may have been, the territory’s political allegiance would be dictated by 
Missouri, the economic lifeline of Santa Fe. “These people are fully prepared to go 
South, provided Missouri so goes,” Jackson assured Davis, “but in advance of Missouri, 
no expression could be obtained from any respectable body of them.”137 
																																																						
133 Otero to Colonel Collins, November 8, 1860, in Santa Fe Gazette, December 8, 1860.  
134 See again, his fierce response to Horace Greeley in early 1861; Otero, An Abolition Attack upon New 
Mexico.  
135 Santa Fe Gazette, December 8, 1860.	
136 Alexander Jackson to Jefferson Davis, February 17, 1861 in Wilson, ed. When the Texans Came, 19.  
137 Jackson to Davis, February 17, 1861, When the Texans Came, 20. 
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	 Missouri never seceded, nor did the northern half of New Mexico.  Rather than 
foment rebellion within the territory, leading secessionists, like Jackson himself, left for 
the Confederate states.  He would later return to New Mexico as a staff officer for an 
invading rebel army.  As they had in California, Republicans shored up the limited 
Unionist sentiment within the territory through shrewd political placements.  For most of 
the decade, federal appointments to the Far West had been made with an eye toward 
appeasing southern-born Democrats.  Lincoln reversed that trend and ousted the old 
proslavery guard.  Crucially, he replaced the territorial governor Abraham Rencher with 
Henry Connelly, a Virginia Unionist.  In his first annual message in December 1861, 
Connelly celebrated his territory’s political loyalties: “[W]hen the secession began and 
for some time after it had been in progress, it was presumed by the prime movers of the 
scheme, that our Territory would join them in their attempts to pull down the pillars of 
free government.” Instead, Connelly proudly reported, New Mexico responded with a 
“patriotic outpouring of men” for the war machine. 138  The territorial governor no doubt 
inflated the territory’s Unionism.  New Mexico was no patriotic stronghold, after all.  It 
clung to an uneasy Unionism, constantly threatened by neighboring Texas.  The political 
indifference of the Mexican-born majority probably best explains the territory’s wartime 
loyalty – or, more accurately, failure to secede – rather than any deep-seated commitment 
to the northern war effort.  It should be remembered that four slave states – Delaware, 
Kentucky, Maryland and most crucially Missouri – also resisted secession.   
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	 Furthermore, Connelly could only speak for the northern part of the territory.  In 
the southern portion, the separatist region of Arizona, matters took a decidedly different 
turn.  During the election of 1860, a group of Mesilla residents staged an unofficial 
election in which they proceeded to “elect” John C. Breckenridge by forty votes, over 
Lincoln’s five, Douglas’s three, and Bell’s seven.139  As the secession crisis deepened, so 
too did the proslavery loyalties of Arizona’s white residents.  In Tucson, Sylvester 
Mowry advocated for secession, claiming that the region would be safer from Indian 
attacks under Confederate protection.140  While South Carolina dispatched commissioners 
throughout the slave states to encourage secession, Texas sent an agent of its own to 
Arizona, Philemon T. Herbert, a former U.S. representative from California and more 
recently a lawyer in El Paso.141  Writing to Secretary of State William Seward that month, 
William Need lamented, “The slave power in this Territory [Arizona] and New Mexico 
has been as proscriptive of Republicans as in South Carolina.”142  
 As the slave states of the South debated disunion, Arizona’s white residents 
hosted two secession conventions of their own. They gathered first in Mesilla on March 
16, 1861, where, once again, James A. Lucas presided over the convention.  Several, 
including Herbert and General W. Claude Jones gave impassioned speeches in defense of 
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140Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 109-110. Mowry was arrested in Tucson by 
General Carlton and marched through the town’s streets in chains in June 1862. He was convicted of 
treason before a military tribunal, stripped of his property, and imprisoned at Fort Yuma, until November 
1862.  
141 For an excellent account of South Carolina’s secessionist commissioners, see Charles B. Dew, Apostles 
of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2002). For more on Herbert see James J. Ayres, Gold and Sunshine: 
Reminiscences of Early California (Boston: Gorham Press, 1922), 120; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
142 Quoted in Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 108. 	
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southern independence.  Jones made the decision a stark one – between subjugation and 
empire.  “Northward, insult, wrong, and oppression are frowning upon us,” he thundered. 
“Southward a brilliant and glorious pathway of hope, leads to the star of empire smiling 
over a constellation of free and sovereign States.”  In this choice between Union or 
secession, the Butterfield overland mail road stood out to Jones as a decisive factor.  A 
“Southern Post Master General” had initially established the road through Arizona to the 
Pacific, Jones reminded the delegation, but “as soon as the North came into power, it was 
taken away from you and placed ten degrees farther toward the north pole.”143  
Transcontinental communication had been one of the major precipitating factors in the 
rift between the free soil North and the slave South, and it remained a central issue for the 
separatists of the Desert West.  And thus, the convention unanimously resolved “that we 
will not recognize the present Black Republican Administration and that we will resist 
any officers appointed to this Territory by said Administration with whatever means in 
our power.”144   
A week later, white residents met at Tucson and, under the chairmanship of 
Granville H. Oury, also adopted secessionist resolutions.145  With these two conventions, 
Arizona broke from the Union – well before the slave states of Virginia, Arkansas, 
Tennessee and North Carolina, which did not secede until after the firing on Fort Sumter 
																																																						
143 Mesilla Times, March 30, 1861. Thank you to Sarah Allison, special collections librarian at New Mexico 
State University, for making available this scarce issue. For California’s coverage of the Arizona secession 
movement, see Sacramento Daily Union, April 4 and April 16, 1861. 
144 This resolution was included in the report of Lorenzo Labadie to James L. Collins, June 16, 1861 in 
Wilson, ed. When the Texans Came, 27. See also OR, Series I, Vol. IV, 39 for another report on Arizona’s 
disunion convention.  
145 For a report of this meeting, see Mesilla Times, March 30, 1861. The Arizona secessionists did not 
bother consulting the native Mexican population, probably realizing they could not count on them for 
support. 
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in April.  That the federal bastion of Fort Fillmore stood a mere six miles from Mesilla, 
the capital of the new Confederate territory of Arizona, did not deter the region’s 
secessionists.  In August, they elected Oury as delegate to the Confederate Congress.146 
With that series of nearly uncontested conventions and elections, Arizona reaffirmed one 
of the principles of southern imperialism: a plantation economy was not a precondition 
for proslavery loyalty; the South could achieve its expansionist aims even without the 
extension of a chattel slave system.  
 In the coming months, white Arizona would not waver in its commitment to the 
Confederacy. When Lorenzo Labadie, a federal Indian agent, arrived in Mesilla in early 
summer 1861, he was met by a belligerent committee of local secessionists. “They have 
desired to compel me to depart from within the limits of the Territory of Arizona, and 
have given me to understand that if I do not comply voluntarily they will drive me out by 
brute force,” Labadie wrote to his superior. “They have at hand a fine barrel of tar, into 
which they will put the first officer appointed by President Lincoln, feather him, and start 
him out to fly.”147   New Mexico’s Unionist congressional delegate, W.W. Mills, found 
the situation in Mesilla equally distressing. “A disunion flag is now flying from the house 
in which I write, and this country is now as much in the possession of the enemy as 
Charleston is,” Mills reported. “The Mesilla Times is bitterly disunion,” he continued, 
“and threatens with death any one who refuses to acknowledge this usurpation.”  With 
																																																						
146 Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 108-110. 
147 Lorenzo Labadie to James L. Collins, June 16, 1861 in Wilson, ed. When the Texans Came, 27. One 
local resident offered to lend the Confederate government between $150,000 and $300,000 to provision 
rebel troops in New Mexico, while another hosted army officers fleeing California for their homes in the 
South. For more on the early secessionist movement in Arizona, see Ganaway, New Mexico and the 
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two exceptions, all the officers at nearby Fort Fillmore were “avowedly with the South.”  
Compounding these local problems, Mills warned, was an invasion force from rebel 
Texas, expected to cross into New Mexico in a mere two weeks.148	 	 
 
Conclusion 
In the spring of 1861, a curious tune could be heard in the streets and saloons of 
Los Angeles.  “We’ll Hang Abe Lincoln from a Tree” was not the song of some 
embittered minority; it was an anthem of Civil War southern California, a manifestation 
of the proslavery and anti-Republican sentiments that had for so long characterized the 
politics of the region.149  That Los Angeles and many parts of the Far West developed in 
such a manner was no accident.  Since the American seizure of northwestern Mexico in 
1848, slaveholders had looked to this part of the continent as a political appendage of the 
South.  And they ensured as much through a combination of factors: infrastructural 
development, migration, and political pressure.  To be sure, relatively few of them carried 
black slaves into the Southwestern territories.  As W.W.H. Davis noted, the expenses and 
risks of moving valuable human property into frontier settings proved too great for most 
southerners, who could otherwise expect greater returns on slave labor in the heavily 
policed plantation districts of the Deep South.150  But even in the absence of a plantation 
																																																						
148 W.W. Mills to John S. Watts, June 23, 1861, OR, Series I, Vol. 4, p. 56.	
149 John W. Robinson, Los Angeles in Civil War Days, 1860-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1977, 2013), 50-51. For more on the pro-Confederate “tone” of southern California during the early months 
of the war, see Benjamin Hayes to Ed. M. Samuel, February 11, 1861; Hayes to his sister Emma, February 
14, 1861; Judge Brown to Hayes, July 6, 1861, all in Benjamin Hayes, Pioneer Notes from the Diaries of 
Judge Benjamin Hayes, 1849-1875, Marjorie Tisdale Wolcott, ed. (Los Angeles: Marjorie Tilsdale 
Wolcott, 1929), pp. 251-256. 
150 For more on the risks (and some of the rewards) of transporting slave property to the Southwest, see 
National Era, February 19, 1852, p. 30. 
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economy, southerners succeeded in transporting their political culture across the western 
territories – to the extent that certain parts of the Far West proved more eager for a 
slaveholders’ rebellion than did many areas of the slave South. 
By extending their influence across the territory taken from Mexico, southerners 
created what we might call a proslavery Sunbelt.  Again, this is not the Sunbelt of the 
twentieth century that historians have so richly described – this was not yet a region 
stitched together by military spending, Christian evangelicalism, and metropolitan 
development.  However, the sense of shared political identity that currently unites the 
southern half of the country did not spring up suddenly in the post-World War II era.  The 
fortunes of the South and the Southwest had been inextricably and deliberately bound 
roughly a century earlier.  Western leaders affirmed their southern affinities through 
legislation, like the slave codes of Utah and New Mexico, and through territorial 
movements, as in southern California and Arizona.  And with the Butterfield overland 
mail road, southern leaders built a physical monument to these regional interconnections.  
Although much of the Southwest did not ultimately follow the Deep South out of the 
Union, it remained, in the eyes of Confederate officials, ripe for the taking.  Thus, when 
rebels invaded the Southwest during the early phases of the war, they did so as self-styled 
liberators of a region they had long identified as their own. 
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Chapter 5 
THE CONFEDERATE DREAM OF A CONTINENTAL EMPIRE,  
1861-1865 
	
 
On July 21, 1861, the newly self-proclaimed Confederate States of America 
launched its first invasion of the war.  In terms of manpower and destructive force, it was 
nothing spectacular, especially compared to the bloodletting of the conflict’s later 
campaigns.  But it was geopolitically significant nonetheless.  With a deployment of just 
over 250 men, John R. Baylor’s invasion of New Mexico made manifest what many had 
long known: slaveholders laid claim to the Southwest, and they were prepared to assert 
their title to that region through force of arms.  Slipping across the border of west Texas 
into the Mesilla Valley, Baylor’s invaders quickly exploited the territory’s patchwork 
defenses and tenuous Unionism, capturing the region’s command, Fort Fillmore and its 
700 men, by late July.  On August 1, 1861, from the proslavery hotbed of Mesilla, Baylor 
issued a proclamation declaring the Confederate Territory of Arizona, with a northern 
border stretching to the 34th parallel.1  Although Union forces soon began to mobilize 
against this far western wing of the rebellion, the Confederate presence in the region only 
strengthened in the months ahead.  The rebel president Jefferson Davis – who had done 
more than anyone else to bolster proslavery interests in the Southwest during the 
antebellum period – reinforced the invasion with a much larger force of roughly 2500 
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under Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, arriving in the fall of 1861.  Slavery’s 
Sunbelt now had an army behind it.2 
 In many ways, the rebel invasion of the Southwest represents the military 
continuation of a political process begun years before.  As with the proslavery campaign 
for the Far West during the antebellum period, California was the ultimate objective of 
this Confederate invasion.  Baylor certainly appreciated the “vast mineral resources” of 
Arizona, but the true strategic payoff of his invasion depended on opening a thoroughfare 
to the Pacific – precisely what southern expansionists attempted through the Gadsden 
Purchase, the “great slavery road”, and the Butterfield mail route during the preceding 
decade.3  Indeed, we cannot truly understand Confederate grand strategy in the Far West 
independent of these antebellum political campaigns.  Whereas a number of historians 
have explored the military history of Baylor’s and Sibley’s invasions, few connect these 
operations to their antecedent political movements.4  We should view southern political 
machinations and rebel invasions alike as a continuous process that stretched from 1850 
to the collapse of the Confederacy fifteen years later.  
																																																						
2 The most detailed account of this invasion is Donald S. Frazier, Blood and Treasure: Confederate Empire 
in the Southwest (College State: Texas A&M University Press, 1995).  
3 On the strategic significance of this conquest, see Baylor to General Earl Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, 
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (OR), Series I, Vol. IV, 22-23. See also T.T. Teel, “Sibley’s 
New Mexican Campaign – Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, Vol. 2, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, 4 vols. (Edison, NJ: Castle, 
1995), 2:700. 
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Destiny and the Campaign for New Mexico, 1861-1862,” in Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the 
United States, edited by Adam Arenson and Andrew R. Graybill (Oakland: University of California Press, 
2015), and Frazier, Blood and Treasure, chapter 1. Frazier, however, overlooks proslavery imperialism 
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As in the antebellum period, proslavery expansion was aided and abetted by a 
transcontinental network of allies. This chapter will therefore follow not only rebel 
invasions coming from the East, but also homegrown Confederate operations originating 
from within the West.  In California, in particular, the strong proslavery coalition of the 
pre-war period gave way to a menacing pro-Confederate movement during the war years, 
concentrated in the southern part of the state.  In many ways, the state was divided 
against itself on a north-south axis, mirroring the political fault lines that had fractured 
the nation as a whole.  Indeed, southern California had to be garrisoned to prevent the 
numerous Confederate sympathizers in the region from fomenting rebellion in the West.  
We might, therefore, view the state – and to a certain extent the entire Southwest – as a 
vast border region, not entirely unlike Missouri or Kentucky, where rebellion constantly 
simmered and Union control could only be maintained through overwhelming military 
force.5  
 
California’s Civil War 
 California may have averted secession or the formation of a breakaway Pacific 
republic, but the state was hardly free of rebellious activity during the war years.  Baylor, 
writing from his post in the Confederate territory of Arizona in the fall of 1861, 
recognized as much.  “California is on the eve of a revolution,” he reported, with “many 
																																																						
5 Zac Coswert has recently extended this conception of a vast Border West to include Indian Territory. His 
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Southern men there who would cheerfully join us if they could get to us.”6  Hundreds, 
perhaps, were poised to join his ranks, if only rebel forces could open a pathway to the 
Pacific, Baylor predicted.7  Although the revolution of Baylor’s fantasies never 
materialized, a number of prominent California residents did slip across state lines to 
offer their services to the Confederacy.  Indeed, the list of Confederate officers from 
California amounts to something of a who’s who of western politics: David Terry, the 
former chief justice of the state Supreme Court and the killer of Broderick; former 
Congressmen Charles L. Scott and Philemon T. Herbert; Los Angeles political kingmaker 
Joseph Lancaster Brent; General John B. Magruder; ex-U.S. District Attorney Calhoun 
Benham; at least three state senators; a handful of assemblymen; and agents in a number 
of federal posts, including the state controller, state navy agent, and a former surveyor 
general.8 
Southern California represented the favored point of departure for western rebels. 
From there, future Confederate generals Albert Sidney Johnston, George Pickett, Lewis 
Armistead, and Richard Garnett all resigned their commissions and fled east.9  After 
																																																						
6 Baylor to Major S.B. Davis, November 2, 1861, OR, Series I, Vol. IV, 149. 
7 Baylor to Colonel H.E. McCulloch, November 10, 1861, OR, Series I, Vol. IV, 135.	
8 For more on the Confederate exodus from California, see Robinson, Los Angeles in Civil War Days, 62-
64, 83-85, 118; Helen B. Walters, “Confederates in Southern California,” The Historical Society of 
Southern California Quarterly 35 (March 1953), 51-52; Woolsey, Ronald C. “The Politics of a Lost Cause: 
‘Seceshers’ and Democrats in Southern California during the Civil War,” California History, 69 (Winter 
1990/1991), 376; Albert Lucian Lewis, “Los Angeles in the Civil War Decades, 1850-1868” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970); Clarence C. Clendennen, “Dan Showalter – 
California Secessionist,” California Historical Society Quarterly 40 (Dec. 1961), 309-325; Etta Olive 
Powell, “Southern Influences in California Politics before 1864” (M.A. thesis, University of California-
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commander of the Pacific Department. They hoped he would aid the Confederate cause by remaining in 
California, and handing over the state’s military resources to the Confederacy. Johnston ultimately 
declined. “If you want to fight,” he told California’s secessionists, “go South.” Asberry Harpending, The 
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resigning as the commander of the Pacific Department, Johnston was escorted out of the 
state by Alonzo Ridley and his Los Angeles Mounted Rifles, a unit of about 80 California 
secessionists, who had earlier been outfitted with a full complement of rifles, revolvers 
and sabers by the order of Governor John G. Downey.  En route to Texas, this company 
traveled over the old Butterfield road, thus transforming the antebellum mail route into a 
Confederate thoroughfare.  The Los Angeles Mounted Rifles would become the only 
organized militia from a free state to fight under a Confederate banner.  Shortly 
thereafter, Joseph Lancaster Brent slipped from the port of San Diego, and after a brief 
imprisonment under Union guard, rose to the rank of brigadier general of a Louisiana 
cavalry unit.10  Two years later, Cameron Thom left his Los Angeles law practice as well 
as his infant son – named in honor of Albert Sidney Johnston – to join the Confederate 
cause in his home state of Virginia.11  Such were the sacrifices that certain Californians 
were willing to make for the rebellion.  In total, Johnston, Ridley, Brent, and Thom 
represented just a fraction of the Confederates who fled from southern California. 
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According to the estimates of Horace Bell, a rare southern California Unionist, Los 
Angeles County furnished the rebellion with “colonels, majors and captains without end, 
besides about two hundred and fifty of the rank and file who were… sent over the desert 
to the Confederate forces in Texas.”12 
California’s rebels waged a two-front war on the Union. While hundreds offered 
their services directly to Confederate armies, a vocal and numerous contingent remained 
in the West, placing Unionist officials on high alert to the ever-present threat of a 
regional rebellion.  As Governor Frederick Low would later recall, the Civil War period 
in California marked “perhaps one of the most difficult positions ever held by an 
executive in the state” given the “large secession element here.”13  General Edwin 
Sumner, commander of the Department of the Pacific, would not have disagreed.  During 
the early years of the war, reports on California’s secessionist activity poured into his 
headquarters.  According to local intelligence, rebel sympathizers ranged from arms-
bearing militants to clandestine conspirators to more matronly figures, including one Mrs. 
Bettis, an enthusiastic secessionist who had begun rallying Californians in support of 
southern independence.14  The cumulative effect of these reports led Sumner to conclude 
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that, while “there is a strong Union feeling with the majority of the people of this State… 
the secessionists are much the most active and zealous party.”15 
 Concerned Unionists agreed: While the state’s legislative and military authorities 
remained loyal to the government, this strong body of secessionists threatened to 
transform the California into another border state.  An August 1861 letter from a group of 
San Francisco businessmen to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, argued against 
diverting Union troops from California to eastern theaters for precisely this reason.  
California was a powder keg of secessionist activity, waiting to go off, they warned. “The 
hatred and bitterness toward the Union and Union men,” they wrote, “manifested so 
pointedly in the South and so strongly evinced on the field of battle, is no more intense 
there than here.”  They estimated that 16,000 Knights of the Golden Circle currently 
operated in California.  Although that figure is probably an exaggeration, the threat of a 
regional rebellion was all too real.  If secessionists were able to organize in sufficient 
numbers, they warned, “The frightful scenes now transpiring in Missouri would be 
rivaled by the atrocities enacted upon the Pacific Coast.”  To this they added, “We need 
only appeal to the examples furnished by Missouri, and even Virginia, to show that the 
efforts of a comparatively small number of audacious and unscrupulous men are 
sufficient to precipitate an unwilling population into disunion, or at least to inaugurate 
civil war.”16 
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Anxieties ran particularly high during the September 1861 gubernatorial election, 
a three-man race which pitted the Republican Leland Stanford in against John Conness 
and the former state attorney general, John R. McConnell, a Kentucky native.  For many, 
McConnell’s platform – which justified the right of secession, opposed military coercion, 
and embraced the Crittenden compromise – raised the specter of rebellion within the 
state.17  If California went for McConnell, the future Democratic Senator Eugene 
Casserly fretted, the election would “do more to encourage the foe and protract the war… 
than another Manassas.”  Like San Francisco’s concerned business community, he 
especially feared a border war within the state.  “Heaven forbid that California should 
ever be another Missouri!”18  According to the Sacramento Daily Union, the McConnell 
ticket had galvanized the powerful secessionist element within California.  The paper was 
probably right to assume that California possessed “a larger number of persons who 
sympathize with the enemies of the Government, than any other free State in the Union.”  
Their votes for McConnell, the Daily Union added, represented something of a 
declaration of war against the government.19  The Alta California echoed these dire 
projections about the fragility of Unionism within the state, predicting that “if McConnell 
had been elected, the Bear flag, in a short time, would have been raised” by secessionists, 
and with a sympathetic administration, they would have invaded Northern California to 
overwhelm the Unionists there.20 
																																																						
17 The platform was written by two southerners, who would later flee California to join the Confederate 
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 Although Stanford carried the state as McConnell and Conness split the 
Democratic vote, the Republican victory hardly dispelled fears of a western rebellion.  
Southern California, in particular, remained a proslavery stronghold.  In fact, Los 
Angeles County registered a strong two-to-one majority in favor of McConnell over 
Stanford.21  And a year later, Los Angeles’s voters once again backed secessionist 
candidates, E.J.C. Kewen and J.A. Watson, for positions in the state assembly.  Their 
victory prompted Henry Dwight Barrows, the San Francisco Bulletin’s correspondent in 
Los Angeles, to lament another rebel victory in his precinct.  “Well, the Secessionists 
have carried this county, body and boots, for Jeff Davis, and for the dis-United States,” 
he wrote.  “Let it never be forgotten that the county of Los Angeles, in this day of peril to 
the Republic, is two to one for Dixie and Disunion; or, for permitting disunion without a 
struggle.”22       
 As Barrows and others were quick to note, the political leanings of Los Angeles 
County’s residents confirmed that pro-Confederate impulses remained alive and well 
within California, even after initial secession scares flared out.  Fears of a statewide 
insurrection may have been exaggerated, but secessionists in southern California were 
full of more than just the sound and the fury.  Indeed, they constituted a powerful fifth 
column within California and posed, according to many, an immediate threat to Unionism 
in the West.  Pro-southern sentiments, of course, were nothing new to Los Angeles.  
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During the 1850s, a wave of Anglo-American immigrants, largely from Texas, began 
transforming the Mexican pueblo into a proslavery outpost of roughly 4,400 residents by 
the time of the 1860 census.  As early as 1859, the Butterfield overland mail route linked 
Los Angeles directly to the South, and helped expedite southern migration to the 
Southwest.  Not surprisingly, when Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 troops to suppress the 
rebellion in the spring of 1861, many within Los Angeles – most likely a majority of the 
town’s residents – sided with the secessionists.  Soon, the strains of two popular songs 
could be heard in the city’s streets and saloons, “We’ll Hang Abe Lincoln to a Tree” and 
“We’ll Drive the Bloody Tyrant from Our Dear Native Soil.”  Rebel sympathizers 
paraded the Bear Flag, a symbol of California separatism, through the towns of El Monte, 
San Bernardino, Merced, and Visalia.  Secessionist activity so alarmed future Union 
general Winfield Scott Hancock, then stationed in Los Angeles, that he assembled a small 
arsenal of Derringers for his own use, while also arming his wife.23 
 As Hancock fortified his household against a potential Confederate uprising, 
Sumner made moves to garrison the entire county.  By September 1861, the commander 
of the Department of the Pacific was preparing to send a sizeable force into southern 
California to stem the tide of secessionism in the region.24  Writing to Colonel George 
Wright, commander of the southern district, Sumner made clear his military priorities 
within California.  “The secession party in this State numbers about 32,000 men… 
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congregating in the southern part of the State and it is there they expect to commence 
their operations against the Government,” Sumner wrote.  This disloyalty, he continued, 
“has been tolerated too long already, and I desire that you will put a sudden stop to all 
demonstrations in favor of the rebel government, or against our own.”25  He promised a 
ready supply of reinforcements. 
 True to his word, Sumner increased the number of soldiers in southern California 
and delayed their shipment east.  On guard against secessionist demonstrations, Union 
troops were stationed in San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, Visalia, and Los Angeles. By 
January 1862, the Union command shifted its operations to Drum Barracks, located in 
Wilmington, outside Los Angeles. The camp housed between 2,000 and 7,000 federal 
troops at various points during the war, including the famous California Column under 
James Henry Carleton, giving Wilmington a larger population than Los Angeles itself.  In 
an ironic twist of fate, thirty-one camels from the U.S. Camel Corps arrived in Los 
Angeles in June 1861, and remained a common sight in the city’s streets until they were 
sold at auction in 1863.  Thus, for at least a brief period, Jefferson Davis’s pet project for 
southwestern development during the antebellum period had been transformed into an 
agent of Yankee control. Between these camels and, most notably, thousands of federal 
troops, southern California had been garrisoned against its own disloyal residents.26       
 The federal presence may have dissuaded more organized forms of rebellion, but 
it hardly eliminated pro-Confederate agitation in southern California.  To celebrate the 
Confederate victory at Bull Run in July 1861, for instance, Los Angeles’ rebels staged a 
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rally and openly insulted the Union Army.27  In the cities of San Bernardino and El 
Monte, rebels thwarted attempts to establish Union Clubs.28  Southern supporters also 
resorted to outright violence on occasion.  In even they pitched a Union supporter from 
an upstairs window of the Bella Union hotel, where Confederate sympathizers frequently 
gathered during the first year of the war.29  “Is Southern California a part of the rebel 
Confederacy that loyalty to the Union is neither respectable nor safe?” bemoaned Henry 
Dwight Barrows in April 1862.  “Our local State, county, and city officers, with very few 
exceptions, are avowed sympathizers with [the Confederacy],” he wrote, “and the Union 
cause is very generally despised.”30  Take A.J. King, for instance, the undersheriff of Los 
Angeles County and “a notorious secessionist,” according to Barrows.  King had rallied a 
large gathering of Confederate supporters in the town by displaying a life-size portrait, of 
rebel General P.G.T. Beauregard, “elegantly engraved and framed.”31  Given this 
atmosphere, Union troops had to proceed with caution beyond the walls of their 
garrisons.  As Horace Bell recalled, the soldiers stationed at Drum Barracks “scarcely 
dared appear in town on account of the wrath of the populace.”32  
The rebel spirit was perhaps equally strong 190 miles north of Los Angeles, in the 
town of Visalia. “There are more secessionists in this and the adjoining counties than 
																																																						
27 Woolsey, “Politics of a Lost Cause,” 376. 
28 Gilbert, “The Confederate Minority in California,” 157. David Terry purportedly organized nightly 
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there are in proportion to the population in any part of the United States this side of 
Dixie,” concluded a Union officer stationed nearby.  On a daily basis, he reported, rebel 
sympathizers would “ride through the streets of Visalia and hurrah for Jeff. Davis and 
Stonewall Jackson.”33  That a federal garrison had been established one mile north of 
Visalia in October 1862, seemed only to galvanize Confederate sympathizers.  They 
regularly mocked Union soldiers as “Lincoln hirelings,” and instigated a number of 
violent confrontations.  One such fight led to an exchange of gunfire and the death of a 
Union soldier as well as the wounding of two Visalia agitators – what we might consider 
the westernmost casualties of the war.34 
While open confrontations were not uncommon in certain pro-southern 
strongholds, much of California’s secessionist activity took place behind closed doors or 
under the cover of darkness.  Two major secret societies were active in California during 
the war – the Knights of the Golden Circle and the Knights of the Columbian Star.  
Members in both organizations pledged themselves to the Confederate cause, and sought 
ways to aid the rebellion from the far side of the continent.  The San Bernardino Knights 
of the Golden Circle, for instance, resolved, “That we mutually pledge to each other our 
lives, our property, and our sacred honor to sustain our brethren of the Southern States in 
the just defense of all their constitutional rights, whether invaded by the present 
Executive or by a foreign foe.”35  The Knights of the Columbian Star, who tended to be 
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more active in the northern part of the state, made similarly grandiose pronouncements.  
According to one report, members of a Sacramento chapter pledged to keep themselves 
well-armed and to “resist the enforcement of any and all unconstitutional laws by the 
Administration.”36  They also raised money to be transmitted to the Confederacy under 
“pretense of giving to the rebel sanitary for rebel prisoners.”  Because activities and 
membership rolls were kept secret, it is impossible to determine, with any degree of 
accuracy, the numerical strength of these two secret societies.  One informant estimated 
that the Knights of the Columbian Star numbered about 24,000 and an equal number of 
Knights of the Golden Circle. Although these numbers are undoubtedly too high, the two 
societies did attract their fair share of high-profile Californians.  Beriah Brown, editor of 
the Copperhead Democratic Press of San Francisco, purportedly headed the organization, 
while ex-governor John Bigler was a “prominent member.”37  As in the antebellum 
period, California’s proslavery element continued to attract the support of political elites 
during the war years.  
California’s Confederate sympathizers undermined the Union cause in a number 
of ways: they paraded openly on the streets of Los Angeles and Visalia; they organized 
secretly in the backrooms of San Bernardino and Sacramento; they fled directly to 
Confederate lines to offer their services to rebel armies; and they also waged a war of 
words in California’s newspapers.  The politics of the old proslavery Chivalry faction 
lived on in a number of publications, and raised considerable alarm for beleaguered 
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Unionist authorities within the state.  According to the estimates of Etta Olive Powell, 
over one hundred newspapers were printed in California during the war years, and of 
these, roughly thirty opposed the Lincoln administration.38   
The Equal Rights Expositor of Visalia was one of the most staunchly anti-Union 
papers of this kind.  Operated by S.J. Garrison and Lovick P. Hall, a Mississippi native 
and longstanding advocate for the extension of slavery into the Pacific West, the Equal 
Rights Expositor, cheered the Confederate cause, even as federal authorities began 
concentrating troops in Tulare County. Rather than colonize free blacks, the Expositor 
argued in a typical editorial, why not colonize abolitionists?39  According to one Union 
officer stationed nearby, the Expositor “goes as far if not further than the vilest sheet 
published in Richmond.”40   
 Los Angeles housed an inflammatory, anti-Unionist editor of its own.  Henry 
Hamilton, though born in Ireland, was a longstanding admirer of the South and the 
southern political diaspora within California.41  He supported William Gwin, E.J.C. 
Kewen, and the Chivalry faction, and dedicated his weekly paper, the Los Angeles Star, 
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to heaping scorn on Abraham Lincoln and the Union war effort.  Founded in 1851 as the 
city’s first newspaper, the Star came under the editorial direction of Hamilton by 1856, 
who lent it a reputation for cosmopolitanism, literary polish, and acerbic political 
commentary.42  In many ways, the Star became the political mouthpiece for southern 
California’s pro-Confederate population during the war years, lashing out against what 
Hamilton viewed as an unholy war.  He kept particularly close tabs on Union authorities 
within the area, who were busy committing “outrages” against the local citizenry and 
arresting innocents on what he dismissed as unfounded charges of treason.43  And he 
articulated, perhaps better than any editor in the region, southern California’s natural 
affinity for the slave states.  “We are on the highway to and from the South, our 
population are from the South, and we sympathize with her,” he announced in a January 
1861 issue. “Why then should we turn our backs on our friends and join their enemies to 
invade, impoverish, and despoil them?”44  Hamilton thus echoed what many others had 
suggested for years: the South’s sphere of influence stretched all the way to the Pacific.  
No federal action, according to Hamilton, was more outrageous than the 
Republican campaign for emancipation.  Lincoln’s preliminary emancipation 
proclamation, had transformed the Union war effort into a campaign “for a dissolution of 
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the Union” as it was, Hamilton wrote.45  In another article, he continued to rage: “Was 
ever such an outrage perpetrated in the name of law, or such foul perjury committed, as 
by this man, sworn to maintain the Constitution and govern by the laws?”46  As for 
Lincoln himself, he was a “tyrant” and an “obscure, fourth-rate lawyer” who had 
somehow swindled his way into the highest office in the land.47  When Union armies – 
what he dubbed the “Abolition force” – went down in defeat, Hamilton seemed almost to 
gloat.  Of the Confederate triumph at Fredericksburg in December 1862, for instance, he 
reported with no small degree of satisfaction, “Their greatest leaders… attempted to 
measure swords with the Rebel leaders, and their inferiority is written in gore.”48  Not 
only was emancipation bald theft and a tremendous waste of human life, he argued, it 
also would bring only misery to the slaves themselves.  Quoting a conservative London 
paper, the Star made its position clear: “The fact is that the whole negro population, with 
here and there an exception, has been happy and contented under slavery; that the free 
negro is utterly unable to take care of himself in the midst of a superior number of whites; 
that he will do no work at all, and is one of the most miserable beings in creation.”49  In 
short, Lincoln and his party were attempting to bring about “the maddest revolution 
recorded in the annals of time.”50   
Always a minority within the state, California’s pro-Confederate population 
nevertheless wielded a political influence well beyond its numbers.  To be sure, reports of 
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their numerical strength and organizational capacities were exaggerated.  And rebel 
sympathizers certainly never succeeded in creating a coordinated, widespread revolt 
within the state.51  But if California’s anti-Unionists never mustered anything resembling 
a full-scale rebellion, they nevertheless provoked enough alarm in high government 
authorities – one might even call it a siege mentality – to delay the eastern transfer of 
Union soldiers and to justify garrisoning the southern part of the state.  Unionist anxieties 
may have been overblown, but they were not entirely unjustified.  Federal authorities had 
good reason to fear the operations of a determined minority.  After all, it did not require a 
particularly long memory to recall how a relatively small faction of proslavery 
southerners had come to dominate the state’s antebellum politics. Many of those 
politicians, like E.J.C. Kewen, remained active and powerful within the state, while 
others, like William Gwin, menaced the Union from abroad.52  Time and again, 
California had cast its lot with the South, and there was reason to suspect – with 
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Confederate armies marching from the East and rebels organizing within the West – that 
the state was anything but secure. 
 
Slavery’s Sunbelt at High Tide 
 The greatest threat to Unionism in California came not from the fifth column of 
Confederate sympathizers within the state, but from the conquering rebel armies in New 
Mexico.  Baylor’s invasion had secured the southern half of that territory, what had 
become the Confederate territory of Arizona by August 1861.  Over the course of the 
next year, Baylor attempted to shore up his military control over region, while Arizona 
petitioned for political representation within the Confederate Congress.  By February 
1862, Jefferson Davis signed the territorial bill and Granville Oury was admitted to the 
rebel Congress as Arizona’s delegate.  With the territory’s organization and admission, 
slaveholders thus achieved by force of arms what they had been attempting through 
political means for nearly a decade.  The newly installed territorial government soon went 
to work for the Confederacy, confiscating the property of Unionists in the region, 
including some mines owned by northerners around Tucson and Tubac.53  In control of 
the upper Rio Grande as well as the old Butterfield overland road, Baylor possessed a 
base of operations for further incursions into New Mexico and even California.   
From the outset of the war Davis disavowed the imperial ambitions of the 
rebellion.  “We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the 
States with which we were lately confederated;” he wrote, “all we ask is to be let 
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alone.”54  Yet his government’s founding document made no such promises.  As Article 
IV, Section 3.3 of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America mandated, “The 
Confederate States may acquire new territory, and Congress shall have power to legislate 
and provide governments for the inhabitants of all territory belonging to the Confederate 
States, lying without the limits of the several States.”  Furthermore, the Constitution 
stipulated that in all new territories, “the institution of negro slavery… shall be 
recognized and protected by Congress.”55  No amount of dissimulating from the rebel 
chieftain could disguise what was unfolding in the Southwest from the summer of 1861 
through the spring of 1862: The Confederacy made a bid for a continental empire, 
organizing two invasion forces in order to extend its frontier westward to the Pacific.56   
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 The primary agents in that mission were Colonel Henry Hopkins Sibley and his 
army of roughly 2,500 invading Texans.  Baylor’s victories in the summer of 1861 had 
been swift and decisive, but with Union armies mustering in Colorado, New Mexico and 
California, his small Confederate force was in desperate need of reinforcement.  Sibley’s 
task, according to T.T. Teel, an artillery officer in the invading force, was to bolster 
Baylor’s presence in the Southwest and to secure the conquest of New Mexico.  But “the 
objective aim and design of the campaign” Teel continued, “was the conquest of 
California.”  Indeed, “as soon as the Confederate army should occupy the Territory of 
New Mexico, an army of advance would be organized, and ‘On to San Francisco’ would 
be the watchword,” he wrote.  Further gains might then be expected in Chihuahua, 
Sonora and Baja California, “either by purchase or by conquest.”57  Thus, when Sibley’s 
army set out for New Mexico in the fall of 1861, they carried with them the promise of a 
transcontinental, slaveholding empire. 
 Federal authorities were well aware of both rebel objectives and Union 
vulnerabilities.  As the inspector general of New Mexico wrote to Henry Halleck in 
February 1862 – when federal prospects in the Southwest seemed particularly dire –
Confederate grand strategy in the region was to “extend their conquest toward old 
Mexico and in the direction of Southern California.”58  This would have come as no great 
surprise to Halleck or any other observer of antebellum politics.  Slaveholders had, after 
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all, actively sought a southwest passage to the Pacific for well over a decade, primarily 
by lobbying for a transcontinental railroad.  A southern route across the country, they 
reasoned, would ensure a proslavery sphere of influence across the Southwest and 
provide more direct access to the lucrative China trade for their plantation economy.  
Confederate grand strategy deviated little from this antebellum mission, except in that 
slaveholders now had an army behind them.59  With the Union blockade of the Atlantic 
coastline, a Pacific outlet had become even more essential to slaveholders’ commercial 
interests.  To this end, Confederate officials looked greedily toward the gold mines of 
California and the treasure ships of the Pacific.  Furthermore, if the rebellion could 
control the entire southern half of the continent, the Confederacy would stand a better 
chance of achieving international recognition. With Baylor holding on in Confederate 
Arizona and Sibley prepared to join him with a larger force from Texas, the Pacific had 
probably never seemed closer to the slave South.  
 Unfortunately for the Confederacy’s nascent western empire, Sibley was ill suited 
to the enormous task at hand.  He had begun recruiting his brigade from south central and 
east Texas in August of 1861, shortly after Baylor had secured Mesilla.  But it took until 
October of that year before he finally set off, at which point Baylor’s position in Arizona 
had been considerably weakened by disease and Apache raiding parties.60  As they made 
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their way across west Texas, his three regiments, along with a handful of slaves and 
4,000 animals, were plagued by water shortage, a lack of feed for the beasts, and Indian 
raiders.  Sibley had expected to supply his army off the fat of the land, but he found the 
countryside alarmingly lean in the late fall of 1861.  His weary troops did not arrive at 
Fort Bliss until mid-December, at which point Sibley took command of Baylor’s forces 
and formed the Confederate Army of New Mexico.61   
Upon his arrival, Sibley issued a proclamation to the people of New Mexico, a 
document that largely echoed the rhetoric of slaveholding expansionists from the 
antebellum era.  “By geographical position, by similarity of institutions, by commercial 
interests, and by future destinies New Mexico pertains to the Confederacy,” he 
announced on December 20, 1861.62  Through military means, Sibley was, in essence, 
continuing the earlier work of proslavery agents, who had succeeded in linking the 
Southwest to the slave South through immigration, infrastructural development, and 
proslavery legislation.  As this earlier breed of southern politician argued, the Southwest 
was a natural appendage of the slave South, and the political outlook of the region largely 
confirmed this belief.  Now Sibley was simply claiming a region that many believed had 
long since belonged to the slaveholding states.     
But what Sibley and Baylor found in the Southwest in late 1861 and early 1862 
did not entirely reflect the region’s political allegiances of the previous decade.  True, 
Mesilla had warmly greeted Baylor in the summer of 1861, and the Confederate territory 
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of Arizona remained loyal to proslavery interests.  But in New Mexico to the north 
federal authorities ensured that their territory would not follow the lead of Arizona in 
breaking from the Union.  Lincoln’s appointment of strong Union men to New Mexico’s 
territorial leadership replaced proslavery partisans, who previously served as territorial 
governor and secretary.  The new territorial legislature finally succeeded in overturning 
New Mexico’s infamous slave code, which had withstood a national campaign for repeal 
since its passage in 1859.  Even the proslavery Santa Fe Gazette tempered its positions 
and largely ceased its usual attacks on abolitionists and Lincoln. Meanwhile, the new 
governor, Henry Connelly, began mobilizing the population, eventually enrolling 
between 5,000 and 6,000 New Mexican volunteers.63  As these enlistments began to 
climb, Connelly celebrated the territory’s Unionism in his first annual message, in 
December 1861. “This patriotic outpouring of men,” he proclaimed, “has removed all 
cause of suspicion which may have been excited in the minds of our countrymen in the 
loyal States in reference to the position we occupy in connection with the war.”64  He 
added that the local force was now strong enough to beat back any invading army from 
Texas.65 Although that projection ultimately proved premature, Connelly and his Unionist 
allies could take solace in the support they received from the largely Hispanic population, 
whose loyalties had been aroused by an all-too familiar foe – Anglo invaders from 
Texas.66 
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of California, 1925.) 
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Despite growing Union strength in New Mexico and waning supplies for Sibley’s 
force, the rebel army continued pushing into Yankee territory.  In March 1862 the New 
Mexican capital of Santa Fe fell to Sibley’s army, thereby unleashing a new wave of fear 
in California. With Union forces scattered and close to 3,000 conquering Texans 
concentrated in New Mexico, this was perhaps the high tide of slavery’s Sunbelt.  The 
rebellion now controlled all of Arizona and southern New Mexico, from the Rio Grande 
to nearly the Colorado River.  Further victories could have carried them to the gold fields 
of Colorado, to the shores of the Pacific, and even into the states of northern Mexico.  To 
that end, Sibley dispatched Colonel James Reily to negotiate with the governor of 
Chihuahua, who reportedly granted the Confederacy’s first recognition by a former 
power.  Reily also attempted to secure a depot for Confederate supplies at Guaymas, in 
the Mexican state of Sonoma.67  Meanwhile, Confederate scouts pushed westward to 
within 80 miles of California.68	
Much like Baylor’s invasion less than a year earlier, Sibley’s thrust into New 
Mexico caught Union forces flat-footed.  Yet though his initial conquests were notable, 
his luck would not hold.  At the Battle of Glorieta Pass in late March 1862, a tactical 
victory quickly turned into a strategic disaster.  Although the rebels initially took the 
field, a Union detachment under the command of John M. Chivington – who would later 
lead U.S. troops in a massacre of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians at Sand Creek – 
																																																						
67 Because Mexico was not affected by the Union blockade, the country therefore offered Confederates 
their only international market to exchange cotton for war supplies; see Watford, “Confederate Western 
Ambitions,” 174-175. 
68 The westernmost engagement of the war took place at Stanwix Station; Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley’s 
New Mexico Campaign (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960), Introduction.		
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destroyed Sibley’s supply train, an irreversible blow to the Confederate advance.  With 
inadequate provisions to hold his position in New Mexico, Sibley began a long retreat 
back to Confederate Texas, [losing much of his force to the brutal summer heat and 
Indian raiders.  According to some, the Confederate defeat had less to do with Union 
tactical skill, and more to do with Sibley’s own inadequacies.  T.T. Teel, for one, 
attributed the failure of the campaign to his commander’s ineptitude – namely his 
administrative oversights and tendency to “let the morrow take care of itself.”  
Compounding this lack of leadership was a “want of supplies, ammunition, discipline, 
and confidence.”  Had Baylor had full command over the invasion, Teel speculated, “the 
result might have been different.”69  Sibley also reportedly suffered from kidney stones 
and often abused alcohol to deaden the pain.  He was confined to his wagon and 
drunkenly incapacitated at several strategic moments during the campaign.  In short, 
Sibley was ill equipped to carry slavery’s empire across the continent.   
That Confederates were the first to recognize and then exploit the strategic 
importance of the Southwest should come as no surprise.  After all, slaveholders had, for 
well over a decade, coveted the region and the transcontinental thoroughfare it opened, 
and made moves to shore up their political control there in the years before the war.  But 
Union officials gradually awakened to the importance of the Southwest and when they 
did, they responded with force, mobilizing units from Colorado, California and even 
Kansas.  They beat back the Confederate advance at Glorieta Pass, and, for the remainder 
of the war, deployed the majority of their fighting force against a rebellion of a different 
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sort – the numerous Native American peoples of the West who continued to assert their 
tribal sovereignty.  But for the better part of the year, the rebellion maintained control of 
southern New Mexico, what Confederates designated Arizona.  In the face of provisional 
shortages, environmental difficulties, powerful Indian tribes, and Union forces, this was 
no mean feat.  Compared to the far larger rebel invasions in the eastern theaters – namely 
Robert E. Lee’s push into Maryland and Pennsylvania, which were quickly turned back at 
Antietam and Gettysburg, respectively – Baylor and Sibley conducted lengthy 
occupations.  These Southwestern invasions would not turn the tide of war in the way that 
eastern campaigns did, but for the early part of the conflict they proved that the rebellion 
could achieve perhaps not only independence, but also territorial aggrandizement.  
In an official report of the campaign – what amounted to something of a post-
mortem – Sibley attempted to shrug off the Confederate defeat.  The commander who 
once rode off for the West with such high expectations for a continental rebel empire, 
now dismissed the region as unworthy of the Confederacy’s efforts.  “Except for its 
political geographical position,” Sibley wrote to his superior, “the Territory of New 
Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest.”70  
Others in the Confederate high command, however, would not so quickly write off the 
value of that region.  The rebellion may have suffered an irreversible defeat, but the war 
in the Far West was far from over. 
 
 
																																																						
70 Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley to General S. Cooper, May 4, 1862, OR, Series I, Vol. IX, p. 
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After Sibley 
Neither homegrown secessionists nor Texas invaders mustered enough support to 
break California or New Mexico from the Union, but the embers of rebellion in the 
Southwest would continue to burn throughout the war, alarming loyalists and 
emboldening Confederate hopes for a transcontinental empire.  Jefferson Davis himself, a 
longtime proponent of western expansion, refused to turn his back on the region that had 
handed Sibley such a decisive defeat.  Until the last days of the rebellion, the Confederate 
high command would authorize several additional invasions, commission a guerilla force 
in California’s gold country, and launch a privateering mission in the Pacific Ocean.  
Indeed, the slaveholders’ dream of empire in the West would almost outlive slavery 
itself.  
From the earliest days of the war, rebels threatened – at least rhetorically – Union 
control of the Pacific Ocean.  As federals tightened their grip on Atlantic trade, 
Confederates sought commercial outlets elsewhere – hence Sibley’s preoccupation with 
both Mexico and the ports of southern California.  The Pacific trade had long held a 
prominent place in the imperial imagination of slaveholders, thus it should come as no 
surprise that secessionists mused on the possibilities of piracy in the Pacific when war 
broke out.  In an open and anonymous letter to President Lincoln, the proslavery 
polemicist Edward Pollard looked to the Pacific as a potentially lucrative theater of war.  
Confederate privateers “will destroy the commercial and navigating interests of the 
North,” he boasted in a May 1861 letter. “[T]hey will scour the South Pacific as well as 
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other oceans of the world; they will penetrate into every sea, and will find as tempting 
prizes in the silk ships of China as in the gold-freighted steamers of California.”71   
Union authorities recognized both the value and the vulnerability of their gold 
shipments from California.  Unsurprisingly, one of Lincoln’s first acts after the firing on 
Fort Sumter was to ensure the protection of the nation’s maritime commerce, especially 
the Pacific treasure ships.72  “I do not know what we would do in this great national 
emergency,” Ulysses S. Grant is rumored to have said, “were it not for the gold sent from 
California.”73 To be sure, there was more bombast than actual threat in declarations like 
Pollard’s.  After all, the Confederacy lacked the naval capacity to launch a full-scale 
maritime contest in the Pacific.  But the rebellion did possess important contacts in 
California who proved all too eager to assist in a privateering campaign.  And with only 
six sloops-of-war and fewer than 1000 sailors to protect a vast coastline and lucrative 
commerce, absolute Union naval control of the Pacific was anything but foreordained. 74   
Enter the adventurer and ardent California secessionist, Ashbury Harpending.  
The scion of a wealthy Kentucky family, Harpending attached himself to proslavery 
schemes at an early age.  At fifteen he sailed for Nicaragua in one of William Walker’s 
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expeditions, though American officials intercepted his ship and prevented the young 
Harpending from taking part in ground operations.  Upon southern disunion, he helped 
organize a secessionist movement within California, appealing to Albert Sidney Johnston 
to turn over the entire Department of the Pacific to the nascent western rebellion.  Failing 
in this, he shifted his attentions toward the Pacific, where he reasoned a weak Union 
naval presence could be turned to the Confederacy’s advantage.75  In 1862 Harpending 
traveled overland to Vera Cruz, then via blockade runner to Charleston, and from there to 
Richmond, where he laid his plans before Jefferson Davis.  He proposed to sail a sloop to 
Mexico, transform her into a fighting vessel, and seize the first eastbound Pacific Mail 
steamer that crossed their path, confiscating the ship’s gold and silver shipments.  Then 
Harpending and his associates proposed “to equip the captured liner as a privateer and 
figured to intercept two more eastbound Pacific Mail steamers before the world knew 
what was happening in those days of slow traveling news.”76  Although Davis was wary 
of any operation that could be construed as piracy, he was clearly intrigued by this plan.  
According to Harpending, Davis “fully realized the importance of shutting off the great 
gold shipments to the East from California,” which in his estimation, “would be more 
important the many victories in the field.”77  Thus Harpending received a commission as 
a captain in the Confederate navy, even though “I had never been on a man-of-war in my 
life.”78   
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Harpending returned to California in July 1862 and soon enlisted the help of two 
co-conspirators, Ridgley Greathouse and a young English gentleman, Alfred Rubery – 
colorful names to match the nature of their operation.  Together they purchased the J.M. 
Chapman, a 90-ton schooner moored in San Francisco’s bay, and outfitted the ship with 
two twelve-pound canons, while also purchasing a small arsenal of side arms – rifles, 
revolvers and cutlasses.  “[W]ithout much difficulty” Harpending also found “twenty 
picked men – all from the South, of proved and desperate courage.”  The Chapman never 
made it out of port, however.  As they were preparing to set sail in March 1863, 
Harpending’s plot was betrayed by the ship’s navigator, and soon he was staring down 
the trained guns of a US warship and several boatloads of Marines.  Harpending and his 
associates were taken to Alcatraz and then to San Francisco’s Old Broadway jail.  After 
six months in prison, Harpending was finally convicted of high treason – though his crew 
was acquitted.  Fortunately for Harpending, Lincoln’s Amnesty Proclamation of 
December 1863 granted full pardon to all political prisoners on the condition they take 
and keep a loyalty oath.  He thus won his freedom by February 1864, after nearly a year 
of confinement, bankrupted and utterly foiled in his plans to bring the Confederacy into 
the Pacific.79  
Harpending may have failed in his mission to secure Union gold shipments, but 
he certainly succeeded in setting the Pacific coast on high alert to a Confederate naval 
threat.  The War Department was soon receiving appeals for additional protections for 
San Francisco harbor, while Washington temporarily suspended gold shipments from 
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California.80  The California press was among those calling for greater naval vigilance 
and bolstered defenses.  Had the Chapman made it to the high seas, “it would have been 
in her power to annihilate the commerce of the port,” the Alta California reported in the 
immediate aftermath of the affair.  “Every vessel leaving or entering the port would have 
fallen an easy pretty.”81  In another article, the Alta reiterated the call for greater naval 
security, arguing, “A bombardment of an hour would set the town, as it is for the most 
part built of wood, on fire in fifty places.”82  When the trial began, the San Francisco 
press called for the execution of the Chapman traitors.  They pointed to Harpending’s 
letter of marque from Jefferson Davis as proof positive of his nefarious designs.  “These 
men of the Chapman… committed a treason as grave as any that ever was, or ever could 
be, committed,” the Alta claimed.  “That of Arnold was not baser or more malicious.”83 
As Harpending languished in prison, Jefferson Davis authorized yet another 
audacious rebel plot in the Far West under yet another inexperienced commander.  This 
time it was Lansford Hastings, an eccentric mapmaker and would-be conquistador, who 
won the approval of the Confederate high command.  Hastings had achieved notoriety 
before the war when his faulty directions sent the Donner Party to a disastrous winter in 
the High Sierra in 1846-1847.  Although Hastings had been born in Ohio, his politics 
took a southern turn by the outbreak of the war, perhaps as a result of his 20-year 
residency in proslavery California.  In December 1863 he wrote to Davis with a plan that 
made Sibley look like a paragon of restraint by comparison.  Hastings proposed to raise a 
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force of 3,000 to 5,000 partisans from California’s southern sympathizing population, 
then march east to reclaim Arizona for the rebellion.  The campaign would open “an 
unbroken intercourse between California and the Confederacy,” according to Hastings.  
Furthermore, it would serve as a “connecting link between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, the best and most feasible line of communication across the continent, the only 
practicable Atlantic and Pacific railroad route, the most valuable agricultural and grazing 
lands, and the richest mineral region in the known world.”84   
The plan was nothing short of preposterous, coming from a man with lack of 
military experience and an abundance of past navigational blunders, but he clearly knew 
how to appeal to Davis.  By highlighting railroad development, as well as the agricultural 
and mineral richness of the Southwest, Hastings spoke the language that southern 
imperialists had employed throughout the antebellum period when discussing 
slaveholding prospects in the Southwest.  Davis thus approved the plan and 
commissioned Hastings a major in the Confederate army.  Although the campaign never 
materialized – probably a result of Hastings’s own shortcomings as a military commander 
and ongoing Confederate difficulties in the major eastern theaters – that Davis would 
even countenance such an operation speaks to the enduring pull of the Far West on the 
southern imperial imagination.85 
Western rebels had more success with a smaller, but better organized, operation 
around Sacramento in 1864.  Under the command of Captain Rufus Ingram, a group of 
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southern sympathizing desperados brought a taste of Missouri’s guerilla warfare to 
California’s gold country.  Ingram himself had fought under the notorious partisan leader, 
William Quantrill in Missouri, and had played an active role in the rebel raid on 
Lawrence, Kansas in August 1863, in which Quantrill’s rangers murdered over 180 
civilians and burned nearly every building in town.  Known as the “Red Fox” in 
Missouri, Ingram saw an opportunity in California, which boasted a sufficient population 
of Confederate sympathizers without an experienced leader.  He began recruiting in 
March 1864, mainly from the Knights of the Golden Circle around San Jose, eventually 
attracting an outfit of some 50 men.  Initially he had hoped to lead his unit back to the 
major military theaters of the East, but with scanty funding, he opted for a guerilla 
campaign within California itself.  As Ingram’s lieutenant and Monterrey undersheriff 
Tom Poole later recalled, “If we could not raise means enough to go South, we were to 
raise and [sic] insurrection in California.”86 
The band that the California press would soon dub “Ingram’s Partisan Rangers” 
achieved their greatest success in June 1864, when they robbed a Wells, Fargo 
stagecoach of its substantial cargo of gold and silver.  Ingram established his Confederate 
bona fides with a note he handed to the stage driver: “This is to certify that I have 
received from Wells, Fargo & Co., the sum of $____ cash, for the purpose of outfitting 
recruits enlisted in California for the confederate states’ army. R. Henry Ingram, captain 
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commanding company, C.S.A.”87  The band of six buried the bullion at a nearby spring 
and then fled to their hideout, where local authorities, hot in pursuit, tracked them down.  
Ingram and his raiders opened fire, killing one officer and grievously wounding another.  
In the exchange Pool lost half his cheek to a shotgun blast, and decided to remain at the 
hideout while the rest of the gang made their escape.  He was later captured when backup 
arrived, and subsequently made a full confession, identifying his confederates and 
revealing where the bullion had been buried.88  
Rebel activity and small-scale carnage continued through most of the summer. 
After a failed heist in mid-July, the gang fled to another hideout, where they were again 
tracked down by posse of sheriffs, constables and citizens.  And once again, Ingram and 
his partisans came out firing, wounding two sheriffs, while two of their own died in the 
exchange.  In late July, California authorities, backed by four companies of infantry – a 
testament to just how seriously Union officials viewed this threat – arrested ten of 
Ingram’s raiders.  Several members of the gang robbed two more stagecoaches in early 
August, but by then their partisan campaign was all but played out.  By early September, 
authorities had killed or arrested nearly every active member of the band – fifteen 
captured, two dead – except for Ingram and one other.  Local citizens packed the 
courtroom that month, as the majority of the Ingram raiders stood trial for murder and 
highway robbery – although notably not for treason.89  Ingram himself, however, eluded 
justice, melting into the countryside and disappearing from history.90       
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The roundup of Ingram’s scattered guerillas coincided with a broader Unionist 
campaign against insurrection within the state.  The most notable target of these 
crackdowns was California’s Copperhead press.  As early as February 1862, the U.S. 
Postmaster banned the Los Angeles Star from the mails.  Several months later the Visalia 
Equal Rights Expositor, the Stockton Argus, and the San Jose Tribune, followed by the 
Placerville Mountain Democrat and Stockton Democrat, joined the Star on the list of 
banned materials.  The prohibitions wounded the finances of these Copperhead papers, 
although local southern sympathizers rallied in defense of their beleaguered press.  In 
Visalia, for instance, substantial donations from local anti-Unionists, particularly from 
the women of Tulare County, floated the Equal Rights Expositor while its subscriptions 
sagged under the ban.  Similarly, the Los Angeles Star endured with the support of 
Democratic sympathizers in the area.  When the mails were reopened to the Star in 
January 1863, the editor Henry Hamilton redoubled his defiance of Lincoln’s 
administration.  “[T]he prohibition was impotent,” Hamilton boasted, “so do we despise 
this proffered sop.”91  Where prohibition failed to silence the southern sympathizing 
press, mob vengeance often proved more persuasive.  After editor Lovick P. Hall 
published an abusive article on California’s federalist volunteers, titled “California 
Cossacks,” a Unionist mob, led by soldiers, demolished the press and offices of the 
Expositor.  One of Merced’s Copperhead papers met a similar end at the hands of 
enraged Unionists.92             
																																																						
91 Los Angeles Star, January 17, 1863. 
92 For more on the crackdown on the state’s anti-Union press, see Robinson, “A California Copperhead,” 
219-228; Robinson, Los Angeles in Civil War Days, 114-115, 149-150; Gilbert, Confederate Minority in 
California, 162-164. 
	 280 
 Along with prohibitions and mob action came a flurry of arrests.  Harpending and 
his co-conspirators, Ingram’s rangers, and other less violent offenders all came under 
lock and key during the course of the war, most of them passing through the federal 
prison at Alcatraz.  In 1862, two of southern California’s most outspoken anti-Unionists, 
Henry Hamilton and E.J.C. Kewen, were arrested, taken to Drum Barracks and then 
transported to Alcatraz.  Upon their release, the citizens of El Monte treated them to a 
celebratory barbeque.  The undersheriff of Los Angeles, A.J. King, who had so brazenly 
displayed a life-sized portrait of rebel General P.G.T. Beauregard, was also arrested on 
charges of conspiracy, though like Hamilton and Kewen, he secured his release upon 
taking a loyalty oath.  Of all Confederate sympathizers in California, none was more 
extraordinary than Peter Biggs, a former slave turned Los Angeles barber and Democratic 
partisan, who was escorted to Drum Barracks in 1864 for suspected treason.93  The 
Expositor’s editor, Lovick P. Hall was arrested twice during the course of the war, 
remaining under guard until September 1865, several months after the conflict had 
ended.94     
 Coupled with Confederate defeats and the departure of southern sympathizers for 
the military theaters of the East, these military detainments helped dampen rebel activity 
in the Far West.  Confederate plots, like Harpending’s would-be privateering expedition 
and Ingram’s guerilla raids, deeply unsettled California’s Unionists, but the loyal 
majority held firm throughout the war, especially in the northern half of the state.  
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Opposition to the Lincoln administration, which had been fueled by the state’s 
antebellum Democratic traditions, dwindled as the contest wore on.  So too did 
Democratic voter turnout at a statewide level.  In 1864, perhaps intimidated by militant 
Unionism, Kewen and Hamilton opted not to run for reelection to the state legislature.  
That year, financial difficulties finally forced Hamilton to sell the Star to a pro-Union 
Democrat.  Later, the wealthy Unionist Phineas Banning purchased the press and 
materials, moved it to Wilmington, and filled its columns with praise for Lincoln.95  The 
proslavery spirit that had burned so brightly during the antebellum period and the early 
war years had waned to mere embers. 
 
A California Rebel in Napoleon’s Court 
 But that spirit was hardly dead.  It merely migrated.  While Unionist crackdowns 
had suppressed the most vocal signs of secessionism in the Far West, California’s rebels 
had gone international by mid-war.  Most threatening, in the eyes of federal authorities, 
was former U.S. senator William McKendree Gwin, who, by 1864, had reached the court 
of Napoleon III.  Gwin had relocated to Paris where he launched a campaign to convince 
the French emperor to back a scheme for a colonial settlement in Sonora, Mexico.  He 
proposed to populate Sonora, then under the jurisdiction of France’s puppet emperor, 
with American miners and adventurers, who would help trigger a gold rush in the region 
– a la California some twelve years earlier.  Although Gwin was not an official 
representative of the Confederate government, Union authorities were under no illusions: 
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the Mississippi planter-cum-California statesman was a southern partisan through and 
through, and his Sonora colony might very well serve as a far western base of operations 
for the rebellion.  Ulysses S. Grant recognized as much when he contemplated the 
invasion of Gwin’s Sonora colony in January 1865.96  In Grant’s mind, the threat Gwin 
posed was dire enough to transform a civil war into an international conflagration.97     
 Union officials watched Gwin’s movements carefully – well before he moved to 
Paris.  After all, few could forget that Gwin was the leading figure in California’s 
proslavery political faction, the owner of a Mississippi plantation, and a close confidant 
of Confederate sympathizers across the country.  Two of those sympathizers served as his 
traveling companions in October 1861 as slipped out of California.  Joining future 
Confederate general Joseph Lancaster Brent and the prominent Chiv lawyer, Calhoun 
Benham, Gwin boarded the USS Orizaba en route to New York via Panama.  But the 
three never intended to sail for a U.S harbor.  Instead, according to Brent, they planned to 
“leave the steamer at Panama, make our way to the West Indies, and from there run the 
blockade into one of the Southern ports, which could be easily done at that period of the 
war.”98  As their misfortune would have it, however, also aboard the Orizaba were four 
hundred U.S. soldiers under the command of General Edward Vose Sumner, the former 
commander of the Pacific Department, who had been particularly vigilant in his 
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surveillance of California rebels during the opening phase of the war.  While at sea, 
Sumner ordered the arrest of Gwin, Benham and Brent, “all leading, active, and 
influential men of the party in rebellion against the government.”99 
 In protesting their arrest, the three prisoners nearly sparked an international 
conflict.  When the Orizaba pulled into port at Panama City, several American 
southerners there – including the former minister to Panama, who owed his appointment 
to Gwin – caught wind of the ex-senator’s arrest.  They appealed to the governor, who in 
turn dispatched a company of soldiers to the landing wharf to protest the “violation of the 
sovereignty of Panama.”  Sumner threatened to bombard the city if his orders were 
resisted and sent the three prisoners ashore, guarded by a flotilla of small boats and four 
hundred soldiers, while a man-of-war pulled into the port and turned its broadside on the 
city.  According to Brent, their arrest was carried out with “a ‘pomp and circumstance of 
war’ such as Pizarro himself never possessed on the Isthmus when at the height of his 
power.”100  Thus secured, the prisoners were sent off to New York under parole, and later 
imprisoned at Fort Lafayette, before ultimately securing their release on the orders of 
Lincoln by the end of 1861.101 
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stated to Mr. Benham that he (Mr. Benham, Dr. Gwin, and Mr. Joseph L. Brent might go their several ways 
– they to ask no questions, nor any questions to be asked of them, and the pending affair between them and 
the Government, growing out of their arrest and parole, to be thus entirely disposed of and ended.” George 
Dennison Prentice, Memorandum, December 7, 1861, Brent Papers, HEHL. Earlier, the three had signed a 
statement of parole, Calhoun Behnham, Joseph Lancaster Brent and William M. Gwin to William Henry 
Seward, December 5, 1861; see also William Henry Seward, Memorandum, December 10, 1861, both in 
Brent Papers, HEHL. Roy Bloss notes that Gwin was “the first Senator of a free-soil state ever to be 
arrested and jailed by the government he served;” Bloss, “Senator Defiled,” 351.	
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 Gwin returned to the Mississippi River Valley to look after his plantation for the 
next few years, while his son served a brief stint in the Confederate cavalry.  Musing on 
his next steps, he wrote to Brent in March 1863.  The plan was to run the blockade with 
his son – since released from military service – and head to Canada, and from there to 
either Cuba or Europe.  America was no place for him, he concluded, with Union troops 
closing in on every side.  “I want to get away from war,” he wrote.  Although “my 
negroes are as yet safe,” there was no telling how far the Yankees (“the vilest thieves on 
Earth”) would go with regard to southern property. Ultimately, however, Gwin hoped to 
return to California – and more specifically, to a California free from Union control.   
“When the war is over & the South gains her independence we will return to California,” 
he wrote.  “If we conquer we can put down the Yankees there & what a country it is & 
what a climate.”102  Although sketchy in their details, here were plans for a separate 
empire on the Pacific: first, southern independence, then the termination of U.S. rule in 
California. 
 But California had to wait until Confederate independence.  In the meantime, 
France beckoned.  After Union forces sacked his Mississippi plantation in July 1863, 
Gwin boarded the side-wheeler R.E. Lee, ran the federal blockade, and sailed for Paris.  
There he joined a large community of southern expatriates, many of whom were 
endeavoring to enlist French aid in the Confederate cause.  Although never pledging 
official support for the the slaveholders’ rebellion, the French emperor, Napoleon III 
proved receptive to these overtures – substantially more so than other European heads of 
																																																						
102 Gwin to Brent, March 27, 1863, Brent Papers, HEHL. 
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state – and he turned a blind eye to the money and munitions that French sources were 
sending to the Confederate South.103  Thus Gwin had reason for optimism when he won 
an audience with Napoleon to outline his ambitious plan for a new mining colony in 
Sonora and Chihuahua, Mexico.  France had invaded Mexico in the spring of 1862, on 
the pretext of securing repayment of past debts, and installed the Austrian archduke 
Maximilian on the throne of the newly created Mexican Empire.  Gwin proposed to 
unearth the hidden wealth of this empire by attracting American immigrants to the 
mineral regions of northern Mexico, and in the process, provide a buffer against the U.S. 
government, which was hostile to Napoleon’s puppet government in Mexico.  All he 
asked in return was a military detachment of some one thousand troops to protect his 
colonists from Comanche and Apache raiders.104  Enchanted by Gwin’s assurances of 
mineral wealth in the region, Napoleon and his cabinet officially endorsed the plan by the 
spring of 1864 and dispatched Gwin to Mexican City to prepare the way for the new 
colony.105  
The former senator pitched his colony as a golden opportunity for France’s 
imperial prospects, but Gwin had a different empire in mind when he set out for Mexico 
in the summer of 1864.  Here was a chance, not only to enhance his personal wealth, but 
																																																						
103 Nathanial Beverly Tucker, the brother of St. George Tucker, was one of the many Confederate 
expatriates who found a warm reception within the high political circles of Paris; see Nathanial Beverley 
Tucker to “Dear Friend”, March 8, 1863, Paris, Thom Family Papers, section 3, box 6, VHS. 
104 Gwin proposed “to effect this colonization by emigration principally from the mining districts of the 
United States of America at the same time encouraging emigration from all other civilized countries;” 
William M. Gwin to Napoleon III, January 5, 1864, Paris, William McKendree Gwin Papers, Bancroft 
Library (BANC). 
105 Gwin followed up on his January letter with more detailed plans. See, Rules and Regulations for 
carrying into effect the Treaty between their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of 
Mexico, Mss; Gwin, Eclaircissement sur le Projet de Colonisation des Etats de Sonora et de Chihuahua, 
March 1864, and Gwin, Memorandum on the Colonization of Sonora, 1864, all in Gwin Papers, BANC. 
For more on Gwin’s operations in Paris, see Thomas, Between Two Empires, 284-304. 
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also to mark out an extensive boundary for a new domain on the Pacific, entirely 
independent of the U.S.  As Gwin recalled in his memoirs, the Sonora colony was to be 
the first step in the formation of a vast Pacific republic.  Had the Confederacy won its 
independence, “it was believed by many that the country would have still been divided by 
the separation of California from the Union and the establishment of an independent 
government on the Pacific coast,” Gwin noted.  “In that event, northern districts of 
Mexico would have formed an important addition to the Western Republic.”106 Gwin thus 
articulated a more fully realized vision of what he had hinted at in his letter to Brent, 
when he mused on the possibility of ending Yankee rule in California.  By attracting 
emigrants – and most likely southerners – to Sonora, Gwin was preparing for a future free 
of U.S. control, and in a strong position to exert his political will over a powerful and 
mineral-rich Pacific empire. 
Only in hindsight does such a geopolitical reordering appear fanciful or far-
fetched.  As historian Rachel St. John recently argued, Gwin’s visions for Pacific 
independence were both “entirely possible” and consistent with decades of American 
imperialism.  Expansionist like Gwin – with “grand ambitions and flexible loyalties” – 
saw “their nation’s boundaries not as a fait accompli but as a work in progress.”107  
Gwin’s plans were particularly consistent with the longer history of proslavery 
expansionism in the American West.  Proponents of a southern transcontinental railroad, 
																																																						
106 Gwin’s memoirs, originally dictated to the California bookseller and historian Hubert Howe Bancroft in 
1878, are notoriously self-serving and revisionist. Throughout, he underplays his proslavery allegiances and 
Confederate sympathies. Thus his candor here is remarkable. William M. Gwin, “Memoirs on the History 
of United States, Mexico, and California of Ex Senator Wm. M. Gwin, Dictated by Himself for Bancroft 
Library,” Mss, 1878, Bancroft Library. (These musings are written on a tipped-in leaf, numbered as page 
249 ½.) 
107 St. John, “The Unpredictable America of William Gwin,” 58, 61. 
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for instance, hoped to exert control over the West through immigration, infrastructural 
development, and commercial penetration.  Territorial conquest and the extension of 
chattel slavery, while certainly desirable, were not essential to this southern vision of 
continental control.  Similarly, Gwin operated politically rather than militarily, and he 
hoped to harness the gradual force of immigration to remake this western region in a 
southern – or certainly an anti-Unionist – image.  Henry Crabb, William Walker, Narciso 
Lopez, and John A. Quitman had repeatedly shown that independent military operations 
were a bloody and inefficient way to carve out geopolitical spheres of influence.  Far 
better to work within legal, political and diplomatic channels to secure imperial ends – 
this was the lesson of over a decade of proslavery scheming in the Far West. 
In fleeing one war in the United States, Gwin nearly created another in Mexico.  
When Union officials caught wind of his movements in Sonora, they prepared for a 
border-crossing conflict.  The federal commander Ulysses S. Grant was particularly 
concerned about Gwin, “a rebel of the most virulent order.”  As his army besieged Robert 
E. Lee’s forces at Petersburg, Virginia, Grant considered the possibility of launching 
another invasion, thousands of miles to the west.  If Gwin organized “the dissatisfied 
spirits of California” and threatened an incursion of American territory, Grant was 
prepared to respond in full force.  “I would not rest satisfied with simply driving the 
invaders onto Mexican soil,” he wrote to General Irwin McDowell in January 1865, “but 
would pursue him until overtaken, and would retain possession of the territory from 
which the invader started until indemnity for the past and security for the future… was 
	 288 
insured.”108  McDowell, commander of the Pacific Department, also tracked Gwin’s 
movements with growing unease.  Evidently, two agents were operating in San Francisco 
to recruit would-be colonists and thereby “plant upon our frontiers a people hostile to our 
institutions, our influence, and our progress.”  McDowell thus dispatched a brigadier 
general to Arizona to track Gwin’s movements in Mexico, and organized a force of two 
to three regiments to “provide for any contingency.”109 
Gwin was not officially commissioned by the Confederate government.  But 
Confederates certainly cheered his progress.  While Gwin and his son-in-law played up 
his Unionism in post-war reminiscences, the ex-senator’s wartime actions betrayed an 
undeniable rebel allegiance.  Gwin himself recognized that he was “highly valued 
because I am with the South in this contest.”110  Even before he arrived in Sonora, 
California disunionists like Cameron Thom believed French intervention in Mexico 
would lift rebel prospects in the West.111  By the time the former senator moved into the 
region, the promise of a Confederate outlet in the Far West took fuller form. “Doubtless 
the Doctor [Gwin] has written you as to his plans in Sonora,” Calhoun Benham wrote to 
Joseph Lancaster Brent in late 1864.  “He is ‘Director in Chief of Colonization in the 
Departments of Sonora and Chihuahua’ which it is proposed to colonize with Southern 
																																																						
108 Ulysses S. Grant to Irvin McDowell, January 8, 1865, OR, Series I, Vol. L, Pt. II, p. 118. 
109 McDowell to Grant, March 12, 1865, OR, Series I, Vol. L, Pt. II, pp. 1158-1160. 
110 Gwin to his brother, June 1, 1864, in Evan J. Coleman, “Senator’s Gwin’s Plan for the Colonization of 
Sonora: Postscript,” Overland Monthly 18:104 (August 1891), pp. 203-213. Coleman was Gwin’s son-in-
law who, in presenting this account of the Sonora colony, insisted “that there is nothing in Doctor Gwin’s 
papers to indicate any connection on the part of the Richmond Government with the ‘Sonora Project’,” p. 
206. In his memoirs, Gwin claimed to be “a consistent and unwavering union man throughout,” Gwin, 
Memoirs, 249 ½, BANC. 
111 Cameron Erskine Thom to Pembroke Thom, January 5, 1863, section 3, folder 5; also Charles Slaughter 
Moorehead to Captain Thom, October 7 and 17, 1863, section 3, folder 3, all in Thom Family papers, VHS. 
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people from California.”112  John Slidell – the Confederate minister to France, who had 
been privy to Gwin’s dealings in Paris – held high hopes for the Sonora mission.  “His 
object is to colonize Sonora with sons of southern birth… residing in California,” Slidell 
wrote to Judah P. Benjamin. “If carried out its consequences will be most beneficial.”113  
Geographic factors alone, as Slidell probably recognized, would have lent the Sonora 
colony a southern character.  In close proximity to rebel Arizona and Confederate-
sympathizing southern California, the Sonora colony stood out as a potential magnet for 
nearby disunionists.  As the Confederacy’s armies crumbled in the East, therefore, 
Gwin’s colony could have opened a rebel escape valve in the West.  
Yet for all the Unionist fears and Confederate expectations that he stirred, Gwin’s 
Mexican career was short-lived.  A medley of factors beyond Gwin’s control – 
interpersonal struggles within the court of Maximilian, the tenacious resistance of 
Juarez’s Liberal armies, various administrative missteps – conspired to doom his best laid 
plans.114  Gwin did indeed begin recruiting in California, but without French military aid 
to protect his would-be colonists from Apache and Comanche tribes, mining operations 
could not safely commence.  Gwin continued pressing his case until the early summer of 
1866, several months after the Confederacy’s collapse. By July, however, he finally 
																																																						
112 Calhoun Benham to Joseph Lancaster Brent, November 25, 1864, Brent Papers, HEHL.	
113 John Slidell to Judah Benjamin, Paris, June 2, 1864, in John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life 
(New York, 1900-1913, II, 190, as quoted in Stanley, “Senator William Gwin: Moderate or Racist?” 
California Historical Quarterly 50 (September 1971), 252.  
114 Gwin played up these factors in explaining Sonora’s failure; see Gwin, Memoirs, 225-245, BANC. For 
his complaints that he had not received adequate support from Maximilian’s court, see Gwin to Napoleon, 
July 3, 1865, Gwin Papers, BANC. 
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abandoned his plans and rode from Mexico City under an armed escort.115  Whereas 
Maximilian eventually faced a firing squad of Juarez’s victorious soldiers, Gwin was 
fortunate to escape with his life – a fact he attributed to the poor marksmanship of the 
Mexican Liberals.116  But he had merely leapt from the frying pan and into the fire.  Back 
in the United States, and with Confederate rebellion quashed, the former senator was 
arrested and transported under guard to Fort Jackson, Louisiana in October 1865.117      
He languished there for nearly eight months, until April 1866 – a prison term that 
reflected the audacity of his plans.118  Aside from Jefferson Davis, no Confederate high 
official served such a long prison term after the war.  And for good reason.  In many 
ways this was the apotheosis – or at least the grandest manifestation – of over a decade of 
southern scheming in the Far West.  James Gadsden and Thomas Jefferson Green had 
conspired to plant a slave colony on the ostensibly free soil of antebellum California; 
Henry Crabb and William Walker had launched short-lived and ill-fated invasions of 
Sonora; Postmaster General A.V. Brown had outmaneuvered northern congressmen to 
construct an overland mail road along a far southern route; Chivalry Democrats had 
leveraged their political power to pass a state division bill in California.  But only Gwin 
																																																						
115 Three months after Gwin fled Mexico, Maximilian commissioned another veteran proslavery 
expansionist, Matthew Fontaine Maury, to carry out a similar plan; see Thomas, Between Two Empires, 
361. 
116 Gwin to the Marquis de Montholon, October 15, 1865, in Coleman, “Gwin’s Plan for the Colonization 
of Sonora,” 210.  
117 On the deterioration of Gwin’s Mexican mission, see Thomas, Between Two Empires, 314-354; St. John, 
“Unpredictable America of William Gwin,” 73-74; Bloss, “Senator Defiled,” BANC, 385-418.   
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unreconstructed rebel added, “Thank God I have never taken an oath [of allegiance];” Gwin to Brent, June 
13, 1866, Brent papers, HEHL. 
	 291 
had dared to conspire with emperors, to antagonize the Union high command, and to 
launch a colony intended as the southern extension of an independent Pacific republic.  
As the U.S. attempted to reassert sovereignty over the former Confederacy, Gwin stood 
as a reminder of the globetrotting nature of the recent rebellion, when the slave South 
reached into the courts of emperors.119  
 
The Death of the Southern Dream 
 As his armies deteriorated across the eastern theaters and his government 
collapsed around him, Jefferson Davis continued to look west.  Indeed, the Confederate 
dream of a continental empire proved nearly impossible to kill.  While Grant, Sherman 
and Sheridan’s Union forces penetrated deep into Confederate territory, Davis considered 
launching an invasion of his own, once again into the territory of New Mexico.  And 
again, he turned to the commander of the first Confederate invasion of the region, John R. 
Baylor.  Between Gwin’s Sonora colony and Baylor’s proposed invasion, the West, some 
believed, represented the last best hope for the rebellion. 
For his encore performance, Baylor hoped to tap the region’s deep reservoirs of 
secessionist sentiment.  To Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon in December 
1864, Baylor wrote of the enduring spirit of rebellion in the Southwest – “the only 
[remaining] section where men of Southern birth can be raised in large numbers, who 
sympathize with us and who would join us in this struggle.”  From southern California 
																																																						
119 For months after the war, the California press maintained a keen interest in the ill-fated Sonora colony 
and the man derided as “Duke Gwin.” See San Francisco Bulletin, February 22, March 3, November 23, 
and December 28, 1866; Alta California May 6, 1866; Sacramento Daily Union, May 18 and November 
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and Arizona he expected to raise somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 rebel troops, with 
perhaps an additional 5,000 coming from New Mexico.120  For the initial invasion force, 
however, he intended to once again recruit in Texas.  With Confederate coffers nearly 
emptied by this stage of the war, Baylor expected to fund his operation through the sale 
of Texas cotton.121      
 The Confederate War Department, reeling from Confederate defeats in the East, 
rejected Baylor’s plan.  But Davis, a western expansionist to the last, overrode Seddon’s 
decision and endorsed this last, desperate push into New Mexico.  In late March 1865, 
Baylor was commissioned a colonel and given authority to raise an invasion force of 
2500 in Texas.122  That Davis proved willing to dispatch 2500 soldiers to New Mexico at 
a time when his armies were disintegrating in Virginia, again illustrates the power of this 
dream of continental empire.  The end of major military operations, however, was a mere 
few weeks away.  Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia surrendered on April 9, 
thus effectively ending the war and sinking Davis’s hopes for another western campaign.  
 The Confederate surrender at Appomattox, however, did not completely 
extinguish the embers of rebellion in the Far West.  In late April, Union officers were still 
fretting over a potential invasion of Arizona.123  And not without reason.  Some Arizona 
rebels were still trying to muster an invasion force a full six weeks after Lee’s 
surrender.124  Meanwhile, when news of Lincoln’s assassination reached California, the 
																																																						
120 John R. Baylor to James Seddon, December 21, 1864, OR, Series IV, Vol. III, p. 960. 
121 Baylor to Seddon, January 24, 1865, OR, Series IV, Vol. III, p. 1035. 
122 Baylor’s Commission, OR, Series IV, Vol. III, pp. 1168-1169. See also Watford, “Far-Western Wing of 
the Rebellion,” 141-142.	
123 OR, Series I, Vol. L, Part 2, p. 1204 
124 L. Boyd Finch, ““Arizona in Exile: Confederate Schemes to Recapture the Far Southwest,” The Journal 
of Arizona History 33 (Spring 1992),” 81. 
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state’s anti-Unionists took to the streets in celebration.  In Los Angeles “the Southern 
‘patriots’ got on a bust,” Horace Bell recalled.  “[T]hey howled themselves horse – they 
howled and they hurrahed until they fell in the streets, dead drunk.” Dr. John S. Griffin 
and Peter Briggs, the so-called black Democrat, were particularly elated by the news. 125   
Reports of similar celebrations across the state began pouring into the Department of the 
Pacific.  According to one such report, the southern sympathizing citizens of Colusa 
“fired guns and cheered the assassination of the President.”126  But Unionists quickly 
clamped down on these displays.  And angry mobs destroyed the presses of five 
Democratic papers, including the one belonging to Beriah Brown, the reputed head of the 
Knights of the Columbian Star.127  
Roughly four months later, in September 1865, the last California rebel faced 
execution.  Tom Poole, Ingram’s lieutenant as well as one of Harpending’s co-
conspirators in the Chapman affair, had been convicted on murder charges near 
Sacramento.  Well over a year earlier, he was arrested as a member of Ingram’s raiders 
after a shootout with local authorities that left one officer dead and another seriously 
wounded.  Although Pool was treated as a common criminal, he identified as a 
Confederate prisoner of war to the very end.  Ingram’s outfit was a rebel operation, he 
insisted, and their heists and subsequent shootouts represented military actions against the 
																																																						
125 Bell, On the Old West Coast, 75. See also, Lewis, “Los Angeles during Civil War and Reconstruction,” 
292-293. For Griffin’s wild celebration upon hearing news of Lincoln’s assassination, see Harris Newmark, 
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336. 
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Union government.128  Befitting such acts, several members of the gang were convicted 
of treason, although they later won their freedom on technicalities.  That left only Poole 
to face punishment for the gang’s guerilla operations.  Despite a spirited campaign 
conducted by his many friends within the state, he failed to obtain the governor’s pardon.  
On September 29, 1865, five months after Appomattox and roughly 2,500 miles from the 
war’s major military theaters, Tom Poole was hanged – making him perhaps the final 
casualty in a war that spanned the continent, from the sea islands of the Carolinas to the 
mining towns of California.129	
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Chapter 6 
THE AFTERLIFE OF THE OLD SOUTH IN THE FAR WEST 
 
Surveying California’s post-war political order in the fall of 1866, writer Bret 
Harte concluded that the state’s once dominant Democratic party now faced extinction. 
“Rip Van Winkle, awakened from his long nap, hurrahing for his Majesty King George, 
did not exhibit a more incongruous and ridiculous spectacle than these men who seem to 
have hibernated during the war,” Harte wrote to the Springfield Republican in 1866.  
Whereas Democrats – largely southern in origin and proslavery in outlook – had ruled the 
state through most of the 1850s, they were now, in Harte’s estimation, little more than 
“fossils” of a bygone era.1  But Harte’s projections were entirely premature.  Within a 
year, the state’s Democratic Party rode to a stunning electoral victory on a white 
supremacist, anti-federal platform.  And in the coming years, they would tap bitter anti-
black and anti-Chinese sentiment to pursue a campaign against Reconstruction, rejecting 
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments – making California the only free state to 
do so during the period.2  This all came at a time when Republicans were successfully 
pressing their agenda at the national level and when most southern states remained under 
the aegis of Military Reconstruction.   
Through a study of California’s Democratic politics, this chapter challenges the 
geography, chronology and racial composition of the standard narrative of 
Reconstruction.  It insists that we look beyond the Mississippi and beyond black-white, 
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Letters to the Springfield Republican, George Stewart and Edwin Fussell, eds. (San Francisco, 1951), 55-
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2 Oregon initially ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and then rescinded its ratification two years later. 
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North-South binaries, and instead view Reconstruction as a protracted, nationwide 
struggle over the legacies of slavery and the Civil War – a struggle that often took 
unexpected turns.  Some of the stiffest opposition to Republican policies at the time came 
from regions far beyond the former Confederate states.  In fact, the so-called “retreat 
from Reconstruction” began largely in California, where as early as 1867 voters vented 
their frustrations with national policy by driving out of office the party most closely 
associated with federal action in the South.3  In tracing this western revolt against 
Reconstruction, it becomes clear that the southern influence on California politics did not 
die with slavery.  Although many of the former proslavery leaders had faded from the 
scene, the old southern interests that once dominated the state continued to exert a 
disproportionate influence on California’s political culture.  Indeed, the state’s 
Democratic politicians and writers stressed their affinity for the beleaguered South and 
articulated, at an early stage, the emerging tenets of Lost Cause mythology.  Along with 
their northern-born partners within the Democratic fold, these southerners blunted the 
reach of Reconstruction and ensured that the former Confederacy had allies in the Far 
West.    
This chapter joins a small but growing body of literature that seeks to shift the 
perspective of Reconstruction-era historiography, a historiography that has traditionally 
limited its purview to the eastern half of the continent.  From Hubert Howe Bancroft in 
the late nineteenth century to Eric Foner in the late twentieth and beyond, historians have 
overlooked the myriad ways in which federal policy shaped politics in the American 
																																																						
3 William Gillette’s influential Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 (Baton Rouge, 1979) ignores 
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West during this period.  Bancroft’s pioneering work focused almost exclusively on local 
politics during the post-Civil War era, while Foner’s synthesis, for all that it 
accomplished, largely ignored political matters in the trans-Mississippi West.4  There 
have been some notable exceptions, however, beginning with Eugene Berwanger’s The 
West and Reconstruction in 1981.  More recently, the scholarship of Joshua Paddison, D. 
Michael Bottoms, and Stacey Smith has drawn needed attention to the racial politics of 
post-Civil War California.5  Yet the dominant narrative remains regional rather than 
national, and none have yet adequately probed the political affinities that bound South 
and West during this period.  The limits of Reconstruction and the path to Redemption 
must be understood in fully national terms, as a program that stretched from the coast of 
California to the heartland of the former Confederacy. 
 
Go West, Old South 
 By the spring of 1865 the Confederacy had been routed, slavery abolished, and 
the wealth of the rebellious states drained.  Yet fears persisted of a lingering threat from 
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the South.  Less than a month after Appomattox, the Sacramento Daily Union predicted 
that a flood of rebel refugees would soon inundate the West.  The border slave states, 
warned the Union, would send westward a “class of shiftless, lawless Union-haters” and 
“across the Plains will come the poor, ignorant, brute whites” of the South, along with 
their political apostasy.  The West’s relative lack of African Americans made it a natural 
escape for the thousands of former Confederates fleeing the fallout of emancipation, the 
paper added.6  Fears of a southern takeover were only compounded by later reports, 
including one from New York, where a secret cabal of former rebels had purportedly 
gathered.  Because of California’s strong Democratic affiliations, the state was regarded 
as a field of opportunity for southern politicians, according to the Union’s New York 
correspondent.  Among those contemplating a fresh start in the West were former 
Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard and California’s estranged former senator, 
William McKendree Gwin. “I tell you their eyes are turned thitherward,” the 
correspondent warned.7		
 Ultimately the threat of a mass southern migration to the Far West never 
materialized.  According to census data, the number of Californians born in the former 
Confederate states increased by only 700 between 1860 and 1870.  Yet this enduring 
distrust of the slave South was not entirely misplaced.  Even if the state’s southern-born 
population had not greatly increased over the previous decade, California still harbored 
five times as many natives of Confederate states than any other part of the West. 8  
																																																						
6 Sacramento Daily Union, April 29, 1865.  
7 Sacramento Daily Union, October 2, 1867. 
8 The number of inhabitants born in the former Confederacy, by state or territory, is as follows: California, 
21,045; Oregon, 4,457, Nevada, 1,531; Washington, 848; Montana, 851; Idaho, 484. Berwanger condenses 
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Furthermore, few longtime residents could forget that proslavery leaders had steered the 
state’s political course through the antebellum period.  And although California remained 
loyal during the Civil War, pro-Confederate activity had forced Union officials to 
garrison the southern part of the state, while a venomous Copperhead press agitated 
against the Lincoln administration.  California may have entered the postwar order under 
relatively progressive Union Party leadership, yet many residents cherished fond 
memories of California’s proslavery past.  
 Lucy Smith Crittenden Thornton was one such Californian.  With a peerless 
southern pedigree – wife of an Alabama Supreme Court judge, mother of a Confederate 
officer, and sister of Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden – Lucy Thornton clung to as 
many of her prewar connections as she could in postwar San Francisco, where she and 
her family had lived since 1849.  While complaining that “Yankee officers are all the 
fashion” in San Francisco, her social world still featured large gatherings of former 
Confederates, including the wife of the slain rebel general, Albert Sidney Johnston.9  
Meanwhile, Lucy Thornton and her California-based family kept up a close 
correspondence with friends in the South, lamenting the “melancholy picture of affairs 
																																																						
this census data in, The West and Reconstruction, 19-20. For the original figures, see Francis A. Walker, A 
Compendium of the Ninth Census (June 1, 1870), Compile Pursuant to a Concurrent Resolution of 
Congress, and Under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1872), 378-388. See also the useful appendix in Doris Marion Wright, “The Making of 
Cosmopolitan California: An Analysis of Immigration, 1848-1870,” California Historical Society 
Quarterly 19 (December 1940), 339. Several prominent California Confederates fled to Mexico during and 
shortly after the war; Albert Lucian Lewis, “Los Angeles in the Civil War Decades, 1850-1868” (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970), 283-286. For more on the prospects for rebel 
immigrants in Mexico, see John McCausland to Captain Thom, January 16, 1866, Thom Family papers, 
section 3, folder 3, Virginia Historical Society. 
9 Lucy Smith Crittenden Thornton to Harry Innes Thornton, Jr., May 12, 1866; Lucy Thornton to Bessie 
Thornton, June 21, 1866; Lucy Thornton to Harry Innes Thornton, Jr., March 14, 1867, in Lucy Smith 
Crittenden Thornton Papers, Huntington Library. 
	 300 
social & political in our beloved old home [Alabama],” in the words of her daughter 
Sarah.10  Such sympathies led the Thorntons and other southern expatriates in San 
Francisco to start a fund for the former Confederate states.11  Although the fund never 
measured up to Lucy’s expectations, she hoped to entice some of her friends and family 
to move to California from the Reconstruction South.  She reminded her son that while 
former rebels in the South suffered under federal intervention, prospects appeared much 
brighter in the West.12 
 Several hundred miles to the south of Lucy Thornton, in the town of Los Angeles, 
prospects for former rebels appeared more promising still.  There, former rebels and rebel 
sympathizers ruled, making life perilous for the town’s Unionists. In the summer of 1866 
“the Civil War continued to rage” in Los Angeles, according to Horace Bell, a Union 
veteran who had just returned to southern California.  Bell found that old friends “turned 
their backs on me” and spoke spitefully of his wartime service.  He met with a common 
refrain on the city’s streets: “The idea… of a Los Angeles man of your stamp fighting on 
the side of the blacks!  As a “red rag to the Secessionist bulls of the vicinity,” Bell wound 
up (according to his own estimates) in as many as 40 brawls for his wartime loyalties, 
although the eventual arrival of more Union veterans relieved some of the pressure.13  As 
a longtime Los Angeles resident, Bell had grown accustomed to the southern character of 
the town.  A natural endpoint to the southern overland route, Los Angeles attracted a 
																																																						
10 Sarah Thornton to Harry Innes Thornton, Jr., June 20, 1867, Thornton Papers, HEHL. 
11 Lucy Thornton to Harry Inness Thornton, Jr. April 14, 1867, Thornton Papers, HEHL. The fund never 
measured up to Lucy’s expectations. She hoped that it would exceed $100,000. 
12 Ibid; and Lucy Smith Crittenden Thornton to Harry, Nov. 21, 1866, Thornton Papers, HEHL.	
13 Horace Bell, On the Old West Coast: Being further Reminiscences of a Ranger, edited by Lanier Bartlett 
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1930), 76-81. 
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sizeable portion of its population from below the Mason-Dixon Line, and during the 
1850s grew into what we might consider the far western outpost of the slave South.14  
During the war, these southern natives transformed Los Angeles and its neighboring 
counties into a hotbed of secessionist activity, leading Union officials to believe that the 
state might devolve into an internal civil war.15  If Bell’s postwar experiences are any 
indication, sentiments were slow to change.  Indeed, Democrats carried the Los Angeles 
Country in every state and national election before 1880.16  And in 1882 the citizens of 
Los Angeles went so far as to elect as mayor, Cameron E. Thom, a former captain in the 
Confederate Army.17     
																																																						
14 See again the population data on southern California, carefully compiled by Daniel Lynch in “Southern 
California Chivalry: The Convergence of Southerners and Californios in the Far Southwest, 1846-1866,” 
(PhD dissertation, UCLA, 2015), 12-14. 
15 See Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. L, Part. I, 472, 556-558, 563-566, 589-
591, 643, 993, 996-997; Series I, Vol. L, Part II, 236, 938; also see John W. Robinson, Los Angeles in Civil 
War Days, 1860-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977, 2013). 
16 In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, the Democratic old guard feared for the worst in Los 
Angeles. According to one observer, “The democratic party is dead for the present in this county.” As 
evidence, he cited the Republican purchase of Henry Hamilton’s proslavery newspaper, The Los Angeles 
Star, as well as the recent imprisonment of anti-administration stalwarts like Hamilton and E.J.C. Kewen; 
John W. Shore to Joseph Lancaster Brent, July 9, 1865, Brent papers, Huntington Library (HEHL). By 
August 1865, however, the gloom that had descended over the Confederate-sympathizing population of Los 
Angeles had begun to lift. One correspondent encouraged Brent to return to California, writing, “The 
animosities… of the war are dying away fast, at least, in this State and you can occupy your former status 
without any cause for chagrin;” Matthew Keller to Brent, August 17, 1865. The Brent papers provide a 
clear window into the post-war politics of Los Angeles County. As the former political kingpin of the area, 
Brent attracted observations from many of his old friends. See also Phineas Banning to Brent, August 3, 
1865; Joseph Brent Banning to Brent, October 11, 1865;	Benjamin Davis Wilson to Brent, July 10, 1865 
and April 10, 1868, all in Brent papers, HEHL. For more on the enduring influence of pro-secessionist 
politics in southern California, see John Mack Faragher, Eternity Street: Violence and Justice in Frontier 
Los Angeles (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 440-444. 
17 The most complete record of Thom’s career is a brief biography, compiled under the WPA; Clare 
Wallace, “Cameron Erskine Thom,” Municipal Reference Library Records, Los Angeles, 1938. When 
Thom disembarked in Los Angeles after the war, he was greeted playfully by a prominent citizen, J.M. 
Griffith, who grasped him by the hand and proclaimed, “Well, you dirty old rebel! You are back here now, 
and if you behave yourself we will not hang you.” Griffith then thrust $300 in gold into Thom’s hand and 
urged him to get a haircut and some clean clothes. In Jackson Alpheus Graves, My Seventy Years in 
California, 1857-1927 (Los Angeles: Times Mirror Press, 1927), 122; see also Albert Lucian Lewis, “Los 
Angeles in the Civil War Decades, 1850-1868” (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970), 
281-282. For Thom’s wartime experiences, see Chapter 5. 
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The southern influence on California persisted in less violent form along the 
Merced River in the Central Valley, where several planters launched an ambitious 
experiment in cotton cultivation.  John L. and J.M. Strong, brothers and Georgia natives, 
served as the pioneers and propagandists of these efforts, gathering around them a small 
community of fellow southern migrants.  John L. Strong viewed California as something 
of an extension of the plantation South, a state that lay almost entirely “within the cotton 
zone.”18  By the early 1870s, efforts at cotton cultivation had created a “mania” in 
California, according to the Fresno Expositor, and soon glowing reports poured in from 
across the state and even the South.19  When the Strong brothers shipped their samples to 
experts in New Orleans, Liverpool and Scotland, they received highly gratifying 
feedback, attesting to the superior quality of the California crop.20   
Aside from the temperate climate, California’s advantage, according to western 
planters, rested in its laboring population.  The Strong brothers insisted that Chinese 
“coolies” presented an elegant solution to the problem of free black labor.  Compared to 
recently emancipated slaves, argued John L. Strong to a correspondent in Kentucky, 
Chinese laborers were “less expensive,” “controlled with less difficulty,” and were 
																																																						
18 In John L. Strong’s letter to the Pacific Rural Press, 7 January 1871. 
19 Fresno Expositor, November 20, 1872. These reports came from a range of California papers, as well as 
some publications within the South; see articles from the San Francisco Bulletin, San Francisco Rural 
Press, Visalia Delta, Woodland Democrat, Yuba City Banner, San Francisco Commercial Herald, 
Sacramento Record, and Stockton Republican, all reprinted in “Transactions of the California State 
Agricultural Society during the Year 1872,” Journal of the Legislature of the State of California, Appendix: 
Reports, Volume 3, 1874, 310-322. See also reports from Georgia in the Georgia Weekly Telegraph, 12. 
September 1871; Savannah Daily Advertiser, 27 June 1871; and Daily Columbus Enquirer, 4 January 1871. 
20 Merced Argus, November 25, 1871; Sacramento Daily Union, May 12, 1873; John L. Strong, “Cotton 
Experiments in California” Overland Monthly 6:4 (April 1871), 329-330. See also, the positive personal 
report of Matthew Keller to Joseph Lancaster Brent, August 17, 1865, Brent papers, HEHL.	
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generally “more efficient.”21  These cotton experiments thus constituted both an 
endorsement of western agriculture and a small-scale revolt against the post-
emancipation order in the South.  Despite the Strong brothers’ boosterism, however, 
fantasies of a new cotton kingdom in the West ultimately came to naught.  The 
combination of a labor shortage and California’s distance from markets proved fatal for 
the crop, which planters had largely abandoned by the late 1870s.22 
Aside from J.M. Strong and his brief foray into state politics, these cotton planters 
did not pose a serious threat to Union or Republican control in California.23  A far greater 
political menace, according to the Unionist press, came from William M. Gwin, the 
former Mississippi slaveholder who had been California’s Democratic kingpin through 
the 1850s.  Senator Gwin’s postwar political comeback was nothing short of spectacular, 
a testament to the enduring power of southerners in the state’s affairs.  In the spring of 
1865, few would have predicted that Gwin could ever return to politics in the West.  For 
the second time in the course of four years, he had been imprisoned on suspicion of 
treason. He remained under guard at Fort Jackson, Louisiana, until early 1866, for a total 
of nearly eight months – a longer prison sentence than any Confederate high official other 
																																																						
21 John L. Strong to Robert Muldron, 16 November, 1871, in “Transaction of the California Agricultural 
Society”, 306. Sugar planters in the post-emancipation South also sought the purported advantages of 
Chinese labor; see Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Strong would later claim that white labor would be far 
more effective than Chinese workers, although he did not discount the proven results of Chinese cotton 
pickers in California; John L. Strong, “Labor in Cotton Culture,” Overland Monthly 13:1 (July 1874), pp. 
18-19, 24. 
22 California cotton would make a comeback in the 1920s and 30s, and to this day, California ranks second 
only to Texas in its cotton output. See Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, 
Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
23 Strong, an “an ultra Democrat, with strong Southern sympathies,” served as a delegate to the 
constitutional convention before his death in 1878; San Francisco Bulletin, November 19, 1878. 
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than Jefferson Davis.24  California’s loyal press had cast him off as a “hoary-headed 
traitor,” while Ulysses S. Grant himself branded him a “rebel of the most virulent 
order.”25  Yet by late 1866 he was back in California, and a year after that he helped 
orchestrate the astonishing electoral victory of his son, Willie, a former Confederate 
cavalryman.26  As a state senator, the younger Gwin would become one of the leading 
opponents of the Fifteenth Amendment, while his father continued to campaign on behalf 
of his various Democratic friends.  Although the elder Gwin never again sought office, he 
remained a prominent voice in state politics and continued to inspire glowing tributes 
from California’s rapidly growing Democratic population.27  For many, Gwin had not 
only redeemed himself; he had helped redeem the state for the old guard of the 
Democratic Party.28 
	
																																																						
24 For a study of other political prisoners during the Civil War, see William A. Blair, With Malice toward 
Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 
In our conversations, Blair confirmed that Gwin’s imprisonment was indeed uniquely long.   
25 Sacramento Daily Union, November 16, 1861; OR, Series I, Vol. L, Part II, 1118. As late as June 1866, 
Gwin confessed to his old political ally and Confederate co-conspirator, Joseph Lancaster Brent, that “I do 
not know where to settle,” adding “like you I cannot go to California which if alone I would prefer to 
anyplace on earth.” Gwin also affirmed his unreconstructed rebel sympathies. “It would have been better 
for the people of the South to have been orphaned by the conquerors before they had sullied their chivalry 
by applying for pardon,” he wrote; William M. Gwin to Joseph Lancaster Brent, June 13, 1866, Brent 
papers, HEHL. Brent himself set sail for Paris that year. 
26 The victory is astounding considering that just two years earlier, Willie was worrying about being hanged 
for his role in the rebellion. See Willie Gwin to his mother, 18 May 1865, in San Francisco Bulletin, 28 
December 1866. 
27 On the sensation Gwin caused in Democratic circles, see Sacramento Daily Union, 10 November 1867. 
For a brief report on the Gwin’s continued success within the San Francisco social scene, see Benjamin 
Davis Wilson to Joseph Lancaster Brent, April 10, 1868, Brent papers, HEHL. 
28 For Gwin’s biography, a sympathetic and thin account, see Lately Thomas, Between Two Empires: The 
Life Story of California’s First Senator, William McKendree Gwin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). In 
his forthcoming book, William Deverell argues that the Civil War wounded, both North and South, sought 
convalescence and personal healing in the postwar West. Gwin’s story illustrates that California could be a 
site of political redemption as well. Deverell rehearses some of these arguments in “Redemptive 
California? Re-thinking the Post-Civil War,” Rethinking History 11, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 61-78. 
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The Roots of Revolt 
The Far West may have avoided the deluge of former Confederates that some had 
feared, but California could not so easily escape its proslavery past.  That past lived on in 
Los Angeles’ lingering secessionist sentiments, in cotton experiments along the Merced 
River, and in the second career of William Gwin.  It also persisted in the politics of a 
small but growing core of Democratic politicians.  When the Thirteenth Amendment 
came up for ratification by the states in December 1865, a cadre of California Democrats 
took a determined stand against emancipation.  Senator J.K. Rush of Colusa suggested 
that the amendment to liberate the nation’s slaves simultaneously infringed upon state’s 
rights, and that such measures would only open the floodgates to greater federal 
encroachments.  Furthermore, he argued, why should a mere two-thirds of the states be 
able to strip Delaware, which had remained loyal to the Union throughout the course of 
the war, of its enslaved laborers?29  The dominant Union Party easily silenced these anti-
abolitionist voices of dissent.  However, in future struggles over the meaning of 
emancipation, Democrats would increasingly exploit California’s white supremacist 
tendencies to gain the upper hand. 
California’s Democrats began their comeback by tapping into a widely-held fear 
among the state’s voting public: that whites sat uneasily atop a racial pyramid slowly 
crumbling under the weight of federal Reconstruction.  White voters recognized that 
																																																						
29 San Francisco Bulletin, 16 December 1865. Several days earlier, a similar group of senators voted against 
resolutions in tribute to the memory of Lincoln; see Bulletin, 14 December 1865. Several months earlier, in 
the Los Angeles County Democratic Convention, E.J.C. Kewen resumed his old political battles, by 
helping to draft resolutions opposing suffrage for blacks, Indians, and Chinese; see John W. Robinson, 
“Colonel Edward J.C. Kewen: Los Angeles’ Fire-Eating Orator of the Civil War Era” Southern California 
Quarterly 61 (summer 1979), 174. 
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measures designed to reconstruct the South would decisively shape the West as well.  In 
fact, Congress extended the suffrage to African Americans in the territories two months 
before those in the former Confederacy.30  In such a diverse state, whites felt particularly 
threatened by the prospect of a widening franchise which would inexorably dilute their 
voting power.  These threats to white supremacy came in many shades of brown – 
African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and Chinese immigrants.31  While 
California’s Mexican-born citizens had earned at least the grudging respect of many 
white Democrats due to their longstanding ties to the Party – especially in southern 
California – blacks, Indians, and Chinese residents remained political outcasts and the 
targets of both rhetorical and physical assaults.32  California’s anxious white electorate 
quickly connected the dots: if Republicans could remake the racial order in the South, 
they might similarly empower non-whites in the West.  Thus, what began as a mistrust of 
federal policy grew into what D. Michael Bottoms calls “a level of racial hysteria 
unmatched anywhere else.”33  
																																																						
30 Berwanger, The West and Reconstruction, 10 
31 According to the 1870 census, California’s non-white residents accounted for over 10 percent of the 
state’s total population. Over 4,000 African Americans and nearly 50,000 Chinese, Japanese and “Civilized 
Indians” lived in the state. The census does not include a separate category for the significant Hispanic 
population within the state; see Francis A. Walker, A Compendium of the Ninth Census (June 1, 1870), 
Compile Pursuant to a Concurrent Resolution of Congress, and Under the Direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), 9-18.  
32 Unlike African Americans, Chinese immigrants, or Native peoples, Hispanics were legally allowed to 
vote in California, as one of the conditions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the California 
Constitution. Indians could win the right to vote, according to the constitution, by a two-thirds concurrent 
decision from the legislature – although there was little danger of that in California’s postwar political 
climate; see Article II, Section 1, Constitution of the State of California (San Francisco: Alta California, 
1849). The discrimination faced by Hispanics had less to do with electoral than with property rights. The 
postwar period saw a continued campaign to divest the state’s Mexican-born population of their land 
claims; see Leonard Pitt, The Decline of the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking 
Californians, 1846-1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). For more on the alliance 
between white Democrats and Spanish-surnamed voters in southern California, see Lynch, “Southern 
California Chivalry.” For more on the assaults on Chinese and black Californians, see below. 
33 Bottoms, Aristocracy of Color, 5. 
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In the statewide races of the immediate postwar period, local issues generated far 
less interest (and friction) than national policies.  For instance, on crucial state labor 
issues – namely support for the eight-hour workday – California’s Democrats and 
Republicans were in agreement.  And unlike eastern Republicans, westerners expended 
little political capital on policies related to prohibition, prostitution, or trade unionism.  
Instead, California’s electoral battles centered on national Reconstruction and the racial 
and economic policies that it entailed.  By conjuring the bogeyman of an overweening 
federal government, Democratic leaders differentiated themselves from their Republican 
opposition and rallied the votes of the white working class.  They harped on the cost of 
Reconstruction in the South, especially expenditures on the Freedmen’s Bureau, and what 
this might mean for taxation in the West.  And above all else, they played to deep racial 
anxieties by presenting scenarios in which the state’s non-white populations had equal 
political power.34  These were the anxieties that united many white voters across the 
continent and made the Republican political experiment such a fragile undertaking.  
Attuned to these apprehensions, Democrats made an attack on black voting rights 
the central plank in their 1865 campaign.  Because Republicans also opposed Chinese 
suffrage, Sinophobia was not the political wedge that it would later become for 
																																																						
34 For a representative samples of these Democratic arguments, see Henry H. Haight, Speech of H.H. 
Haight, Esq. Democratic Candidate for Governor, Delivered at the Great Democratic Mass Meeting at 
Union Hall, July 9, 1867; Bancroft Library; and Haight, Inaugural Address of H.H. Haight, Governor of 
the State of California, at the Seventeenth Session of the Legislature, and Special Message of Governor 
H.H. Haight, of California Declining to Transmit Senate Resolutions Condemnatory of President Johnson 
(New York: Douglas Taylor’s Democratic Book and Job Printing Office, 1868). For more on the 
similarities between the western Democratic and Republican Parties – that is, on issues not pertaining to 
Reconstruction – see Berwanger, The West and Reconstruction, 5-6, 31-34, 207-208; also, Winfield J. 
Davis, History of Political Conventions in California, 1849-1892 (Sacramento: California State Library, 
1893), 264-286. 
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Democratic candidates.  At the Democratic State Convention that year, Eugene Casserly, 
fast emerging as the Party’s leading spokesman on this issue, pledged his “opposition to 
negro suffrage and its inevitable result, the social equality of the negro.”35  Democrats 
like Casserly learned that casting their opponents as champions of black suffrage and 
racial equality paid political dividends, while simultaneously distracting from accusations 
of wartime disloyalty.  In turn, their opponents complained that Democrats had created a 
single-issue party.  The Stockton Independent reported, with some justification, that “the 
negro is about the only staple in Democratic argument… without him the party would be 
non est.”36  
As the self-anointed defenders of white rule, Democrats enjoyed modest success 
in the 1865 elections.  Although the Union Party retained control of the statehouse, 
Democrats won important seats from Sacramento, San Francisco, and Sonoma.  But more 
valuable than any legislative gains were the lessons learned: race baiting won votes, and 
more generally, vocal opposition to Reconstruction could provide a way forward for the 
party.  In the legislature of 1865-66, Democrats compensated for their limited numbers 
with the ferocity of their attacks on federal policy.  They inserted themselves into the 
national struggle over Reconstruction by issuing a wave of resolutions on federal issues, 
while also introducing more localized bills to prevent the immigration of blacks into 
California and to permanently bar them from the franchise.  When, in December 1865, 
Congress refused to seat the recently elected candidates from former Confederate states – 
																																																						
35 San Francisco Bulletin, 20 September 1865. 
36 Stockton Independent, 18 August 1865, quoted in, Thomas E. Malone, “The Democratic Party in 
California, 1865-1868 (M.A. Thesis, Stanford University, 1949), 22. 
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including six members of Davis’s cabinet, 58 Confederate Congressmen, and four 
Confederate generals – California’s Democrats spoke out in opposition.37   
Support for Andrew Johnson and sympathy for the defeated South became 
hallmarks of this opposition to Reconstruction.  Democrats were jubilant when Johnson 
vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau bill in February 1866.  To celebrate, they held a rally in 
San Francisco, and issued a series of resolutions, drafted by Benjamin Franklin 
Washington, the Virginia-born editor of the state’s leading Democratic newspaper.  In 
conjunction with opposition to black suffrage, sectional healing was the order of the day:  
Resolved: That American progress and civilization alike demand that 
friendly feelings should be cultivated between the North and the South; 
that their citizens should forgive and forget the wrongs of the past; that 
they should seek to soothe the asperities growing out of the war; that they 
should ‘let the dead past bury the dead,’ and shaking hands over the graves 
of common brothers and countrymen, pledge themselves to a better 
understanding in the future.38 
	
This early paean to reconciliation came at a time when the memory of the war was still 
fresh in the nation’s collective mind, when retribution seemed as likely as reunion.  In 
their battle against Reconstruction, California’s Democrats were among the first to 
embrace the reconciliationist (if racially exclusive) spirit that would, in time, guide much 
of the nation.39  
As Democrats united in opposition to Reconstruction, the Union Party began to 
fray.  A coalition of Republicans and loyalist Democrats that came together during the 
																																																						
37 Malone, “Democratic Party in California”, 15, 29-30, 42-46.  
38 San Francisco Bulletin, 28 February 1866. 
39 California and the West are largely absent from David Blight’s important account of Civil War memory 
and the politics of reconciliation. See David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2001).  
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early years of the war, the Union Party clung tenaciously to its old majority in a time of 
peace.  Johnson’s vetoes of the Freedmen’s Bureau and civil rights bills – triumphs for 
California’s Democrats – exposed fissures within the fragile Union coalition.  Party 
leaders would eventually endorse the civil rights bill – what would become the 
Fourteenth Amendment – but at the cost of alienating their more conservative allies.  
Union stalwarts who guided the state during the war years were dismayed to find the 
party in shambles by 1867.  Yet, in many ways, this swift decline was no surprise.  
Taking the long view of California history, we can see the Union party as merely the 
product of wartime exigencies, an aberration in the state’s deep association with 
proslavery politics.  Beneath the surface, California remained an intensely racist state, 
hostile to the progressive politics of the Republican postwar order.  The Union Party 
simply lacked the blueprint for a political future.  That future belonged to the Democrats 
and their politics of white supremacy.  Thus, the Democratic victories of the late 1860s 
look less like a “political revolution,” as Michael Bottoms has suggested, and more like a 
return to the political equilibrium that had long reigned in California.40  This was a 
redemption of sorts, not a revolution.41 
 
																																																						
40 Bottoms writes of this so-called revolution by “a party that only a year earlier had seemed so blackened 
by the stain of rebellion that few thought it would ever rise again,” Aristocracy of Color, 55. Although 
Bottoms remains one of the best historians on this period in California’s history, he vastly overplays the 
strength of the state’s Unionism.  
41 Stacey Smith argues that the Democratic resurgence in California marked a western Redemption, as it 
overturned the previous period of Republican rule within the state and returned to power the political party 
that had reigned throughout the antebellum period; Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 210. Of course, this western 
Redemption – if we can call it that – did not have to contend with a federal military presence, as did the 
Democratic Redeemers of the former Confederate states. [This is a provocative conceptualization of 
California’s Democratic comeback, but I don’t want to conflate the political resurgences in the South and 
West, and Stephanie McCurry has largely convinced me that “Redemption” is an awkward fit for the 
California context.] 
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A Referendum on Reconstruction 
 When Congressional Republicans passed three Reconstruction Acts between 
March and July 1867, they once again invigorated the Democratic cause in California.  
Here was confirmation of white supremacists’ worst fears: not only had the acts placed a 
suffering South under military rule, but they had enfranchised black voters in the former 
Confederacy while simultaneously barring many whites from the polls.  B.F. 
Washington, slavery apologist and editor of the San Francisco Examiner, raged against 
what he called the “great Mongrel military despotism” and the “Five Monarchy Acts,” a 
reference to the five military districts into which the former Confederacy had been 
divided.  No amount of scorn seemed sufficient for the Republicans behind these policies.  
“Never before in this or any other country did a more atrocious band of wicked traitors 
and unconscionable knaves meet together,” Washington seethed.42  Military 
Reconstruction was naked act of northern aggression, according to Washington, born out 
of a vengeful hatred of the South.  “Ranting, raving New England Puritans,” Washington 
wrote, “hate a Southern gentleman and all his belongings, on the same principle that the 
devil does holy water.”43 Other Democrats were no less vehement in their denunciations 
of Military Reconstruction.  An equally irate California Democrat claimed that the recent 
																																																						
42 San Francisco Examiner, 1 July and 23 July 1867. Thanks to the staff at the Green Library, Stanford 
University, microfilm archive, for making issues of the Examiner available to me. For a particularly rich 
archive of newspapers articles and digitized rare materials on Washington, see West Virginia GeoExplorer 
Project http://www.wvgeohistory.org/. Thank to Bill Theriault for directing me to his website. Although a 
staunch supporter of the Confederate rebellion, Washington did not rejoin the slave South during the war. 
Instead, he went into a political hibernation of sorts within California. But when he emerged during the 
post-war period, he quickly reasserted himself as one of the West’s most vocal slavery apologists.  
43 San Francisco Examiner, July 24, 1867. 
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Congressional measures “crushe[ed] beneath the iron heel of naked power every principle 
of right and freedom [for which] the revolution [had been] fought.”44 
 Democratic politicians carried this outrage into campaign season that summer and 
urged California’s voters to join them by casting their ballots in protest against 
Reconstruction.  A quick look at the Democratic platform would immediately dismiss 
any notion that the Far West isolated itself from national issues during this period.  In 
fact, it was precisely upon national issues that Democrats aimed to rebuild the party.  
Roughly half of their platform planks targeted Reconstruction, especially the issues of 
black suffrage and military rule in the South.  Radical Republicans, the state committee 
argued, had “imperil[ed] the union by their mad and seditious course.”  Reflecting 
growing sympathy for the defeated South, the committee insisted that “the states lately in 
rebellion should be dealt with in a spirit of kindness and forbearance” rather than 
Congress’ current “harsh, illiberal, and oppressive” policy. The committee also 
hammered on the party’s central plank by reminding voters that suffrage for “negroes, 
Chinese, and Indians… would end in the degradation of the white race and speedy 
destruction of the government.”45  The cumulative effect of these resolutions was to 
present a clear and united front of opposition to Republican national policy.  And by 
linking the Union Party with Congressional legislation, California’s Democrats turned the 
September elections into a referendum on Reconstruction. 
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 Opposition to Military Reconstruction, rejection of black suffrage, and sympathy 
for the defeated South proved a winning formula in the election.46  Indeed, this grand 
strategy catapulted California’s Democrats to one of the most stunning electoral reversals 
in the postwar years.  While the Union Party held a decisive 65 percent of the seats in 
previous state legislature, when the polls closed in September 1867 the Democrats had 
gained a 22-seat majority in the assembly, and won two of the three U.S. House elections.  
Out of the state’s 47 counties, 32 went Democrat, while Union-Republicans polled a 
dismal 35 percent in San Francisco, once a party stronghold.  Democrats were now 
poised to elect a U.S. senator in December and to fill most state offices with party 
loyalists.47  Although Union-Republican supporters insisted that their defeat resulted from 
internal party divisions and low voter-turnout, Democrats recognized that their attacks on 
Reconstruction had been the deciding factor in the election.48  By returning the 
Democrats to power, California’s white voters effectively denounced Military 
Reconstruction in the South and registered their firm opposition to black suffrage.  
 The Democratic landslide was all the more remarkable coming as it did at the 
high tide of national Republicanism.  In the election of 1866 – what one scholar has 
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called the most important mid-term contest in American history – Republicans extended 
their massive majority in Congress to ensure that they controlled well over two-thirds of 
the votes required to override a Johnson veto.49  As Howard Beale noted in his influential 
account of the election, that decisive victory helped transform the Radicals from a  
“determined minority” to a position of “irresistible mastery.”50  Over the next year, 
Radical Republicans leveraged these gains to secure the military occupation of the South 
and to advance their program of black suffrage, constituting what Eric Foner has called 
“a stunning and unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy.”51 
The 1867 returns thus came as a sobering rebuke to the Republican establishment, 
still flush from its victories only a year earlier.  Twenty states across the country held 
elections between March and November 1867, and Republicans, according to historian 
Michael Les Benedict, “lost ground in nearly all of them.”52  In Connecticut’s 
Congressional elections, Democrats won three of four available seats, while the state’s 
Democratic candidate eked out a narrow victory in the gubernatorial contest.  Meanwhile, 
Ohio’s voters struck down a state constitutional amendment that would have enfranchised 
black men while barring “disloyal” whites from the polls.  In New York and New Jersey 
as well Republicans lost a substantial amount of votes.  Yet what were setbacks for 
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Republicans in most states was an utter rout in California.  Only in California did 
Republicans lose the governorship, the statehouse, and their Congressional majority.  In 
no other free state did the Democratic gubernatorial candidate win by a larger margin 
than California’s Henry H. Haight, who beat his opponent, George Gorham, by more than 
ten percentage points. 53  The message coming from the West was thus especially clear: 
The party that had seemingly bested President Johnson and his conservative allies faced a 
hard road ahead.  Indeed, following California, Oregon’s Democrats also took back the 
statehouse in 1868.  And in the coming years, other western states and territories 
expressed a growing unease over federal encroachment.54  Anyone attuned to the mood in 
the West could tell that the struggle against Reconstruction would extend far beyond the 
former Confederacy. 
 The 1867 defeat proved fatal to California’s Union Party, which dissolved shortly 
thereafter.  During the election Union candidates largely ignored national issues, never 
able to parry the damning Democratic critique that they had abandoned the white voter.  
When Union gubernatorial candidate George Gorham attempted to set the moral direction 
of his party by appealing to the “universal brotherhood of man,” he played directly into 
the hands of his race-baiting opposition.55  His party’s campaign lacked both the 
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coherence and the force of previous efforts.  Union candidates continued waving the 
bloody shirt – that is, blaming Democrats for secession and the ravages of the war – but 
this strategy was evidently yielding diminishing returns.56  California’s voters had 
seemingly traded their indignation over secession for a growing sympathy for the South, 
now chafing under military occupation.  Amid mounting appeals for reconciliation, the 
Union Party – which was, after all, a product of wartime exigencies – had lost its trump 
card of anti-Confederate outrage.  Those members of the now defunct Union Party who 
did not defect to the Democrats soon adopted the Republican banner.  The reconstituted 
Republicans would enjoy some success in the coming decades, but only after shedding 
the racially progressive ideals of the wartime era and crafting a new party image based on 
the hard experiences of 1867.  There would be no more “brotherhood of man” in 
California electoral politics.57  
 
California’s Southern Revival 
By 1867 white Californians were eager to bury the past.  The Union Party’s 
failure to sufficiently tap wartime bitterness coincided with a sea change in how 
Californians imagined the former Confederacy.  Through a sort of political alchemy, 
Democrats had redeemed former rebels and transformed the Party of Lincoln into the 
enemy of both Union and Constitution.  Few Californians would go so far as to defend 
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secession, but Democratic leaders regarded the South as the true victim in a postbellum 
order that was perhaps more destructive to the nation than the carnage of the war years.  
Sharpening this sympathy for former rebels was a widely shared fear that the state-
sponsored depredations afflicted on the South might soon migrate west.58   
At the center of both the Democratic and the pro-southern revivals was the newly 
elected governor, Henry Huntley Haight.  Haight’s path to Democratic ascendency was 
hardly a straight one.  A supporter of the Republican candidate John C. Fremont in 1856, 
Haight went on to serve as the Republican state chairman four years later during 
Lincoln’s campaign.  But less than a month into the war, he renounced his previous 
affiliations, denounced Lincoln’s war machine, and began a dramatic swing to the 
Democratic right – citing northern coercion as the reason for his political 
transformation.59  When his adopted party mounted its comeback in the postwar years, 
Haight emerged as one of the Democracy’s most forceful speakers, especially on the 
issues of Military Reconstruction and universal suffrage.  During the 1867 campaign, 
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Haight harped on Radical Reconstruction in a series of rallies held around San Francisco 
and Sacramento, transforming himself into the “anti-black, states’ rights spokesman for 
the West.”60 
 Haight may have been born in Rochester, New York, but his sympathies for the 
defeated South were unmistakable.  Before enthusiastic crowds he conjured the image of 
a vindictive and bullying national government, exacting undue vengeance on former 
Confederate states long after the war had ended.  In one of his most celebrated campaign 
speeches, Haight played to the reconcilationist impulses of his Democratic audience. 
“The South seceded, was conquered, and now lies helpless and bleeding at every pore,” 
he pleaded.61  Instead of vengeance, he called for “a spirit of broad, catholic patriotism 
that knows no North, no South, no East, no West.”62  This growing, vengeful government, 
Haight argued, struck at the very heart of American democracy, undermining the 
constitutional rights of states at every turn.  Haight was unshakable in his defense of 
states’ rights.  Some of his political opponents made note of this, charging that not even 
John C. Calhoun went as far as Haight in attempting to limit federal power.63  In his 
inaugural address, Haight struck a dire note on this subject.  Reconstruction – the policy 
of black suffrage, the wasteful spending of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the military 
occupation of the former Confederacy – had brought about a new and highly 
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unconstitutional epoch in American history, and if the federal government continued to 
act beyond its delegated powers, the nation would fall victim to “the worst form of 
despotism,” or what he would later call “a congressional absolutism.”64 Confiding to 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868, Haight fretted over the dangerous policies of the 
Radicals, which he feared “would light the flames of civil war again from one end of the 
country to the other.”65 
State rights were sacrosanct, according to Haight, especially when it came to the 
right of denying suffrage to non-white citizens.  He argued that a Republican Congress 
had sacrificed the white South on the altar of black suffrage, and the result was pure 
pandemonium.  Haight devoted much of his inaugural address to this issue.  White 
southerners had been stripped of their constitutional rights and subjected to military 
despotism, he claimed, which devolved “political control to a mass of negroes just 
emancipated and almost as ignorant of political duties as the beasts of the field.”  The 
federal policy of Reconstruction, he elaborated, was the “subversion of all civil 
government under military rule, the abolition of those personal rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution” and “the subjection of the white population of the Southern States, men, 
women, and children, to the domination of a mass of ignorant negroes just freed from 
slavery.”  At this point in history, Haight fulminated, the former Confederacy amounted 
to nothing more than “negro States,” dangerously close to becoming “another St. 
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Domingo on our Southern border.”66  Haight attempted to bring home the severity of this 
issue to his California electorate by introducing a thought experiment.  “What would you 
think of the Government, if, to punish you it should disfranchise half your white 
population, and by military force give the Chinese population the right of suffrage?” 
Haight goaded at a campaign rally. “What would you think of such legislation? Would 
you not rather have all the property confiscated and every tenth man hang?”67  With this 
nightmare scenario, California’s leading statesman not only provoked outrage amongst 
his electorate, but also implicitly approved the South’s violent resistance to 
Congressional Reconstruction.  
Haight’s heated rhetoric on the federal menace and the evils of Reconstruction 
struck a chord, not only among California audiences, but within the former Confederate 
states as well.  When she read the text of one of Haight’s political addresses, Narcissa 
Saunders of Nashville, Tennessee felt compelled to express her appreciation directly to 
the California governor.  Saunders congratulated the governor on his effective leadership 
and thanked him for his enduring support of the South.  “Like everything from your pen,” 
she wrote in June 1868, the speech conveyed “true patriotism, justice, and integrity, and 
gives us down trodden people some hope of a bright future.”68 That same month, Andrew 
Roland, a distant relative from New Orleans confided in Haight: “Between the ‘cotton 
wound’ and the Radicals, poor Louisiana has suffered a perfect martyrdom.”  That 
martyrdom included, most egregiously, the political elevation of black men over their 
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former masters, a system enforced by strict federal oversight.  “So you see how we are 
persecuted,” Roland added, “having strangers, and negroes in office, to rule us, and make 
laws for us.”69  Here was first-hand confirmation of everything Haight had warned about 
Military Reconstruction and the perils of black enfranchisement.  Beleaguered rebels like 
Roland knew they had a sympathetic audience in the California governor.    
While Haight might have been able to out-Calhoun Calhoun in his bitter 
denunciations of federal power, no Californian could surpass B.F. Washington in both his 
opposition Reconstruction and his fierce support for Southern intransigence.  Raised on a 
Virginia plantation and a lineal descendent of George Washington’s brother, B.F. 
Washington’s Old Southern pedigree ran deep.  While he had been airing his outrage for 
years, it was the Radical measures of 1867 that brought his invective to a fever pitch.  In 
Washington’s eyes, every federal measure was a dire slander on a noble, suffering South.  
The imprisonment and trial of the former Confederate president Jefferson Davis was a 
“shameful, disgraceful and contemptible farce.”  “We venture to say,” Washington 
added, “that the history of jurisprudence presents no parallel to the infamy of these 
proceedings.”70  Thanks to Congress, the once prosperous South had been reduced to a 
Yankee thralldom, equal to “a Poland, a worse than Hungary, and a rival for the 
despotism of a crushed Ireland.”71  Secession may or may not have been a mistake – 
Washington was vague on this – but the southern conscience remained deservedly 
spotless.  “[N]o men ever embarked in a cause with a more thorough conviction of right 
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and justice than did they,” he argued.  “No men conscious of wrong could ever have 
made the heroic and prolonged resistance against such overwhelming odds.”72 The real 
rebels, Washington insisted, were Radical Republicans, who threatened to dismember the 
nation through their crazed Reconstruction policies.  To call the current Congress “the 
hell-spawn of civilization,” he added, is “a slander on the infernal regions.”73  
As slavery’s staunchest post-mortem apologist within California, Washington 
infused the Examiner with a profound nostalgia for the Old South.  The San Francisco 
Elevator, one of California’s leading African American papers, hardly exaggerated when 
it argued that Washington “would doubtless like to see the old era re-established, and 
slavery triumphant over the land.”74  Indeed, just a few days earlier Washington wrote 
that slavery – the “negro birthright” – had provided each black person in the South with 
“the protecting care and guardianship of his master who provided for all his wants, and 
made him a useful member of the community.”  Now, “with an insane love for the 
negro,” Yankees had uprooted this benevolent and prosperous order and attempted to 
“force” freedom on blacks, which would bring them “nothing but wretchedness and 
misery.”75  While many southerners in the immediate postwar years sought to distance 
themselves from their slaveholding pasts, Washington came as close to embracing the 
institution as any leading figure plausibly could.  In this respect, he was perhaps less 
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reconstructed than Jefferson Davis, himself, who all but erased the issue of slavery from 
his wartime memoir.76  By insisting on the benign nature of slavery and the valor of 
Confederate soldiers, Washington articulated at an early date two fundamental tenets of 
the emerging Confederate mythology.  Indeed, we can reasonably trace to the Examiner 
the beginnings of the Lost Cause in the American West.   
Washington was no mere maverick. He edited the leading Democratic paper in 
California and therefore could rightfully claim to represent many of the views of the 
state’s most powerful party.  To be sure, the overtly proslavery wing of California’s 
Democratic Party crumbled shortly after secession.  Yet the continuities between the pre-
war and post-war political orders in California were more pronounced than historians 
have yet recognized.  Although the old proslavery leader of the party, William Gwin, had 
retired to mining, railroading, and lobbying, those who followed in his wake – including 
his son, the former Confederate cavalryman – continued to nurture deep connections to 
the South.  The most detailed study of Democratic politics in post-Civil War California 
reveals that native southerners continued to wield a disproportionate influence within the 
state.  Of the 17 Democrats who Thomas Malone identified as the party’s most influential 
leaders, over half hailed from former slave states.  Only seven, including Haight, were 
born in free states, while one, Eugene Casserly, came from Ireland.77  Clearly, B.F 
Washington had good, southern company in the upper echelons of the party. 
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Retreat from Reconstruction 
 With a popular mandate, the ascendant Democratic Party lost little time in 
attacking federal policy, leading the West in the struggle against Reconstruction.  
Democrats acted on their campaign pledges to resist Radical Reconstruction, introducing 
a wave of resolutions in December 1867 in opposition to the military occupation of the 
South.78 Several months later they followed these resolutions with one of their fiercest 
declarations yet: “Resolved, That it is not only the patriotic duty, but the deliberate 
purpose of the democratic party never to submit to be governed by negroes, nor by those 
claiming to be elected by negro suffrage.”79  Three years after the Civil War, California’s 
lawmakers were, by all appearances, flirting with rebellion, as determined in their 
opposition to Reconstruction as any group of legislators reasonably could be.  Over the 
coming years, Democrats were as good as their word, refusing to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment and then overwhelmingly rejecting the Fifteenth.  
 California Democrats’ battle against the Fourteenth Amendment was hardly a 
battle at all.  After winning two-thirds majorities in Congress, the amendment was sent to 
the states for ratification, arriving in the summer of 1866 when California’s legislature 
was in recess. The Union Party governor could have called a special session to consider 
the amendment but – perhaps realizing that his ailing party could not survive such a 
contest – he simply left the issue for his successor, Henry Haight.80  Not surprisingly, 
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Haight sat on the legislation and it never came up for a full vote, making California the 
only free state that did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment before the turn of the 
decade.81  Meanwhile, Senator Eugene Casserly publicly applauded the former 
Confederacy’s ongoing resistance to the amendment, a measure he deemed 
unconstitutional in that it barred some ex-rebels from voting.  This was all part of a 
Radical “negro supremacy” master plan, Casserly insisted, which also included attempts 
to arm “en masse the negro hordes of the South.”  Unless something could be done to 
avert the Radical spiral, the former Confederacy was headed in the direction of “Hayti”, 
Casserly warned.82 
 California would never suffer such a cruel fate – this was the Democratic Party 
pledge in the campaign against the Fifteenth Amendment.  Again, Senator Casserly 
played a leading role in California’s ongoing retreat from Reconstruction, railing against 
the amendment before a large Democratic audience in San Francisco in July 1869.  “This 
Fifteenth Amendment is a subversion of the Constitution,” he thundered to applause.  “It 
is no amendment… it is a revolution [Cheers].”  Although Congress had amassed a litany 
of abuses in the post-war years, this amendment, according to Casserly, was the most 
egregious overreach yet.  At the expense of hardworking white voters, it would 
enfranchise and empower not only “the most wretched negro between the Potomac and 
the Sabine,” but also “the most depraved coolie of China or Hindoostan.”  Reconstruction 
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had made a colony of the South and now its baleful effects were coming to be felt in the 
West as well, Casserly continued.  “[A] small, remote State, like California, is governed 
at Washington, very much in the spirit in which old Rome, in her decline, might govern a 
distant province by a pro-consul.”83  Governor Haight picked up on this theme of western 
subordination several months later in his official review of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
“If, in our local concerns and interests, we are to be governed by representatives of other 
States,” he warned, “we might as well be governed by a foreign king or emperor.”84  Thus 
the Fifteenth Amendment, according to Haight and Casserly, would not only inaugurate 
an era of black and Chinese rule; it would also signal the colonization of the South and 
West by the federal government. As these leading statesmen of California argued, the 
South and West were locked in a common struggle against the arbitrary and quasi-
monarchical rule of a distant Congress.  
This opposition to the federal government and universal enfranchisement – which 
remained the cornerstones of the Democratic platform – clearly played well with 
California’s electorate.  In the 1869-1870 legislature, Democrats enjoyed a nearly four-
to-one majority. They used this majority to issue a resounding renunciation of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, after Congress submitted the measure to the states in late 1869.  
Not surprisingly, Willie Gwin, the Confederate soldier-cum-California state senator, was 
the first within the statehouse to speak out against the amendment.  He followed the state 
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rights line of thinking that was so popular with his peers by arguing that the federal 
government had no power to impose universal manhood suffrage.85   
But no member of the legislature was so strident in his opposition as John S. 
Hager, who blended appeals for sectional reconciliation with racist tropes.  He anticipated 
a withering defeat for the amendment in California, which had taken pride of place as a 
Democratic stronghold.  “The West is no longer the setting but the rising sun,” he 
cheered.  This push for black voting rights amounted to “a more mischievous – a more 
dangerous rebellion” than the Civil War itself, Hager warned, and would effectively 
exchange “white civilization” for “the dominion of the black race.”86  According to 
Hager, all of human history affirmed a simple truth: white and black were inherently 
unequal.  He hammered home his point with a particularly vicious metaphor.  “I do not 
think the donkey is the equal of the thoroughbred,” he argued, “nor do I think our radical 
Congress can legislate him into a horse, or into social equality with the horse.”87		Like 
Casserly and most of the party, Hager was particularly concerned that the amendment 
might enfranchise California’s Chinese workers – who constituted roughly 10 percent of 
the state population – despite assurances from Republicans that the Chinese could never 
vote, being legally barred from citizenship.  Ultimately, Hager’s jeremiad sealed the 
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inevitable.  The Democratic majority carried the day, rejecting the amendment by an 
overwhelming 81 to 16 vote.88  California would not ratify the measure until 1962, the 
only free state to withhold support for so long. 
California’s campaign against black suffrage took place not just within the 
statehouse, but also in polling places across the state.  Clerks in Sacramento, San Joaquin, 
Santa Clara, and San Francisco counties refused to register black voters, in defiance of 
the Fifteenth Amendment, which had become national law in February 1870.89  Their 
defiance received the firm backing of California’s attorney general, Jo Hamilton, a native 
of Kentucky.  In a letter to the clerk of Nevada County, California, Hamilton advised 
“against the registration of negroes.”  According to Hamilton, “the so-called Fifteenth 
Amendment” was not “self-operative;” that is, it required confirmation in the California 
constitution itself in order to become enforceable within the state.  Until then, “it is not 
only not the duty of County Clerks to place their [blacks’] names upon the Great 
Register, but it is their duty not to do it.”90   
Judge Sepulveda of the County Court of Los Angeles reinforced this message in 
an influential ruling one month later.  Citing his 15th Amendment rights, Lewis Green, an 
African American, had applied for a writ of mandamus to secure his place on the voting 
registry, and took his case before Sepulveda in the spring of 1870.  Sepulveda struck 
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down the request, ruling, “The wording and spirit of the Amendment is so general in its 
meaning that it cannot be operative without regulations to enforce and prescribe the mode 
in which it shall be carried into effect.”  Like Hamilton, Sepulveda argued that further 
“legislative enactments” would be necessary to secure black voting rights. The 
Amendment, he continued, “cannot punish its violation, and hence it is not self-
executing; for really it has no modus operandi, and cannot be enforced.”91  Thus, with the 
blessings of the attorney general and county judges, state officials succeeded, for a time, 
in establishing proto-Jim Crow strategies of disfranchisement on the Pacific Coast.	 
	
Black Politics and Anti-Chinese Violence in the Age of Emancipation 
California’s African Americans did not take these attacks on their citizenship 
lying down.  Emboldened by Confederate defeat and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, blacks in the postwar West seized the initiative to inaugurate an era of 
increased political consciousness and activity.  Just as Congressional policy triggered a 
heated reaction among California’s reactionary white voters, it invigorated a black 
political struggle that had previously lagged under Democratic rule in the pre-war years.  
Thus, from the perspective of San Francisco’s African American community – the largest 
such community west of St. Louis – the black political struggle of the Reconstruction era 
takes on a truly nationwide dimension.92 African Americans may have waged their most 
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intense and important battles in the post-emancipation South, but greater attention on the 
cognate struggles in the Far West reveals a broader, more nuanced movement than the 
standard narrative allows.93  As western blacks closely monitored the unfolding struggle 
within Congress and in the former slave states, they also responded to unique challenges 
engendered by California’s demographics. Their path to citizenship would wind between 
the rock of white supremacist politics and the hard place of a perceived Chinese labor 
threat.   
The postwar bid for citizenship and voting rights was part of a longer history of 
black political mobilization, dating back to the early 1850s, at a time when some African 
Americans in California were still enslaved.94  Black political activists cut their teeth in a 
prolonged campaign against a pair of discriminatory testimony statutes, which barred 
African Americans from taking the stand in civil and criminal cases involving whites. 
Centered in San Francisco, the community launched three separate campaigns to end the 
testimony ban, although the Democratic state legislature ignored all of their petitions.  To 
better identify and pursue black needs within California, the First Colored Convention 
assembled in November 1855, and a year later, the state’s first black newspaper, The 
Mirror of the Times, appeared.95  The black community also rallied financially and 
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politically around several high profile fugitive slave trials within the state, notably the 
Archy Lee case.  Not until the outbreak of secession and the ascent of the Republican 
party, however, would African Americans have allies within the state legislature.  By 
1863, with pressure from the black community, Union-Republican legislators finally 
overturned the statutes banning black testimony in civil and criminal cases. 
Black leaders transferred the lessons learned in their campaign against the 
testimony laws to a postwar political order that was at once more promising and more 
challenging.96  This was the age of emancipation, but also an era of Democratic 
resurgence and white backlash.  Phillip A. Bell recognized both the pitfalls and the 
promise of the times when he founded The Elevator in San Francisco on April 7, 1865, 
two days before Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox and amid a nascent, national 
African American movement for civil rights.  A former correspondent for William Lloyd 
Garrison’s Liberator and one of the most experienced and respected black activists in the 
country, Bell quickly turned The Elevator into the most widely read African-American 
periodical within the state, surpassing the other black-owned publication, the Pacific 
Appeal.  Within months, Bell had established himself as the most vocal champion of 
black voting rights in the West.  Again and again, he called on both the California 
legislature and federal congress to break America’s long history of oppression by 
enfranchising its “law loving and law abiding, honest, industrious” black citizens.97   
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In the absence of voting rights, Bell nevertheless ensured that California’s African 
Americans received a comprehensive political education.  The Elevator published some 
of the most searing critiques of the state’s Democratic leadership, smearing them with the 
broad brush of wartime treason.  Bell blasted the 1870 Democratic leadership as “the 
legislature of a thousand swindles,” little more than a gang of unreconstructed rebels.  
“Of what material is this infamous body composed, and who are its leaders?” he asked.  
“They are traitors and the sons of traitors. Wm. M. Gwin, son of an ex-Senator, soidisant 
Count of the Mexican empire, and … traitor, leads the Senate,” Bell charged.98  Here, 
then, was a fierce and capable editor who could lead the black campaign for political 
rights and simultaneously challenge the white supremacist, Democratic majority.99  
Yet Bell also turned his acidic pen on far less offensive opponents.  California’s 
substantial Chinese population – “alien to our customs, habits and language, heathen in 
their worship, and naturally licentious” – served as Bell’s foil for a thoroughly rooted and 
reliable black population, “with their American ideas, Christian religion, and family 
connections.”100  Indeed, for Bell and other black leaders within the state, Sinophobia and 
black political advancement went hand-in-glove.  This rhetorical assault resulted largely 
from the perceived labor threat caused by rising Chinese immigration.  Whereas San 
Francisco’s African American population remained fairly stagnant during the 1860s, the 
Chinese population had more than tripled.  By 1870 the city’s Chinese outnumbered 
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blacks by more than nine to one, while at the statewide level, there was a 50,000 to 5,000 
imbalance in favor of the Chinese.101  Sinophobia only deepened with the debate over the 
Fifteenth Amendment, as Democrats warned that suffrage would also extend to the 
Chinese if the statute passed.  Bell was particularly insistent that the Fifteenth 
Amendment would leave Chinese disfranchisement in place, dismissing rumors to the 
contrary as “the sheerest nonsense and “brazen-faced falsehood.”102 
The politically beleaguered black community enjoyed plenty of company in its 
Sinophobia.  Although white workers had targeted Chinese immigrants since their arrival 
during the gold rush, it was not until the postbellum period that racial anxieties 
crystalized into official anti-Chinese clubs.  The first major club of this kind, the Central 
Pacific Anti-Coolie Association, emerged in the aftermath of a particularly violent anti-
Chinese riot in the winter of 1867, in which 400 white laborers drove Chinese contract 
workers from their jobs on the Portrero Street railway.  The rioters injured twelve 
Chinese laborers, one of whom later died of his wounds. When ten of the rioters were 
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convicted and sentenced to prison, San Francisco’s white conservatives, and the newly 
formed Central Pacific Anti-Coolie Association, in particular, rallied to their defense and 
eventually won the release of all ten perpetrators on technicalities.  California’s sole 
Democratic congressman at the time, Samuel B. Axtell, was central in securing their 
release. 103   
Also central to this growing anti-Chinese movement was General Albert M. 
Winn, a former slaveholder and Mississippi militia officer who served under Jefferson 
Davis during the U.S.-Mexico War.  Winn, who owned several slaves in California 
during the gold rush, emerged as one of the leading voices in anti-Chinese politics during 
this period, serving as the co-secretary of the Central Pacific Anti-Coolie Association and 
later as president of the Anti-Chinese Convention.104  Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that Winn himself took part in anti-Chinese mob violence, he did little to 
discourage it.  As president of the Anti-Chinese Convention in 1870, Winn addressed a 
menacing letter to the six Chinese Companies of California, warning (or threatening) 
them of the likely assaults that would result from increased immigration.105  Thus, as 
unreconstructed rebels unleashed a reign of racial terror against free blacks across the 
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former Confederacy, southern émigrés in California condoned a not dissimilar wave of 
violence against the state’s Chinese population.  
The parallels between southern and western racial violence were often made 
explicit by the perpetrators themselves.  In the late 1860s California’s newspapers of the 
more Republican variety frequently reported on outrages committed by western iterations 
of the Ku Klux Klan and other unaffiliated vigilante groups.106  Rather than target African 
Americans, however, these California Klansmen generally assaulted Chinese immigrants 
and their white employers, while occasionally threatening Republican politicians and 
journalists as well.  Although there is no evidence to suggest western Klansmen were in 
direct contact with their southern counterparts, they clearly drew on the terrorist 
strategies employed by the latter.107   
Like southern Klansmen, western vigilantes operated in a cryptic and clandestine 
fashion, often achieving their political ends through anonymous threats. In April 1869, 
“another open Ku Klux proclamation, without address or envelop, was thrown into the 
Post Office receiving box last night after ten o’clock,” reported the Patriot of San Jose, 
where the Klan was particularly active. “It threatens a destruction of all the crops of 
persons employing even a single Chinaman.”108  A particularly violent message sent to 
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one Rice Eli and signed “Ku Klux Klan,” demanded the cessation of “your obscene and 
slanderous conversations at once, or the excrements will be ripped out of you.”109  
Although not directly identified with the Klan, an anonymous writer sent a similarly 
threatening note to a former Union soldier and correspondent to the Alta California, 
warning that “parties are watching your course” and that “serious consequences” could 
result from further Republican writings.  The Alta rightfully took this as proof of “the 
affinity of character between the Ku Klux of the South and the Democracy of 
California.”110 
Anonymous threats may have been effective in certain circumstances, but western 
Klansmen and various vigilantes also resorted to outright violence.  In an article titled 
“Kuklux Klan – California Branch,” the Sacramento Daily Union reported on several 
raids on northern California ranches in the spring of 1868.  The white raiders captured, 
beat, and “nearly murdered” the Chinese workers on these ranches, the paper reported, 
and succeeded in carrying away a small amount of money in the process.111  The spring 
and summer of 1869 seems to have been a particularly active period for anti-Chinese 
vigilantes.  In one instance, a group of Klansmen raided a ranch near Santa Cruz, “drove 
some Chinamen off after horribly maltreating them, abused and terrified the children, 
declared their intention to Democratize the whole county, broke open the wine cellar and 
stole, broke and raised Cain generally with things.”112  California’s press also circulated 
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several reports of vigilante attacks on Chinese churches.  In Nevada City, California, a 
newly opened school for Chinese children was scheduled to operate strictly in the 
daytime and on Sundays, “so as to avoid the Ku Klux Klan, who are burning churches, 
and will next attempt to destroy all school books,” reported the Marysville Daily Appeal 
in March 1869.113  Not isolated to a single western state, the Klan and similar vigilante 
groups also operated in Oregon and Utah, according to several reports.114 
The steady stream of reports of Klan atrocities pouring from the West, and 
especially the South, handed Republicans a stick with which to bludgeon their political 
opposition.115  Despite the hailstorm of bad press, however, California’s Democrats 
refused to concede that former rebels were responsible for this southern bloodbath.  
Rather, they turned the blame back on Republicans.  By elaborate contortions of logic, 
Eugene Casserly charged that the “secret clans and leagues” purportedly organized in the 
South were merely proof that Republican Reconstruction policies had failed.116  
According to Edward Stanly, the former Republican candidate for governor and North 
Carolina slaveholder, the Klan was “merely an organization for mutual protection against 
negroes.”117  B.F. Washington, meanwhile, dismissed reports of vigilante violence in the 
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South, while repeatedly thundering against “the infamous atrocities perpetrated upon 
defenceless [white] people by the infamous tools of Radicalism.”118  After Congress 
passed a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871, giving needed protections to the 
freedpeople of the South, the Democratic state central committee of California issued a 
resolution firmly in opposition.  While the committee paid lip service to the unfortunate 
“riotous and unlawful combinations” in the South, it more forcefully “denounce[d]… the 
‘Ku-Klux bill,’ as enacted for no other purpose than to complete the work of 
centralization, and by establishing a military despotism to perpetuate the present 
administration without regard to the will of the people.”  In branding these acts 
“revolutionary and dangerous in their tendency” California Democrats could implicitly 
dismiss Klan violence as a byproduct of unjust federal intervention, rather than as a 
manifestation of a continuing rebellion in the South .119  
As California’s Democrats dismissed reports of racial violence in the South and 
railed against protections for freedpeople, one of the largest anti-Chinese massacres of 
the century erupted in the small town of Los Angeles.  On the evening of October 24, 
1871 a mixed crowd of some 500 frenzied Angelenos – whites and Hispanics, common 
laborers and local elites alike – pressed in around a small cluster of buildings where 
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several dozen Chinese residents had taken refuge.  The mob had gathered in response to a 
brief and disorganized shootout between suspected Chinese gang leaders and local law 
enforcement, which left two men dead – one Chinese and one white.  Crying for blood, 
the crowd charged the main building, stabbing and shooting some of the Chinese, while 
dragging others to a makeshift gallows to be hanged and mutilated.  In total, the mob left 
eighteen mangled bodies in its wake, including those of a respected doctor and a twelve-
year old boy, a death-toll representing a full 10 percent of the city’s Chinese population.  
None of the victims had participated in the earlier shootout.  Of the 500 rioters, only eight 
were convicted of manslaughter and none would serve a full sentence.  They were 
released from San Quentin one year later on technicalities.120  As in San Francisco in 
1867 and as in countless cases across the South, the perpetrators of racial violence had 
once again walked free. 
Rituals of racial violence at both the local and national level provided a template 
for the Los Angeles mob.  Longtime residents of Los Angeles would likely remember 
previous episodes of mob action – the sacking of an Indian rancheria in 1847 or any one 
of the thirty-seven lynchings, mostly of Mexican men, that took place between 1854 and 
1870.121  Angelenos were accustomed to seeking extra-legal redress, and when the local 
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courts appeared unable to extinguish small-scale criminal activity within the city’s 
Chinese community, they probably saw an opening for mob action.  As historian David 
Samuel Torres-Rouff argues, “The anti-Chinese massacre, rather than being an anomaly, 
more rightly stands as another episode in an embedded local social practice that found 
specific traction at a specific moment as it had many times in the past.”122  The mob 
mentality was doubtlessly also fueled by a sensationalist, white supremacist press, headed 
by the Los Angeles News editor, Andrew J. King.  A Georgia native and ardent 
Confederate supporter while undersheriff of Los Angeles during the war, King turned his 
pen against the growing Chinese population in the late 1860s.123  He portrayed the 
Chinese as “an alien, an inferior and idolatrous race” pouring into California to squeeze 
white men out of work and leave “a foul blot upon our civilization.”124  That these 
editorials were followed by an uptick in assaults on Los Angeles’s Chinese residents is 
hardly surprising. 
This massacre should be placed in the context, not only of rising anti-Chinese 
sentiment within California, but also of an orgy of extra-legal violence sweeping the 
South.  While not ignoring local peculiarities, we should recognize the Los Angeles 
Chinese massacre for what it was: part of a larger pattern of race riots and mob violence. 
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pro-Confederate sympathies in the city with a life-size portrait of the rebel General P.G.T Beauregard; 
Henry D. Barrows to Col. J.H. Carleton, April 9, 1862, Official Records, Series I, Vol. L, Part I, 993-994. 
King employed Charles E. Beane, a former Confederate officer, as the editor of the Daily News while he 
assumed the role of publisher; for more on this tandem and on mob action in southern California, see 
Faragher, Eternity Street, 440-452.  
124 Los Angeles News, November 17, 1870 and December 24, 1870, quoted in Zesch, “Chinese Los Angeles 
in 1870-71,” 126. 
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New Orleans, Memphis, Pulaski – all these southern cities witnessed the assault, murder 
and often mutilation of African Americans by white crowds in the immediate postwar 
years.  Although the victims in Los Angeles had a different skin color than their southern 
counterparts, the features of mob violence in both the South and the West exhibit striking 
parallels – parallels that historians have yet to fully trace.125  Whether in southern 
California or western Tennessee, race riots generally erupted over a perceived crime or 
offense committed by an ethnic minority, deemed threatening to local hegemonic 
prerogatives.  What followed was the indiscriminate targeting of these minorities, which 
generally included lynching, looting and mutilation, with little or no legal action taken 
against the perpetrators.  Collective killings generally featured a performative element as 
well – public hanging and torturing, for instance – serving as a ritualistic reassertion of 
white rule.  With low regard for due process, western and southern vigilantes favored 
communal retribution as the surest means to preserve the hierarchical order.  To be sure, 
racial violence in the West involved more than a bipolar struggle between white and 
black, as the joint efforts of Hispanic and white rioters in Los Angeles attests.  Yet, such 
diversity should not obscure an important point: The unreconstructed South hardly had a 
monopoly on racial violence.126  
 
																																																						
125 As Michael Pfeifer writes in his illuminating study of postbellum lynching, few historians, aside from 
Richard Maxwell Brown, “have analyzed mob violence as more than a regional phenomenon. This has led 
to two oddly provincial literatures on American collective violence.” Michael J. Pfeifer, Rough Justice: 
Lynching and American Society, 1874-1947 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 5. 
126 I have drawn on the seminal work of Richard Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of 
American Violence and Vigilantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) and Pfeifer, Rough Justice. 
Though strictly southern in scope, Christopher Waldrep, Roots of Disorder: Race and Criminal Justice in 
the American South, 1817-80 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998) is also highly useful in 
understanding the anatomy of nineteenth-century racial violence.     
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Conclusion: Continental Reconstruction  
Reconstruction, as westerners at the time recognized, was a political reordering 
that unfolded on a truly continental scale. The former Confederacy may have been the 
epicenter of the political struggle of this era, yet the South’s road to Redemption 
accompanied corollary conflicts that stretched to every corner of the Union.  To 
California’s anxious white voters, Reconstruction came largely as a specter, as a series of 
politically potent fears – the fear that the federal juggernaut that purportedly invaded the 
South would find its way west; the fear that manhood suffrage would give the state’s 
unassimilated underclasses a decisive say in local affairs; the fear that federal spending 
on programs for freedpeople would shatter an already weakened economy and perhaps 
deprive the West of needed resources.  What made California unique – its racial diversity 
and specifically its large Chinese population – also made it particularly resistant to the 
racially-leveling policies of the national Republican Party. 
Californians were hardly alone in their opposition to this growing nation-state, 
however.  In neighboring Utah, polygamists were fighting a losing battle against 
Republican lawmakers who had targeted Mormonism’s “peculiar institution” since the 
1856 presidential campaign, when polygamy appeared alongside slavery as one of the 
“twin relics of barbarism.”   After a series of legal and legislative defeats, Mormon elders 
finally succumbed to federal pressure and renounced polygamy in 1890, thereby capping 
what legal historian Sarah Barringer Gordon has called a “second reconstruction in the 
West.”127  Meanwhile on the Central Plains, sovereign Indian tribes clashed with federal 
																																																						
127 Gordon, The Mormon Question, 14. 
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armies, fresh from their victories against rebels in the South.  Many of the commanders 
who carried out these campaigns in Indian country, like Philip Sheridan, O.O. Howard, 
E.O.C. Ord and John Pope, had previously overseen aspects of the military occupation of 
the former Confederacy under Congressional Reconstruction.  As historian Steven Hahn 
has argued, the federal response to rebellions in the slave South, Mormon Utah, and 
Indian country should be seen as an integrated political process, a defining aspect of 
state-making in the Civil War era.  This reconstruction – or rather, Greater 
Reconstruction, as Elliot West suggests – transformed a geographically diffuse nation of 
sovereign and semi-sovereign polities into an increasingly centralized nation-state.128   
This framing of a continental Reconstruction is not merely a historian’s attempt to 
provide narrative coherence to a highly complex period.  Even voters at the far western 
rim of the empire recognized that these centralizing forces would stretch well beyond the 
bounds of the former slave states. In fact, Democrats rebuilt their party on precisely this 
assumption.  California’s Democratic leaders rhetorically linked their state with the 
former Confederacy, in common cause against Congressional policy, and they rode back 
to power on a platform familiar to any unreconstructed rebel.  Indeed, ex-Confederates 
and conservative Californians alike spoke a common language of federal opposition, 
white supremacy, and sectional reconciliation.  Of course, the retreat from Reconstruction 
in the West took on a distinct character, given the racial diversity of the region.  But 
Californians employed a combination of tactics, including noncompliance with federal 
																																																						
128 Steven Hahn, A Nation Without Borders: The United States and Its World, 1830-1910 (manuscript, 
2015); Chapters 8 and 10; Hahn, “Slave Emancipation, Indian Peoples and the Projects of a New American 
Nation-State”; West, The Last Indian War, xvii-xxiii.		
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law, restrictive legislation, racial violence, and eventually outright exclusion, to ensure 
the subordination of ethnic minorities and to preserve a system of white rule that southern 
rebels would have envied.  In the age of emancipation, California’s voters successfully 
resurrected the political party that had ruled in an age of slavery. 
The Democratic reign could not, of course, last forever.  By the early 1870s, as 
the nation as a whole pulled back from the racially liberal measures of Congressional 
Reconstruction, California Democrats softened their rhetoric.  Without a Radical 
bogeyman guiding national policy, Democrats on the Pacific coast had lost a key – 
perhaps the key – weapon in their political arsenal.  Thus, state Republicans were able to 
begin a comeback that decade.  In many ways, Democratic leaders were victims of their 
own success.  In order to curry favor with the white electorate, California Republicans 
adopted some of the race-based policies that had propelled their rivals to high office.  For 
instance, they dropped all appeals to what George Gorham called the “brotherhood of 
man” and instead endorsed a ban on Chinese immigration.   No longer the party of slave 
abolition, they were now the party of Chinese exclusion.129  Democrats’ power may have 
waned but the ideology of white supremacy that they did so much to promote in the late 
1860s would continue to hold sway in California through the next decade, and indeed 
beyond. 
 
 
Epilogue 
																																																						
129 Smith, Freedom’s Frontier, 215-223. 
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THE REBELLION’S WESTERN RESTING PLACE 
 
 Dwarfed by the gaudy tombs of southern California’s celebrities and socialites, a 
cluster of graves in Hollywood Forever Cemetery bears silent witness to a largely 
forgotten chapter in western history.  There lie buried some thirty Confederate veterans 
from nearly every rebel state, along with a handful of prominent figures from the United 
Daughters of the Confederacy.  Rising above these headstones stands a seven-foot granite 
monument with a bronze plaque commemorating the rebel soldiers who spent their final 
days in southern California.  Erected in 1925, it was the first Confederate monument in 
the Far West.1  Yet elsewhere in the state, and across the Southwest generally, there are 
very few physical reminders of the region’s deep affiliations with slavery and 
slaveholders.  No William Gwin Boulevard, for instance, runs through San Francisco, nor 
does a John R. Baylor Avenue grace any part of Tucson.2  The western landscape, by and 
large, does not speak to this past.  This is hardly surprising, however.  It is, after all, a 
history many westerners may prefer to forget. 
																																																						
1 For a romantic interpretation of rebel veterans in twentieth-century southern California, see Connie 
Walton Moretti, Dixie Manor Days: The Confederate Veterans Who Lived There and the UDC Members 
Who Made It Possible (Redondo Beach, CA.: Mulberry Bush Publishing, 2004). For a brief videotaped tour 
of the Confederate section of the Hollywood Forever Cemetery, see M. Keith Hariss’s Cosmic America 
blog post, August 28, 2011 (http://cosmicamerica1.blogspot.com/2011/08/confederate-veterans-at-
hollywood.html). Research into the rebel presence in the postbellum West quickly leads down the dark hole 
of the neo-Confederate blogosphere. For obvious reasons, those pages do not merit a citation here, although 
some directed my attention to more useful sources, free of racist conspiracy theories and misguided 
revisionist history. 
2 To find such markers, one has to know where to look. Few, if any, of us on the Polytechnic football team 
who did wind-sprints up Kewen Drive in the dog days of summer recognized that our running route had 
been named for one of southern California’s staunchest proslavery partisans. Kewen, along with his 
southern-born brethren Benjamin Davis Wilson, John S. Griffin, and Joseph Lancaster Brent owned the 
land upon which the city of Pasadena was founded. After selling his land to Midwestern settlers for $7.50 
an acre, Wilson reportedly boasted, “This is once where I got the best of those damned Yankees,” quoted in 
Albert Lucian Lewis, “Los Angeles in the Civil War Decades, 1850-1868” (PhD dissertation, University of 
Southern California, 1970), 293-294. For more on these Pasadena land sales, see Benjamin Davis Wilson to 
Joseph Lancaster Brent, September 21, 1865 and May 15, 1868, in Joseph Lancaster Brent Papers, HEHL. 
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 This proslavery past is at odds with western myths of freedom, rugged 
individualism, and forward progress.  Since the earliest days of the republic, the West has 
occupied a central place in the American imagination as a landscape of opportunity and 
social mobility.  As Thomas Jefferson argued, the West belonged to white yeoman, 
whose economic independence and agrarian virtues would usher forth an “empire of 
liberty.”  In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis lent scholarly validation to 
the stories that Americans tell about the West.  Free from the squabbles over slavery that 
convulsed the eastern half of the continent, Turner’s frontier was the nursery of 
republicanism and virtuous self-sufficiency.3  Various bonanzas and technological 
breakthroughs have only added luster to the glittering image of western promise – the 
land of gold became the land of the automobile, became the land of film, became the land 
of silicon.  The busts are quickly forgotten, the next boom just around the corner.  In 
order to have any validity whatsoever, this narrative must be scrubbed clean of slavery.  
Californians, and westerners in general, have whitewashed more than just their adobe.4 
																																																						
3	For a particularly useful assessment of Frederick Jackson Turner’s place in American historiography and 
a reprinting of his frontier thesis, see Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History” and Other Essays, commentary by John Mack Faragher (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998). A number of works have detailed the imperial thinking and western imagination of 
Thomas Jefferson. See, for instance, Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in 
Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s 
Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); and 
the essays in James P. Ronda, ed., Thomas Jefferson and the Changing West: From Conquest to 
Conservation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997). 	
4 As anyone who, as a child, visited the Disney-esque mining towns of California’s gold country can attest, 
these myths have staying power. The literature on western mythology is vast. Through his many works, 
Kevin Starr has been an elegiac chronicler of the California dream. A good place to start is Starr, 
Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). On the history 
of forgetting in Los Angeles, see William F. Deverell, Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and 
the Remaking of Its Mexican Past (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). On the romantic 
repurposing of California’s Spanish era, see Phoebe S.K. Young (ne Kropp), California Vieja: Culture and 
Memory in a Modern American Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). I am particularly 
indebted to the insights and historiographical discussion in Stacey L. Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: 
California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University 
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 The tombs of the Confederate dead in Hollywood Forever Cemetery provide a 
rare window into a very different western narrative.  The modern metropolis that now 
surrounds this cemetery bears little resemblance to the nineteenth-century pueblo of 
several thousand denizens, where proslavery politics found such fertile soil.  There, a 
curious alliance of californio landholders and southern emigres transformed the old 
Spanish pueblo into a Chivalry stronghold.  During the Civil War, Los Angeles County 
hosted a vocal pro-secessionist element, prompting the establishment of several federal 
military encampments in the area in order to prevent open rebellion.  Although slavery 
was dead by 1865, Los Angeles voters still nurtured its ghost, delivering strong 
Democratic majorities through the 1870s and electing as mayor a former Confederate 
officer in 1882.  In subsequent decades, a number of Confederate veterans drifted west, 
naturally gravitating to a town that had for so long cherished its southern roots.  True, the 
influx of emigrants from former free states had, by the turn of the century, supplanted this 
old southern bloc.  But in the leafy suburb of Pasadena, where a particularly active 
Confederate veterans’ chapter operated, these old rebels still could find a home.  In 1929 
the California Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy even established a 
rest facility for their tired soldiers in nearby San Gabriel, one of only two such residences 
outside the former rebel states.5   
																																																						
of North Carolina Press, 2013), introduction. Smith argues that through numerous historical renderings, 
free labor has been naturalized in the Far West.  
5 The other was located in Ardmore, Oklahoma, part of Indian Territory during the Civil War. For more on 
these Confederate soldiers homes, see Rusty Williams, My Old Confederate Home: A Respectable Place 
for Civil War Veterans (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010); and R.B. Rosenburg, Living 
Monuments: Confederate Soldiers’ Homes in the New South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1993). For a description of the California home, its residents, its celebrations, and countless 
deliveries of canned fruit, see again, Moretti, Dixie Manor Days. 
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 In terms of its deep-rooted proslavery sympathies, Los Angeles was no anomaly, 
however.  Rather, it represented merely the far western outpost of an antebellum political 
orbit that stretched to the Pacific.  This network was built deliberately by imperial-
minded southerners who saw in the West their best chance to extend their section’s 
political power, if not its economic institutions.  Indeed, the slave South and the Far West 
came together through the efforts of influential leaders in both regions – senators from 
California, cabinet ministers from Mississippi and Tennessee, territorial officers from 
New Mexico, foreign ministers from South Carolina, magazine editors from Louisiana, 
cartographers from Virginia, and the list goes on.  If these expansionists argued over 
tactics – and they certainly did at times – they at least agreed on strategy: the westward 
extension of a southern commercial and political empire.  Not all of their imperial 
fantasies materialized, but they exercised enough power to shape the political culture of 
the Far West prior to the Civil War.  The old men who withered away in San Gabriel’s 
Dixie Manor can perhaps be considered the last representatives of this once-mighty and 
continent-spanning slave power. 
There is a political imperative to remembering.  To lay the sin of slavery at the 
South’s door is to ignore the western half of the continent and its role in nurturing the 
ideology upon which that institution drew strength.  Slavery was indeed national.  During 
the antebellum period, bondspeople – black, brown, and red alike – could be found in the 
gold fields of California, the Mormon households of Utah, the mines of Arizona, and the 
adobe towns of New Mexico.  To be sure, black chattel slavery never flourished as an 
economic system in those places.  Yet the fact that it was legally protected in most of the 
antebellum Southwest, despite the lack of economic incentives, speaks to the remarkably 
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broad appeal and durability of race-based systems of unfreedom.6  In framing the history 
of American slavery as regional, rather than national, we indulge a misguided brand of 
American exceptionalism and impose a moral quarantine on a system that recognized no 
natural limits. 
This dissertation rests on a relatively straightforward premise: The road to 
disunion ran west, and unless we account for the Pacific ambitions of slaveholders, our 
understanding of America’s bloodiest conflict will remain incomplete.  Several studies 
have pointed to the existence of slavery in particular territories and states of the West.  
But no historian has yet to enlarge the geographic optic, and to explore the deep political 
affinities that ran from the coastal Carolinas to the shores of the Pacific.  With regard to 
the vast scholarship on slaveholding imperialism, historians’ geographic purview 
generally hits a western boundary at Kansas.  These scholars have instead fixed their 
focus eastward, their attention drawn to bloody bids for territory in the Atlantic Basin – 
the invasions of Nicaragua and Cuba, for instance.  But the horizons of proslavery 
imperialists also stretched far in the opposite direction, all the way to the ports of China.  
Slaveholders fought for the Far West and its commercial outlets, first through legislation 
and infrastructural projects, and then with rebel armies.  This dissertation has attempted 
to reconstruct this grand imperial project – how it came to be, how it was destroyed, and 
why it ultimately mattered.  
																																																						
6 Indeed, the passage of Utah and New Mexico’s slave codes and California’s Archy Lee decision 
coincided with Britain’s attempts to offset the economic fallout from emancipation by importing coolie 
bound labor across its global empire. 
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Yet in the end, such a study may raise more questions than it answers.  And the 
geographic scope could be enlarged further still.  Where, for instance, did Oregon fit into 
the imperial imagination of slaveholders?  Henry Foote was hardly the only Confederate 
to expect that the Pacific Northwest would join California in forming an independent 
western republic.7  Like California, Oregon had been dominated by Democratic 
politicians through much of the antebellum period, and in 1860 it supplied the vice 
presidential candidate, Joseph Lane, on John C. Breckinridge’s proslavery ticket.  When 
discussing the promise of the Far West, slaveholders also eyed northern Mexico.  
Filibusters like William Walker and Henry Crabb launched invasions of Sonora with the 
blessing of many of California’s proslavery leaders.  For southerners like Postmaster-
General A.V. Brown, western infrastructural development dovetailed nicely with 
territorial conquest.  His unabashedly sectional report on the overland mail road 
celebrated the route’s potential to unite south and west, and to provide a staging ground 
for potential invasions of northern Mexico.8  In short, slaveholding visions of empire 
encompassed an enormous swath of the American West and Mexican North, and future 
research will hopefully explore the dimensions of these grand ambitions and what they 
can tell us about the antebellum United States. 
The ambitions of slaveholding expansionists only hastened their empire’s 
collapse.  A western proslavery project that had been cultivated for decades crumbled 
																																																						
7 See his 1862 resolution “recognizing the practical neutrality of the States of California and Oregon, and of 
the Territories of Washington and Nevada,” in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of 
American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc., 11 volumes (New York: 
G.P. Putnam, 1863), 5:90. Recall that Foote also looked toward the Pacific Northwest as a field for 
slaveholding expansion in an 1859 speech, reprinted in “The Southern Convention at Vicksburg, Part 2,” 
De Bow’s Review 27 (August 1859), 216. 
8 Report of the Postmaster General, Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, appendix, 27-28. 
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decisively with the Confederate surrender at Appomattox in 1865.  And yet in certain 
places, southerners’ transcontinental political communities proved remarkably resilient.  
Well into the twentieth century, ancient Confederate veterans in southern California 
continued their rebellion in the only way they could: through memory.  Clustered in the 
retirement home of Dixie Manor and aided by nearby Confederate memorial associations, 
these veterans celebrated a heroic past.  They honored fallen comrades, wrote paeans to 
their lost cause, and accepted new medals for old service.  That they now lived thousands 
of miles from the Confederate South and decades after the last guns fell silent mattered 
little to them.  On the contrary, Los Angeles County seemed a perfectly fitting location 
for this minor Confederate renaissance.  Indeed, what better place to seek their final rest 
than the city that had once exemplified the slave South’s hold over the Far West? 
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